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This thesis explores how Eusebius of Caesarea’s ideas about demons interacted with 
and helped to shape his thought on other topics, particularly political topics. In 
doing so, it builds on and complements recent work on early Christian demonology 
by scholars including Gregory Smith, David Brakke and Dayna Kalleres, as well as 
Stuart Clark’s work on early modern demonology. Eusebius’ political thought has 
long drawn the attention of scholars who have identified in some of his works the 
foundations of later Byzantine theories of kingship. However, Eusebius’ political 
thought has not previously been examined in the light of his views on demons. 
Moreover, despite frequent references to demons throughout many of Eusebius’ 
works, there has, until now, been no comprehensive study of Eusebius’ views on 
demons, as expressed throughout a range of his works. The originality of this thesis 
therefore lies both in an initial examination of Eusebius’ views on demons and their 
place in his cosmology, and in the application of the insights derived from this to 
consideration of his political thought. As a result of this new perspective, this thesis 
challenges scholars’ traditional characterisation of Eusebius as a triumphal optimist. 
Instead, it draws attention to his concerns about a continuing demonic threat, 
capable of disrupting humankind’s salvation, and presents Eusebius as a more 
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for a slightly different translation. Modern language translations are my own, 
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To many scholars of late antiquity, Eusebius of Caesarea (d.339) will seem a familiar 
figure. His Historia ecclesiastica is one of the most important sources for the history 
of the early Christian church1 – likewise his Vita Constantini and De laudibus 
Constantini are invaluable for those studying the reign of Constantine.2 The 
Praeparatio Evangelica contains extensive quotations, preserving lengthy fragments 
of earlier works that would otherwise have been lost.3 Alongside these texts, 
Eusebius also left several works of biblical scholarship and exegesis, as well as of 
theological polemic – all written in a period of dramatic political and religious 
upheaval.4 In consequence, it is hardly surprising that he has long attracted the 
attention of scholars, or that work on Eusebius continues to flourish today.5 The 
reader might therefore be forgiven for wondering what this present study can add 
to an already considerable body of scholarship. 
The answer is simple – until now, there has been no comprehensive study of 
the role played by Eusebius’ ideas about δαίμονες (demons) in shaping his thought. 
The following study will highlight the prominent place occupied by demons in 
Eusebius’ cosmology. In doing so, it will shed fresh light on Eusebius’ ideas about 
human agency and moral responsibility, salvation history, and the role of a 
                                                          
1 T. Heyne, ‘The Devious Eusebius? An Evaluation of the Ecclesiastical History and its Critics’, Studia 
Patristica 46 (2010), 325. 
2 A. Cameron, ‘Eusebius of Caesarea’, in S. Hornblower and A. Spawforth, eds., The Oxford Classical 
Dictionary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 575. 
3 A.P. Johnson, Ethnicity and Argument in Eusebius’ Praeparatio Evangelica (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006), 13. 
4 On Eusebius’ works and their context, see Chapter I below. 
5 The range of work currently being pursued on Eusebius, as well as a trend towards greater 
consideration of his less-studied works, is illustrated by the recent collection of papers: A.P. Johnson 
and J.M. Schott, eds., Eusebius of Caesarea: Tradition and Innovations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2013). Eusebius’ significance is acknowledged by the recent inclusion of an 




Christian emperor. With the exception of Eusebius’ views on moral responsibility, 
which, as I will show in chapter IV, merit rather more attention than they have 
hitherto received, these are topics that have long been of interest to Eusebian 
scholars. However, by examining these subjects through the prism of Eusebius’ 
ideas about demons, this study will offer a very different interpretation of Eusebius 
from that with which late antique scholars are familiar. It will present a Eusebius far 
less at ease in his world than is generally assumed and will suggest that we need to 
reconsider the common belief that Eusebius was a complacent optimist. 
First, however, it is necessary to set this study in the context of existing 
scholarship. Each of the following chapters will discuss the literature directly 
relevant to the topic under consideration there, and this introduction will therefore 
only be concerned with broad trends in the study of Eusebius. Following this 
general survey of the scholarship, I will outline in more detail the particular 
contribution of this study. Finally, I will offer a brief overview of the structure and 
contents of the remainder of the thesis. 
 
Previous Scholarship 
Scholarship on Eusebius can be seen to fall broadly into two main categories – that 
which uses Eusebius’ works as a source of information about the events they 
describe, and that which manifests an interest in Eusebius’ ideas in their own right. 
The first approach has a long history and has frequently been linked to scholars’ 
desire to understand the religious views and motives of the emperor Constantine. 
This trend in the scholarship can be seen as far back as the work of Jacob 
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Burckhardt,6 and arguably reached its peak over a century later in the 
comprehensive study of Timothy Barnes.7 Despite their similar interest in using 
Eusebius’ works to assess the figure of Constantine, these two scholars held directly 
opposite views of Eusebius himself. For Burckhardt, he was ‘the first thoroughly 
dishonest historian of antiquity’,8 while Barnes, by contrast, suggested that 
Eusebius’ works reveal his ‘evident care and honesty’.9 
Unsurprisingly, this led to very different characterisations of Constantine. 
According to Burckhardt, Constantine was a canny politician, whose attitude 
towards religious matters was one of ‘political expediency’,10 yet Barnes, relying 
heavily on Eusebius’ own portraits of the emperor, presented Constantine as a 
committed Christian.11 Barnes, of course, was not uncritical of Eusebius – he notes 
that there are ‘serious chronological errors’ in Eusebius’ Historia ecclesiastica,12 and 
also points out that Eusebius often paraphrased and shortened his quotations in a 
way that might ‘misrepresent’ the original material.13 Nevertheless, Barnes 
preferred to attribute such misquotation to scribal error,14 rather than asking how 
Eusebius may have deliberately presented his sources in a way that would support 
his own interpretation of events.15 Barnes’ primary interest thus remained, not in 
                                                          
6 J. Burckhardt, The Age of Constantine the Great, trans. M. Hadas (New York: Dorset Press, 1989 
[originally published in German, 1853]). 
7 T.D. Barnes, Constantine and Eusebius (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981). 
8 Burckhardt, Age of Constantine, 283. 
9 Barnes, C&E, 141. 
10 Burckhardt, Age of Constantine, 283. 
11 Barnes, C&E, especially 275. 
12 Ibid. 146. 
13 Ibid. 141. 
14 Ibid. 141. 
15 As some more recent scholarship has done – for example: S. Inowlocki, Eusebius and the Jewish 
Authors: His Citation Technique in an Apologetic Context (Leiden: Brill, 2006). 
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the analysis of Eusebius’ views and preoccupations in themselves, but in the use of 
Eusebius’ works to produce a picture of Constantine.16 
This question of Eusebius’ ‘reliability’ recurs frequently as part of this first 
strand of Eusebian scholarship. Although it has been shown that at least one of the 
contemporary documents Eusebius quotes in his work was reported accurately,17 
this cannot, as Averil Cameron has pointed out, prove the accuracy of all the similar 
sources which he cites.18 At times, Eusebius has received a rather negative 
assessment from modern historians hoping to find in his works an approach to 
historiography similar to their own.19 This approach to Eusebius – using his works 
as more-or-less reliable ‘sources’ for the reign of Constantine – has, however, been 
challenged in more recent scholarship. Focusing in particular on the acutely 
problematic Vita Constantini,20 Cameron has argued that Eusebius’ works are 
‘unsuited to positivist critique’ of the kind adopted by Barnes.21 Elizabeth Clark has 
similarly noted the difficulty of using early Christian texts, such as the works of 
                                                          
16 See the review of A. Cameron, ‘Constantinus Christianus’, JRS 73 (1983), 184-90. 
17 A.H.M. Jones, and T.C. Skeat, ‘Notes on the Genuineness of the Constantinian Documents in 
Eusebius’ Life of Constantine’, JEH (1954), 196-200. 
18 Cameron, ‘Constantinus Christianus’, 188. 
19 For example: Burckhardt, Age of Constantine, 283 ; K.M. Setton, Christian Attitude Towards the Emperor 
in the Fourth Century (New York: Cornell University Press, 1941); 42; T.G. Elliott, ‘Eusebian Frauds in 
the Vita Constantini’, Phoenix 45 (1991), 162-71; M. Grant, The Emperor Constantine (London: Weidenfeld 
& Nicholson, 1993), 4-5; R.M. Grant, ‘The Case Against Eusebius: Or, Did the Father of Church History 
Write History?’, Studia Patristica 12 (1975), 413. 
20 See, in particular: A. Cameron, ‘Eusebius of Caesarea and the Rethinking of History’, in E. Gabba, 
ed., Tria Corda: Scritti in onore di Arnaldo Momigliano (Como: Edizioni New Press, 1983), 71-88; A. 
Cameron, ‘Eusebius’ Vita Constantini and the Construction of Constantine’, in M.J. Edwards and S. 
Swain, eds., Portraits: Biographical Representations in the Greek and Latin Literature of the Roman Empire 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 145-74; A. Cameron, ‘Form and Meaning: The Vita Constantini and the 
Vita Antonii’ in T. Hägg and P. Rousseau, eds., Greek Biography and Panegyric in Late Antiquity (Berkeley, 
CA: University of California Press, 2000), 72-88. See also: Eusebius, Life of Constantine, trans. with intro. 
and commentary by A. Cameron and S.G. Hall (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999) (henceforward cited as 
Cameron and Hall, Life of Constantine). 
21 Cameron, ‘Construction’, 155. For further critique of Barnes’ approach, see: A. Cameron, ‘History 
and the Individuality of the Historian: The Interpretation of Late Antiquity’, in C. Straw and R. Lim, 
eds., The Past Before Us: The Challenge of Historiographies of Late Antiquity (Turhout: Brepols, 2004), 75. 
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Eusebius, as ‘sources of social data’, arguing instead that we need to treat them ‘first 
and foremost as literary productions’.22 As a result of this critique of the traditional 
approach, the past two decades have seen a flourishing of further work on Eusebius 
– work which, in highlighting the value of studying Eusebius’ ideas in their own 
right, falls firmly into the second category of scholarship on Eusebius.23 
Of course, while study of Eusebius as a thinker and writer has received a new 
impetus and new direction in recent years, interest in Eusebius’ thought is not 
entirely a phenomenon of the past two decades. In particular, scholarly interest in 
the past has tended to focus on Eusebius’ political thought and his ideas about 
kingship and empire.24 For many scholars, Eusebius’ so-called ‘Constantinian’ 
writings – the Vita Constantini, De laudibus Constantini and later books of the Historia 
ecclesiastica – can be said to have laid the foundations of later Byzantine theories of 
kingship.25 Following the work of E. Peterson, there has also been a tendency to 
characterise Eusebius as a ‘political theologian’, whose theological views were 
moulded to support an idea of divinely appointed supreme monarchy.26 In many 
                                                          
22 E.A. Clark, History, Theory, Text: Historians and the Linguistic Turn (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2004), 159. Cf. Cameron, ‘Form and Meaning’, 86. 
23 This approach to Eusebius is exemplified in two recent edited collections: S. Inowlocki and C. 
Zamagni, eds., Reconsidering Eusebius: Collected Papers on Literary, Historical and Theological Issues 
(Leiden: Brill, 2011); Johnson and Schott, eds., Eusebius: Tradition and Innovations. 
24 For example: N.H. Baynes, ‘Eusebius and the Christian Empire’ in N.H. Baynes, Byzantine Studies and 
Other Essays (London: The Althone Press, 1955), 168-72, repr. from Mélanges Bidez: Annuaire de l’institut 
de philology et d’histoire orientales ii (Brussels, 1933), 13-18; R. Farina, L’impero e l’imperatore Cristiano in 
Eusebio di Cesarea: La prima teologia politica del Cristianesimo (Zurich: Pas Verlag, 1966); F.E. Cranz, 
‘Kingdom and Polity in Eusebius of Caesarea’, HTR 45 (1952), 47-66; H. Eger, ‘Kaiser und Kirche in der 
Geschichtstheologie Eusebs von Cäsarea’, ZNW 38 (1939), 97-115; J.M. Sansterre, ‘Eusèbe de Césarée et 
la naissance de la théorie “césaropapiste”’, Byzantion 42 (1972), 532-94. 
25 For example: F. Dvornik, Early Christian and Byzantine Political Philosophy: Origins and Background 
(Washington, DC: Dumbarton Oaks, 1966), vol. II, 616; Baynes, ‘Eusebius and the Christian Empire’, 
168-72; Farina, L’impero, 257; H. Ahrweiler, ‘Eusebius of Caesarea and the Imperial Christian Idea’, in 
A. Raban and K.G. Holum, eds., Caesarea Maritima: A Retrospective After Two Millennia (Leiden: Brill, 
1996), 541-46. 
26 E. Peterson, Der Monotheismus Als Politisches Problem: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Politischen 
Theologie im Imperium Romanum (Leipzig: Jakob Hegner, 1935), 71-84 – recently translated in: E. 
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accounts, Eusebius appears as little more than a mouthpiece of the emperor 
Constantine.27 More sympathetic readings have denied that Eusebius’ theology bent 
to fit his political views and have suggested instead that Eusebius’ existing 
theological views predisposed him to welcome the Constantinian regime and to 
justify it in the manner he did.28  
Recent scholarship has tended to move away from this servile characterisation 
of Eusebius and from a preoccupation with his political writings by turning to 
examine some of his previously neglected works.29 These include works of exegesis 
and biblical commentary in which references to the empire and emperor occupy a 
less prominent place.30 This has led scholars more recently to stress the considerable 
importance of the church in Eusebius’ thought and to focus on the way in which his 
theological views underpinned much of his thinking, even on high political topics.31 
No doubt this appreciation of a more independent Eusebius has also been facilitated 
by the recognition, following the work of Barnes, that Eusebius was not a ‘court 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Peterson, Theological Tractates, ed. and trans. with an introduction by M.J. Hollerich, (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2011), 68-105. Cf. C.N. Cochrane, Christianity and Classical Culture: A Study of 
Thought and Action from Augustus to Augustine (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940), 183; A.H.M. Jones, 
Constantine and the Conversion of Europe (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1948), 253; H. Berkhoff, Die 
Theologie de Eusebius von Caesarea (Amsterdam: Uitgeversmaatschappij Holland, 1939), 22. 
27 For example: P.R.L. Brown, The World of Late Antiquity: From Marcus Aurelius to Muhammad, (London: 
Thames and Hudson, 1971), 86; J. Quasten, Patrology, Vol. iii (Utrecht: Spectrum, 1960; repr. 1975), 319.  
28 For example: G. Ruhbach, ‘Die Politische Theologie Eusebs von Caesarea’, in G. Ruhbach, ed., Die 
Kirche angesichts der konstantinischen Wende (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1976), 
236-58; F. Young, From Nicaea to Chalcedon: A Guide to the Literature and Its Background (London: SCM 
Press, 1983), 16. 
29 For criticism of the older approach and the need to pay greater attention to Eusebius’ theological 
views, see, in particular: M.J. Hollerich, ‘Religion and Politics in the Writings of Eusebius: Reassessing 
the First “Court Theologian”’, Church History 59 (1990), 309-25.  
30 On Eusebius’ works, see Chapter I below. Important work on Eusebius’ biblical exegesis includes: 
M.J. Hollerich, Eusebius of Caesarea’s Commentary on Isaiah: Christian Exegesis in the Age of Constantine 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999); M.J. Hollerich, ‘Eusebius’ Commentary on the Psalms and its Place in 
the Origins of Christian Biblical Scholarship’, in Johnson and Schott, eds., Eusebius: Tradition and 
Innovations, 151-67. 
31 For example: Hollerich, ‘Religion and Politics’; Hollerich, Eusebius’ Commentary on Isaiah. 
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theologian’ or close adviser of the emperor Constantine.32 Rather, he could not have 
met the emperor more than a few times and was unlikely to have had much, if any, 
private conversation with him.33 It is important to emphasise this point, for echoes 
of the older presentation of Eusebius as a religious advisor to the emperor 
remarkably continue to surface even in some of the most recent scholarship.34 
In shifting its focus to the lesser-known areas of Eusebius’ oeuvre, recent 
scholarship has also begun to look far beyond Eusebius’ ideas about sovereignty 
and kingship to explore other aspects of his thought. Aaron Johnson, for instance, 
has established the importance of ideas of ethnicity in Eusebius’ presentation of 
Christian identity.35 In this, Eusebius’ apologetic approach can be seen to 
correspond to that of other early Christian thinkers.36 Further work has explored 
Eusebius’ attitude towards other religious groupings of pagans and Jews,37 or has 
looked more closely at his theology and his role in the doctrinal disputes of his 
time.38 Alongside this, the past two decades have also produced a number of studies 
of Eusebius’ scholarly background and literary technique, which have done much to 
                                                          
32 Barnes, C&E, 266-67. Cf. B.H. Warmington, ‘Did Constantine have “Religious Advisers”?’, Studia 
Patristica 19 (1989), 117-29. For the older view, see, for example: Quasten, Patrology iii, 309; C.N. 
Cochrane, Christianity and Classical Culture, 183-84; F.J. Foakes-Jackson, Eusebius Pamphili: A Study of the 
Man and His Writings (Cambridge: Heffer, 1933), 3; Setton, Christian Attitude, 40. 
33 Barnes, C&E, 266. 
34 For instance, I.L.E. Ramelli describes Eusebius as the ‘intellectual inspirer’ of Constantine: The 
Christian Doctrine of Apokatastasis: A Critical Assessment from the New Testament to Eriugena (Leiden: 
Brill, 2013), 310, 312. Similarly, C. Kannengiesser describes him as a ‘prominent theological adviser of 
the Emperor Constantine’: Handbook of Patristic Exegesis: The Bible in Ancient Christianity, 2 vols (Leiden: 
Brill, 2004), ii.675. 
35 Johnson, Ethnicity and Argument. 
36 On whom, see: D.K. Buell, Why This New Race? Ethnic Reasoning in Early Christianity (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2005). 
37 A. Kofsky, Eusebius of Caesarea Against Paganism (Leiden: Brill, 2000); J. Ulrich, Euseb von Caesarea und 
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38 J.R. Lyman, Christology and Cosmology: Models of Divine Activity in Origen, Eusebius and Athanasius 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993); M. DelCogliano, ‘Eusebian Theologies of the Son as the Image of God 
before 341’, JECS 14 (2006), 459-84; M. DelCogliano, ‘Eusebius of Caesarea on Asterius of Cappadocia 
in the Anti-Marcellan Writings: A Case Study of Mutual Defense within the Eusebian Alliance’ in 
Johnson and Schott, eds., Eusebius: Tradition and Innovations, 263-87. 
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improve our understanding of his approach. Eusebius’ early biblical scholarship, in 
the context of the scholarly environment of Caesarea, has been highlighted by 
Anthony Grafton and Megan Williams.39 Andrew Carriker’s careful survey of the 
contents of Eusebius’ library at Caesarea has been invaluable in clarifying which 
sources Eusebius might have had access to, and which writers he would have 
known.40 It revealed that the library was particularly well-stocked with works of 
Middle Platonic philosophy, as well as holding the majority of works by Philo and 
Josephus.41 The library appears to have contained remarkably few works in Latin.42 
Furthermore, our awareness of how Eusebius used his sources has been greatly 
improved by studies of his citational and apologetic technique.43 We are thus much 
better able than previous scholars of Eusebius’ political thought to situate Eusebius 
in his broader intellectual context. 
It is widely agreed that this intellectual context included the influence of 
Origen. Although the two writers did not have any direct contact, as Origen died in 
c.254,44 scholars have long recognised the profound debt that Eusebius owed to 
Origen,45 who founded the library at Caesarea which provided the basis for 
                                                          
39 A. Grafton and M. Williams, Christianity and the Transformation of the Book: Origen, Eusebius and the 
Library of Caesarea (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2006). 
40 A.J. Carriker, The Library of Eusebius of Caesarea (Leiden: Brill, 2003). 
41 Ibid. 311. 
42 Ibid. 312. 
43 For example: Inowlocki, Eusebius and the Jewish Authors; S. Inowlocki, ‘Eusebius’s Appropriation of 
Moses in an Apologetic Context’, in A. Graupner and M. Woter, eds., Moses in Biblical and Extra-Biblical 
Tradition (Berlin: DeGruyter, 2007), 241-55; A.J. Droge, ’The Apologetic Dimensions of the Ecclesiastical 
History’, in H.W. Attridge, and G. Hata, eds., Eusebius, Christianity and Judaism (Leiden: Brill, 1992), 492-
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Patristica 26 (1993), 251-60. 
44 On Origen, see: F.L. Cross and E.A. Livingstone, eds., The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church, 3rd 
edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 1193-95. 
45 See, for example: Barnes, C&E, 94-95; Berkhoff, Die Theologie, 125; C. Kannengiesser, ‘Eusebius of 
Caesarea, Origenist’, in H.W. Attridge, and G. Hata, eds., Eusebius, Christianity and Judaism (Leiden: 
Brill, 1992), 435-66; Grafton and Williams, Christianity and the Transformation of the Book; I.L.E. Ramelli, 
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Eusebius’ scholarship.46 Eusebius’ admiration for Origen is evident from the 
‘biography’ of Origen which appears in Book 6 of the Historia ecclesiastica,47 and E.C. 
Penland has shown that Eusebius sought to present himself and his scholarly circle 
in Caesarea as the inheritors of Origen’s legacy.48 Unsurprisingly, Carriker’s study 
of the Caesarean library found that it held an excellent collection of Origen’s 
works.49 However, it should not be imagined that Eusebius was slavishly dependent 
on Origen and recent work has increasingly begun to highlight areas in which 
Eusebius also sought to distance himself from Origen’s ideas.50 
 
This Study 
In focusing above all on Eusebius’ thought, this study falls firmly into the second 
category of scholarship on Eusebius. Its aim is not to explore the religious beliefs of 
the emperor Constantine, or to establish how rapidly the ‘Christianisation’ of the 
empire took place; it is rather to shed fresh light on key aspects of Eusebius’ 
thought. In doing so, however, it is by no means ignoring the kinds of historical 
question that have for so long preoccupied scholars of the later Roman empire, such 
as the question of how Christianity came to achieve a position of dominance. As 
Averil Cameron has shown, the growth and spread of Christianity owed at least as 
much, if not more, to the language and ideas adopted by early Christian thinkers as 
                                                                                                                                                                    
‘Origen, Eusebius, the Doctrine of Apokatastasis, and Its Relation to Christology’, in Johnson and Schott, 
eds., Eusebius: Tradition and Innovations, 307-23; Lyman, Christology and Cosmology, 85. 
46 Carriker, Library, xiii. 
47 On which, see: P. Cox, Biography in Late Antiquity: A Quest for the Holy Man (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1983), 69-101. 
48 E.C. Penland, ‘The History of the Caesarean Present: Eusebius and Narratives of Origen’, in Johnson 
and Schott, eds., Eusebius: Tradition and Innovations, 83-95. 
49 Carriker, Library, 311. 
50 See, in particular: J. Corke-Webster, ‘Mothers and Martyrdom: Familial Piety and the Model of the 
Maccabees in Eusebius of Caesarea’s Ecclesiastical History’, in Johnson and Schott, eds., Eusebius: 
Tradition and Innovations, 51-82. 
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it did to the kinds of social, political and economic factors traditionally emphasised 
by historians.51 As a result, Cameron argues that any attempt to understand the 
spread of Christianity must involve the study of its teachings and of the language 
and texts in which they were expressed.52 Examining the views of Eusebius, who 
was a prominent church leader in this period of transition, can therefore provide 
considerable insight into some of the many changes that marked the early fourth 
century.53 
In addressing questions relating to Eusebius’ political thought, this study is 
building on a long tradition of interest in Eusebius’ political ideas. However, unlike 
earlier work on this topic, which has often tended to focus upon the ideas of 
kingship and imperial sovereignty presented in later works like the Vita Constantini 
and De laudibus Constantini, this study will adopt a broader understanding of what 
may be termed ‘political’. Looking beyond those of Eusebius’ works which directly 
discuss Constantine and the high political affairs of the empire, it will examine 
Eusebius’ views on topics such as human agency and responsibility, and the 
purpose and direction of human history. In influencing Eusebius’ understanding of 
how individuals related to each other, society and even the wider universe, such 
views are inherently relevant to ‘political’ questions about the best form of 
government for Christians and the most suitable style of leadership. Clear 
connections between these various topics will emerge over the course of this study. 
                                                          
51 A. Cameron, Christianity and the Rhetoric of Empire: The Development of Christian Discourse (Berkeley, 
CA: University of California Press, 1991), 22-23. Older studies, which emphasise the importance of 
social, material and political factors in encouraging conversion, include: Jones, Constantine and 
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52 Cameron, Christianity and Rhetoric, 32, 46. 
53 Such is the premise of the most recent edited volume on Eusebius: A.P. Johnson, ‘Introduction’, in 
Johnson and Schott, eds., Eusebius: Tradition and Innovations, 1. 
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This broad perspective, exploring the complex network of ideas that underpinned 
Eusebius’ high political speculation, is one new contribution that this study can 
offer to scholarship on Eusebius’ political thought. 
A further, more significant innovation lies in the decision to approach 
Eusebius’ thought through the lens of his ideas about demons. Despite prolific 
references to the demonic throughout many – although not all – of his works, 
dedicated studies of Eusebius’ demonology are almost non-existent. Eusebius’ 
references to demons are at times noted in passing by scholars, but for the most part 
are subjected only to the most fleeting, if any, analysis.54 The only work which has 
focused primarily on Eusebius’ ideas about demons until now is Sharron 
L. Coggan’s PhD thesis.55 This, however, restricts itself primarily to Eusebius’ 
discussions in the Praeparatio Evangelica and is principally concerned with how 
Eusebius took over and adapted the earlier Greek terminology of the δαίμων as 
part of his apologetic effort. Coggan therefore does not explore how Eusebius’ ideas 
about the demonic interacted with his thought on other topics. The brief remarks of 
Aaron Johnson, contained as part of his study of Eusebius’ ideas about ethnicity and 
                                                          
54 For example: Berkhoff, Die Theologie, 100-01, 109-11; H. Strutwolf, Die Trinitätstheologie und 
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55 S.L. Coggan, Pandaemonia: A Study of Eusebius’ Recasting of Plutarch’s Story of the “Death of Great Pan”, 
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Christian identity, are also worthy of mention.56 Once again, however, Johnson’s 
focus is restricted to the Praeparatio Evangelica and to the place of demons within 
Eusebius’ apologetic argument. There has hitherto been no study of how Eusebius’ 
ideas about demons, expressed throughout a range of his works, influenced and 
interacted with his thinking on other subjects. 
This tendency to overlook Eusebius’ references to the demonic is unfortunate 
for, as work on other historical periods has demonstrated, examining writers’ 
discussions of demons can reveal a great deal about their views on other subjects. In 
particular, Stuart Clark’s work on early modern demonology has shown how 
intellectuals of this period could ‘think with’ demons, using their ideas on this 
subject to develop their views on other, most notably political, topics.57 Clark's 
approach to ideas about the demonic has, however, been the subject of some 
criticism in more recent scholarship. Ellen Muehlberger, whose work on angels 
emphasises the reality of these spiritual beings for late antique thinkers,58 is 
particularly dismissive of such an approach, arguing that it implies a ‘utilitarian 
motive’ for ideas about angels and fails to allow for this strength of belief.59 A 
similar note of caution towards Clark’s approach has also been sounded by Sophie 
Lunn-Rockliffe.60 Such concerns are justified. Clark’s characterisation of demons as 
an ‘intellectual resource’ makes little allowance for the very real fears about demons 
which many people in the late antique period must have had and is thus unhelpful, 
                                                          
56 Johnson, Ethnicity and Argument, 163-70. 
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at least for writers of Eusebius’ era.61 However, in acknowledging the reality of 
spiritual beings like angels and demons for thinkers like Eusebius, we do not need 
to follow Muehlberger in dispensing with the idea that they could be ‘good to think 
with’.62 Rather, this thesis combines both the idea of demons as ‘good to think with’ 
and the more recent scholarly recognition of the strength of late antique beliefs 
about demons, highlighted by the work of G.A. Smith,63 in order to understand 
Eusebius’ thought. 
Finally, this study is comparatively unusual in adopting a broad perspective, 
which embraces a wide variety of Eusebius’ works. While this is by no means 
unprecedented,64 Eusebius’ output was so large that scholars, particularly those 
interested in Eusebius’ thought, have tended to limit themselves either to one 
specific work,65 or to a narrow range of his works.66 Such an approach, although 
often very fruitful, would not have been appropriate in this case. In order to gain as 
full and accurate a picture as possible of Eusebius’ understanding of the demonic, it 
is necessary to adopt a broad perspective. Eusebius’ apologetic concerns in works 
such as the Praeparatio Evangelica mean that they often offer only a partial picture of 
Eusebius’ thinking about demons. This is evident from the earlier discussions of 
Coggan and Johnson, both of which focus principally on the evidence of the 
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Praeparatio.67 This restricted focus, as I will show in Chapter V, leads them to over-
estimate the impact that Eusebius believed the incarnation to have had on demonic 
power and, consequently, to misinterpret the place of demons within Eusebius’ 
cosmology. Of course, references to demons are more plentiful in some of Eusebius’ 
works than in others; inevitably, it is those works which contain the most detailed 
accounts of demons that appear most frequently in this study. Works such as the 
Praeparatio Evangelica, Demonstratio Evangelica, Historia ecclesiastica and Vita 
Constantini have proved particularly fruitful for my examination of Eusebius’ ideas 
about demons and, for that reason alone, will dominate the remaining chapters. 
Such a broad perspective brings challenges as well as benefits, raising the 
question, for instance, of how far we can generalise about a writer’s thought from 
works so different in style and form and often written many years apart. This is a 
question which I will address more fully in Chapter I. Nevertheless, it is surely the 
case that, if we are to understand Eusebius’ thought in all its variety and 
complexity, we need to have a combination of both detailed studies of individual 
works and broader surveys, since each can reveal different aspects of his thought. 
This thesis thus adopts a new approach to an old issue – the nature of 
Eusebius’ political thought. In doing so, it reaches conclusions about Eusebius’ 
outlook and attitude towards the events of his lifetime that challenge what appears 
to be one of the most ingrained assumptions of Eusebian scholarship – namely, that 
he was a triumphal optimist, who viewed the events of his lifetime as the climax of 
human history. This view seems to be almost universal, even amongst the most 
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recent scholarship on Eusebius.68 For Barnes, Eusebius’ outlook was characterised 
by ‘unrestrained optimism’;69 his works represent ‘a celebration of the success of 
Christianity’.70 More recently, Johnson has suggested that ‘triumphalism is a 
consistent feature of nearly all his works’.71 J. Moreau believed that Eusebius saw 
Constantine’s reign as ‘the fulfilment of world history’.72 This is echoed by Dale 
Martin, who considered that, in Eusebius’ view, ‘world history has reached its 
culmination in the triumph of Constantine’.73 The only question appears to be, not 
whether Eusebius was an unreserved triumphalist, but when he became so.74 Yet 
this characterisation of Eusebius does not sit comfortably with the picture of hostile 
and threatening demons which this study identifies as a feature of many of his 
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works. This study will therefore argue that this traditional characterisation of 
Eusebius needs to be modified in the light of his views on demons. 
Recognising that an understanding of Eusebius’ attitude towards the demonic 
can have a dramatic impact on how we read other aspects of his thought also has 
implications for the wider study of Christian demonology in the fourth century. 
Scholarly interest in this feature of early Christian culture has been growing in 
recent years, particularly following the publication of David Brakke’s monograph 
Demons and the Making of the Monk, which highlighted the role of ideas about 
demons in the development of the idea of the Christian monk.75 This has since been 
followed by studies which explore late antique ideas about the physicality of 
demons76 or the role of demons in works of hagiography, such as the Vita Antonii, 
and literature relating to the lives of desert saints.77 With few exceptions,78 however, 
scholars have appeared reluctant to explore the role of demons in the thought of the 
educated, intellectual Christians who held positions of leadership in urban 
communities. This discrepancy has previously been highlighted by Dayna Kalleres’ 
exploration of the demonology of Gregory of Nazianzus.79 By showing the 
importance of ideas of the demonic in Gregory’s work, Kalleres also challenged the 
traditional view that the rich and complex demonology of Evagrius Ponticus should 
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be traced to his later ascetic experiences, rather than his earlier training under 
Gregory.80  
This problem also reaches much further than Evagrian scholarship, as some 
comments of Ramsay MacMullen illustrate. Discussing the place of Christian 
accounts of miracles and exorcisms in encouraging conversion to Christianity, 
MacMullen suggests that accounts of demonic exorcisms such as those found in 
Athanasius’ Vita Antonii would have had the most impact ‘among the simple folk 
illuminated by ascetic experience’.81 He implies, by contrast, that such accounts 
would have had little effect on ‘the learned and intellectual’.82 Once again, we see a 
divide being created between ‘learned’ Christianity on the one hand and ‘simple’ or 
‘ascetic’ Christianity on the other. For MacMullen, it appears, beliefs about demons 
can only be understood in the context of this, supposedly uneducated Christianity. 
In focusing on the works of Eusebius, a prominent bishop and leading scholar of the 
time,83 this study therefore goes some way towards filling a gap that presently exists 
in scholarship on early Christian demonology. It also demonstrates some of the 
benefits that can result from analysing, rather than dismissing, ideas about demons 
in the works of educated fourth-century Christian leaders. In doing so, this study 
echoes that of Kalleres in highlighting the need for further exploration of references 
to demons in the writings of intellectual Christian elites. 
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Finally, brief mention of questions of translation and terminology must be 
made at the outset of this study. I refer throughout to ‘demons’ rather than the 
alternative ‘daemons’ or ‘daimons’, which represent more neutral translations of the 
ancient Greek δαίμων. Scholars working on late antique demonology have differed 
in their choice of the best translation for this word. Coggan adopted ‘demon’ when 
referring to Jewish or Christian uses of the term, and ‘daemon’ for the more 
traditional Greek usage. This, she suggested, accurately reflected the different moral 
connotations which these different writers attached to the term.84 Such an approach, 
however, has rightly been criticised by Dale Martin on the grounds that it might 
convey the false impression that late antique writers were themselves using 
different terms.85 We therefore need to make a choice between the different English 
terms and must use the same term consistently, regardless of the religious views of 
the writer under discussion. Martin’s own preference for ‘daimon’ makes perfect 
sense in the context of a book which is, for the most part, concerned with earlier 
Greek uses of the word.86 It would not be appropriate here, however. Like Brakke, 
who also studied early Christian ideas about demons, I have therefore opted to use 
the English ‘demon’.87 This more accurately reflects the negative character of these 
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The following study is divided into six chapters. The first of these gives an 
overview of Eusebius’ oeuvre, addressing, as necessary, any questions of dating and 
authenticity. This chapter attempts to situate Eusebius’ various works in relation to 
each other and to set them in the context of the political and religious developments 
of the time. In the second chapter we will turn our attention to Eusebius’ ideas 
about demons. Benefitting from recent work on early Christian demonology, 
particularly by G.A. Smith,88 this chapter will show that demons were far more than 
merely a useful rhetorical tool for Eusebius. On the contrary, it will demonstrate 
that Eusebius had a strikingly physical understanding of the demonic and also 
believed firmly in the reality of demonic power and their ability to cause harm. It 
will therefore argue that we need to move beyond readings of Eusebius’ demons 
simply as metaphors. 
The third chapter will explore the implications of Eusebius’ understanding of 
demons for his broader cosmology. It will show that Eusebius’ belief in a stark 
divide between the benevolent Christian God and the malevolent demons was 
reflected in a series of further polarised divisions in his thought. As a result, this 
chapter will ask and answer the question of whether or not Eusebius’ cosmology 
should be characterised as ‘dualistic’. 
From the fourth chapter onwards, we will begin to engage with those aspects 
of Eusebius’ thought that may be seen as more obviously ‘political’. The fourth 
chapter itself will offer an unprecedented study of the language of agency and 
responsibility in Eusebius’ works. It will move beyond an anachronistic 
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terminology of ‘free will’ to demonstrate the importance of the concept of 
προαίρεσις (loosely translated ‘choice’)89 in Eusebius’ understanding of moral 
responsibility. In consequence, we will see the great importance which Eusebius 
attached to the development of personal virtue in order to resist demonic attacks 
and achieve salvation. This chapter also sheds new light on Eusebius’ presentation 
of the problematic figure of Licinius. 
The fifth chapter will address the role of demons in Eusebius’ view of 
salvation history. Eusebius’ understanding of the purpose of history has long been 
regarded as central to his perception of the events of his lifetime,90 particularly to his 
view of the Roman empire.91 This chapter will suggest, however, that Eusebius’ 
outlook was rather less ‘sanguine’92 than scholars have generally believed. Where 
scholars have suggested in the past that Eusebius considered all demonic power to 
have effectively ceased with the incarnation, this chapter will find evidence that 
Eusebius believed demons still to be active in his own time. This will lead to a 
reconsideration of Eusebius’ presentation of the role of the church and the empire in 
his works. 
Finally, the sixth chapter will turn to those questions of sovereignty and 
imperial virtue that have traditionally dominated work on Eusebius’ political 
thought. Rather than focusing on Eusebius’ presentation of Constantine, however, 
this chapter will be primarily concerned with Eusebius’ presentation of tyranny. It 
will show that Eusebius believed non-Christian rulers to be enslaved to malevolent 
                                                          
89 The nuances of this term, and the difficulty of translating it, will be discussed below, in Chapter IV. 
90 See, for example: Hollerich, Eusebius’ Commentary on Isaiah, 67; Wallace-Hadrill, Eusebius of Caesarea, 
168-89; Ruhbach, ‘Politische Theologie’, 236-58, 242. 
91 Chesnut, First Christian Histories, 91. 
92 Adler, ‘Early Christian Historians and Historiography’, 596. 
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demons, making them, in his view, incapable of governing. Moreover, it will 
suggest that, as a result of a multi-layered process of μίμησις (imitation), Eusebius 
believed impious tyranny to be, not merely unpleasant in practical terms, but 
morally corrupting and therefore damaging to human salvation. Lastly, it will 
consider the implications of Eusebius’ understanding of tyranny for his 
presentation of Constantine. 
Each chapter will explore a slightly different aspect of Eusebius’ thought, 
although clear connections between these various elements will emerge over the 
course of the study. Moreover, a clear picture of Eusebius will develop over the 
following chapters. It is a picture that is at odds with the present scholarly 
consensus on Eusebius’ optimistic outlook. While not wishing by any means to 
dismiss the positive elements of Eusebius’ thought, or to deny the profound relief 
with which he must surely have greeted Constantine’s patronage of the church, I 
would suggest that this side of Eusebius has been somewhat over-emphasised in 
the scholarship so far. It is time to rebalance our characterisation of Eusebius by 
recognising that he also had doubts, fears and hesitations. In the shifting political 
and religious climate of the early fourth century, such a figure is surely far more 





Before turning to a full examination of Eusebius’ ideas about demons, it is 
important to give some consideration to the nature of – and challenges posed by – 
the material in which those ideas were expressed. Eusebius was a prolific writer 
and a large number of his works survive, either in full, or in large parts. We also 
have extensive fragments of other works, and ancient translations of some of his 
writings which are now lost in the original Greek. Besides this, the titles remain of 
several further works that have been entirely lost. Eusebius did not mention 
demons in all of his works, and even some of those which do refer to δαίμονες 
contain only brief, passing references. To take only a couple of examples, the Contra 
Marcellum (CM) contains no uses of the term δαίμων, while the De ecclesiastica 
theologia (De eccl. theol.) briefly mentions δαίμονες once, and contains one further 
reference to ‘demonic activity’.93 To an extent, these gaps may be the result of the 
different purposes and audiences of Eusebius’ various works. A text such as the 
Onomasticon (Onom.), an account of scriptural place-names, offers little scope for 
discussion of the demonic and, unsurprisingly, contains only one, passing mention 
of Christ’s healing of those possessed by demons, in reference to the location of 
Gergesa in Mark 5:1.94 Lengthy discussion of demons would quite simply have been 
out of place in such a text. 
                                                          
93 De eccl. theol. 1.12.4.4 and 1.12.10.6 (ἐνεργείᾳ δαιμονικῇ). For the sake of consistency, I have opted 
throughout to use the standard Latin titles for Eusebius’ works, as given in CPG, where these exist. 
Where there is no standard Latin title – for instance, with some lost works – I have opted for a Greek or 
Latin title based on the account of either Photius or Jerome. 
94 Onom. 74.13: ἔνθα τοὺς δαιμονιῶντας ὁ κύριος ἰάσατο. 
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Nevertheless, demons appear in enough of Eusebius’ works both to 
demonstrate that they formed an important part of his understanding of the 
universe and to provide a sound basis for study. Moreover, they are not confined to 
one particular ‘genre’ of Eusebius’ works, but appear throughout a range of 
writings, composed at various points throughout his life. This is significant, for 
some scholars have attempted in the past to tie apparent changes in elements of 
Eusebius’ thought, such his eschatology or his political ideas, to external political 
and religious developments.95 Scholars such as D.S. Wallace-Hadrill, for instance, 
posited a decline in Eusebius’ interest in ‘conventional’ apocalyptic eschatology as 
the earthly success of the church increased with the patronage of Constantine.96 The 
fact that demons are prominent even in works written towards the end of Eusebius’ 
life, most notably the Vita Constantini (VC) and Oratio de laudibus Constantini (LC), 
means that it is impossible to make a similar argument concerning Eusebius’ ideas 
about demons. 
Simply owing to the fact that demons appear more frequently in some of 
Eusebius’ works than in others, there are certain texts that will feature particularly 
heavily in this thesis. The Praeparatio Evangelica (PE) and Demonstratio Evangelica 
(DE) contain lengthy descriptions of demons, their origins and activities. The 
Historia ecclesiastica (HE) and VC show demons at work in human history. It is 
therefore these works that will be discussed most often, supplemented as 
                                                          
95 For example: Eger, ‘Kaiser und Kirche’; W. Tabbernee, ‘Eusebius’ “Theology of Persecution”: As 
Seen in the Various Drafts of his Church History’, JECS 5 (1997), 319-34; Schott, Christianity, Empire and 
the Making of Religion, 155; Twomey, Apostolikos Thronos, 5, 7; R.M. Grant, Eusebius as Church Historian 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 1. Arguing for development, although by no means rupture, in 
Eusebius’ understanding of history, see: Cameron, ‘Rethinking’. 
96 D.S. Wallace-Hadrill, ‘Eusebius of Caesarea’s Commentary on Luke: Its Origin and Early History’, HTR 
67 (1974), 63. This view has, however, been challenged in particular by: F.S. Thielman, ‘Another Look 
at the Eschatology of Eusebius of Caesarea’, Vigiliae Christianae 41 (1987), 226-37. 
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appropriate by references to other works by Eusebius, particularly the Contra 
Hieroclem (CH) in chapter IV and the LC in chapter VI. These six works, which are 
most relevant to the remainder of the thesis, will be the main focus of this chapter, 
although there will also be some brief discussion of Eusebius’ other works, in order 
to help set them in context. 
It is important to consider how Eusebius’ various works fit together, as in 
many cases the date, ‘genre’ and purpose of Eusebius’ writings have been the 
subject of considerable uncertainty and debate. At times, even the authenticity of 
particular works, especially the VC and CH, has been disputed. Questions of dating 
are made still more complex because in several cases Eusebius himself appears to 
have undertaken considerable revision of his work, producing more than one 
edition of the same work. This is most famously the case with the HE, in which we 
have been left with different variations clearly composed before and after the defeat 
and disgrace of Constantine’s former co-emperor Licinius. Since the question of a 
work’s date can affect our interpretation of its purpose and character, it is necessary 
to establish at the outset which date appears most convincing for each work. 
Alongside this, this chapter will also explore questions of the ‘genre’ and original 
audience of these works in order to see how this may have influenced what 
Eusebius had to say about demons on different occasions. 
First, the chapter will begin by briefly discussing issues of ‘genre’ and, more 
specifically, how far Eusebius’ works may be regarded as works of ‘apologetic’. This 
will be followed by a survey of some of the debates surrounding Eusebius’ various 
works, beginning – in tentative chronological order – with those works which are 
discussed most often in this thesis, and progressing to a brief discussion of some of 
38 
 
Eusebius’ other works. Finally, the chapter will conclude by considering a 
methodological challenge posed by Eusebius’ works. In view of the variety within 
Eusebius’ oeuvre, I will ask how far it is possible to discuss Eusebius’ thought – 
political, historical, demonological, and so forth – without imposing false coherence 
onto a diverse range of texts. 
 
The Question of ‘Genre’ 
The question of the ‘genre’ of many of Eusebius’ works has proved particularly 
intractable for scholars and is therefore worth briefly addressing upfront. The 
debates surrounding the ‘genre’ of some of Eusebius’ most famous works, most 
notably the VC and HE,97 make it clear that many of Eusebius’ works cannot be 
straightforwardly assigned to separate categories. Eusebius is often regarded as 
something of a literary innovator98 – indeed, he claims as much for himself.99 If 
Eusebius was attempting to produce new and innovative works, this might explain 
the difficulty of assigning his writings to particular ‘genres’. Yet Eusebius’ 
originality should not be overstated. As David DeVore has noted in the case of the 
HE, ‘it is a priori doubtful that the Ecclesiastical History either fell from the sky, 
                                                          
97 See, for example, VC: Cameron and Hall, Life of Constantine, 27-34; T.D. Barnes, ‘Panegyric, History 
and Historiography in Eusebius’ Life of Constantine’, in R. Williams, ed., The Making of Orthodoxy: Essays 
in Honour of Henry Chadwick (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 94-123, repr. in T.D. 
Barnes, From Eusebius to Augustine: Selected Papers, 1982-1993 (Aldershot: Variorum, 1994); J. Moreau, 
‘Zum Problem der Vita Constantini’, Historia 4 (1955), 234-45. HE: D.J. DeVore, ‘Genre and Eusebius’ 
Ecclesiastical History: Towards a Focused Debate’, in Johnson and Schott, eds., Eusebius: Tradition and 
Innovations, 19-49; D.J. DeVore, ‘Eusebius’ Un-Josephan History: Two Portraits of Philo of Alexandria 
and the Sources of Ecclesiastical Historiography’, Studia Patristica 66 (2013), 161-79; M. Verdoner, 
‘Transgeneric Crosses: Apologetics in the Church History’, in A.-C. Jacobsen and J. Ulrich, eds., Three 
Greek Apologists: Origen, Eusebius and Athanasius (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2007), 75-92. 
98 For example: Cameron and Hall, Life of Constantine, 26; R.W. Burgess, Studies in Eusebian and Post-
Eusebian Chronography, with the assistance of Witold Witakowski, Historia Einzelschriften 135 
(Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1999), 73; Johnson, ‘Introduction’, in Johnson and Schott, eds., Eusebius: 
Tradition and Innovations, 11; Verdoner, Narrated Reality, 1, 4; Cameron, ‘Rethinking’, 82; Cameron, 
‘Form and Meaning’, 72. 
99 For example at: HE 1.1.3; LC Prol.2; PE 1.3.5. 
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distinctively formed and alien to the classical tradition, or that its lines of 
participation in Greek historiographical genres are untraceable’.100 The same could 
be said of many of Eusebius’ other works as well. However hard he strove to be 
original, Eusebius could not help but be influenced by existing works and the prior 
expectations of his audience. As a result, the VC has been described as ‘a literary 
hybrid’,101 while even DeVore’s attempt to encourage a more considered discussion 
of the ‘genre’ of the HE resulted in the conclusion that this text combines elements 
of ‘heresiology, apology… martyr drama… [and] national, war, and intellectual 
historiography’,102 demonstrating the difficulty of describing the ‘genre’ of such 
works with any precision. 
Moreover, for some scholars, Eusebius’ works have far too much in common 
to allow them to be assigned to separate ‘genres’. Sharron Coggan, for instance, felt 
that Eusebius ‘seems always to be engaged in apologetics’.103 Michael Frede 
similarly questioned why, on a broad understanding of the term ‘apologetic’, a 
treatise such as Eusebius’ Quaestiones Evangelicae should not be classified as an 
apology.104 In large part, this surely reflects more widespread scholarly uncertainty 
about where to draw the boundaries of an ‘apologetic genre’.105 Recent scholarship 
has come to see the traditional understanding of Christian apologetic as directed 
                                                          
100 DeVore, ‘Genre’, 19. 
101 Cameron and Hall, Life of Constantine, 27. 
102 DeVore, ‘Genre’, 44-45. 
103 Coggan, Pandaemonia, 17. 
104 M. Frede, ‘Eusebius’ Apologetic Writings’, in M. Edwards, M. Goodman and S. Price, eds., 
Apologetics in the Roman Empire: Pagans, Jews and Christians (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 
223. 
105 For some expressions of this uncertainty, see the contributions in Edwards et al., eds., Apologetics in 
the Roman Empire. For analysis of this volume in particular, as well as the question of ‘apologetics’ in 
general, see: A. Cameron, ‘Apologetics in the Roman Empire – a Genre of Intolerance?’, in J.M. Carrié 
and R. Lizzi Testa, eds., ‘Humana Sapit’: Études d’antiquité tardive offertes à Lellia Cracco Ruggini 
(Turnhout: Brepols, 2002), 219-27. 
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primarily at a hostile external audience in defence of the Christian position as 
unhelpfully restrictive. Indeed, several scholars have denied the existence of a clear-
cut ‘apologetic genre’ altogether.106 Averil Cameron, for instance, suggested that 
apologetics represent, ‘not a genre but a tone or method of argument’.107 Frances 
Young likewise distinguished between the ‘surface-genre’ and the ‘apologetic 
character’ of various works written in defence of the Christian faith during the 
second century, similarly implying that ‘apologetics’ should not be seen as a fixed 
genre.108 
This, indeed, is in line with Eusebius’ own use of the term ἀπολογία 
(apology). As Frede noted, while Eusebius’ use of the term at times appears to refer 
to a narrow group of works addressed to Roman emperors and governors in 
defence of Christianity, in other cases, he adopts a broader understanding of the 
term.109 For instance, Frede notes that the only one of Eusebius’ works which he 
himself expressly referred to as an ‘apology’, the Apologia pro Origene,110 is ‘not an 
apologetic writing even in an extended sense, since it does not involve a response to 
an attack on Christianity, or on a Christian on account of his Christianity’.111  Thus it 
appears that in Eusebius’ usage ἀπολογία could refer to a range of texts far wider 
than that traditionally classified by scholars as Christian apologetics. We should 
therefore avoid trying to identify particular features of an ‘apologetic genre’, but 
                                                          
106 For example: Cameron, ‘Apologetics’, 219-27, esp. 223; F. Young, ‘Greek Apologists of the Second 
Century’, in Edwards et al., eds., Apologetics in the Roman Empire, 90-91; M. Edwards, M. Goodman, S. 
Price and C. Rowland, ‘Introduction: Apologetics in the Roman World’, in Edwards et al., eds., 
Apologetics in the Roman Empire, 1-2. 
107 Cameron, ‘Apologetics’, 227. 
108 Young, ‘Greek Apologists of the Second Century’, 82. 
109 Frede, ‘Eusebius’ Apologetic Writings’, 229. 
110 Although the Latin title is not, of course, Eusebius’ own, he does describe the work as an ἀπολογία 
at HE 6.33.4. This text was not exclusively the work of Eusebius, but was written in conjunction with 
his mentor Pamphilus during the latter’s imprisonment. For more on this, see below, p. 74-75. 
111 Frede, ‘Eusebius’ Apologetic Writings’, 225. 
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recognise instead that for early Christians works of a variety of different literary 
forms could share a common apologetic purpose. 
As the validity of the concept of an ‘apologetic genre’ has been questioned, so 
too has the assumption that the purpose of apologetics was exclusively a defence 
against hostile external attacks. Cameron suggested that ‘one function of apologetic 
has clearly to do with the search for identity and self-definition’,112 arguing that the 
writing of apologetic did not cease with the apparent triumph of the church under 
Constantine, but continued long into the fourth century in the genres of biblical 
commentary and exegesis.113 Aaron Johnson has similarly argued that early 
Christian apologetic literature was ‘fundamentally about the formation of 
identity’,114 and has expertly highlighted the key role played by questions of ‘ethnic’ 
identity in one of Eusebius’ major ‘apologetic’ writings, the PE.115 Thus, as Young 
has argued, apologetics could have in view an audience as much of ‘insiders’ as of 
those hostile either to Christianity or to a particular version of it.116 When we adopt 
this broader understanding of the nature and purpose of apologetic literature, it 
becomes clear that Coggan and Frede were right to see much of the Eusebian corpus 
as sharing a common apologetic thread. 
                                                          
112 Cameron, ‘Apologetics’, 223. Cf. A.K. Petersen, ‘The Diversity of Apologetics: from Genre to a Mode 
of Thinking’, in A.-C. Jacobsen, J. Ulrich and D. Brakke, eds., Critique and Apologetics: Jews, Christians 
and Pagans in Antiquity (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2009), 16. 
113 Cameron, ‘Apologetics’, 226. 
114 Johnson, Ethnicity and Argument, 1. 
115 Johnson, Ethnicity and Argument; A.P. Johnson, ‘Identity, Descent and Polemic: Ethnic 
Argumentation in Eusebius’ Praeparatio Evangelica’, JECS 12 (2004), 23-56. 
116 Young, ‘Greek Apologists of the Second Century‘, 92; cf. the discussion of the question of the 
audience of ‘apologetics’ at: Cameron, ‘Apologetics’, 222-23. 
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Even so, noting the similarity of purpose between Eusebius’ works, whilst 
valuable, only takes us so far.117 To appreciate Eusebius’ thought, we need also to 
recognise that, in order to achieve his apologetic goals, Eusebius produced a variety 
of very different works. These were often apparently aimed at slightly different 
audiences and made slightly different points, albeit in support of overarching goals 
of shaping Christian identity and promoting the Christian message, as it appeared 
to Eusebius. These differences could have an effect both on what Eusebius chose to 
say in each work, and on how he chose to say it. As Averil Cameron and Stuart Hall 
noted, Eusebius was capable of using a particular ‘language and literary manner’ in 
order to appeal to different and varied audiences.118 There are therefore clear 
differences of emphasis between many of his works. We can only begin to 
appreciate what effect such differences might have had on his presentation of his 
political and demonological ideas if we acknowledge the differences between his 
various works, as well as their similarities. 
In order to highlight both the connections and the differences between 
Eusebius’ various writings, I will first survey in tentative chronological order those 
of his works which are most important to this thesis. This will then be followed by 
consideration of Eusebius’ other remaining and fragmentary works. The reader is 
also directed to the chronological table on p. 12-13 for a summary of my views on 
the – often contested – dating of various works. 
 
 
                                                          
117 As Frede recognised: ‘Eusebius’ Apologetic Writings’, 224. 




The CH, a short, one-book treatise, has been variously dated by scholars anywhere 
from before the beginning of persecution in 303 to its end in 313.119 Often classified 
in catalogues of Eusebius’ works as an ‘apology’,120 it in many ways conforms to the 
traditional understanding of apologetics.121 The CH was written in response to a 
work by Hierocles, a high-ranking imperial official, and persecutor of Christians,122 
entitled either The Lover of Truth or The Truth-Loving Discourse.123 Since this work no 
longer survives, its contents can only be reconstructed from references in Eusebius’ 
CH, as well as in Lactantius’ Divine Institutes, which also mentions Hierocles’ 
treatise.124 It seems, however, that Hierocles’ work consisted of a lengthy 
comparison between Jesus and Apollonius of Tyana, which Eusebius used the CH 
to refute.125 
Some scholars have questioned whether Eusebius was really the author of the 
CH; their arguments, however, fail to convince. The question of the authenticity of 
the CH was first raised by Tomas Hägg,126 whose doubts later found support from 
                                                          
119 Before 303: T.D. Barnes, ‘Sossianus Hierocles and the Antecedents of the “Great Persecution”’, 
Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 80 (1976), 240-41. Around 311-13: Quasten, Patrology iii, 334; 
Carriker, Library, 38; Ulrich, Euseb und die Juden, 52, n.105; É. Des Places, ‘Le Contre Hiéroclès d’Eusèbe 
de Césarée à la lumière d’une edition récente’, Studia Patristica 19 (1989), 38. The most recent editions 
of this work are: Eusebius, Contre Hiérocles, ed. É. Des Places, trans. with intro. and notes by M. Forrat, 
Sources Chrétiennes 333 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1986) and the version in Philostratus, Apollonius of 
Tyana, vol. 3: Letters of Apollonius, Ancient Testimonia, Eusebius’ Reply to Hierocles, ed. and trans. C.P. 
Jones, LCL (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006). In citing this work, I have followed the 
division into chapters and sections adopted by Jones. 
120 For example: Quasten, Patrology iii, 333-34; CPG ii, 269; Moreau, ‘Eusebius von Caesarea’, 1067. 
121 As Frede noted: ‘Eusebius’ Apologetic Writings’, 223. 
122 On Hierocles’ career, see M. Forrat, ‘Introduction’, in Eusebius, Contre Hiéroclès, ed. É. Des Places 
and trans. M. Forrat, Sources Chrétiennes 333 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1986), 11-18. 
123 For a discussion of this title, see: T. Hägg, ‘Hierocles the Lover of Truth and Eusebius the Sophist’, 
Symbolae Osloenses 67 (1992), 138-50. 
124 Hägg, ‘Hierocles the Lover of Truth’, 140; Lact. Div.Inst. 5.2.12. 
125
 S. Borzi, ‘Sull’autenticità del Contra Hieroclem di Eusebio di Cesarea’, Augustinianum 43 (2003), 400-
01. 
126 Hägg, ‘Hierocles the Lover of Truth’, 147-50. 
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Timothy Barnes,127 and, most recently, from Aaron Johnson.128 However, Hägg’s 
arguments are far from convincing and have been challenged by both C.P. Jones 
and S. Borzi.129 Hägg suggests that the style of the CH, which demonstrates 
familiarity with the techniques of the Second Sophistic movement, is unlike that of 
Eusebius’ other writings.130 However, in separate articles both Jones and C. Smith 
have identified the influence of the Second Sophistic in other works by Eusebius, 
the authenticity of which has never been doubted. Jones notes several parallels 
between the language of the CH and book 6 of the PE,131 while Smith points to 
Second Sophistic techniques in the panegyric on the dedication of the Church at 
Tyre which is preserved in book 10 of the HE.132 Borzi likewise drew attention to the 
similarity of theme and expression between chapters 45-47 of the CH, and book 6 of 
the PE133 – a point reinforced by the study of Eusebius’ ideas of moral responsibility 
in chapter IV below, which also finds much in common between book 6 of the PE 
and the later chapters of the CH. 
A further point raised by Hägg is that Eusebius, unusually, does not quote 
from the Bible in the CH;134 however, Eusebius did not use direct biblical quotations 
                                                          
127 T.D. Barnes, ‘Eusebius of Caesarea’, Expository Times 121.1 (2009), 1. To avoid confusion with other 
articles, I will refer to this article throughout as Expository Times 121.1 (2009). 
128 A.P. Johnson, ‘The Author of the Against Hierocles: A Response to Borzi and Jones’, JTS 64 (2013), 
574-94. Here, Johnson is modifying his earlier position, in which he found Hägg’s arguments 
‘insufficient to reject its [the CH’s] authenticity’: ‘Eusebius’ Praeparatio Evangelica as Literary 
Experiment’, in S.F. Johnson, ed., Greek Literature in Late Antiquity: Dynamism, Didacticism, Classicism 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 68, n.11. 
129 Borzi, ‘Sull’autenticità’; C.P. Jones, ‘Introduction to Eusebius’ Reply’, in Philostratus, Apollonius of 
Tyana, vol. 3: Letters of Apollonius, Ancient Testimonia, Eusebius’ Reply to Hierocles, ed. and trans. C.P. 
Jones, LCL (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 152. 
130 Hägg, ‘Hierocles the Lover of Truth’, 147-49. 
131 C.P. Jones, ‘Apollonius of Tyana in Late Antiquity’, in S.F. Johnson, ed., Greek Literature in Late 
Antiquity: Dynamism, Didacticism, Classicism (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 50-51. Cf. Borzi, 
‘Sull’autenticità’, 413. 
132 C. Smith, ‘Christian Rhetoric in Eusebius’ Panegyric at Tyre’, Vigiliae Chrstianae 43 (1989), 231. 
133 Borzi, ‘Sull’autenticità’, 410-11. 
134 Hägg, ‘Hierocles the Lover of Truth’, 147. 
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in his LC either and scholars have remarked on the largely classical language of that 
oration.135 Eusebius was therefore perfectly able to adapt his style to suit his 
audience and this absence of biblical citation should certainly not be taken as proof 
that the work is not Eusebian. Thirdly, Hägg notes that Eusebius does not refer to 
the CH, or quote from it, in his other works.136 Although Eusebius tended to refer 
back to his other works where relevant, this is hardly conclusive, and must be set 
against compelling arguments in favour of the work’s Eusebian authorship. As 
Hägg recognises, these include the fact that all the manuscripts attribute the work to 
Eusebius.137 In consequence it seems clear that the CH should be accepted as a 
genuine work of Eusebius. 
This leaves only the question of the date of the CH. Barnes, before he rejected 
the work’s authenticity, placed it before 303, partly on the grounds of style, and 
partly because it does not refer to Porphyry’s Against the Christians,138 for which 
Barnes suggested an unusually late date of c.300.139 Yet there are several good 
reasons for preferring a date later than 303 for the CH instead. These include the fact 
that Lactantius suggests that Hierocles’ treatise was not published until after the 
                                                          
135 For example: Cameron, ‘Rethinking’, 79; Drake, In Praise of Constantine, 29. 
136 Ibid. 147. 
137 Ibid. 150. Cf. Borzi, ‘Sull’autenticità’, 397. 
138 Barnes, ‘Sossianus Hierocles’, 240-41; Barnes, C&E, 165. H.W. Attridge and G. Hata also give the 
work an early date of ‘before 303’: ‘Introduction’, in Attridge and Hata, eds., Eusebius, Christianity and 
Judaism (Leiden: Brill, 1992), 33. 
139 T.D. Barnes, ‘Scholarship or Propaganda? Porphyry’s Against the Christians and Its Historical 
Setting’, BICS 39 (1994), 53-65; cf. T.D. Barnes, ‘Porphyry Against the Christians: Date and Attribution of 
Fragments’, JTS 24 (1973), 442. The date traditionally given to this work is c.268-75 – see, for example: 
R.M. Grant, ‘Porphyry Among the Early Christians’, in W. den Boer et al., eds., Romanitas and 
Christianitas: Studia I.H. Waszink (Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Co., 1973), 181-87; A. 
Cameron, ‘The Date of Porphyry’s ΚΑΤΑ ΧΡΙΣΤΙΑΝΩΝ’, CQ 17 (1967), 382-84. It should be noted, 
however, that Barnes’ dating of the CH and Against the Christians tends towards circularity, with the 
dates he gives to each work dependent in part on his dating of the other. See, for example: Barnes, 
‘Scholarship or Propaganda’, 59. 
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beginning of the persecution.140 Although Barnes suggested that Lactantius, who 
heard the work in Nicomedia, was not aware that it had earlier been published in 
the east, where Eusebius would have encountered it,141 this is purely speculative, 
and Lactantius’ remark remains a point in favour of a later date for the CH. 
Moreover, in his De martyribus Palaestinae (Mart. Pal.), usually dated to c. 311,142 
Eusebius refers to Hierocles as a persecutor, yet he makes no mention of the CH,143 
as one might expect if he had already written the work. This suggests that Eusebius 
wrote the CH after the Mart. Pal., putting it in late 311 at the earliest. It is, however, 
difficult to believe that Eusebius would have written this small apology at the same 
time as he was working on the enormous PE and DE, on which work is generally 
believed to have begun around 313.144 As a result, the most likely date for the CH 




Next in chronological order comes the first edition of what was to become arguably 
Eusebius’ most famous work, the HE.146 This work appeared in several editions – 
                                                          
140 Lact. Div.Inst. 5.2.2. 
141 Barnes, ‘Sossianus Hierocles’, 242-43. Forrat, in contrast to Barnes, suggests that Lactantius, based in 
the capital of Nicomedia, would have been aware of Hierocles’ work before Eusebius, who, she 
suggests, is unlikely to have encountered it earlier than 311: ‘Introduction’, in Eusebius, Contre 
Hiéroclès, 25-26 
142 See discussion below, p. 65-66. 
143 E. Junod, ‘Polémique Chrétienne contre Apollonius de Tyane’, Revue de théologie et de philosophie 120 
(1988), 479; Mart.Pal. [LR] 5.3. 
144 See below, p. 51-53.  
145 Forrat, ‘Introduction’, in Eusebius, Contre Hiéroclès, 21-26; Jones, ‘Introduction to Eusebius’ Reply’, 
149; cf. Jones, ‘Apollonius of Tyana’, 52; E. Junod, ‘Polémique Chrétienne’, 476. 
146 Eusebius, Die Kirchengeschichte: Uber die Martyrer in Palestina, ed. E. Schwartz, Eusebius Werke II:i-iii, 
GCS 9 (Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs, 1903-09). 
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the exact number is disputed147 – over the course of at least a decade, but for the 
sake of convenience the various editions of this work will be discussed together 
here. 
The HE, which survives in an edition of ten books,148 covers the history of the 
church from its beginning with Christ to the events of Eusebius’ own lifetime. It is 
often regarded as a ground-breaking work,149 the beginning of a genre of 
ecclesiastical history that would be continued by Eusebius’ fifth-century 
successors.150 In his preface to the work, Eusebius emphasised that he was 
attempting to produce something new, describing himself as ‘the first to set upon 
this purpose’.151 The first seven books cover the period up to Eusebius’ lifetime, 
including an extended discussion of the life of Origen in book 6.152 Book 8 describes 
the events of the persecution that began in 303, overlapping significantly in terms of 
content with another of Eusebius’ works, the De martyribus Palaestinae.153 In three of 
                                                          
147 Barnes, for instance, argues for four distinct editions: C&E, 149-50. Tabbernee suggests three or four 
editions, the first dating from c.313-14, and the fourth simply removing references to Constantine’s 
disgraced son Crispus in 326. Tabbernee also suggests a first, unpublished draft of the HE from before 
303: Tabbernee, ‘Eusebius’ “Theology of Persecution”’. Burgess argues for two editions: ‘Dates and 
Editions’. Most recently, A.P. Johnson has challenged the multiple-edition thesis, suggesting a single 
edition of c.324: Eusebius, 85-112. However, even while suggesting a single ‘published’ edition, Johnson 
still finds composition over a long period of time essential to explaining some features of the work: 
Eusebius, 109. 
148 For discussion of the manuscript tradition of the HE, see: K. Lake, ‘Introduction’, in Eusebius, 
Historia ecclesiastica, I-V, ed. and trans. K. Lake, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1949), 
xxvii-xxxiii. 
149 G. Downey, for instance, described it as ‘epoch making’: ‘The Perspective of the Early Church 
Historians’, GRBS 6 (1965), 57. Cf. DeVore, ‘Genre’, 19; Verdoner, Narrated Reality, 4; Attridge and 
Hata, ‘Introduction’, 27; Chesnut, First Christian Histories, 31; Momigliano, ‘Pagan and Christian 
Historiography’, 90. 
150 On which, see: Chesnut, First Christian Histories; R.A. Markus, ‘Church History and the Early 
Church Historians’, in D. Baker, ed., The Materials, Sources and Methods of Ecclesiastical History (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1975), 1-17. 
151 HE 1.1.3: …πρῶτοι νῦν τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἐπιβάντες… 
152 Eusebius’ biographical presentation of Origen in HE 6 has been excellently analysed by Cox, 
Biography in Late Antiquity, 69-101. Cameron has highlighted the similarities between Eusebius’ 
approach to writing the biography of Origen, and his later approach in the Vita Constantini: Cameron, 
‘Construction’, 153. 
153 Barnes, C&E, 149-50.  
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its manuscripts, book 8 also contains a section known as the Appendix,154 which 
covers the gruesome deaths of the persecuting emperors. In book 9 the work 
addresses the end of the persecution, the defeat of the persecutors, and the victory 
of the Christian emperors Constantine and Licinius. The final book celebrates the 
success of the church following this victory and consists in large part of a speech 
which Eusebius delivered at the dedication of the Church at Tyre in 315,155 as well 
as a variety of documents showing Constantine’s favour towards the church. The 
later chapters of this book were evidently added after Constantine’s defeat of 
Licinius in 324, as they outline the actions which Eusebius suggests had brought 
Licinius to destruction.156 
The final, revised edition of the HE was clearly completed shortly after 
Licinius’ defeat in 324;157 however, the question of the date, and length, of its first 
edition has proved much more controversial. There are two main camps into which 
scholars divide on this issue. The first, adopted by E. Schwartz in his edition of the 
text, argues for a first edition in eight books, appearing in c.312,158 while the second 
puts a first edition of seven books much earlier, before the outbreak of the 
persecution in 303.159 The most notable champion of an early date in recent years 
                                                          
154 The Appendix is found in manuscripts AER: T. Christensen, ‘The So-Called Appendix to Eusebius’ 
Historia Ecclesiastica VIII’, Classica et Mediaevalia 34 (1983), 177-209. 
155 HE 10.4. For the date, see: Barnes, C&E, 162. 
156 HE 10.8.2-10.9.5. 
157 As is widely acknowledged by, for example: Verdoner, Narrated Reality, 38; F. Winkelmann, 
‘Historiography in the Age of Constantine’, in G. Marasco, ed., Greek and Roman Historiography in Late 
Antiquity (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 23; Barnes, C&E, 150; Carriker, Library, 40; A. Louth, ‘The date of 
Eusebius' Historia Ecclesiastica’, JTS 41 (1990), 111; Wallace-Hadrill, Eusebius of Caesarea, 39; Cameron 
and Hall, Life of Constantine, 2. 
158 E. Schwartz, ‘Einleitung’, in Eusebius, Die Kirchengeschichte: Uber die Martyrer in Palestina, ed. E. 
Schwartz, Eusebius Werke II vol.iii, GCS 9 (Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs, 1909), lvi. 
159 A brief, if now somewhat outdated, summary of the two positions can be found in Quasten, 
Patrology iii, 315. 
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has been Barnes, putting the first edition before 300.160 However, the arguments in 
favour of an early date have been convincingly disproved in recent years by the 
work of R. Burgess and A. Louth,161 and there are several compelling reasons for 
believing that the first edition consisted of at least eight, if not nine books, and was 
published shortly after the end of the persecution, around 313. Indeed, even Barnes 
now accepts that Burgess and Louth have disproved his theory of an early first 
edition.162 
The content of the first eight books of the HE suggests that they were written 
after 303, for there are several references in the first seven books to the events of the 
persecution,163 including in the preface to book 1 when Eusebius states that he will 
refer to the ‘martyrdoms of our lifetime’.164 Although these could be later additions, 
this would imply extensive revision of the first seven books, for which there is no 
evidence.165 Moreover, the biography of Origen which occupies most of book 6 
appears to be based on the largely lost Apologia pro Origene, which Eusebius helped 
his mentor Pamphilus to complete during the latter’s imprisonment in 308-10.166 
Crucially, however, there is simply no manuscript evidence for an edition of 303, 
                                                          
160 Barnes, C&E, 128, 277; T.D. Barnes, ‘The Editions of Eusebius’ Ecclesiastical History’, GRBS 21 (1980), 
191-201. Earlier exponents of this view include: Wallace-Hadrill, Eusebius of Caesarea, 41 and R. 
Laqueur, ‘Ephoros’, Hermes 46 (1911), 189. 
161 Louth, ‘The date’; R.W. Burgess, ‘The dates and editions of Eusebius’ Chronici canones and Historia 
ecclesiastica’, JTS 48 (1997), 471-504. 
162 Barnes, Expository Times 121.1 (2009), 6-7. 
163 Burgess, ‘Dates and editions’, 485. 
164 HE 1.1.2: …καθ’ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς μαρτύρια… 
165 Burgess, ‘Dates and editions’, 485; Grant, however, has argued for extensive revision to the first 
seven books of the HE, based on differences he identifies between the surviving manuscripts of the HE 
and the Chronicle: Grant, Eusebius as Church Historian. While Grant refuses to commit himself on the 
date of the first edition of the HE, he does suggest that an earlier edition would allow more time for the 
revisions which he posits, 15. Nevertheless, Grant does identify one of the main themes addressed by 
Eusebius in the HE as ‘martyrdom and persecution’, surely implying that the work was conceived 
after the beginning of the persecution, 114-25. Tabbernee also believes that the first seven books were 
written, although not published, before 303, but he rejects Grant’s suggestion of extensive revision: 
‘Eusebius’ “Theology of Persecution”’, 321. 
166 Louth, ‘The date’, 121-22; cf. Grant, ‘The Case Against Eusebius’, 418. 
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making its existence purely speculative.167 Consequently it appears most likely that 
the first edition of the HE was written in response to the events of the persecution 
and appeared c.313 in eight or nine books. The tenth book can only have been 
added after 315, since it is made up largely of a speech which Eusebius delivered in 
that year.168 This book was then extended sometime after 324 to address the defeat 
of Licinius. 
Establishing even a broad outline of the dates of these editions is essential to 
any assessment of the purpose and character of the HE, as many of those involved 
in these debates have recognised.169 Giving an early date to the first edition of the 
HE allowed Barnes to present it as ‘contemporary evidence for the standing of the 
Christian Church in Roman society in the late third century’,170 revealing ‘the 
optimistic assumptions of a Christian writing in the reign of Diocletian before 
persecution threatened’.171 By contrast, the later date of c.313, after the persecution, 
sets the work in a completely different context and forces us, in Burgess’ phrase, to 
look at it ‘in the light of... propaganda and apologetic, not of confidence, peace and 
pure scholarship’.172 Burgess is by no means the only scholar to have identified a 
strong apologetic element in the HE, with A.J. Droge suggesting that Eusebius used 
his version of history to defend the church against the attacks of its opponents.173 In 
line with the broader understanding of ‘apologetic’ outlined above, Marie Verdoner 
                                                          
167 Burgess, ‘Dates and editions’, 484. 
168 Barnes, C&E, 162. 
169 Louth, ‘The date’, 123; Burgess, ‘Dates and editions’, 496; T.D. Barnes, ‘Some Inconsistencies in 
Eusebius’, JTS 35 (1984), 471. Cf. the review article of Cameron, ‘Constantinus Christianus’, 185. 
170 Barnes, ‘Some inconsistencies’, 471. 
171 Barnes, C&E, 146. 
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173 Droge, ‘The Apologetic Dimensions’, 492-93. 
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also recognised that the HE played a role in ‘shaping… the self-understanding of 
the Christians’.174 
 
Praeparatio Evangelica and Demonstratio Evangelica 
The PE and DE clearly merit combined discussion.175 Although both works can 
stand independently – and, indeed, have received independent treatment from 
scholars176 – they were expressly envisaged by Eusebius as part of the same larger 
project,177 originally running to thirty-five books in total. The PE, of which we have 
all fifteen books intact, has been described as ‘the culmination (though by no means 
the end) of the apologetic tradition’.178 Together with the DE, of which only the first 
ten books, together with fragments of the fifteenth book, survive from an original 
total of twenty books,179 this work was clearly an enormous undertaking. Although 
the date of these works is generally placed between c.313 and c.325, the date of the 
Council of Nicaea,180 there is considerably more disagreement about their purpose 
and audience. 
                                                          
174 Verdoner, Narrated Reality, 1. 
175 Eusebius, Die Praeparatio Evangelica, ed. K. Mras and E. Des Places, Eusebius Werke VIII:i-ii, GCS 43 
(Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1982-83); Eusebius, Die Demonstratio Evangelica, ed. I.A. Heikel, Eusebius 
Werke IV, GCS 23 (Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs, 1913). As Ulrich insists: Euseb und die Juden, 36. 
176 On the PE, see: Johnson, Ethnicity and Argument; and, on the DE: S. Morlet, La Démonstration 
Évangélique d’Eusèbe de Césarée: Étude sur l’apologétique chrétienne à l’époque de Constantin (Paris: Institut 
d’Études Augustiniennes, 2009). 
177 PE 1.1.1: Τὸν Χριστιανισμόν, ὅ τι ποτέ ἐστιν, ἡγούμενος τοῖς οὐκ εἰδόσι παραστήσασθαι διὰ τῆς 
προκειμένης πραγματείας τὴν εὐαγγελικὴν ἀπόδειξιν περιέξειν ἐπαγγελλομένης… 
178 Johnson, Ethnicity and Argument, 11. 
179 Moreau, ‘Eusebius von Caesarea’, 1068. The original number of books for the PE and DE is given in 
Phot. Bibl. 9-10. 
180 See, for example: Carriker, Library, 39; Moreau, ‘Eusebius von Caesarea’, 1068; Barnes, C&E, 278; K. 
Mras, ‘Einleitung’, in Die Praeparatio Evangelica, ed. Mras and Des Places, liv-lv; J. Sirinelli, 
‘Introduction Générale’ in Eusebius, La préparation évangélique, ed. and trans. É. Des Places, G. 
Schroeder, et al., Sources Chrétiennes 206 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1974), 8-15; Wallace-Hadrill, 
Eusebius of Caesarea, 49; Ulrich, Euseb und die Juden, 37; Kofsky, Eusebius Against Paganism, 74. 
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Barnes believed that the combined work was intended as a ‘systematic and 
definitive refutation of Porphyry’, whose treatise, Contra Christianum, represented a 
serious attack on Christian belief.181 As such, Barnes considered the PE and DE to 
have been aimed primarily at an audience of ‘sympathetic pagans’.182 More recent 
work has challenged this, however, arguing that it is wrong to see the PE and DE 
primarily as a response to the work of Porphyry.183 As noted above, Johnson’s 
insightful work on the PE has revealed that these works may have been intended as 
much to help shape Christian identity among those already within the church as to 
refute attacks from those outside.184 This certainly corresponds to Eusebius’ 
declaration at the start of the PE that he envisaged this first part of the work as 
being most suitable for ‘those who have just come to us from the nations’, while the 
DE would provide further instruction for those who had either just read the PE, or 
who already had a more advanced understanding of Christianity from other 
sources.185 This suggests that both the PE and the DE were aimed, at least in part, at 
an internal audience, perhaps of recent converts. 
                                                          
181 Barnes, C&E, 175. Cf. Barnes, Expository Times 121.1 (2009); Quasten: Patrology iii, 331; Lyman, 
‘Eusebius of Caesarea’, 326; R.L. Williams, ‘Eusebius on Porphyry’s “Polytheistic Error”’, in D.E. Aune 
and R.D. Young, eds., Reading Religions in the Ancient World: Essays Presented to Robert McQueen Grant 
on his 90th Birthday (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 274. Frede similarly considered the PE to be a response to 
questions raised by Porphyry: ‘Eusebius’ Apologetic Writings’, 241-50. 
182 Barnes, C&E, 178. 
183 S. Morlet, ‘Eusebius’ Polemic Against Porphyry: A Reassessment’, in Inowlocki and Zamagni, eds., 
Reconsidering Eusebius, 125-26; Morlet, La Démonstration Évangélique, 628; cf. A.P. Johnson, Review of: 
Sébastien Morlet, ‘La Démonstration évangélique d’Eusèbe de Césarée: Étude sur l’apologétique 
chrétienne à l’époque de Constantin’, Bryn Mawr Classical Review 2010.11.47. Kofsky felt that, while 
‘Porphyry was a key figure behind the work’, the PE and DE were not intended primarily to refute his 
Contra Christianum, but were more broadly directed against opponents of Christianity: Eusebius Against 
Paganism, 313. 
184 Johnson, Ethnicity and Argument, 14-15; A.P. Johnson, ‘Identity, Descent and Polemic’, 23-56. Cf. 
Ulrich, Euseb und die Juden, 37-38. 
185 PE 1.1.12: ...καὶ τοῖς ἐξ ἐθνῶν ἄρτι προσιοῦσιν ἐφαρμόττοντα. 
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Barnes’ description of the PE as ‘the most majestic and disdainful of all 
polemics’186 hardly does justice to the complexity of either the PE or its companion 
work, the DE. As Johnson has noted, the PE appears to combine two different 
genres – apology, and introductory instruction manual.187 Its purpose therefore 
seems to be less about defence and more about instruction – Eusebius is providing 
recent converts with the means to understand their new faith in relation to their 
former religion, culture and education.  Likewise, Sébastien Morlet has suggested 
that the DE should be regarded as primarily a ‘work of instruction, conceived as a 
confirmation of the faith and an aid to argumentation’.188 As such, both these works 
should be viewed as trying to shape the collective identity of those already within 
the church and to respond to attacks from outside.189 
 
Oratio de laudibus Constantini 
It is now widely accepted that the work traditionally known as the Oratio de laudibus 
Constantini,190 which was transmitted as part of a lengthy appendix to the VC, in fact 
consists of two entirely separate speeches.191 These are the true De laudibus 
Constantini, consisting of chapters 1-10, and a second oration in chapters 11-18. The 
                                                          
186 Barnes, C&E, 175. 
187 Johnson, ‘Literary Experiment’, 75. Cf. Johnson, Eusebius, 27. 
188 Morlet, La Démonstration Évangélique, 80: ‘une oeuvre d’enseignement, conçue comme une 
confirmation de la foi et une aide à l’argumentation’. 
189 Johnson, Ethnicity and Argument, 15. 
190 Eusebius, Uber das Leben Constantins, Constantins Rede an die Heilige Versammlung, Tricennatsrede an 
Constantin, ed. I.A. Heikel, Eusebius Werke I, GCS 7 (Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs, 1902). 
191 See, for example: Drake, In Praise of Constantine, 30-45; Barnes, ‘Two speeches’; Kannengiesser, 
‘Eusebius of Caesarea, Origenist’, 453; Attridge and Hata, ‘Introduction’, 34; C.T.H.R. Ehrhardt, 
‘Eusebius and Celsus’, Jahrbuch fur Antike und Christentum 22 (1979); Cameron, ‘Rethinking’, 75; 
Kofsky, Eusebius Against Paganism, 48-50; R. Farina, L’impero e l’imperatore Cristiano in Eusebio di Cesarea: 
La prima teologia politica del Cristianesimo (Zurich: Pas Verlag, 1966), 14. For the older view, see: Wallace-
Hadrill, Eusebius of Caesarea, 44.To make clear the distinction between the two works, I will adopt the 
practice suggested by Drake of referring to the two speeches by separate titles, the De laudibus 
Constantini (LC), and De sepulchro Christi (SC), although this is not universal practice. 
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arguments in favour of seeing this work as two different orations have been 
convincingly set out by H.A. Drake and Barnes and will only be summarised here.192 
A key point raised by Drake is the length of the supposed oration. As one work, 
Drake suggests that it is far too long to have been delivered as a single speech – a 
problem which disappears once it is seen as two separate orations.193 Drake 
acknowledges the possibility that the speech might have been rewritten and 
extended for publication, but doubts that Eusebius would have had the time to 
enlarge the work so substantially between delivering the speech in 336 and his 
death in 339, given the amount of other work, including the VC, which he was 
producing at the same time.194 Furthermore, in several of the manuscripts of the 
orations there is evidence of a gap between chapters 10 and 11,195 while some 
manuscripts only contain the first part of the orations.196 These two parts are clearly 
distinct in terms of style and content, with each part comfortably able to stand alone 
as an independent work.197 Finally, a reference in chapter 11 suggests that these later 
chapters were delivered in Jerusalem,198  whereas the De laudibus Constantini was, 
we know from the VC, delivered in the imperial palace in Constantinople.199 
Consequently it is clear that the two parts of this manuscript should be treated 
as separate works. The first part is the De laudibus Constantini, delivered in 
                                                          
192 Drake, In Praise of Constantine, 30-45; Barnes, ‘Two speeches’. 
193 Drake, In Praise of Constantine, 30. 
194 Ibid. 
195 Barnes, ‘Two speeches’, 341. 
196 Drake, In Praise of Constantine, 30. 
197 Barnes, ‘Two speeches’, 341. 
198 Barnes, ‘Two speeches’, 342; SC 11.2: …πόλεώς τε τῆσδε, ἔνθεν ὁ σωτήριος λόγος ὥσπερ ἀπὸ 
πηγῆς εἰς πάντας ἀνώμβρησεν ἀνθρώπους… 
199 VC 4.46.1; Drake, In Praise of Constantine, 173, n. 4. 
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celebration of the emperor’s tricennalia, most likely in July 336.200 The second part 
has been identified instead as the speech which Eusebius gave at the dedication of 
the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem in September 335,201 and labelled by 
Drake the De sepulchro Christi.202 As two different speeches, these works would 
clearly have had different audiences. The audience of the SC would surely have 
consisted in large part of the bishops and other lay Christians who might be 
expected to have attended the dedication of a new church and Drake suggests a 
largely clerical audience on the basis of references at SC 17.6 and 17.11.203 The 
possibility that the audience might also have contained important pagans cannot be 
discounted either.204 As Drake has noted, however, the internal situation within the 
church in 335 was ‘theologically charged’, with the dedication of the Church of the 
Holy Sepulchre closely following the Council of Tyre, at which Eusebius’ opponent 
Athanasius had been excommunicated.205 As a result, even if speaking mainly to 
Christians or even to clerics, Eusebius need not have been addressing an entirely 
sympathetic audience. 
                                                          
200 Drake and Barnes both reject the traditional dating of July 335 in favour of delivery at the closing 
festivities of the tricennial year, in July 336: Barnes, ‘Two speeches’, 343; H.A. Drake, ‘When was the De 
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203 Ibid. 36. 
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members of the imperial service’ and ‘recent and superficial converts’: ‘Eusebius and Celsus’, 41; 
Cameron suggests a largely pagan audience: ‘Rethinking’, 78. Johnson argues that it was addressed 
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205 Drake, In Praise of Constantine, 36. 
56 
 
For the LC, delivered at the imperial palace in Constantinople,206 the audience 
would arguably have been more religiously diverse.207 The audience for this speech 
certainly included Constantine, and therefore probably many senior officials. The 
question of the religious balance at Constantine’s court, and how far Christianity 
had penetrated the ranks of the aristocracy by this point is very much contested.208 
However, Cameron and Hall’s suggestion that ‘court circles contained people of all 
persuasions as well as many who prudently kept their own counsel’ seems perfectly 
reasonable.209 As such, Eusebius most likely delivered the LC to an audience 
containing not just Christians and those sympathetic to Christianity, but also to 
those who were possibly wary of, or even hostile towards Christianity. 
This question of the audience of the LC has been used by some to help explain 
what appears to be a curious feature of the speech.210 The LC does not mention 
Christ, or Christianity, by name, referring instead to the ‘Logos’.211 One possible 
reason for this is that Eusebius may have been trying to make his arguments appeal 
to as wide an audience as possible, including to pagans at Constantine’s court.212 
Drake rejects the idea that Eusebius was simply following the conventions of 
classical rhetoric by omitting Christian language in this speech, on the grounds that, 
as a bishop, he would have been more interested in expressing his Christianity than 
                                                          
206 VC 4.46.1. 
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in ‘preserving a pristine literary tradition’.213 Yet, by expressing his ideas in terms 
that would have been familiar even to non-Christians, Eusebius might have hoped 
to make his views more easily understood by his audience, and hence more 
appealing. As Cameron and Hall have noted in connection with the VC, using ‘a 
language and a literary manner which conform at least in general terms to classical 




While the debates surrounding these two orations have tended to concern questions 
of date and audience, the problems that have attended the study of the more 
famous VC have been rather different.215 For many years the authenticity of the VC 
was questioned by scholars reluctant to attribute it to Eusebius.216 This was made 
possible by Jerome’s failure to mention the VC in his catalogue of Eusebius’ 
works.217 Yet this is far from conclusive, especially since Jerome did not claim to be 
giving an exhaustive list of all Eusebius’ writings, ending with a reference to 
Eusebius’ multa alia works.218 Indeed, the VC may have appeared far less significant 
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216 See, for example: W. Seston, ‘Constantine as “Bishop”’, JRS 37 (1947), 127-31; H. Grégoire, ‘Eusèbe 
n’est pas l’auteur de la “Vita Constantini” dans sa forme actuelle et Constantin ne s’est pas “converti” 
en 312’, Byzantion 13 (1938), 561-83. For a full survey of debates over the authenticity of the VC, see: F. 
Winkelmann, ‘Zur Geschichte des Authentizitätsproblems der Vita Constantini’, Klio 40 (1962), 187-243. 
217 Jerome Vir. Inl. 81; Seston used this as a reason to doubt Eusebius’ authorship of the work: 
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to Jerome than it has done to later scholars, for, as Cameron and Hall have shown, 
the VC was not widely known in the centuries immediately after its publication.219 
To a large extent, scholarly doubts about the authorship of the VC can be 
traced to a misunderstanding of its nature.220 Scholars who wished to find an honest 
and reliable historian in Eusebius were understandably reluctant to attribute this 
work, which has been described as ‘fraudulent’ in its presentation of events,221 to 
Eusebius. Indeed Henri Grégoire, who argued strenuously against the Eusebian 
authorship of the VC, even pointed out that his approach was ‘very fortunate for 
Eusebius’ memory. For decidedly it is necessary to acquit him of the accusation… of 
having deliberately falsified history.’222 Grégoire’s argument rested in the main on 
supposed ‘factual inaccuracies’ in the work, and he singled out for particular 
criticism the discussion of the causes of Constantine’s war against Licinius.223 
Eusebius suggests that this conflict arose as a result of Licinius’ persecution of 
Christians, a claim which Grégoire felt Eusebius would have known to be false.224 
As a result, he attributed the VC to the work of a later forger.225  
However, as Cameron and Hall recognised, the VC is ‘a highly apologetic 
work’,226 one of the aims of which is to support and enhance Constantine’s 
reputation.227 This would have involved defending Constantine’s actions in 
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attaining sole rule of the empire, particularly the civil wars against fellow emperors 
like Licinius. Cameron and Hall therefore suggest that the account given in the VC 
of the war between Constantine and Licinius should be understood in this 
apologetic light.228 Consequently it is unnecessary to see the presentation of this war 
as arising from the misunderstanding of a later writer, as Grégoire had imagined.229 
Moreover, Cameron and Hall refute the idea that parts of the VC were the result of 
later interpolation by pointing to the consistency of the work’s style, noting as well 
that it is difficult to believe a later writer could have imitated Eusebius’ distinctive 
tone so successfully.230 There remains, finally, the fact that in all its manuscripts the 
VC is consistently attributed to Eusebius.231 As a result, the Eusebian authorship of 
this work is now generally accepted,232 and discussion has turned instead to 
questions about its ‘genre’ and purpose. 
Much of this debate has concerned the manner in which the work was 
composed. The fact that the VC contains several repetitions and in places appears 
poorly structured has led many scholars to believe that the work was left unfinished 
when Eusebius died.233 The chapter headings at least were most likely the work of a 
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later editor,234 who assembled the work and the speeches appended to it for 
publication after Eusebius’ death.235 The varied style of the VC, combining elements 
of panegyric and biography, together with the extended quotation of documents so 
characteristic of the HE, has led Barnes to conclude that the VC as we have it was in 
fact a conflation of two different works, hastily and clumsily assembled by 
Eusebius.236 Barnes has even suggested that ‘every sentence of the Life can be 
assigned with ease to one of its three constituent elements’, which he identifies as 
‘an unfinished basilikos logos’, ‘a continuation of the Ecclesiastical History’, and ‘the 
additions of the editor’.237 This claim, however, has been rightly criticised by 
Cameron and Hall, who, while accepting that the work was a ‘literary hybrid’, 
argue that it cannot be so easily divided into various parts.238 Even if it were 
possible to identify two separate drafts of the VC so precisely, it is difficult to see 
what benefit that would bring, for in combining the two drafts, Eusebius would 
surely have been intending to create a new work, which is best understood on its 
own terms.239 It therefore seems more sensible to consider the work as the whole 
which it was on its way to becoming, rather than trying to break it apart into its 
constituent pieces.240 
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The composition of the VC is generally dated to the last two years of Eusebius’ 
life, between the death of Constantine in 337 and Eusebius’ own death in 339.241 
Although it has been suggested that Eusebius may have begun research into the 
project before 337, perhaps as early as 335,242 the majority of the writing was most 
likely carried out during the uncertain years which followed Constantine’s death.243 
This was a time both of considerable political upheaval and of theological 
controversy within the church.244 The question of the imperial succession remained 
unsettled, particularly during 337, a year which saw dynastic murders, and led to 
the division of the empire between Constantine’s three remaining sons.245 
Meanwhile, 337 also saw Athanasius recalled from exile, meaning Eusebius, who 
had presided at the Council of Tyre which had excommunicated Athanasius two 
years earlier, was called upon once again to defend his theological views.246 Shortly 
before, or at around the same time as writing the VC, Eusebius was also working on 
two treatises intended to refute the views of his theological opponents, the Contra 
Marcellum and De ecclesiastica theologia.247 In the VC, Eusebius therefore had much to 
gain from associating himself, and particularly his theological views, as closely as 
possible with those of the late emperor.248 It has therefore been suggested that the 
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VC should be seen as a ‘mirror for princes’, encouraging Constantine’s sons to 
pursue a policy towards the church which Eusebius favoured.249 
 
Other Works 
Having examined the debates concerning those of Eusebius’ works which figure 
most prominently in this thesis, it will be worth briefly considering Eusebius’ other 
works. Some of these works are referred to on occasion in the chapters which 
follow, but even those that are not can help to provide an idea of the context in 
which Eusebius was writing, and of the topics which most interested him. These 
will, once again, be discussed in tentative chronological order, with the proviso that, 
as above, many of these works can only be dated quite roughly. The focus first will 
be on those works which survive mostly intact. Eusebius’ more fragmentary and 
lost works will then be surveyed separately. 
Among Eusebius’ earliest works are the Canones Evangeliorum.250 Dating the 
Canones is difficult, but they are regarded by Barnes as an early work on the 
grounds that they do not discuss the disputed last twelve verses of the gospel of 
Mark, which Eusebius was less inclined in later life to reject outright.251 Following 
Barnes, Andrew Carriker placed the work in the 290s252 and suggested that the 
Canones might be ‘a product of Eusebius’ collaboration with Pamphilus’.253 
Described by Jeremy Schott as one of Eusebius’ ‘innovative biblical study aids’, the 
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Canones presented parallel passages of the gospels laid out in clear tabular form,254 
and were adopted in many later manuscripts of the New Testament.255 Eusebius 
outlined the system he had adopted in his Epistula ad Carpianum, which also 
survives.256 
The date of the next work to be considered, Eusebius’ Chronicon,257 has proved 
particularly controversial in the past, with questions about its date frequently 
entangled with debates about the various editions of the HE.258 Barnes, the most 
vocal recent champion of an early date for the HE, also gave the first edition of the 
Chronicon an early date, before 295.259 More convincing, however, as even Barnes 
has since admitted,260 is the dating of Burgess, who suggests that the Chronicon was 
not completed before 311.261 The Chronicon was undoubtedly written in some form 
before the HE, since it seems to provide the chronological basis for the history.262 
Moreover, a reference at HE 1.1.6 implies that the Chronicon was already published 
before the HE was written.263 This means that the Chronicon must have passed 
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through more than one edition, since it reached Jerome in a version that ran until 
Constantine’s vicennalia in 325,264 long after the first edition of the HE was 
published. Since a date c.313-14 is the latest usually allowed for the first edition of 
the HE,265 it is clear that an early edition of the Chronicle must have been written 
during the first decade of the fourth century, if not before. The work would surely 
have taken considerable effort to research and assemble. It therefore seems likely 
that Eusebius had already embarked on the project before the persecution began in 
303,266 and must have finished it before the first edition of the HE in 313. 
The Chronicon originally consisted of two books, the first of which survives 
only in an Armenian translation, while the second was translated and extended in 
Latin by Jerome.267 Some Greek fragments also survive, alongside two Syriac 
epitomes of the work.268 The first book summarised and explained the manner in 
which Eusebius had combined earlier chronologies to produce the Chronici canones, 
which comprised the second book.269 This second book then synchronised these 
various dating systems in parallel columns to produce an overview of the 
chronology of the human past.270 Scholars have identified various motives behind 
Eusebius’ composition of this work: Burgess saw it as an attempt to ‘correct’ the 
chronology offered by Porphyry in his Contra Christianum,271 while W. Adler 
suggested that its target might actually have been opponents within the Christian 
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community, regarding it as motivated by a desire to refute the millennialist 
assumptions inherent in the earlier Christian chronographies of writers like Julius 
Africanus.272 
Belonging to a similar period to the first edition of the Chronicon is the De 
martyribus Palaestinae,273 another work which has been discussed in connection with 
the HE.274 This work, mistaken by some for ‘a full list of all the martyrdoms of the 
Great Persecution’ in the province of Palestine,275 is in fact, as Barnes recognised, 
simply an account of those people Eusebius knew who were martyred between 303 
and 311.276 Eusebius himself stated that his aim in the work was ‘to speak of those 
with whom I was personally conversant’.277 It survives now in two versions, the 
‘short recension’ in Greek, and the ‘long recension’ in a Syriac translation and some 
Greek fragments.278 Much of the material used in the De martyribus Palaestinae is also 
found in book 8 of the HE, with two passages in the HE identical to ones in the short 
recension.279 Barnes has argued convincingly that Eusebius wrote the long recension 
around 311, since it does not cover events after that date, while the short recension 
was originally part of the first edition of book 8 of the HE in c.313.280 In a later 
edition, possibly when he added book 10 of the HE, Eusebius seems to have 
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rewritten Book 8, replacing what is now known as the short recension.281 Although 
the long recension of the De martyribus Palaestinae appeared before the HE, the 
greater length of the history makes it likely that Eusebius would have been 
researching and writing both works at a similar time. 
The dating of the Onomasticon,282 an account of biblical place-names arranged 
in alphabetical order, has also become linked to debates about the dating of the 
Chronicle and the HE because of Jerome’s statement in his translation of the 
Onomasticon that it was written after these two works.283 As a result, by arguing for 
an early date for the Onomasticon, Barnes was able to find further support for his 
early dating of the HE and the Chronicle.284 However, Barnes’ dating of the 
Onomasticon to before 300 has been described as ‘not very secure’,285 and has not 
been widely accepted, with the majority of writers giving the work a date in the 
320s.286 Barnes rested his case in part on his belief that it was ‘not plausible’ for 
Eusebius to have written the Onomasticon either during the persecution, or during 
the 310s, when he was occupied both by his duties as bishop, and with the 
composition of the enormous PE and DE.287 Yet, given the amount of research that 
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must have been required to produce the work,288 if this is so, it should surely point 
to a later date, in the 320s, rather than an earlier one in the 290s. 
Louth has offered two compelling reasons for a later date for the Onomasticon. 
Firstly, Jerome’s comment that the Onomasticon was written after the HE specifically 
mentions an edition of ten books, which puts it most likely after 324, or at the 
earliest after about 315.289 Secondly, the Onomasticon is dedicated to a Paulinus, who 
is described as a ‘holy man of God’.290 This was most likely the same Paulinus, 
Bishop of Tyre, to whom Eusebius also dedicated the tenth book of his HE.291  Since 
this Paulinus most likely became bishop shortly after the persecution, this suggests 
a date for the Onomasticon of no earlier than 313.292 As this was the period in which 
Eusebius began work on the PE and DE, it seems that the Onomasticon was in all 
probability a work of the 320s. Dating the first edition of the HE to c.313 is therefore 
perfectly compatible with Jerome’s statement that this work preceded the 
Onomasticon. A late date for the final publication of the Onomasticon does not, 
however, preclude the possibility that Eusebius was working on compiling it for 
some time before that.293 
Usually dated slightly later than the Onomasticon, the next work to consider is 
Eusebius’ best-preserved biblical commentary, the Commentarii in Isaiam. This has 
received excellent treatment in recent years from Michael Hollerich,294 benefitting 
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from a new critical edition published in 1975.295 Hollerich dates the CI to the period 
between 325 and 328,296 on the basis partly of internal references to other works, 
particularly the Onomasticon, and partly of its avoidance of language and 
terminology which would have been problematic in the immediate aftermath of 
Nicaea.297 
Like the CI, the Theophania, a work in five books, can be dated to the later 320s 
at the earliest, although there has been considerable disagreement about when, 
precisely, it was written, with some placing it as late as the 330s. For Wallace-
Hadrill, it represents ‘a last word’ on Eusebius’ views, taking the form of a 
retractiatio.298 The work certainly relies heavily on his earlier apologetics, the PE and 
DE, as well as demonstrating considerable overlap with the SC. There is, however, 
some dispute about whether the Theophania was written before or after the SC. It is 
widely agreed that the Theophania was written after Constantine’s defeat of Licinius, 
yet Quasten was prepared to date it only to the period after 323.299 Barnes was more 
precise, opting for 325/26,300 and suggesting that Eusebius simply re-used sections of 
the Theophania when he composed his SC in 335.301 Johnson has similarly placed the 
Theophania before 335, and hence before the SC, although he refused to commit to a 
date more precise than ‘the 320s or early 330s’.302 By contrast, Wallace-Hadrill 
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placed the Theophania in 337, after the SC.303 It survives only in a Syriac translation 
and a few Greek fragments.304 
Towards the end of his life, most likely in the years 336-38,305 Eusebius 
produced two treatises directed against one of his theological opponents, Marcellus 
of Ancyra, who had been deposed from his see at the Council of Constantinople in 
336.306 These works, the Contra Marcellum in two books, and the De ecclesiastica 
theologia in three books,307 demonstrate the extent to which Eusebius continued to 
play an active role in theological controversies throughout his life. Moreover, since 
Eusebius was composing these works at a similar time to his work on the VC, they 
are an important reminder that the VC, in which accounts of theological disputes 
are often brief, does not present a full picture of Eusebius’ interests and concerns at 
the end of his life.308 They show instead that, even at the very end of his life, 
Eusebius found himself once again having to defend his theological position. The 
supposedly triumphalist VC was not written in isolation from these wider concerns. 
Lastly, it is important to mention also the oration Ad sanctorum coetum,309 
which Eusebius promised to append to the VC310 and which appears in some 
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manuscripts of this text.311 This speech is attributed by Eusebius to Constantine, but 
both its date and its authorship have been much disputed by scholars.312 Some have 
even suggested that it was at least partly the work of Eusebius himself,313 although 
this appears unlikely in view of Eusebius’ own claim that it represents a translation 
of a Latin original.314 Although not a work of Eusebius himself, Eusebius 
deliberately chose to include this speech as an illustration of Constantine’s piety. It 
therefore seems reasonable to assume that Eusebius would not have felt 
uncomfortable with the theological views expressed in the speech. As a result, it can 




Alongside these works, which survive largely intact either in the original Greek or 
in ancient translations, there remain besides several more works, the condition of 
which is far more fragmentary. Dating these works is particularly problematic, and 
many continue to lack critical editions. Of these works, the most intact are the 
                                                          
311 Cameron and Hall, Life of Constantine, 51. 
312 On authorship, M. Edwards accepts Constantine as the author of the speech: ‘Introduction’ in 
Constantine and Christendom: The Oration to the Saints, The Greek and Latin Accounts of the Discovery of the 
Cross, and The Edict of Constantine to Pope Sylvester, trans. with an introduction and notes by M. 
Edwards, Translated Texts for Historians 39 (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2003), xviii-xxii; as 
does T.D. Barnes, ‘Constantine’s Speech to the Assembly of the Saints: Place and Date of Delivery’, JTS 52 
(2001), 26-36. P.S. Davies is far more dubious: ‘Constantine’s Editor’, JTS 42 (1991), 610-18, and R.P.C. 
Hanson also rejected Constantinian authorship: ‘The Oratio ad Sanctos Attributed to the Emperor 
Constantine and the Oracle at Daphne’, JTS 24 (1973), 505-11. On dating, see: H.A. Drake, ‘Suggestions 
of Date in Constantine’s Oration to the Saints’, AJP 106 (1985), 335-49, and Barnes, ‘Constantine’s 
speech’. 
313 Davies, ‘Constantine’s Editor’, 616-18. 
314 VC 4.32.1. Edwards, who accepts the attribution of the speech to Constantine, outlines several other 
compelling reasons why the speech cannot be regarded as a composition of Eusebius: Edwards, 
‘Introduction’, xviii-xix. Even if Constantine’s authorship remains in doubt, it is clear that the speech 
should not be counted among Eusebius’ writings. 
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Generalis elementaria introductio (GEI),315 the Commentarii in Psalmos (CPs),316 and the 
Quaestiones Evangelicae.317 There are also substantial portions of a treatise or speech 
De solemnitate Paschali, the Apologia pro Origene, a defence of Origen’s views which 
was co-authored with Pamphilus, and, perhaps, a further set of Commentarii in 
Lucam. In addition, several of Eusebius’ letters survive, usually in fragmentary 
form. 
Eusebius refers to the GEI at HE 1.2.27 and questions about its date are 
therefore linked to debates about the date of the HE. Accepting a date for the first 
edition of the HE of c.313 makes it unnecessary to follow Barnes’ early dating of the 
GEI to c.303,318 and makes Johnson’s suggestion of a date c.310 far more plausible.319 
As Johnson has shown, the GEI ought to be considered in part as an educational 
work, since it shares many of the features of an εἰσαγωγή, an introductory teaching 
manual.320 The majority of the GEI has been lost, with only books 6 to 9 remaining 
under the title Eclogae Propheticae (Ecl. Proph.).321 Even these books contain large 
lacunae, and the work continues to lack a modern critical edition.322 It has, however, 
been suggested by Wallace-Hadrill that some of the surviving Eusebian fragments 
                                                          
315 Eusebius, Eclogae Propheticae, ed. T. Gaisford (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1842). 
316 PG 23.66-1396; 24.9-76. 
317 Eusebius, Questions évangéliques, ed. and trans. with intro. and notes by C. Zamagni, Sources 
Chrétiennes 523 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 2008). 
318 Barnes, C&E, 167-68. 
319 A.P. Johnson, ‘Eusebius the Educator: The Context of General Elementary Introduction’, in Inowlocki 
and Zamagni, eds., Reconsidering Eusebius, 100. A later date of c.310-13 is also favoured by: Carriker, 
Library, 38; Kofsky, Eusebius Against Paganism, 52. 
320 Johnson, ‘Eusebius the Educator’, 99-118. 
321 Eusebius, Eclogae Propheticae, ed. T. Gaisford (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1842). At the 
beginning of book 3 of the Eclogae Eusebius notes that this book is the same as book 8 of the GEI: Ecl. 
Proph. 97.2-5. The Ecl. Proph. are cited throughout according to their page and line number in the 
Gaisford edition. 
322 Johnson, ‘Eusebius the Educator’, 100. 
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on the gospel of Luke may have come from the lost tenth book of the GEI.323 The 
Eclogae Propheticae consist of a selection of Old Testament passages and seek to 
demonstrate that the prophecies contained in these books have been fulfilled in 
Christ. On the basis of these surviving parts of the work, Johnson has suggested that 
the GEI may have been far more than merely an introductory study-aid, arguing 
that it represents an attempt to establish ‘a rival pedagogy to that of Porphyry’.324 
Thus, the GEI can also be seen as serving an apologetic purpose and contributing to 
debates between Christians and their opponents, leading both J. Quasten and 
Barnes to rank it among Eusebius’ ‘apologetic works’.325 
The Commentarii in Psalmos survives in a far worse state than Eusebius’ other 
Old Testament commentary, the CI and, perhaps in consequence, has received only 
limited scholarly attention.326 Hollerich has dated it to some time after 326 at the 
earliest, as it contains references to buildings which were constructed in Jerusalem 
at some point between 326 and 333, putting its composition some time after that.327 
Surviving mainly in the catenae, it is often unclear how far the text has been edited 
by later scholars, or even misattributed.328 The CPs continues therefore to lack a 
critical edition, and it remains doubtful how much of the material preserved in 
Migne’s Patrologia Graeca is genuinely Eusebian.329 Nevertheless, it is clear that the 
                                                          
323 Wallace-Hadrill, ‘Eusebius’ Commentary on Luke’, 55-63. See below, p. 75-76 for discussion. 
324 Johnson, ‘Eusebius the Educator’, 117. 
325 Quasten, Patrology iii, 328-29; Barnes, Expository Times 121.1 (2009), 8. 
326 Exceptions include the work of C. Curti, much of which is collected in: C. Curti, Eusebiana I: 
Commentarii in Psalmos (Catania: Università di Catania, 1987); and, most recently, Hollerich, ‘Eusebius’ 
Commentary on the Psalms’, 151-67. 
327 Hollerich notes references in the CPs to buildings which were constructed in Jerusalem between 326 
and 333, putting its composition sometime after that: Hollerich, ‘Eusebius’ Commentary on the Psalms’, 
154, citing PG 23.1064a. 
328 Hollerich, ‘Eusebius’ Commentary on the Psalms’, 151-52. 
329 Hollerich suggests that at least 60 per cent is by Eusebius: ‘Eusebius’ Commentary on the Psalms’, 152. 
Since the attribution of much of the material in the CPs remains disputed, I have opted to follow the 
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CPs was a substantial work – Hollerich suggests that it is ‘probably the longest book 
he [Eusebius] ever wrote’.330 If nothing else, its existence demonstrates the 
continuing importance which Eusebius attached to biblical scholarship throughout 
his life. 
Eusebius’ fragmentary works include as well the Quaestiones Evangelicae, 
which Claudio Zamagni, the work’s most recent editor, thinks was quite possibly 
based on the earlier Canones evangeliorum.331 The Quaestiones were most likely 
composed at a similar time to the DE,332 since both works contain references to each 
other.333 The Quaestiones survive only in substantial fragments, preserved in a Greek 
epitome, as well as in catenae in a variety of ancient languages.334 Originally three 
books long, the Quaestiones consisted of two separate parts, two books of Quaestiones 
ad Stephanum, and one book of Quaestiones ad Marinum.335 Of these, sixteen questions 
and answers to Stephanus are preserved in the Greek epitome, but only four to 
Marinus. The Quaestiones ad Stephanum deal with issues relating to Jesus’ genealogy, 
and those to Marinus with questions about his resurrection. In each case, Eusebius 
                                                                                                                                                                    
strategy of Barnes and Walker of citing only the securely Eusebian passages found in PG 23.441-1221 
(commenting on Ps.51-95): Barnes, C&E, 334-35, n.135; Walker, Holy City, 409. 
330 Hollerich, ‘Eusebius’ Commentary on the Psalms’, 151. 
331 C. Zamagni, ‘Introduction’, in Eusebius, Questions évangéliques, ed. and trans. with intro. and notes 
by C. Zamagni, Sources Chrétiennes 523 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 2008), 45. More recently, the shorter 
Greek fragments, and fragments in other languages, have been brought together and translated in: 
Eusebius, Gospel Problems and Solutions. Quaestiones ad Stephanum et Marinum, ed. R. Pearse, and trans. 
D.J.D. Miller et al. (Ipswich: Chieftain, 2010). This edition reproduces Zamagni’s edited text of the 
longer Greek epitome: xiv. 
332 That is, most likely between c.315 and 320. 
333 The Questions to Stephanus at least must have been written at this time, for that is the part that 
contains the cross-references. C. Zamagni, ‘Introduction’, 42-43, citing Qu7 to Stephanus, and DE 7.3.18. 
334 For a discussion of the difficulties involved in assembling a full and reliable edition of this text, 
together with a list of all manuscripts hitherto identified as containing fragments of the Questions, see: 
C. Zamagni, ‘New Perspectives on Eusebius’ Questions and Answers on the Gospels: The Manuscripts’, in 
Johnson and Schott, eds., Eusebius: Tradition and Innovations, 239-61. 
335 R. Pearse, ‘Editor’s Preface’, in Pearse, ed., Eusebius, Gospel Problems and Solutions, x. 
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attempts to resolve tensions or contradictions between the different Gospel 
accounts. 
Eusebius’ active part in theological and doctrinal disputes is illustrated by his 
treatise on the date of the Easter festival, the De solemnitate Paschali. Only fragments 
of this text remain,336 and it is unclear what the original form of the work was, with 
Barnes regarding it as a homily.337 A more recent suggestion, however, is that it was 
a treatise written in response to opponents of the decision of the Council of Nicaea 
to enforce a single date for the observance of Easter throughout the empire.338 
Eusebius mentions this work in the VC,339 and Mark DelCogliano has even 
suggested on the basis of this reference that the treatise may have been written at 
the request of Constantine himself.340 However, we already know that Eusebius’ 
self-presentation in the VC was frequently tendentious,341 and it is therefore best to 
be wary about accepting too readily any of Eusebius’ claims of intimacy with the 
emperor. 
The Apologia pro Origene is, in its surviving form, hardly a work of Eusebius at 
all, but his involvement in its composition nevertheless makes it worthy of mention 
here. It appears that Eusebius assisted his mentor Pamphilus to write this defence of 
Origen’s views between 307 and 310, during Pamphilus’ imprisonment.342 Only the 
                                                          
336 PG 24.693-705. 
337 Barnes, Expository Times 121.1 (2009), 10. 
338 See the discussion in M. DelCogliano, ‘The Promotion of the Constantinian Agenda in Eusebius of 
Caesarea’s On the Feast of the Pascha’, in Inowlocki and Zamagni, eds., Reconsidering Eusebius, 39-68. 
DelCogliano’s essay also includes the first English translation of the remaining fragments of the 
treatise: 59-68.  
339 VC 4.34-35. 
340 DelCogliano, ‘The Promotion’, 47. 
341 Cameron, ‘Construction’, 166-69; Cameron, ‘Rethinking’, 77, 86; Barnes, C&E, 270. 
342 R. Amacker and E. Junod, ‘Avant-Propos’, in Pamphilus and Eusebius of Caesarea, Apologie pour 
Origène, suivi de Rufin d’Aquilée, Sur la falsification des livres d’Origène, ed. and trans. with notes by 
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first book out of an original six survives, and this only in the later Latin translation 
of Rufinus.343 The first five of these books appear to have been primarily the work of 
Pamphilus, while Eusebius added a sixth book of his own after Pamphilus’ death.344 
Although Eusebius’ contribution to the work is lost, his participation in its 
composition nevertheless demonstrates his interest in preserving the legacy of 
Origen, and shows that he was active in theological controversies even before he 
became bishop. 
In addition, some fragments remain from what might have been a set of 
Commentarii in Lucam.345 These were preserved in Nicetas of Heraclea’s catenae on 
Luke, but their origin remains disputed, and they continue to lack a critical 
edition.346 Wallace-Hadrill argued that the surviving fragments come, not from an 
independent commentary, but rather from the lost tenth book of another work, the 
Generalis elementaria introductio.347 Wallace-Hadrill’s doubts have been echoed by 
Hollerich, who has pointed out that the fragments suggest a different approach to 
the biblical text from that found in Eusebius’ other commentaries on Isaiah and the 
Psalms.348 In these commentaries, Eusebius dealt with the entire book, whereas in 
the fragments on Luke, he appears to have addressed only certain verses or 
chapters of the book, and also made use of quotations from other books, such as 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Amacker and Junod, Sources Chrétiennes 464 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 2002), 12. Eusebius mentions 
this at HE 6.33.4. 
343 Ibid. 12. 
344 Barnes, C&E, 200. 
345 PG 24.529-606. Since I do not accept that the case for an independent commentary has yet been 
proved, I will refer throughout, not to a commentary, but to the Fragmenta in Lucam (Fr.Luc.). 
346 Johnson, ‘The Ends of Transfiguration’, 191. 
347 Wallace-Hadrill, ‘Eusebius’ Commentary on Luke’, 62. 
348 Hollerich, Eusebius’ Commentary on Isaiah, 8. Quasten makes no mention of a Commentary on Luke, 
suggesting that ‘there is no indication’ that Eusebius wrote commentaries on New Testament books: 
Patrology iii, 337. 
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Matthew and the epistles of Paul.349 More recently this view has been challenged by 
Aaron Johnson, who has argued for an independent commentary on the grounds 
that the fragments on Luke are incompatible with both the style and the expressed 
aims of the Generalis elementaria introductio.350 However, while Johnson has shed 
considerable doubt on Wallace-Hadrill’s thesis, he has not proved that the 
fragments come instead from a full commentary on Luke, and has not addressed 
Hollerich’s points about the different style of the fragments on Luke. Thus, the 
existence of a full commentary remains uncertain, and all we can safely say is that 
there remain several fragments of Eusebius’ discussion of the gospel of Luke from 
an unidentified work. 
Lastly, a small number of Eusebius’ letters survive, although they surely 
represent only a tiny fraction of those he must have written over the course of his 
life. These letters include, most famously, the Epistula ad Constantiam augustam,351 in 
which Eusebius appears to reject the empress’ request for an image of Christ. This 
letter has received attention largely because it figured prominently in later 
Byzantine disputes over the use of religious images and indeed it survives only in 
fragments preserved in works produced during the controversy.352 However, since 
the letter does not appear in any manuscripts dating from before the eighth-century 
iconoclast controversy, its authenticity is open to question.353 Also worthy of note is 
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Eusebius’ Epistula ad ecclesiam Caesariensem,354 in which Eusebius sought to explain 
and defend his position at the Council of Nicaea to his congregation. 
 
Lost Works 
Extensive as the body of surviving Eusebian writings is, there was undoubtedly 
much more that has been almost entirely lost. An exhaustive account of all the 
possible works associated by scholars with the name of Eusebius is unnecessary 
here, but a brief glance at some of the references to Eusebius’ missing writings can 
help to provide a sense of Eusebius’ interests. Jerome’s catalogue of Eusebius’ 
works mentions twenty-five books of a work Contra Porphyrium and three books of 
a De vita Pamphili.355 Besides this, Eusebius’ own works contain various references to 
his other writings, not all of which survive. These include a treatise addressing 
questions about the large families fathered by the biblical patriarchs, mentioned 
briefly by Eusebius in his PE and DE.356 Eusebius also mentions a speech, 
presumably similar to the De laudibus Constantini, which he delivered on the 
occasion of the emperor’s vicennalia celebrations.357 The HE refers to a work in which 
Eusebius brought together accounts of earlier martyrdoms,358 which Barnes has 
suggested formed part of Eusebius’ early scholarly activity in the library of 
Caesarea, when he was still working under his mentor Pamphilus.359 The catalogue 
of Photius, ninth-century bishop of Constantinople, also mentions two editions of a 
                                                                                                                                                                    
(2010), 313-17; P. Van Nuffelen accepts the letter as genuine: ‘The Life of Constantine: The Image of an 
Image’, in Johnson and Schott, eds., Eusebius: Tradition and Innovations, 143-44. 
354 Athanasius Werke III.i, ed. H.-G. Opitz (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1934), 42-47. 
355 Jerome, Vir.Inl. 81. 
356 DE 1.9.20; PE 7.8.29. See: Quasten, Patrology iii, 339. 
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two-book ‘ἐλέγχου καὶ ἀπολογίας’ directed against opponents of Christianity,360 
and two works called the ‘ἐκκλησιαστικὴ προπαρασκευὴ’ and ‘ἐκκλησιαστικὴ 
ἀπόδειξις’.361 In addition to those lost works for which we can recover the titles, 
Eusebius doubtless wrote much more that has left no trace. We have, for instance, 
very few of his letters, and remarkably little preaching.362 
Obviously very little is known about these works. Nevertheless, it is 
important to be aware of them in order to help to set in context some of Eusebius’ 
works which do survive. The fact that Eusebius devoted so much space to refuting 
Porphyry’s views in a dedicated treatise Contra Porphyrium suggests, for instance, 
that we should be cautious about seeing the PE and DE as primarily a reaction to 
Porphyry’s work.363 Moreover, these lost works give some indication of the kinds of 
topics that interested Eusebius. He was concerned to defend Christianity against 
external attacks in works like the Contra Porphyrium and the ‘ἐλέγχου καὶ 
ἀπολογίας’, but also appears to have wanted to answer questions that might have 
been raised within the church, for instance in his treatise about the size of the 
families of the patriarchs. We can only speculate about why these works failed to be 
transmitted – in the case of the missing books of the DE, for instance, J. Ulrich 
suggests that it may be because some of the ideas they expressed appeared 
‘unorthodox’ to later church authorities.364 We cannot recover what these ideas may 
                                                          
360 Phot. Bibl. 13. Cf. Quasten, Patrology iii, 334. 
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have been, but keeping in mind the selectivity of the transmission of Eusebius’ 
works is an important reminder that we do not have a complete picture of his 
interests. Even so, the range of Eusebius’ lost works testifies, if nothing else, to the 
variety and scale of his output. Furthermore, if the reason for the loss of some of 
Eusebius’ works was that later scribes found their contents uncomfortable, the 
repeated appearance of demons in those of his works that do survive makes it clear 
that speculation about demons was not a cause for embarrassment in later 
antiquity. 
 
Some Methodological Considerations 
The above discussion has highlighted, if nothing else, the extraordinary variety to 
be found within the Eusebian corpus. Eusebius’ works not only spanned a 
remarkably lengthy chronological period, but also took a range of forms, addressing 
different audiences in different ways. This poses an undoubted challenge to anyone 
seeking to understand his thought. There remains a danger that, in trying to extract 
Eusebius’ ideas from a range of texts that may originally have had very different 
purposes, we may be tempted to overlook or smooth over inconsistencies in order 
to produce a coherent picture of his views. 
This challenge is hardly unique to Eusebius. It has already been raised by 
scholars in relation to other late antique writers.365 Peter Brown noted the 
importance of terminology when discussing the thought of ancient writers, 
preferring the term ‘attitude’ to refer to Augustine’s views on religious coercion, 
                                                          
365 For example: P.R.L. Brown, ‘St. Augustine’s Attitude to Religious Coercion’, JRS 54 (1964), 107-16; S. 
Lunn-Rockliffe, Ambrosiaster’s Political Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 6. 
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rather than ‘doctrine’, which might imply a more carefully formulated set of 
ideas.366 Similarly, when describing Eusebius’ views, the language of ‘thought’ and 
‘ideas’ is surely preferable to the older terminology of ‘political philosophy’ 
adopted by scholars like Francis Dvornik.367 Eusebius did not write works of 
kingship theory, nor, as far as we can tell, was he seeking to develop a coherent 
‘political philosophy’.368 Where ‘philosophy’ or, even worse, ‘theory’ implies a 
deliberate and developed scheme of thought, a more flexible terminology of 
‘thought’ and ‘ideas’ recognises the fluid and often nebulous nature of Eusebius’ 
thinking on political subjects.369 A judicious choice of terminology can therefore go 
some way towards mitigating this problem. 
Yet there remains the question of how to avoid, not only implying, but also 
imposing false consistency on Eusebius’ ideas. There is no straightforward solution 
to this, although being alert to the difficulty is undoubtedly the first step towards 
managing the problem. It is perhaps, above all, a question of managing our own 
expectations, and of being prepared, where necessary, to accept that Eusebius does 
not provide us with answers to all of our questions. Again in the case of Augustine, 
Brown recognised that a ‘historian… must resign himself, as best he can, to living 
with this ambivalence’.370 There are lacunae in Eusebius’ thought just as there are in 
his works, and we must not try to fill those gaps. 
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Brown also drew an important distinction between seeing a writer’s ‘thought 
as a whole’ and trying ‘to make it seem consistent’.371 This will be a crucial 
distinction for this thesis. By surveying the ideas put forward by Eusebius in a 
range of works composed over a number of years, we are attempting to form a full 
picture of his thought in all its variety. That is very different from trying to pull 
together his different ideas and mould them into an intellectually satisfying 
‘political philosophy’. There are areas of consistency in Eusebius’ thought – we shall 
see, for instance, that his belief in demonic hostility appears to have altered very 
little – but there are also tensions and apparent contradictions, as when Eusebius 
appears in one work, the PE, to imply that all demonic power has ceased, while in 
others, such as the VC, he appears to suggest that the demonic threat continues into 
his own time.372 Recognising this can be of enormous value, for, by highlighting 
areas of tension between Eusebius’ works, rather than avoiding them, we may in 
fact discover unexpected emphases in his thought or new avenues to be 
investigated. 
Overall, the approach taken in this thesis, of focusing in particular on 
Eusebius’ notions of demons, leads us to join those scholars who have argued that 
Eusebius’ basic outlook was little altered by the dramatic political changes of his 
lifetime.373 We find little sign of a waning interest in demons, nor of a decline in 
Eusebius’ concern about the threat they might pose. Eusebius’ basic cosmology does 
not appear to have been altered by the changing situation of the church. Yet, rather 
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373 For example, Barnes, C&E, 164; Johnson, Ethnicity and Argument, 156 (‘Eusebius maintained to the 
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than joining these scholars in seeing Eusebius as a perennial triumphalist,374 the 
conclusions drawn below will suggest to the contrary that it is time to reassess our 
assumptions about the optimistic mind-set of this, supposedly familiar, figure. The 
following chapters will reveal instead a more cautious figure, arguing that Eusebius 
continued to demonstrate concern about potential challenges to the ‘orthodox’ 
teaching of the church or about the possibility of Christians straying from the path 
of virtue. 
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THE REALITY OF THE DEMONIC THREAT 
A study such as this, which seeks to explore the role played by Eusebius’ ideas of 
the demonic in other areas of his thought, must be based on a reasonably firm 
understanding of what those ideas were. However, despite frequent references to 
demons in a range of Eusebius’ works, there has as yet been no thorough study of 
his discussions of the demonic throughout the entire corpus of his works. While 
Eusebius’ evident interest in the subject of demons has not entirely escaped the 
attention of earlier scholars, previous work on the topic is either clearly outdated,375 
or extremely limited in scope.376 Sharron Coggan’s PhD dissertation, for instance, 
which is by far the most sustained examination of Eusebius’ attitude towards the 
demonic, takes as its primary focus only the PE.377 Although Coggan does include 
some discussion of relevant passages from the HE,378 potentially valuable references 
to the demonic in other works such as the VC and LC are largely overlooked. 
Moreover, Coggan’s work was written too early to benefit from many of the 
insights of the most recent scholarship on early Christian demonology. One such 
insight, which, as I will show, may fruitfully be applied to Eusebius, has been 
greater recognition of the physicality of demons in the eyes of late antique writers.379 
However, despite suggesting in her concluding chapter a variety of ways in which 
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we might read Eusebius’ demons – including ‘cosmological, locational, theological, 
psychological and ethical’ readings – Coggan does not pay attention to Eusebius’ 
demons as a physical reality.380 
Among more recent work, Aaron Johnson’s remarks on the topic of demons in 
Eusebius are regrettably brief, despite his evident recognition of the importance of 
this theme in the PE.381 Moreover, like Coggan, he too fails to look much beyond the 
PE in his discussion of Eusebius’ views of demons. His focus is Eusebius’ 
suggestion that demons lie behind the oracles and cults that formed the basis of 
civic religion in the Greek poleis.382 While this was certainly an important feature of 
demonic activity in Eusebius’ eyes, it is, as we shall see, by no means a full picture 
of Eusebius’ understanding of the nature and activity of demons. Similarly, while 
Sébastien Morlet recognised that ‘demons play a fundamental role in Eusebius’ 
theology’, he devoted barely a page of his book on Eusebius’ DE to the subject.383 
Elsewhere, although Dale Martin looked further than either Coggan or Johnson in 
exploring Eusebius’ ideas about demons, his work on Eusebius forms just one 
chapter of a broader survey of ideas about ‘superstition’ (deisidaimonia) throughout 
Greek and Roman antiquity.384 Martin’s interest therefore lies primarily in 
determining how Eusebius’ ideas fit into longer-term trends in ancient demonology, 
rather than in an extensive exploration of those ideas in themselves. 
                                                          
380 Coggan, Pandaemonia, 200. 
381 Johnson, Ethnicity and Argument, 163-70. 
382 Ibid. 
383 Morlet, La Démonstration Évangélique, 470: ‘Les démons jouent un role fondamental dans la théologie 
d’Eusèbe’. 
384 Martin, Inventing Superstition, 207-25. 
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Even the earlier discussion of Jean Sirinelli, who did at least acknowledge the 
potency of demons for Eusebius,385 is limited by the overall scope of his work, 
which focuses only on those of Eusebius’ works written before the Council of 
Nicaea.386 While this does allow for some brief discussion of the HE,387 in practice 
the majority of Sirinelli’s references are to the PE and DE.388 This may be 
understandable, since these works contain by far the fullest and most detailed of 
Eusebius’ descriptions of demons,389 but it is nonetheless unfortunate, for such a 
heavy focus on these apologies leads to an imbalanced picture of Eusebius’ thought 
in this area. For instance, Sirinelli was led to suggest that ‘Eusebius’ demonology 
has no other function than to explain pagan error’;390 as we shall see, however, 
Eusebius’ understanding of the demonic involved far more than simply an 
explanation of the origin of the pagan cults. 
In order to achieve a full and balanced picture of Eusebius’ views of demons, 
it is therefore necessary to look beyond the discussions of the PE and DE and to take 
into account references to demons throughout a range of his works. A thorough 
examination of Eusebius’ ideas about demons, benefitting from recent 
developments in scholarship on late antique demonology, is therefore not only an 
essential foundation for the remainder of this study, but also in itself a much-
needed contribution to our understanding of Eusebius’ thought. 
                                                          
385 Sirinelli, Les vues historiques, 337-38. 
386 Sirinelli devotes two sub-sections of his chapter on ‘spiritual powers’ to demons, so, once again, he 
offers only a comparatively brief discussion: Les vues historiques, 312-26, 337-38. 
387 Ibid. 337-38. 
388 Ibid. 312-26. 
389 Particularly in Books 4, 5 and 7.16 of the PE, and Book 4 of the DE. 




Yet even when adopting a broader perspective which encompasses a variety 
of Eusebius’ works, it remains a challenging task to establish with any clarity what 
Eusebius’ view of demons was. Despite the abundance of references to the demonic 
throughout Eusebius’ works, he in fact provides us with little in the way of a 
coherent or systematic ‘demonology’. Heidi Marx-Wolf has described the writing of 
demonology in late antiquity as a process of ‘systematisation’, in which intellectuals 
sought to impose order on the wide range of popular beliefs about the demonic.391 
This idea that demonology was about systematising and classifying the demonic 
can also be found in studies of later demonologies – for instance, the idea that 
demonology was about asserting control through ‘a structure of classification’ 
forms a key part of David Frankfurter’s understanding of the term.392 
While it is open to question how far any demonological writings were ever 
purely systematic explorations of the nature of the demonic,393 on this 
understanding of the term ‘demonology’, none of Eusebius’ works could accurately 
be described as purely, or even primarily ‘demonological’. As Sirinelli recognised, 
attempting to find such a systematic account in Eusebius’ works would therefore be 
a serious ‘error of perspective’.394 It is essential to remember that Eusebius’ accounts 
of demons in the PE and DE were included in support of an overall apologetic goal 
– clearly set out at the beginning of the PE – of demonstrating why Christians had 
                                                          
391 H. Marx-Wolf, ‘Third Century Daimonologies and the Via Universalis: Origen, Porphyry and 
Iamblichus on Daimons and Other Angels’, Studia Patristica 46 (2010), 207. 
392 D. Frankfurter, Evil Incarnate: Rumors of Demonic Conspiracy and Ritual Abuse in History (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2006), 26. 
393 Stuart Clark noted that, shortly after beginning his research into early modern demonology, he 
‘rapidly discovered that there was too much demonology embedded in… books of all kinds and on 
many subjects – for it to be attributed to one kind of writer’: Thinking With Demons: The Idea of 
Witchcraft in Early Modern Europe (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), viii-ix. 
394 Sirinelli, Les vues historiques, 301: ‘Ce serait une erreur de perspective que d’en retrace une tableau 
systématique qu’il n’a jamais cherché à donner.’ 
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made the correct decision in choosing to abandon the traditional cults of Greece and 
Rome.395 It is therefore necessary to supplement the lengthier discussions in these 
works with numerous additional remarks about demons to be found in other works 
such as the HE and VC, in which Eusebius’ focus was different. Even brief and 
scattered references to demons can reveal a great deal about Eusebius’ 
understanding of the demonic – for instance by showing some of the ways in which 
he believed them to act. 
In speculating about the nature and activities of demons, Eusebius was far 
from alone. Demons played a prominent role in the works of many early Christian 
writers, yet they were by no means an exclusively Christian concept, and thinking 
about the demonic had a long history among both Greek and Jewish writers.396 The 
extensive quotations on the subject of demons in the PE and DE, which have been 
drawn from a variety of thinkers,397 attest both to the strength of this tradition of 
thinking about demons, and to the range of possible influences on Eusebius’ own 
views about the demonic. Early Christian writers were able to draw on the Platonic 
idea of δαίμονες as morally ambiguous spiritual intermediaries, passing messages 
                                                          
395 PE 1.5.11-13. 
396 The bibliography on the development of Jewish and early Christian ideas about demons and the 
devil is now considerable. Some of the most helpful examples are: V. Flint, ‘The Demonisation of 
Magic and Sorcery in Late Antiquity: Christian Redefinitions of Pagan Religions’, in B. Ankarloo and 
S. Clark, eds., Witchcraft and Magic in Europe: Ancient Greece and Rome (London: Athlone Press, 1999), 
281-96; E. Pagels, The Origin of Satan (New York: Random House, 1995); J. Burton Russell, Satan: The 
Early Christian Tradition (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1981); N. Forsyth, The Old Enemy: Satan 
and the Combat Myth (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987); A.Y. Reed, Fallen Angels and the 
History of Judaism and Christianity: The Reception of Enochic Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005). Parallels between the Rabbinic concept of the evil yetzer and late antique ideas about 
demons are explored by I. Rosen-Zvi, Demonic Desires: Yetzer Hara and the Problem of Evil in Late 
Antiquity (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011). For summaries, see: G.J. Riley, 
‘Demon’ in K. van der Toorn, B. Becking and P.W. Van Der Horst, eds., Dictionary of Deities and Demons 
in the Bible (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 445-55, and G.J. Riley, ‘Devil’, in Van Der Toorn et al., eds., Dictionary of 
Deities and Demons, 463-73. 
397 Including, for example: Porphyry (PE 4.15.1-2), Clement of Alexandria (PE 4.16.12-13) Plutarch (PE 
5.16.1-17.12), the Book of Isaiah 10:13 (DE 4.9.2). 
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between the gods and men,398 as well as on the stories found in biblical and 
apocryphal literature of a far more morally reprehensible kind of demon, often 
acting in the service of ‘the satan’, God’s spiritual adversary.399 Christians writing in 
Greek may have shared their key term ‘δαίμων’ with their pagan contemporaries, 
but their understanding of these beings, under the influence of Jewish ideas about 
demons and angels, was often very different. 
For early Christian thinkers, demons were usually unambiguously evil 
creatures,400 whereas even among those earlier Greek philosophers who, like 
Plutarch, appear to have allowed for the possibility of maliciously inclined demons, 
there was no suggestion that all demons were wicked.401 This tension between 
Platonic and Christian understandings of the demonic can be seen in Eusebius’ PE, 
where he discusses the accounts of demons put forward in particular by the 
Neoplatonist philosopher Porphyry. It is evident from these discussions that 
Eusebius’ own views of the demonic were broadly in line with those of his Christian 
predecessors.402 There are nevertheless some areas of his thought that are 
distinctive. He shows, for instance, very little interest in the concept of a ‘personal’ 
demon or angel which can be found in writers of the Platonic tradition and, more 
                                                          
398 For the history and development of Platonic ideas about demons, see: A. Timotin, La démonologie 
platonicienne: histoire de la notion de daimon de Platon aux derniers néoplatoniciennes (Leiden: Brill, 2012); 
and, in the context of wider Middle Platonic thought: J. Dillon, The Middle Platonists: A Study of 
Platonism, 80BC to AD220 (London: Duckworth, 1977; rev. edn. 1996). 
399 See: Flint, ‘The Demonisation of Magic’, 292-309; E. Ferguson, Demonology of the Early Christian World 
(Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellon Press, 1984). On the development of the idea of ‘Satan’, see: Pagels, 
Origin of Satan; Burton Russell, Satan; Forsyth, The Old Enemy. 
400 For discussion, see: Riley, ‘Demon’, in Van Der Toorn et al., eds., Dictionary of Deities and Demons; 
Flint, ‘The Demonisation of Magic’, 296-309. 
401 Dillon, Middle Platonists, 216-24. For further discussion of Plutarch’s demonology, particularly the 
controversial question of whether or not he believed that there could be wicked demons, see: F.E. 
Brenk, ‘“A Most Strange Doctrine”: Daimon in Plutarch’, Classical Journal 69 (1973), 1-11, and Martin, 
Inventing Superstition, 93-108. 
402 Coggan even goes so far as to suggest that ‘Eusebius’ treatment of the term [δαίμων] is a kind of 
classical representative of Jewish and Christian perspectives’: Pandaemonia, 182. 
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importantly in view of his heavy influence on Eusebius, in Origen.403 Such 
differences may be slight, but they can nevertheless help to highlight particular 
emphases of his thought. 
Overall, when remarks about the demonic throughout Eusebius’ works are 
taken into consideration, a reasonably clear picture emerges of his views. Of course 
there are gaps, and even at times apparent contradictions – this is hardly surprising 
given that Eusebius’ aim was not specifically to elaborate his views of demons. 
Even so, the frequency of Eusebius’ references to the demonic is enough to 
demonstrate the important role that they occupied in his understanding of the 
world. This chapter will show that Eusebius saw demons as a real and dangerous 
presence in the universe, that he believed them to live in close proximity to 
humankind and to be a force for evil, seeking to derail human salvation. In the past, 
some scholars have regarded Eusebius’ references to demons as little more than a 
useful literary or rhetorical device.404 By contrast, this chapter will suggest that such 
an approach underestimates the significance of the demonic threat for Eusebius. 
Like many of his era, Eusebius appears to have believed firmly in demons as an 
active, physical reality. Consequently it is only by acknowledging this that we can 
come to appreciate fully the role which demons played in his thought. This chapter 
will first explore Eusebius’ views on the physical nature of demons, before moving 
on to consider his opinion of their moral character, and his understanding of their 
                                                          
403 For discussion of the idea of ‘internal’ or ‘personal’ demons among Platonic writers, see: Timotin, La 
démonologie platonicienne, 243-322. On Origen, see: Timotin, La démonologie platonicienne, 272-73; 
Muehlberger, Angels, 98-99; C. Blanc, ‘L’angélologie d’Origène’, Studia Patristica 14 (1976), 103-04. 
404 For example: Chesnut, First Christian Histories, 59-60, 128. 
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powers. It will argue that, for Eusebius, demons represented a potent threat, against 
which all Christians needed to remain constantly on their guard. 
 
Physical Demons 
As G.A. Smith has shown, modern scholars have often dismissed late antique and 
early Christian references to demons as little more than ‘figures of speech’, brushing 
aside the many discussions of the physicality of demons which appear in these 
texts.405 However, as Smith’s article demonstrates, recognising this aspect of late 
antique speculation about the demonic has much to offer our understanding not 
only of late antique demonology, but also of other topics, such as late ancient ideas 
about physics and biology.406 It is therefore essential, he suggests, to treat references 
to the demonic in late antique works ‘as literally, as physically, as possible’.407 
Previous work on Eusebius’ ideas about demons, however, has consistently 
overlooked his discussions of the physical nature of the demonic. It is clear from his 
remarks on this subject that Eusebius considered the realm of the demonic to be 
closely connected to the human world. Demons, in his view, were corporeal, albeit 
invisible, beings, which participated in events in the earthly realm. Demons were 
thus not abstract ‘personifications’,408 or even a distant and obscure element of the 
universe for Eusebius. Rather, they were a real and active presence in the 
recognisable everyday world which he and his readers inhabited. In order to 
understand Eusebius’ attitude towards the demonic, and in particular in order to 
                                                          
405 Smith, ‘How Thin?’, esp. 479-83. 
406 Ibid. 496. 
407 Ibid. 483. 
408 Chesnut suggested that demons in Eusebius’ works were the ‘personification’ of φθόνος: First 
Christian Histories, 128. The problems with this view will be discussed in more detail below. 
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appreciate the severity of the demonic threat in his eyes, it is necessary to highlight 
this aspect of his thought on the subject. 
In holding the view that the demonic realm was capable of interaction with 
the human world, Eusebius was far from alone among his contemporaries. Indeed, 
ever since Plato,409 it had been widely held that one of the functions of demons was 
to act as messengers or intermediaries, bridging the divide between mortals and the 
transcendent divinity.410 By the time Eusebius was writing, as Smith has shown, 
speculation about the demonic had developed even further, and discussion of 
demons’ physical form, habitat and bodily needs was widespread among writers of 
the second to fifth centuries CE.411 Among both earlier Christian writers, and 
Neoplatonist philosophers like Porphyry, there appears to have been a common 
belief that demons ‘had bodies’,412 which lived in the lower part of the atmosphere, 
and which required nourishment.413 This nourishment, it seems, came principally 
from sacrifices: Origen described demons ‘nourishing themselves with the meaty 
smells and bloods and vapours of sacrifices’,414 while Porphyry similarly suggested 
that the smoke of sacrifices could enhance the demons’ ‘pneumatic and corporeal 
                                                          
409 The key text was Plato’s Symposium 202d-e, in which the character of Diotima described both ὁ 
δαίμων and πᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον as being ‘μεταξὺ θνητοῦ καὶ ἀθανάτου’, and described their main 
activity as being to deliver messages between the gods and mortals. 
410 Within Middle Platonism, the idea of God’s transcendence and distance from the mortal realm was 
key, with demons and other intermediate spiritual beings therefore providing the necessary link 
between the two realms: Dillon, Middle Platonists, 47, 84, 217. 
411 Smith, ‘How Thin?’. 
412 Ibid. 479. 
413 Ibid. 483. There was a widespread belief among ancient Greeks that the atmosphere was divided 
into different layers, with the dense air nearer the earth changing into a finer ‘aither’ at higher levels. 
In Homer, this higher part of the atmosphere was considered to be the part inhabited by the gods (e.g. 
Il. 2.412; 15.192): M.R. Wright, Cosmology in Antiquity (London: Routledge, 1995), 111-12. 
414 Orig. Cels.7.35: …τούτους δαίμονας ὄντας, τρεφομένους κνίσσαις καὶ αἵμασι καὶ ταῖς ἀπὸ τῶν 
θυσιῶν ἀναθυμιάσεσι… For discussion of Origen’s views on this, see: Smith, ‘How Thin?’, 483-85. 
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part’.415 With such views about the physicality of demons apparently widespread in 
this period, we should not be surprised to find that Eusebius also considered 
demons to have a very real and physical existence. 
Although Eusebius did not discuss the nature of demonic bodies to the same 
extent as, for instance, Origen had done, it is clear, even from his few scattered 
references to the subject, that he shared many of these assumptions about the 
physical nature of demons. In the VC, Eusebius refers to sacrifices as ‘demonic 
festivals’,416 and elsewhere describes ‘those wicked demons which, lurking in 
images and sunk into dark corners, covet the libations and fatty smoke of 
sacrifices’.417 Crucially, Eusebius also believed these physical demons to live in 
places very close to humans. Demons, he asserts, ‘are near the earth and 
subterranean, and wander about the heavy and misty air about the earth and… are 
fond of inhabiting the tombs and memorials of the dead’.418 Although people cannot 
see these demons, Eusebius suggests that ‘spreading great error, chthonic and 
demonic beings, invisible to us, are flying about the air around the earth, unknown 
and indistinct to men’.419 Thus Eusebius’ demons effectively surround human 
beings, inhabiting the spaces above, below and among them. The human and 
demonic realms are envisaged as existing in close proximity to each other. 
                                                          
415 Porph. de Abst. 2.42.3, cited in Smith, ‘How Thin?’, 486: Οὗτοι οἱ χαίροντες “λοιβῇ τε κνίσῃ τε” δι’ 
ὧν αὐτῶν τὸ πνευματικὸν καὶ σωματικὸν πιαίνεται. 
416 VC 3.48.2: …δαιμονικὰς ἑορτάς… Cf. Mart. Pal. [SR] 4.8. 
417 SC 13.4: …τοῖς ἐμφωλεύουσι τοῖς ξοάνοις σκοτίοις τε μυχοῖς ἐγκαταδεδυκόσι δαίμοσι πονηροῖς 
ἀμφὶ τὰς τῶν θυσιῶν λοιβάς τε καὶ κνίσας λιχνεύουσιν… Cf. PE 5.2.1. 
418 PE 5.2.1: Οἵδε γοῦν περίγειοί τινες ὄντες καὶ καταχθόνιοι τόν τε ἐπὶ γῆν βαρὺν καὶ ζοφερὸν 
ἀέρα περιπολοῦντες καὶ… τάφοις νεκρῶν καὶ μνήμασι… ἐμφιλοχωροῦντες… 
419 DE 4.8.4: πολυπλανοῦς ὑπαρχούσης τῆς ἀοράτως ἡμῖν ἀμφὶ τὸν περὶ γῆν ἀέρα πωτωμένης 
χθονίου καὶ δαιμονικῆς οὐσίας ἀγνώστου τε καὶ ἀδιακρίτου ἀνθρώποις… This is perhaps a 
reference to the ‘ruler of the power of the air’ (τὸν ἄρχοντα τῆς ἐξουσίας τοῦ ἀέρος) in Eph. 2:2 – I am 
grateful to the audience at the King’s College London Classics Department Research Seminar, 13th 
December 2011, for raising this possibility. 
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As well as situating demons within a recognisable human world of graves, 
temples and sacrificial rituals, Eusebius also firmly roots his demons within 
historical time. In his accounts of the human past, Eusebius gives demons an active 
and intimate role in the events he believed to have unfolded. He suggests, for 
instance, that traditional Greek and Roman polytheistic worship is to be attributed 
to the malign influence of demons.420 In this, of course, Eusebius was hardly original 
among early Christian writers. The idea that the pagan gods were in reality demons 
appears in the Psalms – in his own discussion of demons, Eusebius quotes the idea 
found in Psalm 95(96).5 that ‘all the gods of the nations are demons’.421 A similar 
idea recurs in the letters of Paul, who wrote that ‘what pagans sacrifice, they 
sacrifice to demons and not to God’.422 Picking up on this scriptural idea, we find 
several Christian apologists making the same point. Like Eusebius, Origen had 
earlier drawn attention to Psalm 95(96),423 while Justin Martyr wrote that, in the 
past, people ‘not understanding that they were wicked demons, called them by the 
name of gods’.424 In suggesting that traditional pagan cult was offered, not to truly 
divine beings, but rather to malevolent demons, Eusebius was therefore following a 
strong early Christian tradition. 
Moreover, Eusebius’ description of the process by which he believed 
polytheism to have become established is far from vague, and he had clearly given 
                                                          
420 PE 4.16.20, 5.1.1, 5.1.16, 5.15.3, 6.11.82, 7.16.10. Cf. for example: LC 7.2, 7.7; SC 13.4; DE 4.10.3, 6.20.5, 
8.Praef.9; CPs, PG 23.680.38, 23.684.45-46, 23.692.2-3, 23.865.5, 23.1020.11; Fr.Luc., PG 24.553.25, 
24.553.42-46; CI 80.28-29. 
421 …πάντες οἱ θεοὶ τῶν ἐθνῶν δαιμόνια. In this case, I have not followed the NRSV translation, 
which, translating the Hebrew rather than the Greek Septuagint, has ‘idols’ instead of ‘demons’. Cited 
by Eusebius at: PE 4.16.20. 
422 1 Cor. 10:20, NRSV trans: …ἀλλ’ ὅτι ἃ θύουσιν, δαιμονίοις καὶ οὐ θεῷ… 
423 Orig. Cels. 3.2. 
424 Justin 1 Apol. 5.2: …μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι δαίμονας εἶναι φαύλους θεοὺς προσωνόμαζον… Cf. Tatian, 
Orat. 8, 18. 
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the topic some thought. In the DE, Eusebius suggests that polytheism had not been 
the original form of worship, even among people who had not been capable of 
recognising the true God.425 Rather, Eusebius suggests that God had set up some of 
his angels to watch over these people, permitting them a simple form of astral 
worship instead.426 This, Eusebius suggests, was intended to bring them as close to 
true worship as was possible for them, by allowing them devotion to the most 
beautiful elements of God’s creation.427 However, this early human state was then, 
in Eusebius’ view, undermined by the activity of the devil and his demons, who 
drew these people away from the worship of the stars towards a less moral and less 
pious polytheism.428 As part of this historical sketch, Eusebius shows humankind as 
suffering the effects of a higher, cosmic battle between God and his demonic 
adversaries: the demons challenge God by undermining his plans for humankind. 
Their rebellion against God takes the form of subjugating humankind to their own 
rule, thereby jeopardising humankind’s salvation.429 
Likewise, when Eusebius writes of the beginnings of a decline in demonic 
power in the PE, he again places it firmly within a recognisable historical 
framework. Describing the end of the practice of human sacrifice, which he 
considered to be a manifestation of demonic influence, he even goes so far as to give 
it a precise date in the reign of Hadrian.430 This date appears to be based on a 
reference at Porphyry’s de Abstinentia 2.56.3, which Eusebius cites at PE 4.16.7.431 
                                                          
425 DE 4.6.9-4.9.12. 
426 DE 4.6.9, 4.8.1. 
427 DE 4.8.2-5. 
428 DE 4.9.5-8. 
429 DE 4.9.1-12. 
430 PE 4.15.6, 4.17.4; cf. Theoph. 3.16; SC 16.10. 
431 Johnson, Ethnicity and Argument, 169. 
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Here Porphyry mentions a statement by the writer Pallas, working in the reign of 
Hadrian, who claimed that the practice of human sacrifice had been almost entirely 
abolished by that time. Eusebius picks up on this claim, but finds a new significance 
in the timing, pointing out that during the reign of Hadrian ‘like a light, the 
teaching of Christ was already shining through every place’.432 
A similarly deliberate pin-pointing of the decline of demonic power occurs at 
PE 5.17.13, where Eusebius dates the ‘death’ of a demon, supposedly described by 
Plutarch,433 to the reign of Tiberius. Once again, the choice of this date is not 
Eusebius’ own, but is based on references to Tiberius within Plutarch’s story.434 
However, at PE 5.17.13, Eusebius does draw particular attention to what he 
considered the significance of this date to be – the fact that the reign of Tiberius was 
the time of Christ’s activity on earth. In both cases, Eusebius makes a connection – 
entirely absent from these earlier sources – between the spread of Christianity and 
the decline of demonic influence. Describing both the emergence, and the decline of 
demonic influence, Eusebius therefore places them within a structured, linear 
historical framework. Eusebius’ interweaving of cosmic and human stories is not 
left in the abstract; rather, Eusebius firmly grounds cosmic events in what he 
considered to be traceable human history. 
It is further worth noting that the demons in Eusebius’ works are consistently 
depicted as an external force. This is significant because, while demons were often 
                                                          
432 PE 4.15.6: …φωτὸς δίκην ἤδη διαλαμπούσης ἐπὶ πάντα τόπον τῆς τοῦ Χριστοῦ διδασκαλίας. 
433 Eusebius quotes Plut. De Defect. Orac. 418E-419F to support his point (PE 5.17.1-12). For a detailed 
discussion of Eusebius’ treatment of this passage of Plutarch, see: Coggan, Pandaemonia. Coggan’s 
thesis focuses on the way in which Eusebius used this passage as part of his apologetic attack on 
traditional pagan religion. Using this passage effectively as a case study, she considers the way in 
which Eusebius altered the meaning of traditionally ambiguous terms such as Πὰν and δαίμων to 
make their meaning exclusively negative. 
434 Plut. De Defect. Orac. 419D. 
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envisioned in very physical terms, especially in later antiquity, this was not the only 
way in which they might be conceived. As Andrei Timotin has recently shown, 
speculation on the nature of Socrates’ δαίμων, as described by Plato, led Middle 
Platonists like Plutarch and Apuleius to develop the notion that the philosopher 
might be guided in leading a virtuous life by a higher, more spiritual, ‘demonic’ 
part of the soul – in effect, a ‘guardian’ demon linked to the individual human 
soul.435 Among early Christian and Jewish writers of the first three centuries CE, this 
idea began to encompass the notion of two personal demons, one good and one 
bad, which were continually vying to control the direction of each person’s life.436 
This idea emerges particularly clearly in Origen’s Homily on Luke:437 
Unicuique duo assistunt angeli, alter iustitiae, alter iniquitatis. Si bonae 
cogitationes in corde nostro fuerint et in animo iustitia pullulaverit, haud 
dubium, quin nobis loquatur angelus Domini. Si vero malae fuerint in nostro 
corde versatae, loquitur nobis angelus diaboli.438 
Two angels, one of righteousness, the other of injustice, stand by each 
one of us. If there are good thoughts in our heart and righteousness 
grows in our soul, no doubt it is an angel of the Lord who speaks to us. 
If, indeed, bad thoughts are moving in our heart, it is an angel of the 
devil who speaks to us. 
In this context, it does not seem unreasonable to suggest that writers might have 
been using the notion of demons or angels to understand or describe aspects of 
human psychology. Nor was such a use of the concept of the angel or demon 
                                                          
435 Timotin, La démonologie platonicienne, 321. 
436 Ibid. 271-72. 
437 Ibid. 272-73. Cf. on Origen’s understanding of ‘guardian angels’: Blanc, ‘L’angélologie d’Origène’, 
103-04. 
438 Orig. Hom. In Luc. 12.4. Origen’s 39 Homilies on Luke survive mainly in the Latin translation of 
Jerome, with only a few Greek fragments remaining. Although the translation has been criticised in the 
past, F. Fournier, one of the editors of the Sources Chrétiennes edition, found that, where the Latin 
translation could be compared with the remaining Greek fragments, it was largely accurate and 
suggested that Jerome ‘exprime bien les idées du maitre d’Alexandrie’: F. Fournier, ‘Introduction II: 
Les Homélies sur Luc et leur traduction par S. Jérome’, in Origen, Homélies sur S. Luc: texte latine et 
fragments grecs, ed. and trans., H. Crouzel, F. Fournier, and P. Périchon, Sources Chrétiennes 87 (Paris: 
Éditions du Cerf, 1962), 85-87. 
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incompatible with a more physical view of the demonic realm as well, for as we 
have seen, Origen also entertained strikingly physical ideas about demons’ 
bodies.439 However, this idea of personal or guardian demons is not one that we 
find emphasised in Eusebius. 
This contrasts with the position adopted by Ellen Muehlberger, who recently 
suggested that Eusebius did believe all Christians to have a permanent, guardian 
angel.440 Her argument is based on a passage in the DE, in which Eusebius writes: 
‘so that men on earth would not be without leaders and inspectors like irrational 
creatures, [God] established heavenly angels as their guardians and curators, like 
leaders of a herd and shepherds’.441 However, this appears to be a misreading of the 
passage. For one thing, Eusebius does not mention ‘Christians’ at all here, rather he 
refers more broadly to ‘the men on earth’ (οἱ ἐπὶ γῆς ἄνθρωποι). More importantly, 
Eusebius’ reference to angels acting like ‘shepherds’ suggests that he envisaged the 
angels watching over large groups of people, rather than being assigned to each 
individual. Finally, this passage is immediately followed by a quotation of 
Deuteronomy 32:7-9, in which, according to the Septuagint version, it is said that 
God divided the human nations between the ‘angels of God’ (ἀγγέλων Θεοῦ).442 
This passage should therefore be read as a reference, not to the notion of ‘guardian 
demons’, but rather to the idea of the ‘angels of the nations’, also found in Origen, 
                                                          
439 See above, p. 91, and Smith, ‘How Thin?’, 508. 
440 Muehlberger, Angels, 118. 
441 DE 4.6.9: …ὡς ἂν μὴ ἄναρχοι καὶ ἀνεπιστάτητοι θρεμμάτων δίκην ἀλόγων εἶεν οἱ ἐπὶ γῆς 
ἄνθρωποι προστάτας αὐτῶν καὶ ἐπιμελητάς, ὥσπερ τινὰς ἀγελάρχας καὶ ποιμένας, θείους 
ἀγγέλους κατεστήσατο… 
442 DE 4.7.1. 
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according to which God had arranged for different angels to supervise the various 
human nations.443 
Since Eusebius accorded the notion of personal demons such little attention, 
despite its appearance in the work of Origen, we should be particularly cautious 
before attempting to read Eusebius’ demons in any ‘psychological’ or ‘internal’ 
way. Eusebius’ emphasis is on demons as a physical, external reality and, as a 
result, this is how we must principally attempt to treat them. 
 
Wicked Demons 
For Eusebius, demons are not simply a physical reality, but a dangerous one too. 
That all demons are a threat to be both feared and if possible avoided is central to 
Eusebius’ conception of the demonic. In the PE, the point about demons which 
Eusebius makes most insistently is that there can be no such thing as a good 
demon,444 thereby distancing himself from the view of contemporary non-Christian 
philosophers like Porphyry.445 On this point, he makes it clear that there is no room 
for doubt, asserting that ‘our divine sayings never name any demon at all as 
good’.446 As Coggan has shown, Eusebius’ discussions of the demonic in the PE 
effectively serve to ‘redefine’ the term δαίμων and to remove from it any of the 
ambiguity which had traditionally been attached to the word.447 
                                                          
443 Blanc, ‘L’angelologie d’Origène’, 88-92, citing Origen Cels. 5.30; Hom in Luc. 35.8; De Princ. 3.2-3. This 
is also how Johnson reads this passage: Ethnicity and Argument, 166-67. 
444 See, for example: PE 4.10.4, 4.14.10, 4.15.3-4, 4.16.20, 4.16.23, 4.17.5-7, 4.17.10, 4.21.1, 5.1.1, 5.1.16, 
5.3.8, 5.4.4, 6.6.1. 
445 As, for instance, very deliberately at: PE 4.15.3-9. 
446 PE 4.5.4: τὰ μὲν γὰρ παρ’ ἡμῖν θεῖα λόγια οὐδ’ ὅλως ἀγαθὸν οὐδέν’ ὀνομάζειν δαίμονα… 
447 Coggan, Pandaemonia, iii. Coggan’s thesis focuses on the way in which Eusebius transforms the 
meanings of the words Πὰν and δαίμων as part of his apologetic approach in the PE. Cf. A. 
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This attempt to undermine the traditional Greek understanding of the nature 
of the demonic can be seen most clearly in the alternative etymology for the word 
δαίμων that Eusebius proposes at PE 4.5.4. Demons, Eusebius informs us, ‘are 
fittingly called demons, not, as it seems to the Greeks, because they are 
knowledgeable (δαήμονας) and skilled, but for fear (τὸ δειμαίνειν), since they fear 
and cause fear.’448 It seems likely that Eusebius took his ‘traditional’ etymology of 
the word δαίμων from Plato’s Cratylus, in which the character of Socrates suggests 
that Hesiod named the demons δαίμονες ‘because they were prudent and 
knowledgeable (δαήμονες)’.449 Although Eusebius does not name his source here as 
Plato, this is most probably because Eusebius usually prefers to quote Plato 
approvingly, as support for his understanding of the demonic, whereas here, 
Eusebius is seeking to distance himself from the Platonic idea.450 Significantly, 
Plato’s etymology occurs in the context of a discussion about how the names of 
natural creatures and objects might come from ‘a more divine power than the 
power of men’, and thus reflect something essential to their nature.451 In the course 
of this discussion, Socrates and Hermogenes agree that ‘the good are also the 
prudent’, before progressing to associate the name δαίμων with the qualities of 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Mendelson, ‘Eusebius and the Posthumous Career of Apollonius of Tyana’, in H.W. Attridge, and G. 
Hata, eds., Eusebius, Christianity and Judaism (Leiden: Brill, 1992), 518. 
448 PE 4.5.4: …τοὺς μέντοι δαίμονας… οὐκ ᾗπερ Ἕλλησι δοκεῖ παρὰ τὸ δαήμονας εἶναι καὶ 
ἐπιστήμονας, ἀλλ’ ἢ παρὰ τὸ δειμαίνειν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ φοβεῖσθαι καὶ ἐκφοβεῖν, δαίμονάς τινας 
προσφυῶς ὀνομάζεσθαι. 
449 Plat. Cra. 398b: …ὁτι φρόνιμοι καὶ δαήμονες ἦσαν, δαὶμονας αὐτοὺς ὠνόμασεν. As Riley also 
noted: ‘Demon’ in Van Der Toorn et al., eds., Dictionary of Deities and Demons, 445. Riley, however, 
believes that the ‘most likely’ etymology of the word δαίμων is not that of either Plato or Eusebius. 
Instead, he suggests that it came from the word δαίω, meaning ‘to divide (destinies)’, and thus 
referred to ‘the spirit controlling one’s fate’, 445. Clearly, however, neither Plato nor Eusebius had this 
in mind, but instead found etymologies for the word that best suited their own understanding of the 
nature of demons. 
450 Eusebius expresses his general admiration for Plato, albeit with some reservations, at PE 11.Praef.5, 
13.13.66. 
451 Plat. Cra. 397c: ἴσως δ’ ἔνια αὐτῶν καὶ ὑπὸ θειοτέρας δυνάμεως ἢ τῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐτέθη. 
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knowledge and prudence or understanding.452 As such, an acceptance of the 
traditional etymology of the term δαίμων might also be taken as an acceptance of 
the essential goodness of their nature. Thus, in redefining the word as he does, 
Eusebius is making clear to his readership the distance that lies between the 
traditional Greek view of the demonic and his own, recognisably Christian view. At 
the same time, he is also drawing attention to one of the most significant aspects of 
his view of the demonic – the idea that they are to be feared. 
To support his argument about the malevolence of demons in the PE, 
Eusebius draws, as so often, on the works of earlier writers, exploiting areas of 
common ground, but also at times using their own arguments against them. In his 
discussion of demons in book 4 of the PE, Eusebius makes particularly extensive 
use of some of Porphyry’s works, most notably the de Abstinentia.453 With its 
condemnation of the practice of animal sacrifice, the de Abstinentia contains several 
areas in which Eusebius might easily find himself in agreement with Porphyry, and 
Eusebius in fact brings these to the reader’s attention. Introducing his discussion of 
the de Abstinentia, Eusebius even goes so far as to suggest that Porphyry had been 
‘moved by correct reason’ in his basic argument against sacrifice,454 and later agrees 
with Porphyry that sacrifice is ‘profane, unjust, and hurtful’.455 
Yet, having established this area of common ground, using lengthy quotations 
from Porphyry’s own text to condemn sacrificial practices, Eusebius then launches 
an immediate challenge to the part of Porphyry’s argument with which he 
                                                          
452 Ibid. 398b: Οἱ δ’ ἀγαθοὶ ἄλλο τι ἢ φρόνιμοι; 
453 As, for example, at: PE 4.11.1-12.1, 4.14.1-9, 4.16.1-9, 4.18.1-19.2, 4.22.1-12. 
454 PE 4.10.1: …ὀρθῷ λογισμῷ κινούμενος…  
455 PE 4.14.10: ἀνόσιον γὰρ καὶ ἄδικον καὶ ἐπιβλαβὲς… 
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disagrees: the suggestion that sacrifices are offered to ‘demons, either good or bad’, 
rather than to the gods.456 Agreeing that sacrifices are not offered to the true God, 
but only to demons,457 Eusebius then uses Porphyry’s own arguments about the 
unholy nature of animal sacrifice to suggest that no good being would require such 
a practice.458 As such, Eusebius argues, sacrificial cults could never have been 
demanded by good demons, but only by the wicked.459 Rather than condemning 
Porphyry’s views outright, and thereby perhaps asking his readers to reject entirely 
the ideas about demons which they might have held prior to their conversion to 
Christianity,460 Eusebius instead uses these views as a foundation on which to build 
his own arguments. His focus is on highlighting the key area of difference between 
the Christian view of the demonic and the Neoplatonic view expressed by Porphyry 
– that is, the moral character of demons. 
Eusebius’ uncompromising belief in the malevolent character of demons can 
also be found reflected in a range of his other works, and is particularly evident in 
his description of the demonic as μισόκαλος (good-hating),461 or φιλοπονήρος 
(evil-loving).462 These terms, particularly μισόκαλος, can be found in many early 
Christian texts, describing not only demons, but also the devil.463 Eusebius’ use of 
these terms therefore points to another important feature of the demonic in his eyes 
– their relationship with the devil.464 The repeated occurrence of these words in 
                                                          
456 PE 4.15.1: …δαίμοσιν δέ, ἀλλ’ ἤτοι ἀγαθοῖς ἢ καὶ φαύλοις. 
457 PE 4.14.10. 
458 PE 4.14.10-4.15.4. 
459 Ibid. 
460 Cf. on Justin Martyr: Reed, Fallen Angels, 186. 
461 E.g. HE 4.7.1, 5.21.2; PE 7.10.14. 
462 E.g. HE 10.4.14, 10.4.57, 10.8.2. Cf. HE 4.7.10: ...τὸν ἐπιχαιρεσίκακον δαίμονα... 
463 G.J.M. Bartelink, ‘Μισόκαλος, Épithéte du Diable’, Vigiliae Christianae 12 (1958), 37. 
464 On which, see below, p. 110-16. 
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Eusebius’ discussions of the demonic has already been noted by Glen Chesnut.465 In 
Chesnut’s view, Eusebius’ characterisation of demons was linked to an exploration 
of deeper psychological concerns, and his descriptions of demons in this negative 
way should be seen as part of an attempt to understand ‘the dark part of the human 
personality’.466 Such an explanation, however, leaves much to be desired. 
In suggesting that demons were, for Eusebius, little more than a tool with 
which to explore human psychology, Chesnut crucially fails to recognise the reality 
of the demonic for Eusebius. Moreover, Chesnut also risks downplaying the 
significance of this characteristic for Eusebius’ understanding of the danger posed 
by demons. Although Chesnut does note that the idea of a hatred of goodness 
acting as a ‘motivating emotion’ would have seemed ‘perverse indeed’ to pagans, 
he fails to point out that this characteristic significantly reinforces the sense that 
demons are a force to be feared.467 Creatures considered to be invariably ‘good-
hating’ would pose a particularly serious and unpredictable threat, since their 
actions against human interests would require no provocation in the form of human 
transgression. 
 
Demons and Envy 
This sense that demons are universally wicked is further reflected in the association 
which Eusebius draws between demons and the characteristic of envy. There are 
three terms which Eusebius uses in this context: φθόνος,468 βασκανία469 and 
                                                          
465 Chesnut, First Christian Histories, 128; cf. Coggan, Pandaemonia, 185. 
466 Ibid. 128. 
467 Ibid. 128. 
468 E.g. PE 7.10.15; DE 4.9.1; HE 10.4.14, 10.4.57, 10.8.2; VC 1.45.3, 2.73.1. 
469 E.g. PE 7.10.14; DE 4.9.1; HE 5.21.2; VC 2.73.1, 4.41.2. 
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ζῆλος.470 As P. Walcot has shown, there was considerable overlap in meaning 
between these terms in classical Greek texts,471 and it is clear that this continued in 
Eusebius’ use of the terms. At times, they appear almost synonymous for Eusebius. 
At DE 4.9.1, for instance, Eusebius combines the terms φθόνος and βασκανία in his 
description of the demons’ fall, thereby suggesting that envy was seen by Eusebius 
as characteristic of demonic activity from the very beginning of their existence: 
… φθόνῳ τῆς ἀνθρώπων σωτηρίας τὴν ἐναντίαν εἷλκεν, παντοίαις 
κακίας μηχαναῖς πᾶσι τοῖς ἔθνεσιν καὶ αὐτῷ τῷ τοῦ κυρίου κλήρῳ 
βασκανίᾳ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιβουλεύοντα.  
… through envy of the salvation of men they took the opposing side, 
scheming by all kinds of wicked means against all the nations and 
against the Lord’s lot itself through their jealousy of the good. 
In his oration on the dedication of the Church at Tyre, Eusebius similarly combined 
φθόνος and ζῆλος in his description of ‘the evil-loving demon’ (τοῦ φιλοπνήρου 
δαίμονος).472 Nor was Eusebius the only fourth-century writer to use these terms at 
times almost interchangeably – in Basil of Caesarea’s homily On Envy, we likewise 
find all three terms employed to describe a nexus of negative envious emotions 
associated with demonic evil.473 It therefore seems that in the fourth century the 
meaning of these three words was similar enough to allow them to be used 
synonymously, or to be combined for emphatic effect, as by Eusebius at DE 4.9.1. 
Nevertheless, the three terms did have slightly different connotations, which 
it is important to recognise. Of these terms, ζῆλος stands out as being able to 
convey, on occasion, a positive connotation. Walcot suggests that, for earlier writers 
                                                          
470 E.g. HE 10.4.57, cf. ἀντίζηλος at HE 4.15.40 (a quotation from the Martyrdom of Polycarp). 
471 P. Walcot, Envy and the Greeks: A Study of Human Behaviour (Warminster: Aris & Phillips, 1978), 2, 
citing Lys. 2.48 and 79, citing Dem. 20.24. 
472 HE 10.4.57. 
473 For example: PG 31.380.3-10, where all three terms appear together in quick succession in the same 
passage. On this homily, see: V. Limberis, ‘The Eyes Infected by Evil: Basil of Caesarea’s Homily, On 
Envy’, HTR 84 (1991), 163-84. 
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like Aristotle and Plutarch, φθόνος and ζῆλος might be distinguished in a similar 
manner to the English ‘envy’ and ‘emulation’, with the latter regarded as a positive, 
rather than a negative emotion.474 Similarly, among early Christian authors, ζῆλος 
could be used to refer to the imitation of God by humankind, or even to describe 
God himself.475 Indeed, even in the works of Eusebius, we find forms of ζῆλος also 
applied to a more positive emulation, such as the attempt to live up to the example 
of the virtuous patriarchs like Abraham and Joseph.476 Yet ζῆλος is also the term 
which Eusebius applies least often to the demons.477 This is surely connected to the 
fact that it could, in certain circumstances, be open to a more positive interpretation. 
In association with demons, Eusebius preferred to use another word for ‘envy’, one 
which had an unambiguously negative meaning – φθόνος. 
Their association with φθόνος would not only have marked Eusebius’ 
demons as wicked, but also as distant from true divinity. Plato, in a passage of the 
Timaeus that was widely discussed in antiquity,478 had stressed that ‘in one who is 
good no envy is ever possible regarding anything’.479 This claim occurred in the 
context of a discussion about the nature of the Demiurge, the world’s creator, in 
which the character of Timaeus was made to suggest that the creator was so good, 
and so free from envy that ‘he wished very much that everything might come into 
                                                          
474 Walcot, Envy, 14, citing Arist. Rhet. 1387b-1388b and Plut. De fraterno amore 487a-b. 
475 PGL, s.v. ζῆλος. 
476 For example: PE 7.8.24, 7.8.25, 7.8.32, 11.4.5. Cf. HE 2.17.5. 
477 In the HE, for example, Eusebius uses ζῆλος only once to describe demons (HE 10.4.57). In the same 
work, Eusebius associates the demons with βασκανία once in his own voice (HE 5.21.2), and once in a 
quotation (HE 4.15.40). Demons are associated most often with φθόνος, which appears three times in 
connection with demons in the HE (HE 10.4.14, 10.4.57, 10.8.2). 
478 On use of this passage by later writers, see: M.W. Dickie, ‘The Place of Phthonos in the Argument of 
Plato’s Phaedrus’, in R.M. Rosen and J. Farrell, eds., Nomodeiktes: Greek Studies in Honour of Martin 
Ostwald (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993), 381-82. 




being similar to himself’ and that ‘as much as possible all might be good and 
nothing wicked’.480 As such, in Platonic thought, envy was seen as an emotion 
entirely incompatible with the ultimate divinity; in fact, a key characteristic of this 
divine creator was the very absence of envy. This was clearly an idea that held 
particular appeal for Eusebius, since he quoted this line from the Timaeus on several 
occasions.481 On one occasion in the PE, Eusebius’ quotation of Plato’s line occurs in 
the context of his own discussion about ‘the essence of the good’,482 in which 
Eusebius asserts that according to Scripture ‘the good itself is nothing other than 
God’.483 For Eusebius, then, just as for Plato, there is a clear association between 
goodness, divinity, and freedom from envy. By describing the demons as envious, 
Eusebius is therefore highlighting several ways in which they are distant from the 
true God. A division is established between goodness, a lack of envy, and true 
divinity on the one hand and wickedness, unrestrained envy, and a lack of divinity 
on the other. 
Likewise, in the early Christian tradition, φθόνος was seen, not simply as 
incompatible with the divine, but even as directly opposed to it. In the New 
Testament, φθόνος appears as a fault among humans,484 at times lined up for 
criticism alongside other vices such as licentiousness, deceit and wickedness.485 
Crucially, however, φθόνος was also associated by early Christians with the devil. 
According to the apocryphal Book of Wisdom, it was ‘by the φθόνος of the devil’ 
                                                          
480 Plat. Tim. 29e: τούτου δ’ ἐκτὸς ὢν πάντα ὅ τι μάλιστα γενέσθαι ἐβουλήθη παραπλήσια ἑαυτῷ; 
ibid. 30a: …ἀγαθὰ μὲν πάντα, φλαῦρον δὲ μηδὲν εἶναι κατὰ δύναμιν… 
481 See: PE 11.21.2, 15.5.2; CH 6.4. 
482 PE 11.21.1: …τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ οὐσίαν… 
483 Ibid.: …αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν οὐδὲν ἄλλο εἶναι ἢ θεὸν… 
484 Matt 27:18; Mark 15:10; Gal. 5:26; Phil 1:15; 
485 Rom. 1:29; Gal 5:21; 1 Tim. 6:4; Tit. 3:3; 1 Pet. 2:1. Note, however, the use of φθόνος at Jas. 4:5, 
referring to God, which appears to be an entirely anomalous use of the term. 
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that death had first come into the world.486 This idea was repeated in the first epistle 
of Clement,487 and Eusebius also cites this passage in the PE.488 Clement of 
Alexandria denied the possibility that God could feel envy, since God was 
untouched by the passions.489 Instead, in a possible, oblique reference to the devil, 
Clement suggests that ‘the one who is envious is another, one who has been 
approached by passion’.490 By characterising the demons as motivated by φθόνος, 
Eusebius is therefore hinting at a connection between demons and the devil which 
he elaborated most fully in the PE and DE.491 It is striking that Eusebius draws such 
a close link between demons and φθόνος, encouraging us to see this vice as 
characteristic of the demonic. More than once in Eusebius’ works we find φθόνος 
and a ‘wicked demon’ working in combination.492 Furthermore, Eusebius also 
characterises φθόνος as μισόκαλος, the same designation that he sometimes gives 
to demons.493 This suggests that φθόνος is so characteristic of Eusebius’ demons 
that the noun φθόνος could even be used in works such as the VC to stand in place 
of a reference to demons. 
The close relationship between Eusebius’ demons and φθόνος in particular 
has previously been noted by Chesnut, who suggested that the demons in Eusebius’ 
works were the ‘personification’ of this emotion.494 Although Chesnut evidently 
recognises the importance of this link for Eusebius, his analysis does not provide 
                                                          
486 Wisdom 2:24: φθόνῳ δὲ διαβόλου θάνατος εἰςῆλθεν εἰς τόν κόσμον. 
487 1 Clem. 3:4, citing Wisd. 2:24. 
488 PE 13.3.38. 
489 Clem. Alex. Stro. 7.2.7.2. 
490 Ibid.: ἄλλος δὲ ὁ φθονῶν, οὗ καὶ πάθος ἥψατο. 
491 See the discussion below, p. 110-16. 
492 E.g.: HE 10.4.14, 10.8.2; VC 1.49.1-2, 2.73.1. 
493 E.g.: VC 1.49.2, 3.1.1, 4.41.1; HE 10.4.14, 10.8.2. On demons as μισόκαλος, see above, p. 101-02. 
494 Chesnut, First Christian Histories, 128. 
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the most helpful way of characterising the relationship between demons and envy. 
In particular, Chesnut’s argument again risks downplaying the reality of the 
demonic in Eusebius’ mind by implying that Eusebius’ demons were little more 
than a way of overcoming an historiographical problem. Chesnut points out that the 
idea of the jealousy of the gods and their resentment of human prosperity was an 
essential part of traditional Greek thought, and a feature of non-Christian 
historiography which the earliest Christian historians, including Eusebius, 
struggled to reconcile with their idea of a benevolent God.495 Chesnut suggests that 
these historians were able to overcome this problem by ‘reinterpreting’ the jealousy 
of the gods as the jealousy of demons.496 Although it is true that references to 
demonic envy are more numerous in Eusebius’ arguably more ‘historical’ works, 
the HE and VC, similar references can also be found elsewhere. In the DE, where 
there is no historiographical or narrative need for a replacement for the ‘jealousy of 
the gods’, demons are still closely linked with the emotion of envy. At DE 4.9.1, 
demons are not simply linked loosely to envy, but the object of their jealousy – the 
salvation of humankind – is identified, and given as a reason for their initial fall. It 
therefore seems that this characteristic was far more important to Eusebius’ 
understanding of the demonic character then Chesnut’s analysis allows. 
It is also significant that, as Chesnut admits, the φθόνος of Eusebius’ demons 
is significantly more serious than the ‘petty jealousy’ or ‘displeasure at human 
arrogance’ of the mythological gods.497 As D.L. Cairns has argued, the traditional 
φθόνος of the Greek gods ‘presupposes at least a minimal notion of human 
                                                          
495 Ibid. 59-60. 
496 Ibid. 60. 
497 Ibid. 128. 
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offence’;498 the φθόνος of Eusebius’ demons, by contrast, required no such 
provocation. In Eusebius’ works, the φθόνος of the demons is regularly linked to 
other demonic traits, such as their hatred of the good, and their love of evil, as when 
Eusebius writes of the ‘good-hating envy, even the evil-loving demon’ resenting the 
prosperity of the church.499 Eusebius is thus able to create a closely linked group of 
key negative associations for the demons. This suggestion that demonic envy might 
arise simply from a ‘hatred of the good’, rather than as a response to some form of 
human transgression served once again to make the nature of their threat seem far 
more unpredictable. It also made it clear that the φθόνος of the demons, unlike that 
of the traditional gods, did not contain any element of divine justice, but was itself 
unjust and indiscriminate in its targeting of humankind. 
Like φθόνος, the characteristic of βασκανία is unambiguously negative for 
Eusebius. Traditionally, the verb βασκαίνω had referred not only to being jealous, 
but also, significantly, to the idea of ‘casting the evil eye’ upon someone.500 As 
Vasiliki Limberis has shown in the case of Basil of Caesarea, some early Christian 
writers sought to bring popular fears about the power of the ‘evil eye’ (βάσκανος 
ὀφθαλμός) into the remit of the church, by suggesting that envy and the evil eye 
were the work of demons and the devil, to be combatted through the pursuit of 
                                                          
498 D.L. Cairns, ‘The Politics of Envy: Envy and Equality in Ancient Greece’ in D. Konstan and N.K. 
Rutter, eds., Envy, Spite and Jealousy: The Rivalrous Emotions in Ancient Greece (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2003), 250. Konstan has similarly noted that, in Classical Greek literature, φθόνος 
might in some cases convey the idea of ‘righteous indignation’, and played a role in the maintenance 
of social and divine hierarchies: D. Konstan, The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks: Studies in Aristotle and 
Classical Literature (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006), 121. 
499 HE 10.8.2: …τῷ μισοκάλῳ φθόνῳ τῷ τε φιλοπονήρῳ δαίμονι… Cf. HE 10.4.14, 10.4.57; VC 1.49.1-2. 
500 Walcot, Envy, 79, citing Plat. Phaedo 95b and Plut. Quaest. Conviv. 680c. On the tradition of the ‘evil 
eye’, see Walcot, Envy, 77-90. 
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virtue.501 It is possible that we see Eusebius similarly attempting a Christian 
explanation for the power of βασκανία, when he suggests in the HE that ‘the good-
hating demon’ is ‘jealous in his nature’.502 For Eusebius, it seems that βασκανία is 
naturally demonic, and may be explained as a product of demonic activity. 
Although clearly very closely connected to φθόνος for Eusebius, βασκανία perhaps 
represents for him the active, harmful product of the demonic characteristic of 
φθόνος. 
Moreover, the characteristic of βασκανία would further have hinted at the 
connection between demons and the devil for early Christians, as one of the several 
possible meanings of the term βάσκανος was ‘slanderous’.503 In older Greek texts, 
such as Aristophanes and Plato, the word used by Christians for the devil, 
διάβολος, usually had the meaning simply of ‘slanderous’.504 It is therefore striking 
that at DE 4.9.1, where the demons are said to be driven by their ‘jealousy of the 
good’ (βασκανίᾳ τῶν ἀγαθῶν), this emotion is described as so extreme that they 
even act ‘against the Lord’s lot itself’ (αὐτῷ τῷ τοῦ κυρίου κλήρῳ). By ‘the Lord’s 
lot’, Eusebius is doubtless referring those who are virtuous. Shortly before this 
passage, Eusebius offers an interpretation of Deuteronomy 32.7-9, in which ‘the 
Lord’s part’ (μερίς Κυρίου) is named as ‘Jacob’.505 Glossing this passage, Eusebius 
explains that ‘Jacob’ refers to that part of humankind which displays ‘clear-
sightedness’ (τὸ διορατικὸν) and is ‘pious’ (θεοσεβής).506 Thus the implication is 
                                                          
501 Limberis, ‘The Eyes Infected’. 
502 HE 5.21.2: …τῷ μισοκάλῳ δαίμονι βασκάνῳ ὄντι τὴν φύσιν… 
503 LSJ s.v. βασκαίνω. 
504 G.J. Riley, ‘Devil’, in Van Der Toorn et al., eds., Dictionary of Deities and Demons, 463, citing 
Aristophanes, Eq. 45 and Plato Apol. 37b. 
505 DE 4.7.1-2. 
506 DE 4.7.2. 
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that piety and insight bring a person closer to God. More specifically, for Eusebius, 
these virtues bring people closer to Christ, for he makes it clear in his interpretation 
of Deuteronomy that he understands ‘Κύριος’ to refer to Christ.507 These virtues 
would also draw people away from the demons, standing in sharp contrast to the 
‘jealous’ and ‘good-hating’ character of the demons. As a result of their βασκανία, 
the demons are thus set up in opposition to Christ and the goodness associated with 
him, and are tied instead to the devil. For Eusebius, envy (φθόνος) and the 
malignant jealousy that accompanied it (βασκανία) were essential characteristics of 
demons, which not only helped to reinforce the sense of their malevolence, but also 
established them as opponents of God, and allies of the devil. 
 
Demons and the Devil 
This relationship between demons and the devil was clearly of considerable 
importance for Eusebius, since his account of the origins of the demons in the PE 
links them closely to the devil. At PE 7.16, where Eusebius offers by far his fullest 
account of the origins of the ‘opposing power’,508 he suggests that the wicked 
spiritual beings known, amongst other things, as demons were, in his view, 
originally angels.509 That Eusebius should have chosen to elaborate on this 
particular story is of considerable significance, since it was not the only explanation 
of demonic origins in circulation among early Christian writers. For some, such as 
Justin Martyr, and Eusebius’ Latin contemporary Lactantius, demons were not 
angels, but rather the maliciously inclined spirits of the giants, which were 
                                                          
507 Ibid. 
508 PE 7.16.1: …τῆς ἐναντίας δυνάμεως… 
509 PE 7.16.2, 7.16.9; cf. PE 13.15.1. 
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themselves the deformed and malevolent offspring of a forbidden union between 
fallen angels and human women.510 This story was most likely drawing on the 
account found in the Enochic Book of the Watchers, according to which the angels 
sent to watch over humankind had fallen from heaven as a result of their lust for 
human women.511 Their offspring, the giants, were then said to have spread terror 
and destruction on earth until they were destroyed at God’s command. However, 
while the giants and the fallen angels themselves were supposed to have been 
confined by God, the spirits of the giants were allowed to remain free on earth, 
continuing to cause trouble as demons.512 
Eusebius was no doubt aware of the Enochic story, yet we find only faint 
traces of it in the PE – as, for example, when Eusebius tells us that, while some of 
the fallen angels were confined in Tartarus, others were allowed to remain free on 
earth.513 Similarly in the Commentary on Isaiah, quoting directly from Genesis 6:2 
rather than from its elaboration in 1 Enoch, Eusebius offers two alternative 
explanations for the origins of wicked spiritual powers: 
τὰς μὲν οὖν δυνάμεις τὰς ἀντικειμένας ἤτοι γιγάντων οὔσας ψυχὰς 
ἢ τῶν ἐξ οὐρανοῦ κατελθόντων ἀγγέλων, ἐξ ὧν ’οἱ γίγαντες 
ἐγεννήθησαν’, ὧν καὶ ἡ Μωσέως μνημονεύει γραφὴ λέγουσα· 
                                                          
510 E. Pagels, ‘Christian Apologists and “The Fall of the Angels”: An Attack on Roman Imperial 
Power?’, HTR 78 (1985), 303; A.Y. Reed, ‘The Trickery of the Fallen Angels and the Demonic Mimesis 
of the Divine: Aetiology, Demonology and Polemics in the Writings of Justin Martyr’, JECS 12 (2004), 
141-71. See Just. 2 Apol. 4(5).3; Lact. Div. Inst. 2.14.1-5. 
511 1 Enoch 6-11. 
512 P.S. Alexander, ‘Contextualising the Demonology of the Testament of Solomon’, in A. Lange, 
H. Lichtenberger, and K.F. Diethard Romheld, eds., Die Damonen/ Demons: The Demonology of Israelite-
Jewish and Early Christian Literature in Context of their Environment (Tubingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), 629. 
Cf. J.C. VanderKam, ‘1 Enoch, Enochic Motifs and Enoch in Early Christian Literature’, in J.C. 
VanderKam and W. Adler, eds., The Jewish Apocalyptic Heritage in Early Christianity (Assen: Van 
Gorcum, 1996), 61-62; Pagels, Origin of Satan, 50-53. See also: Reed, ‘The Trickery of the Fallen Angels’, 
148. 
513 PE 7.16.7-8. 
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’ἰδοντες δὲ οἱ ἄγγελοι τοῦ θεοῦ τὰς θυγατέρας τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὅτι 
καλαί εἰσιν, ἔλαβον ἑαυτοῖς γυναῖκας ἀπὸ πασῶν, ὧν ἐξελέξαντο’.514 
And so the adverse powers are either the souls of the giants or the 
angels fallen down from heaven, from whom come ‘those descended of 
the giants’, of which the writing recorded by Moses says: ‘The angels of 
God, seeing that the daughters of men were fair, took them to 
themselves as wives out of all the things which they selected’. 
Here we find both possibilities raised: the wicked powers might be either fallen 
angels, or they might be the remnants of the giants. Eusebius does not appear to see 
any apparent contradiction between the two explanations, and, in a biblical 
commentary, the aim of which was not to elaborate on the nature of demons, we 
should not expect Eusebius to adjudicate between them. 
Nevertheless, Eusebius’ evident familiarity with the story of the giants makes 
it particularly striking that, in his longer explanation in the PE, he chose to focus on 
the story of the fallen angels. The hints of the story of the giants that appear in the 
PE make it clear that Eusebius was already aware of this version when he wrote this 
work; it is not a later discovery made between the composition of the PE and the CI. 
Rather, it seems that Eusebius deliberately chose to emphasise the original link 
between demons and angels, claiming that the demons have fallen directly from the 
‘blissful and angelic choruses’.515 This has the effect of drawing a much closer link 
between the demons and the figure regarded as their leader, the devil, for it appears 
that Eusebius also saw the devil as a fallen angel. 
In both the PE and the DE, Eusebius describes the initial fall of a clearly 
diabolical figure, identified with the fallen day-star of Isaiah 14:12.516 This figure, 
                                                          
514 CI 95.21-25. 
515 PE 7.16.7: …μακαρίοις καὶ ἀγγελικοῖς χοροῖς… 
516 DE 4.9.1-8; PE 7.16.1-7. Isaiah 14:12-15 is cited directly at PE 7.16.4 and DE 4.9.4. 
113 
 
also labelled in the PE as a ‘dragon’ (δράκων) and ‘snake’ (ὄφις),517 in line with the 
description of the devil in Revelation,518 is said to have fallen directly from among 
‘the better’.519 Moreover, he is said to have fallen for similar reasons to the demons, 
whose offences are described as ‘equal’ (παραπλησίοις) to his.520 Crucially, in the 
DE, this figure is labelled as a ‘great demon’ (μεγαλοδαίμων).521 Thus, according to 
Eusebius’ account of their origins, the demons and their leader are the same kind of 
being – the devil is not just the leader of the demons, but a demon himself, albeit a 
‘great demon’. 
Moreover, this figure is described as ‘responsible for the departure from the 
better which happened both to himself and to the rest’.522 As to precisely what the 
cause of this fall may have been, Eusebius offers at least two possible options in the 
PE and DE, likely reflecting the fact that a number of different understandings of 
the devil’s fall were current among Christian writers of the first few centuries. 
Sirinelli identified two main views that were prevalent at the time: the first, which 
he attributed to writers including Tertullian, Athenagoras and Lactantius, placed 
the devil’s fall after the creation of humans, and considered it to stem from the 
devil’s envy of humankind.523 The second view, advocated by Origen, saw the cause 
of the devil’s fall as pride, arising independently of the creation of humankind.524 
                                                          
517 PE 7.16.3. 
518 Rev. 12:9. 
519 PE 7.16.3; DE 4.9.5. 
520 PE 7.16.7. 
521 DE 4.9.1-2. 
522 PE 7.16.3: …αὑτῷ τε καὶ ἑτέροις τῆς τῶν κρειττόνων ἀποστασίας γενόμενον αἴτιον… 
523 Sirinelli, Les vues historiques, 305. 
524 Ibid., 306. More recently, however, this idea that early Christian views on the cause of the devil’s fall 
can be neatly divided into two camps – one favouring pride and the other envy – has been rightly 
criticised by S. Lunn-Rockliffe, who has demonstrated that many writers held far more complex 
understandings of the devil’s fall: ‘The Diabolical Problem of Satan’s First Sin: Self-moved Pride or a 
Response to the Goads of Envy?’, Studia Patristica 63 (2013), 121-40. 
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In Sirinelli’s opinion, Eusebius followed Origen in ascribing the devil’s fall to 
the sin of pride.525 This is certainly the impression conveyed at PE 7.16, where 
Eusebius blames the ‘boastfulness and battle against God’ of this diabolical δράκων 
for his fall.526 A quotation from Ezekiel, suggesting that God had told this figure that 
he was cast out of heaven because ‘your heart is proud, and you have said “I am a 
god; I sit in the seat of the gods,”’ further reinforces the sense that it was pride and a 
desire to be like God that brought about this initial fall.527 However, in a shorter 
account of the fall of the wicked powers at DE 4.9, we also find a prominent role 
being allocated to envy of humankind,528 with particular emphasis placed on the 
actions taken by the μεγαλοδαίμων to undermine God’s plans for humanity.529 
Thus, rather than straightforwardly adopting one view of the fall of the 
μεγαλοδαίμων, or suggesting that his – and the demons’ – evil behaviour had just 
one cause, Eusebius combines a range of influences to produce a picture in which 
pride and envy become the defining characteristics of the demonic forces opposed 
to God. 
Recognising the close relationship between demons and their diabolical leader 
is crucial to understanding Eusebius’ attitude towards the demonic. Eusebius 
envisaged a cosmology in which the supreme God was opposed by a hostile 
‘rebellious power’ (ἀποστατικῆς δυνάμεως),530 variously described as the 
                                                          
525 Ibid. 
526 PE 7.16.7: …δι’ οἰκείαν μεγαλαυχίαν καὶ θεομαχίαν… 
527 Ezek. 28:2, NRSV trans., cited at PE 7.16.5. Eusebius also cites Ezek. 28:12-15, 28:17, and Isa. 14:13-14 
at PE 7.16.4-6.  
528 DE 4.9.1. 
529 DE 4.9.1, 4.9.3. 
530 DE 4.9.1. 
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διαβόλος,531 and the μεγαλοδαίμων,532 identified with the fallen day-star of Isaiah 
14:12,533 and named as Beelzebul.534 The link between this figure and the demons is 
made explicit in several places – the supporters of the μεγαλοδαίμων are described 
as the ‘demons and worse spirits’,535 while a clearly diabolical figure is called ‘the 
beginner of their [the demons and wicked spirits’] fall’,536 and the ‘ruler’ (ἄρχων) of 
the demons.537 Not only is there a clear link, but the relationship is evidently 
envisaged as hierarchical – the devil leads, and the demons follow. 
While Eusebius was by no means the first Christian writer to consider demons 
as subordinates and followers of the devil, this Christian position did mark a 
significant departure from that of earlier Greek philosophy. According to Origen’s 
report, Celsus had found the idea that the supreme god might have an adversary to 
be ‘most impious’ (ἀσεβέστατα),538 and had further considered all demons to be ‘of 
god’ (τοῦ θεοῦ).539 Even when Plutarch acknowledged that some demons might 
cause harm to humans, the source of their misbehaviour was seen as their 
susceptibility to passion.540 There was no suggestion that they might be acting as 
part of a wider hostile force, with an identifiable leader. Thus, the demons we find 
                                                          
531 PE 11.26.5. 
532 DE 4.9.1. 
533 DE 4.9.4; PE 7.16.4. 
534 PE 4.22.15. In Luke 11:15-19, Beelzebul is clearly identified with ‘the Satan’ (ὁ Σατανᾶς). Moreover, 
an association between Beelzebul and demons occurs in three different gospel accounts of the same 
story: when Jesus is accused of driving out demons ‘by Beelzebul’, his accusers identify Beelzebul as 
the ‘ruler of the demons’ (ἄρχων τῶν δαιμονίων): W. Herrmann, ‘Baal Zebub’, in Van Der Toorn et al., 
eds., Dictionary of Deities and Demons, 293-96. See: Matt. 12:24; Mark 3:22; Luke 11:15. 
535 DE 4.9.1: τὰ δὲ τῆς ἀντιπάλου καὶ ἀποστατικῆς δυνάμεως εἴτε δαιμόνων εἴτε καὶ χειρόνων 
ἄλλων πνευμάτων… 
536 PE 7.16.3: …κατάρξαντα τῆς πτώσεως… 
537 DE 4.9.8. Cf. DE 4.9.1. 
538 Orig. Cels. 6.42. 
539 Orig. Cels. 8.24. For discussion of Celsus’ criticisms of Christianity, see: S. Benko, ‘Pagan Criticism of 
Christianity During the First Two Centuries AD’, ANRW 2.23.2 (1980), 1101-08. 
540 Dillon, Middle Platonists, 217. See Plut. De Fac. Lun. 944c-d. 
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in Eusebius’ works appear to be considerably more co-ordinated and deliberate in 
their threat than the occasional rogue demons of earlier Greek philosophy. 
 
Demonic Power 
The preceding sections of this chapter have shown that Eusebius held demons to be 
a hostile force, opposed both to the Christian God and to those virtuous humans 
who followed him. The following section will demonstrate that Eusebius also 
believed firmly in the reality of demonic power. Although he makes it clear that the 
demons’ power could not match that of the truly divine Christian God, he 
nonetheless allows them a level of ability and knowledge considerably beyond that 
of humans, further enhancing the sense of the threat that they posed. At PE 5.2.1, 
Eusebius stresses that demons have the power to inflict considerable suffering on 
their human victims, describing how demons would send illnesses to afflict people, 
which they would then proceed to ‘cure’ in order to gain worship. Here, Eusebius is 
suggesting that the demons possessed considerably greater power than humans, 
but is at the same time restricting the scope of that power. In curing an illness which 
it had itself caused, a demon would not be demonstrating truly divine power. 
Moreover, the idea that the demons might deliberately cause human suffering 
simply in order to claim worship as gods points once again to their malevolence. 
This belief in the power of the demons also emerges particularly clearly from 
Eusebius’ discussion of oracles and divination in the preface to the fifth book of the 
DE. Questioning whether the traditional Greek oracles are the work of demons or of 
true gods, Eusebius suggests that ‘it seems that the oracles were of demons, 
applicable to the detection of a thief, or the destruction of a utensil, or other such 
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things, of which it was not improbable that those haunting the air around the earth 
should have some small knowledge’.541 Eusebius does not attempt to deny that the 
traditional oracles might have revealed information that was hidden to humans, 
attributing the demons’ greater knowledge to their ontological superiority.542 
However, he is at the same time quick to stress the limitations of their power, 
immediately contrasting these oracles with the predictions of the ‘Hebrew 
prophets’, such as Moses.543 While the traditional oracles dealt only with the ‘small 
and lowly’,544 the divinely inspired prophecies of the Jewish and Christian 
scriptures ‘contributed to great things’.545 As such, even while accepting some 
degree of demonic power, Eusebius carefully positions it within a wider hierarchy 
of power and ability, in which the Christian God, as always, takes the higher 
position. 
This belief in the existence of some demonic power was clearly of 
considerable significance for Eusebius, since in his discussions of oracles in the PE 
he deliberately dismisses an alternative explanation for the traditional oracles that 
would have downplayed the extent of the demons’ power – namely, that they were 
the result of human fraud. Introducing his discussion of oracles in book 4 of the PE, 
Eusebius acknowledges that some writers might choose to argue against the 
validity of the traditional oracles by suggesting that ‘the whole thing is a deceit and 
                                                          
541 DE 5.Praef.17: ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὡς ἔοικεν, δαιμόνων ἦν μαντεῖα, μέχρι κλέπτου φωρᾶς ἢ σκεύους 
ἀπωλείας ἤ τινος ἄλλου τοιούτου φθάνοντα, ὧν οὐκ ἀπεικὸς ἦν αὐτοὺς ἐν τῷ περὶ γῆν ἀέρι τὰς 
διατριβὰς ποιουμένους τὴν εἴδησιν ἐσχηκέναι· 
542 A similar claim that demons’ apparent knowledge of the future arose, not from any sort of divine 
insight, but rather from the fact that the nature of their bodies allowed them to travel quickly through 
the air occurs in the Vita Antonii of Athanasius (31:2-6): Smith, ‘How Thin?’, 505. 
543 DE 5.Praef.20: …τοῖς Ἑβραίων προφήταις… 
544 DE 5.Praef.22: …σμικρῶν καὶ ταπεινῶν… 
545 DE 5.Praef.21: …ἐπὶ μεγάλοις συνετελεῖτο. 
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the contrivances and misdeeds of human sorcerers’.546 However, Eusebius prefers 
the alternative explanation that the oracles were the result of demonic influence,547 
as the demons attempted to draw people away from the true God, towards a life of 
immorality.548 The furthest Eusebius is prepared to go in allowing a role for human 
fraud in oracular predictions is in his suggestion that the priests of various oracles 
might have conspired alongside the demons to create the impression that the 
oracles were more powerful than was in fact the case.549 Even here, however, 
Eusebius attributes the initial impetus behind the oracles to the demons, writing 
that ‘again the wicked demons themselves began the instruction of these matters to 
their attendants’,550 and describing the demons as ‘responsible for establishing the 
sorcery that was the root of wickedness for all the life of men’.551 Thus, Eusebius 
appears to have been firmly wedded to the view that the demons did have a role in 
the operation of the traditional oracles. There were alternative explanations for 
oracular predictions available to him, and he was fully aware of these. However, he 
deliberately chose not to use them, consistently downplaying the role of human 
fraud, and stressing instead the malign influence of the demons. 
In fact, the idea that demonic power was real, but at the same time 
considerably weaker than that of the truly divine Christian God was of central 
importance to Eusebius’ apologetic argument in the PE and DE. Although Coggan 
                                                          
546 PE 4.1.8: …πλάνην εἶναι τὸ πᾶν καὶ γοήτων ἀνδρῶν τεχνάσματά τε καὶ ῥᾳδιουργίας… Cf. the 
full discussion at PE 4.1-2. 
547 See especially: PE 5.21.6, where Eusebius criticises Oenomaus for suggesting that oracles are the 
result of human fraud, rather than admitting that they come from demons. 
548 See, for example: PE 4.4.1-2, 4.14.10, 5.18.4-5, 6.6.3-4. 
549 PE 5.2.5. 
550 Ibid.: …τῆς καὶ τούτων διδασκαλίας αὐτων πάλιν τῶν φαύλων δαιμόνων τοῖς θεραπεύουσι 
προκαταρξάντων. 
551 Ibid.: …τῆς ἀρχεκάκου γοητείας παντὶ τῷ τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίῳ κατέστησαν αἴτιοι… 
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and Johnson have previously noted that Eusebius’ discussions of demons could 
serve an apologetic purpose in the PE,552 with Coggan suggesting, for example, that 
Eusebius turns the story of the ‘Death of Pan’ into ‘a testimonial to the power of the 
Christian saviour’,553 they did not emphasise the way in which Eusebius’ defence of 
the power of Christ depends upon a belief in the power of demons. Eusebius was 
able to contrast the extent of the demons’ power with that of Christ, which he 
considered to be much greater, by suggesting that the struggle between Christianity 
and the polytheistic cults on earth was simply a manifestation of the more 
significant cosmic conflict taking place between the demons on the one hand, and 
Christ on the other. In fact, Eusebius even poses his readers the direct question of 
why the supposed ‘gods’ of paganism have failed to stop the spread of Christian 
teaching:  
εἰ δὴ ὁ μὲν θνητός, ὡς ἂν φαῖεν, ἄνθρωπος (τάχα δ’ ἂν εἴποιεν ὅτι 
καὶ πλάνος), οἱ δὲ σωτῆρες καὶ θεοί, τί δῆτα τοίνυν πάντες ἀθρόως 
αὐτῷ Ἀσκληπιῷ πεφεύγασι, τὰ νῶτα τῷ θνητῷ καὶ πᾶσαν ἑξῆς 
ὑποχείριον τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα τῷ μηκέτ’ ὄντι, ὡς ἂν εἴποιεν αὐτοί, 
παραδεδωκότες;554 
Indeed, if he is a mortal man, as they may say (perhaps even a deceiver, 
they may say), but they are saviours and gods, why indeed have they all 
fled in crowds, even Asclepius himself, their backs towards this mortal, 
and why have they handed over all humankind in their control, one 
after another, to this one, who, so they say, no longer exists? 
Eusebius finds ‘evidence’ for the supposed decline of pagan oracles and the civic 
cults in discussions drawn from non-Christian writers like Porphyry and Plutarch 
about cases of failed or abandoned oracles.555 He then contrasts these with the 
                                                          
552 Coggan, Pandaemonia, 189; Johnson, Ethnicity and Argument, 163-70. 
553 Coggan, Pandaemonia, ii. 
554 PE 5.1.12. 
555 See, for example: PE 5.1.9-10, 5.17.13. 
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spread of Christian teaching, and the success of the Christian church.556 At times, 
Eusebius makes his case for the greater power of Christ even more explicitly, 
remarking that ‘our saviour, undertaking his teachings among men, is described as 
having driven out the whole race of demons from the life of men, so that already 
some of the demons fell to their knees and supplicated him not to give them up to 
the Tartarus that was waiting for them’.557 Here Christ is depicted as stronger than 
the demons – his power is so far superior to theirs that they are reduced to the 
position of mere suppliants, forced to appeal for mercy. Acknowledging the reality 
of demonic power thus allows Eusebius to argue for the reality of the power of 
Christ as well. Depicting the Christian God as the strongest of a variety of equally 
real spiritual powers could provide valuable support to Eusebius’ claim in the PE 
and DE that the Christians had acted sensibly in turning away from the old civic 
cults towards Christianity. By suggesting that the power of Christ has overcome the 
power of the demons, Eusebius is implying that the Christians have chosen the 
protection of a stronger divinity than those of the old pagan civic cults, as Dale 
Martin has argued.558 If the demons had not been regarded as exercising genuine 
power, albeit of a limited kind, it would have made Christ’s supposed undermining 
of that power appear considerably less impressive. The fact that Eusebius sought to 
construct part of his defence of Christianity on the basis that demons exercised real 
                                                          
556 See, for example: PE 5.1.13-15. 
557 PE 5.17.13: …ὁ ἡμέτερος σωτὴρ τὰς σὺν ἀνθρώποις ποιούμενος διατριβὰς πᾶν γένος δαιμόνων 
ἐξελαύνειν τοῦ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀναγέγραπται βίου· ὥστε ἤδη τινὰς τῶν δαιμόνων γονυπετεῖν 
αὐτὸν καὶ ἱκετεύειν μὴ τῷ περιμένοντι αὐτοὺς Ταρτάρῳ παραδοῦναι. Cf. DE 6.13.8. The question of 
exactly what effect Eusebius believed the incarnation to have had on demonic power will be discussed 
in more detail below, in Chapter V. 
558 Martin, Inventing Superstition, 225. Martin joins Ferguson in suggesting that a substantial part of 
Christianity’s appeal lay in the protection it claimed to offer from the harm that demons were widely 
believed to cause: Martin, Inventing Superstition, 243; Ferguson, Demonology, 129. 
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power illustrates how deeply not only he, but also his intended audience, believed 
in the reality and immediacy of the demonic presence in their world. 
 
Conclusions 
Overall, this survey of Eusebius’ discussions of the demonic throughout a range of 
his works has revealed a remarkably consistent picture of demons. It has shown 
that Eusebius held demons to be an active and hostile presence in the universe. In 
league with the devil, demons ranged themselves against God and his virtuous 
followers. Although Eusebius was adamant that their power could not match that of 
the true God, it was nevertheless strong enough to enable demons to interfere 
considerably in human existence, either by causing physical harm through the 
infliction of illnesses, or moral harm through the encouragement of polytheism. It 
therefore appears that for Eusebius the demonic threat was both potent and real. In 
consequence, while Eusebius may at times have chosen to emphasise particular 
features of demonic activity in certain of his works for apologetic ends,559 we must 
be careful to avoid reading Eusebius’ references to the demonic simply as part of a 
convenient apologetic strategy. Rather, we need to acknowledge his genuine 
concern about the danger which demons might pose. The depth of this concern can 
further be seen from the way in which Eusebius’ idea of a stark divide between the 
good Christian God and the wicked demons manifested itself in a series of further 
polarities in Eusebius’ thought, expanding into a picture of a universe 
                                                          
559 Such as, in Johnson’s suggestion, arguing against the power of the oracles in order to undermine the 
‘political theology’ of the Greek poleis: Ethnicity and Argument, 163-70. 
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fundamentally divided between hostile spiritual opponents. This, however, will be 




A DIVIDED UNIVERSE 
Previous work on demons in Eusebius has returned repeatedly to the idea that 
demons were associated above all with polytheistic cults and oracles, and deployed 
primarily to attack the foundations of traditional Greek and Roman religion.560 
However, this was only one aspect of the demonic presence for Eusebius, albeit the 
one that emerges most obviously from a reading of the PE. To focus exclusively on 
this aspect of the demonic therefore does not do justice to the full range of Eusebius’ 
views on this topic. More seriously, it risks implying that Eusebius’ ideas about 
demons were neatly partitioned from other areas of his thought, capable of being 
deployed only at such convenient moments as best suited Eusebius’ apologetic 
argument. Such an approach fails to appreciate the physical reality of demons for 
Eusebius. It also shows little awareness of the extent to which Eusebius’ ideas about 
demons permeated and helped to structure his understanding of the universe more 
generally. Throughout Eusebius’ works we repeatedly find the fundamental 
opposition between God/Christ on the one hand and the devil/demons on the other 
reflected in a series of extreme polarities, demonstrating how Eusebius’ ideas about 
demons underpinned his thought more broadly. 
Although both Sharron Coggan and Dale Martin have previously highlighted 
the fact that Eusebius’ conceptual universe was one of polarised extremes,561 their 
resulting analyses do not adequately acknowledge the potency of the demonic for 
Eusebius. Coggan, for instance, suggests that Eusebius makes use of an extreme 
                                                          
560 See, for example: Coggan, Pandaemonia, 189; Sirinelli, Les vues historiques, 317; Johnson, Ethnicity and 
Argument, 163-70; and, to a lesser extent, Martin, Inventing Superstition, 209-13. 
561 Coggan, Pandaemonia, 183-87; Martin, Inventing Supersition, 221. 
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terminology of good and evil in order to transform the meaning of the term δαίμων 
from the ambiguous ‘daemons’ of the classical tradition to the thoroughly wicked 
demons of early Christian thought.562 In this analysis, Eusebius’ treatment of the 
demonic appears as little more than an intellectual exercise, implying an 
astonishing level of detachment from his subject. In light of Eusebius’ views on the 
physical reality and wicked nature of demons highlighted in the previous chapter, 
such an approach cannot be maintained. This chapter will therefore propose an 
alternative reading, taking full account of the depth and sincerity of Eusebius’ belief 
in demons, in which it will be suggested instead that Eusebius’ understanding of 
malevolent demons as the opponents of the benevolent God led him to view the 
universe as fundamentally divided. This basic division then found expression in a 
range of other terminological and conceptual extremes. 
Elsewhere, Martin’s recognition that a ‘basic dualistic opposition rules 
Eusebius’ entire corpus’ represents a much more felicitous reading than that of 
Coggan in acknowledging the way that Eusebius’ many polarisations reflect the 
fundamental structure of his thought rather than acting simply as an apologetic 
device.563 In tracing the root of these divisions, however, Martin’s emphasis is 
misplaced. Martin suggests that ‘the basic theological opposition in Eusebius’ 
writing… is between monotheism on the one hand and polytheism… on the 
other.’564 Although he recognises the division between ‘God-Christ’ and ‘Satan-
daimons’ as one of several ‘oppositions’ within Eusebius’ thought, it appears only 
sixth in his list of such divisions – a list headed by the divide between monotheism 
                                                          
562 Coggan, Pandaemonia, 183-87. 




and polytheism.565 This suggests that Martin significantly underestimates the 
importance of the opposition between the divine and the demonic in structuring 
Eusebius’ thought. We have already seen that Eusebius believed demons to lie 
behind the polytheistic cults. Polytheism for Eusebius was the creation of demons, 
as they sought to win divine honours for themselves.566 Polytheism was thus the 
result of a prior opposition between the divine and the demonic and therefore 
cannot be seen as the most ’basic opposition’ in Eusebius’ thought. Rather, the 
essential opposition in Eusebius’ thought, from which all others stemmed, was 
between the Christian God on one side and the devil and his demons on the other. 
A fresh and full analysis of the divisions in Eusebius’ universe is therefore 
necessary at this point. 
The present chapter will explore how Eusebius’ demons are associated in his 
works with a series of further negative concepts. Demons are not only excluded 
from goodness, but are set up in direct opposition to anything which might be 
presented as good or virtuous. The result is a universe of hostile, even warring, 
extremes, in which there is no middle ground and, it appears, little room for 
reconciliation. This raises the question, already implied in Martin’s reference to the 
‘dualistic opposition’ in Eusebius’ thought, of how far Eusebius subscribed to a 
dualistic view of the universe. Although at times Eusebius appears to come very 
close to dualism in his suggestion of an absolute cosmic divide, I will nevertheless 
show that he consistently resists placing the demonic powers on an equal footing 
with the divine. 
                                                          
565 Ibid. 




Demons and Angels 
The extent to which Eusebius saw the universe as starkly divided between good 
and evil can clearly be seen from his presentation of another group of spiritual 
beings, similar to demons in terms of physicality, but fundamentally opposed to 
them in their moral character – that is, the angels.567 Eusebius’ benevolent spirits, 
described as the ‘angels of God’ (οἱ ἄγγέλοι τοῦ θεοῦ), are characterised by light as 
opposed to the demons’ association with darkness.568 Throughout Eusebius’ works, 
darkness is a frequent attribute of the demonic.569 At one point, he even describes 
‘the wicked demon’ as ‘belonging to darkness’,570 suggesting that he saw darkness 
as fundamental to the demonic character. Moreover, in the course of their fall, 
demons are said to have ‘taken darkness over light’ (σκότος τε ἀντὶ φωτὸς 
ἀλλαξαμένην).571 This is in clear contrast to Eusebius’ angels, who are described as 
‘shining’ (φωτεινὴν), and likened to the ‘stars in heaven’ (τῶν κατ’ οὐρανὸν δίκην 
ἄστρων).572 These contrasting associations for Eusebius’ demons and angels help to 
tie these two groups to their respective leaders – the devil and God – by reflecting 
the language in which these two figures were also regularly described. Echoing 
terms common to descriptions of the devil and demons both in the New Testament, 
                                                          
567 It is surprising that, despite recognising the extreme polarisation of Eusebius’ universe, neither 
Coggan nor Martin displays much interest in his opposition of demons and angels: Coggan, 
Pandaemonia; Martin, Inventing Superstition. 
568 PE 11.26.5. Cf. PE 7.16.1. 
569 See, for example: PE 1.5.1, 5.2.1, 7.16.7-9, 13.15.7; VC 1.49.1; HE 10.4.13. This association is also noted 
by Strutwolf, Die Trinitätstheologie, 214. 
570 DE 5.Praef.26: …τὸ μὲν πονηρὸν δαιμόνιον, οἷα σκότου οἰκεῖον… 
571 PE 7.16.2. 
572 PE 7.16.1. For other examples of angels being associated with light, see: Theoph. 1.38; VC 3.26.1. 
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and in other earlier Christian writers,573 Eusebius drew a connection between 
darkness and an identifiably diabolical figure described as the ‘dragon’ (δράκων) 
and ‘snake’ (ὄφις) – terms which had already been applied to the devil in 
Revelation.574 Stemming from this, darkness was also associated for Eusebius with 
other negative concepts, such as distance from God or ignorance of correct 
religion.575 
When discussing the fall of this diabolical δράκων, Eusebius even goes so far 
as to describe this figure as ‘the maker (ποιητής) of darkness and irrationality’,576 
showing how closely Eusebius associated the wicked spiritual powers with these 
negative characteristics. Eusebius’ choice of the word ‘ποιητής’ here is particularly 
striking, since this was a term that Eusebius also applied to God.577 This hints at a 
tension within Eusebius’ thought. Although, as I will show below,578 Eusebius 
avoided attributing equal power to the wicked powers and to God, we nevertheless 
sense here Eusebius’ discomfort with the idea that God might be responsible for the 
creation of evil. Describing this diabolical δράκων as a ποιητής in his own right 
helps to absolve God of responsibility for the creation of negative things. It also 
highlights the extent to which Eusebius viewed the universe as starkly divided. 
By contrast, God and his Logos are, for Eusebius, characteristically associated 
with light.579 Christ, for instance, is described as ‘a sun of intellectual and rational 
                                                          
573 For the devil associated with darkness, see, for example: Acts 26:18; Eph. 6:12; Barnabas 18.1; Justin 
Dial. 76.17; Clem. Alex. Stro. 4.8.68.4, 4.14.96.1; Orig. De Princ. 3.2.4. 
574 See, for example: PE 7.10.15; 7.16.3. Cf. Rev. 12:9. 
575 See, for example: PE 2.5.2; DE 6.18.47, 7.2.42, 9.8.10, 9.15.9, 10.7.7; VC 2.19.1, 3.1.8. 
576 PE 7.16.3: …σκότους δὲ καὶ ἀλογίας ποιητὴν… 
577 For example at PE 4.5.4. 
578 See below, p. 145-53. 
579 See, for example: HE 9.8.15, 10.4.13; PE 1.1.4, 1.1.6, 1.5.1, 4.15.6, 5.1.2, 5.1.8; DE 3.1.3, 4.3.2-3, 4.6.1, 
4.10.4, 4.17.19, 5.Praef.27, 9.1.14, 10.2.16; CH 6.4; VC 3.26.4; Ecl. Proph. 202.5; SC 14.11; Theoph. 1.5; LC 
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souls’,580 while God is ‘inexpressible light’.581 By linking his angels with light, 
Eusebius is thereby also stressing their proximity to God. Eusebius’ demons are 
established as the opponents of benevolent spiritual forces and his universe 
becomes polarised between two hostile groups. For Eusebius, two opposing figures 
in the universe – God and the devil – are each joined and supported by their own 
followers, which are equally opposed to each other. Eusebius makes it very clear 
that in his view these opposing spiritual forces are entirely incompatible when he 
poses to his readers the question: ‘how could the bad at any point become a friend 
to the good, unless it were to be said that it is possible for light and darkness to 
become one combination?’582 Eusebius’ characterisation of demons and angels by 
the contrasting associations of darkness and light highlights the fundamental – and 
seemingly unbridgeable – division which he envisaged between the two. 
Eusebius was not alone among Christian writers of this period in holding that 
there was a clear distinction between ἀγγέλοι and δαίμονες, and in seeking to 
demonstrate in his works the difference between Christian and non-Christian 
                                                                                                                                                                    
1.1-2, 6.20. As Strutwolf also noted: Die Trinitätstheologie, 214. In this, Eusebius was again echoing 
Biblical language, where light is frequently evoked as a characteristic of both God and Christ. See, for 
example: 2 Sam. 22:29; Job 29:3; Ps. 4:6; Ps. 18:28; Ps. 27:1; Isa. 2:5; Mic. 7:8; Tob. 3:17; Bar. 5:9; Lk. 2:32; 
Jn. 1:4-9; Jn. 8:12; 1 Jn. 1.5; Rev. 22:5. An association between light and the divine or the Good was also 
common in Platonic philosophy: J. Dillon, ‘Looking on the Light: Some Remarks on the Imagery of 
Light in the First Chapter of the Peri Archon’, in C. Kannengiesser and W.L. Peterson, eds., Origen of 
Alexandria: His World and His Legacy (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 229; J.F. 
Finnamore, ‘Iamblichus on Light and the Transparent’, in H.J. Blumenthal and E.G. Clark, eds., The 
Divine Iamblichus: Philosopher and Man of Gods (London: Bristol Classical Press, 1993), 57. 
580 PE 2.5.2: …τις νοερῶν καὶ λογικῶν ψυχῶν ἥλιος… 
581 DE 4.3.3: …ἀρρήτου φωτὸς… 
582 PE 4.17.11: πῶς γὰρ ἂν γένοιτό ποτε τῷ ἀγαθῷ τὸ φαῦλον φίλον, εἰ μὴ καὶ φωτὸς καὶ σκότους 
κρᾶσιν δύνασθαι μίαν φαίη τις ἂν γενέσθαι; This question echoes that of Paul at 2 Cor. 6:14, where 
he asks: ‘what partnership is there between righteousness and lawlessness? Or what fellowship is 
there between light and darkness?’ NRSV trans., (τίς γὰρ μετοχὴ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ ἀνομίᾳ; ἢ τίς 
κοινωνία φωτὶ πρὸς σκότος;). The incompatibility of light and darkness was a recurring theme among 




understandings of the terms.583 As with the word δαίμονες, early Christian writers 
shared the term ἀγγέλοι with their non-Christian contemporaries. Although the 
word was frequently used to refer to ordinary, human messengers, from the second 
century onwards non-Christian authors were also using ἀγγέλοι to describe 
spiritual messengers, acting as intermediaries between the divine and human 
realms.584 However, while pagan and Jewish philosophers saw little difference 
between angels and demons, early Christian writers were insistent on separating 
the terms.585 The Hellenised Jewish philosopher Philo of Alexandria, for instance, 
had considered that ‘souls and demons and angels are names carried from one to 
another, but on the same one foundation’.586 Yet Origen deliberately differentiated 
between angels and demons on the grounds that, while angels, like humans, could 
be either good or bad, demons were without exception wicked.587 Eusebius makes 
his division between angels and demons even clearer than that of Origen, by 
placing his angels fully on the side of the good, while demons remain firmly on the 
side of the wicked. The complete polarisation of these two groups would have 
served to reinforce Eusebius’ claim that there could not be any good demons. It also 
illustrates the extent to which Eusebius’ universe was fully split between the cosmic 
forces of good and those of evil. 
That Eusebius should have considered these two groups of spiritual beings to 
be so fundamentally divided is all the more striking because of the similar origins 
which he appears to have envisaged for both angels and demons. Eusebius suggests 
                                                          
583 R. Cline, Ancient Angels: Conceptualising Angeloi in the Roman Empire (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 4. 
584 Ibid. 3-4. 
585 See ibid. 4-11 for discussion of Origen and Augustine. 
586 Philo, De Gig. 16: Ψυχὰς οὖν καὶ δαίμονας καὶ ἁγγέλους ὀνόματα μὲν διαφέροντα, ἓν δὲ καὶ 
ταὐτὸν ὑποκείμενον… 
587 Cline, Ancient Angels, 6, citing Orig. Cels. 8.25. 
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in the PE that demons were originally angels when he informs the reader that the 
demons and wicked spirits have apostatised from ‘the choruses of the better’,588 and 
have in the process ‘taken darkness over light’.589 Moreover, demons and angels 
seem to have remained ontologically similar beings for Eusebius, since, in the 
Theophania, he groups both beneficent and maleficent spiritual beings together as 
‘incorporeal and invisible powers’.590 Yet despite this, Eusebius places demons and 
angels at different positions on a clear spiritual hierarchy: the ‘refined and good 
powers’ are far below ‘the unoriginated God, their own maker’,591 but they are also 
significantly above the ‘depraved race of the demons’,592 occupying a position 
somewhere between the two. Despite their similar origins, it seems that the moral 
differences between angels and demons were enough to require that they be seen as 
different kinds of spiritual beings.593 Eusebius’ categorisation of angels and demons 
is thus based primarily on moral criteria. 
At the heart of this distinction between Eusebius’ angels and demons there 
lies the crucial issue of choice: that is, the original decision of the demons to depart 
from the company of ‘the better’.594 Explaining why he feels that demons and angels 
should not be given the same name, Eusebius asserts that ‘it would be most 
unreasonable of all that one and the same name should be fitting for things which 
are similar neither in their choice (τὴν προαίρεσιν) nor in the nature from their 
                                                          
588 PE 7.16.2: …τῆς τῶν κρειττόνων χορείας… Cf. PE 7.16.3. 
589 PE 7.16.2: …σκότος τε ἀντὶ φωτὸς ἀλλαξαμένην… Cf. PE 13.15.1. 
590 Theoph. 1.38, trans. S. Lee. 
591 PE 4.5.4: τὰς δὲ ἀστείας καὶ ἀγαθὰς δυνάμεις… πολλῷ τὸν ἀγένητον καὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν ποιητὴν 
θεὸν ἀφυστερούσας… 
592 PE 4.5.4: …τοῦ τῶν δαιμόνων μοχθηροῦ γένους… 
593 PE 4.5.5. 
594 PE 7.16.2. 
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behaviour (τὴν ἐκ τοῦ τρόπου φύσιν)’.595 Eusebius’ use of the word προαίρεσις 
here is significant, for, as I will demonstrate below,596 Eusebius considered the 
concept of προαίρεσις to be closely linked to issues of moral responsibility. In this, 
Eusebius was not alone among early Christian writers. In Tatian’s Oratio Ad Graecos, 
it was προαίρεσις, and specifically ‘freedom of προαίρεσις’ (τῇ δὲ ἐλευθερίᾳ τῆς 
προαιρέσεως), that allowed punishments and rewards to be justly meted out to 
humankind.597 Thus, προαίρεσις carried with it, at least among early Christian 
writers, the sense of responsibility for one’s actions. Eusebius’ remark about the 
different ‘nature from their [the demons’] behaviour’ is also worthy of note, for it 
suggests that their wicked nature is not innate, but is rather the product of their 
behaviour and actions. Since these actions would stem from the demons’ 
προαίρεσις, this phrase emphasises once again that demons are to be held 
responsible for their own wickedness. 
This idea that the demons were ultimately responsible for their own 
separation from the angels is reflected throughout the PE. The fall of the demons’ 
diabolical leader is described as ‘self-determined’ (αὐθεκούσιος),598 and, similarly, 
it is the demons’ ‘own wickedness’ (δι’ οἰκείαν φαυλότητα) that leads them to 
follow him.599 It is this fundamental moral choice – to follow God, or to oppose him 
– that ultimately separates Eusebius’ angels and demons. In his method of 
distinguishing between good and bad spiritual beings, Eusebius therefore differed 
significantly even from those Greek writers who had allowed for the possibility of 
                                                          
595 PE 4.5.5: ἐπεὶ καὶ πάντων ἂν εἴη παραλογώτατον τὰς μήτε μὴν τὴν προαίρεσιν μήτε τὴν ἐκ τοῦ 
τρόπου φύσιν ὁμοίας μιᾶς καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἐπωνυμίας ἀξιοῦν. 
596 See Chapter IV. 
597 Tat. Orat. 7. 
598 PE 7.16.3. 
599 PE 7.16.2. 
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maliciously inclined demons. While Plutarch’s bad demons may have been acting 
under the influence of the passions, there was no sense that they had deliberately 
chosen evil.600 By contrast, Eusebius’ demons, having voluntarily embraced evil, 
appear far more threatening. The line was drawn at the moment of the demons’ fall 
between those spiritual beings that chose God, and those that chose the devil. 
Again, there is a clear polarisation within Eusebius’ cosmology between good and 
bad spiritual beings. 
 
Further Polarities 
This basic opposition between benevolent and malevolent spiritual forces in the 
universe can be seen to extend into a series of further polar opposites associated 
with these two groups. One of the most important of these is the distinction which 
Eusebius makes between rationality (λογικός) and intellectual reasoning (νοερός) 
on the one hand,601 and irrationality (ἀλογός) and madness (μανία) on the other. 
Throughout Eusebius’ works, the activity of demons and the devil is frequently 
associated with the spread of irrationality – people he considers to be in the power 
of demons are described as mad or irrational,602 while at the time of their fall, the 
                                                          
600 Dillon, Middle Platonists, 217-18. In Dillon’s view, while Plutarch did suggest that some demons 
were capable of wicked actions, he did not believe in ‘primally evil [demons], such as one finds in 
Zoroastrian or Gnostic systems’, 218. However, Dillon notes a possible anomaly in Plutarch’s De Isiride 
et Osiride, which ‘tends far more towards the postulation of inherently evil daemons’ than Plutarch’s 
other works, 218. This, however, appears to be an exception, based perhaps on the fact that Plutarch 
was attempting in this work to explain the nature of the Giants and Titans, 218. 
601 As Frede has pointed out, there was considerable overlap in ancient texts between a variety of 
words such as these which might loosely be translated into English as signifying the concept of 
‘rationality’ or ‘reason’. Frede writes of ‘a certain wavering in terminology between logos, to logikon, 
nous, hegemonikon, mens, ratio, and other terms’: M. Frede, ‘Introduction’, in M. Frede and G. Striker, 
eds., Rationality in Greek Thought (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 3. 
602 For example: HE 7.31.1, 10.8.9-10; VC 1.45.2-3; LC 7.7, 9.13; SC 13.6; Theoph. 1.78, 2.1. 
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wicked powers are themselves considered to be acting in a way that was mad.603 
Importantly, however, despite the irrationality of their behaviour, Eusebius does 
not present demons as, in essence, irrational beings. Instead he directly asserts that 
‘the demons are rational’ (λογικοὶ οἱ δαίμονες) as part of his criticism of older 
Greek philosophical explanations of demonic origins.604 That Eusebius’ demons 
possessed the capacity for rational thought but failed to act accordingly is 
significant, since, as rational beings, they would have been able to exercise 
προαίρεσις, reinforcing the sense that they were responsible for their own fall and 
subsequent actions.605 
This association between demons and irrational behaviour is further reflected 
in Eusebius’ frequent portrayal of demons, and those in their power, as ‘wild 
beasts’.606 In a vivid passage from his panegyric on the Church at Tyre, Eusebius 
likens the ‘good-hating envy and the evil-loving demon’ (τοῦ μισοκάλου φθόνου 
καὶ φιλοπονήρου δαίμονος) to a ‘fighting dog’ (κυνὸς λυττῶντος), which had 
turned its ‘savage madness’ (τὴν θηριώδη μανίαν) towards the persecution of the 
Christian church.607 The combination here of an adjective drawn from the word for 
‘beast’ (θήρ), with the word for ‘madness’ (μανία) emphasises the close connection 
which Eusebius saw between animals and irrationality. As Richard Sorabji has 
shown, the idea that animals lacked rationality was reasonably common in 
                                                          
603 PE 7.16.3-4; Cf. DE 4.9.12.  
604 PE 13.15.6. 
605 On rationality as essential to προαίρεσις for Eusebius, see below, chapter IV, p. 172-74. 
606 For example: Demons as beasts: PE 4.17.9, VC 1.49.1; HE 10.4.14; DE 10.8.73; Theoph. 3.13, 3.55; 
people as beasts: PE 7.2.6; DE 3.3.7, 4.10.2; LC 9.13. 




antiquity, although by no means universal.608 Aristotle and the Stoics had 
considered that only humans possessed the ability to reason, although their view 
was challenged by many within the Platonist tradition.609 Even among early 
Christians there was considerable disagreement on this point: Origen had 
considered animals to lack reason,610 yet Eusebius’ Latin contemporary Lactantius 
took the opposite view.611 
On this topic, Eusebius clearly shared Origen’s view. According to Eusebius, 
animals were most emphatically not rational: in the PE he states clearly that beasts 
were ‘irrational according to nature’,612 and animals or beasts are often referred to as 
ἄλογα throughout Eusebius’ works.613 As such, by associating demons and those he 
considered to be in their power with wild animals, Eusebius was drawing attention 
to their intellectual shortcomings. Coggan has suggested that Eusebius’ 
presentation of demons as savage animals is so extreme as to become almost a 
‘caricature’, which serves to ‘trivialise’ the demons.614 Although Eusebius’ 
presentation of the demonic is certainly invariably negative, the suggestion that this 
lack of balance in any way downplays the extent of the demonic threat is far from 
accurate. In fact, Eusebius’ portrayal of demons as beasts serves as a regular 
reminder of the kind of threat that Eusebius considered the demons to pose to 
                                                          
608 R. Sorabji, Animal Minds and Human Morals: The Origins of the Western Debate (London: Duckworth, 
1993), 1-2. 
609 On Aristotle, see ibid.  12-16; on the Stoics, ibid. 20; on various Platonists, including Plutarch and 
Porphyry, ibid. 178-79, 182. 
610 Ibid. 200, citing Orig. Cels. 4.74. 
611 Ibid. 90, citing Lact. Div. Inst. 3.10 and 7.9.10. 
612 PE 3.5.3: …πρὸς αὐτῆς τῆς φύσεως ἄλογα θηρία… Cf. PE 7.18.3; DE 1.10.1-13, where Eusebius 
explicitly challenges those Greek philosophers who had suggested that animals shared the human 
capacity for reason, and therefore ought not to be sacrificed. He stresses that the Old Testament does 
not condemn animal sacrifice, and presents animals as more akin to plants than to humans. 
613 See, for example: PE 1.4.9, 2.5.4, 4.15.5, 4.15.9, 7.4.2, 13.3.44; DE 1.1.15, 3.2.42, 3.3.8, 3.3.16, 5.Praef.19, 
5.Praef.30, 5.3.14. 
614 Coggan, Pandaemonia, 178. 
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humans. It was a threat that consisted, above all, in drawing people away from the 
true God and thus away from the better part of themselves. 
For Eusebius, God, in contrast to the demons, was pre-eminently associated 
with the spread of rationality. Eusebius describes Christ as ‘intellectual light’ (φῶς 
νοερόν), combining this attribute of rationality with his common association of the 
divinity with light.615 Eusebius also presents Christ as rescuing people from a prior 
state of irrationality by offering them improved understanding through his 
teaching.616 Moreover, in Eusebius’ view it was the rational human soul that 
brought humankind closest to God, since he interpreted the reference in Genesis to 
God making man in his own image as describing, not the human body, but the 
soul:617 
ψυχὴ μὲν οὖν λογικὴ καὶ ἀθάνατος καὶ νοῦς ἀπαθὴς ἐν ἀνθρώπου 
φύσει εὖ μοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι εἰκόνα καὶ ὁμοίωσιν ἀποσῴζειν θεοῦ, 
καθ’ ὅσον ἄυλος καὶ ἀσώματος νοερά τε καὶ λογικὴ τὴν οὐσίαν 
συνέστηκεν…618 
And so it seems to me that, in the nature of man, the rational and 
immortal soul and the passionless mind are well said to keep safe an 
icon and resemblance of God, insofar as in their substance they are both 
immaterial and incorporeal, and intellectual and rational… 
Thus, in associating the demons with irrationality, Eusebius was not only 
highlighting their opposition to God, but was also suggesting that they could 
deprive people of access to the best part of themselves, the part that was nearest to 
God. It is striking that Eusebius, claiming to follow the teaching of Moses, regards 
the ‘true man’ as that located in the soul and sharing in ‘intellectual, incorporeal 
                                                          
615 DE 5.Praef.33. Cf. PE 2.5.2: …τις νοερῶν καὶ λογικῶν ψυχῶν ἥλιος… 
616 See, for example: PE 1.4.12-13; DE 7.3.34. 
617 Gen. 1:26-7. Eusebius was by no means the only early Christian writer to adopt a non-physical 
interpretation of this idea that humankind was the image of God. See, for example: Orig. De Princ. 
1.1.7; Clem. Alex. Prot. 10.98.4. 
618 PE 3.10.16. Cf. PE 7.4.3, 7.10.9, 7.18.3, 13.3.44; DE 4.6.6. 
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and rational substance’.619 Therefore, by drawing people into irrationality, demons 
were not only drawing them away from God, but were also robbing them of their 
full humanity. 
In the light of this, it is surely also significant that Eusebius described those 
who practised polytheistic or astral worship as being ‘like children in their souls’ 
(οἷα νήπιοι τὰς ψυχὰς),620 once again implying that they were in a less intellectually 
developed state. Therefore, in making a connection between demons and irrational 
animals, it hardly seems that Eusebius would have been trying to ‘trivialise’ the 
demons, since the effect of this association is rather to highlight yet another feature 
of the demons that not only separated them from God, but also made them a threat 
to humans. 
There was a widespread sense in Greek philosophy and Roman law that 
children were, if not entirely without reason, at least not as rational as adults.621 
Plato had denied that children possessed reason, while the Stoics held that children 
only became rational as they grew older.622 Eusebius’ use of the childhood simile 
does, however, convey the impression – missing from the imagery of irrational 
animals – that this state of irrationality might not be permanent, and that it might, 
with the correct education, be possible to escape from the power of demons. This is 
reflected elsewhere in the PE, where recent converts are described as being ‘like 
children in their souls’ (ὡς ἂν τὰς ψυχὰς νηπίοις), in contrast to those who have 
                                                          
619 PE 7.10.9: …ἐν ψυχῇ μὲν ὁρίζεται τὸν ἀληθῆ ἄνθρωπον, νοερᾶς οὐσίας καὶ ἀσωμάτου καὶ 
λογικῆς μέτοχον ὡς ἂν κατ’ εἰκόνα θεοῦ δεδημιουργημένον. 
620 PE 1.6.3. Cf. Theoph. 1.26. 
621 On which, see: Sorabji, Animal Minds, 70, 127; P. Garnsey, Ideas of Slavery from Aristotle to Augustine 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 181-82. 
622 Sorabji, Animal Minds, 70, citing Plato Rep. 441a-b and 127, citing Aëtius 4.11.4 and Diogenes 
Laertius Lives 7.55. 
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progressed further in their understanding of the scriptures.623 A similar idea is 
found in some of Paul’s epistles, where the metaphor of childhood could similarly 
imply the possibility of progress, particularly progress towards God.624 In Galatians, 
Paul compared Christians before the coming of Christ to slaves, who, through 
Christ’s teaching, have been converted from slaves to children, ‘and if a child then 
also an heir, through God’.625 In suggesting at PE 1.6.3 that the earlier generations of 
humans who worshipped the stars rather than the true God were ‘like children’, 
Eusebius perhaps had in mind the idea found in Galatians that such children might, 
with the coming of Christ, be able to progress to a state of greater knowledge and 
understanding. 
This distinction between rationality and irrationality appears to have been 
fundamental to Eusebius’ understanding of the difference between the forces of 
good and evil in the universe, and it is also a polarity that underpins the whole of 
the combined apologetic of the PE and DE. It is a central aim of these works to 
demonstrate that Christians have chosen their new beliefs, not irrationally, and out 
of blind faith, but as a result of ‘judgement and temperate calculation’.626 This was in 
part a response to accusations previously levelled against Christians that their 
beliefs were based on ‘irrational and unexamined belief’.627 As many scholars have 
noted, Eusebius’ apologetic technique throughout these works consists of attempts 
to ‘prove’ the validity of Christian doctrine by drawing on the ‘evidence’ both of 
                                                          
623 PE 12.1.4. 
624 Garnsey, Ideas of Slavery, 181-82. 
625 Gal. 4:7, NRSV trans., cited in Garnsey, Ideas of Slavery, 181. On Paul’s use of the term νήπιος, see 
also the relevant entry in: G. Kittel, ed., Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament, vol. 4: Λ-Ν 
(Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1942), 918-22. 
626 DE 1.1.17: …κρίσει δὲ καὶ σώφρονι λογισμῷ… Cf. PE 15.1.12. 
627 PE 1.1.11: …ἀλόγῳ δὲ πίστει καὶ ἀνεξετάστῳ… 
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historical events and of non-Christian writers.628 The association which Eusebius 
saw between the demons and irrationality therefore not only suited, but arguably 
influenced, his broader apologetic stance in these works. 
As well as irrationality, Eusebius also associated demons with another 
concept that was traditionally viewed in a negative light by his society: the idea of 
tyranny.629 For Eusebius, demons were tyrannical rulers, who enslaved and 
oppressed those in their power. At times, Eusebius makes this association between 
demons and tyranny perfectly obvious, as when he describes how, in the past, ‘the 
demons ruled all the nations as tyrants’, (τῶν ἐθνῶν ἁπάντων κατετυράννουν οἱ 
δαίμονες).630 The use of the verb κατατυράννω draws attention to what Eusebius 
evidently considered to be the oppressive nature of demonic power. Likewise, at PE 
4.21.2, Eusebius describes how people have been saved by Christ from their 
‘ancestral slavery’ to demons,631 again showing the demons as oppressive. This 
association between demons and tyrannical power also permeates Eusebius’ works 
at a less obvious level, reflected in the similar language which Eusebius uses to 
characterise both tyrants and demons, and in the verbs which he uses to describe 
their actions.  
At times, some of the figures whom Eusebius portrays as tyrants in works like 
the HE are also, like demons, described as ‘good-hating’ (μισόκαλος);632 likewise, 
both demons and human tyrants can be found characterised by madness (μανία).633 
Significant parallels also occur in the verbs that Eusebius uses to describe the 
                                                          
628 See, for example: Coggan, Pandaemonia, 61-66; Johnson, ‘Literary Experiment’, 71. 
629 On this, see further, chapter VI below. 
630 PE 1.4.5. Cf. Ecl. Proph. 190.13-14. 
631 …παλαιοτάτης δουλείας… 
632 See, for example: HE 9.2.1, 9.6.4. 
633 See: HE 9.9.1, 9.9.12, 9.10.2, 10.4.14, 10.8.9. 
139 
 
actions of demons and tyrants. Demons, like tyrants, are said to ‘enslave’ (δουλόω) 
their subjects,634 and even where Eusebius does not use exactly the same word to 
describe the manner in which demons and tyrants act, his choice of vocabulary 
nevertheless represents them behaving in similar ways and is generally suggestive 
of oppression. Verbs such as καταδυναστεύω, καταδουλόω and κατατρῦχόω are 
used of demons,635 while tyrants are described in similar terms with the verbs 
κατατυραννέω and καταπονέω.636 Not only are most of these verbs linked by a 
shared sense of power or oppression, they are also connected by the repeated use of 
the prefix ‘κατα-’, meaning ‘down’ or ‘below’. In some cases, this serves to intensify 
the already negative meaning of the verb, as with ‘τυραννέω’; in others, it turns an 
otherwise relatively neutral verb like ‘κρατέω’, which could have either a positive 
or a negative meaning, into an unquestionably negative verb. Either way, the 
regular use of this prefix helps to associate demons firmly with ideas of tyranny and 
subjugation. By drawing such parallels between demons and concepts that were 
already viewed in a negative light by much of his audience, Eusebius was once 
again reinforcing his argument that demons were to be viewed as unremittingly 
negative figures. In contrast, Eusebius associates the Christian God with freedom 
(ἐλευθερία), presenting Christ as offering people the chance of liberation from the 
demonic tyranny to which they had been subject.637 Christ, we are told, ‘called the 
entire race of men out from impious and Egyptian idolatry under wicked demons 
                                                          
634 See, for example: HE 8.12.3, 8.14.6; VC 1.13.3; PE 4.17.4; DE 3.6.34, 4.9.8. 
635 DE 4.10.13; DE 6.20.11; PE 1.5.1. 
636 HE 10.9.3; VC 1.12.2. See also: HE 10.2.1: …τῆς τῶν τυράννων καταδυναστείας… 
637 See, for example: PE 1.4.2, 7.16.11; DE 3.1.2, 3.2.9, 9.10.7. 
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into freedom’.638 Thus, once again, we find God and the demons associated with 
contrasting concepts, this time of liberty and tyranny, further reinforcing the sense 
that Eusebius held these powers to be separated by a great gulf. 
This idea that both non-Christians and people in the pre-Christian era were in 
some way enslaved was by no means original to Eusebius – it first occurs in the 
Pauline notion of ‘slavery to sin’, according to which Christian converts, having 
previously been enslaved to sin, have, through the teaching of Christ, ‘been set free 
from sin, [and] have become slaves of righteousness’.639 For Eusebius, Pauline 
slavery to sin appears to have been replaced by a more tangible form of slavery to 
demons.640 Nevertheless, sin and demons remained closely connected for Eusebius, 
since he in turn linked the oppressive influence of the demons to the spread of 
immorality.641 This was then contrasted with the moral benefits which Eusebius 
suggested had been brought about by Christianity.642 In making his argument that 
demons were associated with immoral practices, Eusebius selected examples of 
activities and behaviours that would have been widely regarded as reprehensible 
within his society. These included ‘sexual impurity’ (πορνεία) and indulgence in 
‘shameful and intemperate pleasure’ (τῆς αἴσχρας καὶ ἀκολάστου ἡδονῆς),643 with 
Eusebius suggesting that the demons had caused people to submit to ‘the 
                                                          
638 DE 3.2.9: καὶ Ἰησοῦς δὲ ὁ Χριστὸς ἐκ τῆς ὑπὸ τοῖς πονηροῖς δαίμοσι δυσσεβοῦς καὶ Αἰγυπτιακῆς 
εἰδωλολατρείας εἰς ἐλευθερίαν τὸ πάντων ἀνθρώπων γένος ἀνεκαλέσατο. 
639 Rom. 6:18, NRSV trans.: ἐλευθερωθέντες δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἁμαρτίας ἐδουλώθητε τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ, cited 
in Garnsey, Ideas of Slavery, 183. On this, see ibid. 183-86. 
640 See the discussion in chapter VI below. 
641 As, for instance, at DE 4.10.1-4; PE 1.4.5-6, 7.2.3-6. 
642 For example at PE 1.4.6, 5.1.8. 
643 PE 7.2.4. Referring to πορνεία, Eusebius quotes Wisd. 14:12 (Ἀρχη γὰρ πορνείας ἐπίνοια 




impassioned portion of their soul’ (τὸ παθητικὸν αὐτῶν μὲρος τῆς ψυχῆς).644 
Under the influence of demons, we are told, Greeks and ‘barbarians’ alike were 
‘instructed in and executing the orgies and unholy mysteries only of shameful and 
intemperate pleasure’.645 In addition, Eusebius mentions incest and cannibalism as 
practices encouraged by demons,646 but it is the practice of human sacrifice to which 
he returns most often in his search for examples of demonically inspired 
immorality.647 
In part, Eusebius’ choice of human sacrifice as his main example of such 
immorality may have been based on the fact that he was able to find several texts by 
non-Christian writers which described reported instances of human sacrifice.648 As 
such, Eusebius had plenty of supposedly objective proof that the practice had been 
widespread. Yet, still more importantly, the example of human sacrifice also 
enabled him to reiterate his point that the pagan ‘gods’ were, in reality, wicked 
demons. After citing a story of human sacrifice found in Diodorus Siculus, Eusebius 
concludes: 
ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἡγοῦμαι διὰ τούτων ἀπεληλέγχθαι σαφῶς δαιμονικήν 
τινα γεγονέναι τὴν παλαιτάτην καὶ πρώτην τῶν ξοάνων ἵδρυσιν, καὶ 
πᾶσαν τὴν εἰδωλικὴν τῶν ἐθνῶν θεοποιίαν καὶ δαιμόνων οὐκ 
ἀγαθῶν, ἀλλὰ πάντα μοχθηροτάτων καὶ φαύλων·649 
For by these things I think it has been plainly shown that the oldest and 
first establishment of images was demonic, and all the idolatrous 
                                                          
644 PE 7.2.2. Cf. the discussion below, p. 267-68, on the idea of enslavement to passion. 
645 PE 7.2.4: …μόνης τῆς αἰσχρᾶς καὶ ἀκολάστου ἡδονῆς τὰ ὄργια καὶ τὰς ἀσέμνους τελετὰς 
μυούμενοί τε καὶ τελοῦντες… 
646 As, for example, at DE 5.Praef.14, and PE 1.4.6. 
647 See, for example: PE 1.4.6, 4.10.4, 4.15.4-5, 4.15.8-9, 4.16.21-27, 4.17.3-6, 4.17.9, 4.19.5-6, 4.21.1, 5.1.8, 
5.4.6, 5.26.6. 
648 Eusebius’ citations include: Dion. Hal. Rom. Antiq. 1.23.1-24.4, 1.38.2-3 (PE 4.16.15-18); Diod. Sic. Bibl. 
Hist. 20.14.4-6 (PE 4.16.19); Porph. De Abst. 2.54.1-56.9, 2.27.2 (PE 4.16.1-10); and a fragment of Philo 
Byblius’ Phoenecian History (PE 4.16.11). He also quotes examples from the Christian writer Clement of 
Alexandria, Protr. 3.42.1-43.1 (PE 4.16.12-13). 
649 PE 4.16.20. Cf. DE 4.10.3. 
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making of gods was the work of demons that are, not good, but entirely 
depraved and wicked. 
Eusebius is making the point that no truly divine being would have required such 
an abhorrent form of worship. Indeed, he even questions why, if there had been any 
good demons, they had not ordered people to put a stop to such practices, thereby 
reinforcing once again his claim that no demon was ever good.650 It is important to 
note that, in focusing on the immorality of such practices, Eusebius was not 
attempting to impose new moral categories on his audience. Human sacrifice, as 
J. Rives has shown, had long been used by Greek and Roman writers to define ‘the 
other’, and to distinguish between ‘civilisation’ and ‘barbarism’.651 Indeed, 
Christians had themselves been accused by their opponents of practising human 
sacrifice, and even cannibalism.652 Instead, Eusebius was simply redrawing an 
existing boundary between ‘civilisation’ and ‘barbarism’, such that Christianity, 
rather than Hellenism, now represented the civilising force.653 
This can be seen most clearly from a passage in the first book of the PE, in 
which Eusebius credits the teaching of Christ with bringing to an end the practices 
of cannibalism and incest which had purportedly been common among the 
traditional enemies of the Roman Empire, such as the Persians: 
…ἐκ μόνων δὲ τῶν αὐτοῦ φωνῶν καὶ τῆς ἀνὰ πᾶσαν τὴν οἰκουμένην 
διαδοθείας διδασκαλίας αὐτοῦ εὖ τὰ πάντων τῶν ἐθνῶν νόμιμα 
                                                          
650 PE 4.16.21; cf. PE 4.5.4, 4.14.10-4.15.4, 5.4.4. 
651 J. Rives, ‘Human Sacrifice Among Pagans and Christians’, JRS 85 (1995), 68. 
652 Such accusations are mainly reported by the Christian apologists who sought to refute them, 
although Pliny, in his famous letter to Trajan about the treatment of Christians, also remarked that the 
Christians only ate ‘harmless’ food, perhaps suggesting that reports of such behaviour were widely 
known: R.L. Wilken, The Christians As the Romans Saw Them (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 
17-21, citing Pliny, Ep.10.96; Minucius Felix, Octavius 9.5; Atheng. Leg. 3.1. See also: Martyrs of Lyons 
1.14; Orig. Cels. 6.27. A reference by Eusebius to rumours that Christians partook of ‘unholy food’ 
(ἀνοσίαις... τροφαῖς) demonstrates that these accusations continued to concern Christian writers even 
in the early fourth century: HE 4.7.11. 
653 As Johnson also noted: Ethnicity and Argument, 217. 
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κεῖται, αὑτὰ ἐκεῖνα τὰ πρὶν θηριώδη καὶ βάρβαρα, ὡς μηκέτι Πέρσας 
μητρογαμεῖν τοὺς αὐτῷ μαθητευθέντας μηδ’ ἀνθρωποβορεῖν 
Σκύθας διὰ τὸν καὶ μέχρις αὐτῶν ἐλθόντα τοῦ Χριστοῦ λόγον…654 
…but, from only his speech and his teaching, which is spread across the 
entire inhabited world, the customs of all the nations, including those 
which were previously wild and barbarian, are well laid down, such 
that the Persians who are his pupils do not any longer marry their 
mothers, nor do the Scythians practise cannibalism on account of the 
word of Christ, which has even come as far as them… 
Christianity is here represented as the force of morality. Later in the PE, Eusebius 
raises the question of why supposedly ‘good’ demons did not intervene to prevent 
such practices.655 By contrast, in this passage from the very beginning of the work, 
Eusebius makes it clear that he considers Christ to have acted where other 
supposed deities had not. Christianity, he suggests, has successfully brought about 
moral improvement. Eusebius does not allow his audience to lose sight of this 
association between Christianity and morality, more than once linking the teaching 
of Christ and his disciples with the decline of practices like human sacrifice in the 
PE.656 As a result, while Eusebius ties the demons to a range of behaviours that were 
considered alien and abhorrent, he associates Christianity with the spread of a 
moral code that would have been highly valued in Hellenic society. 
However, in order to suggest that Christianity alone represented the force of 
civilising morality, while other religions were connected with barbarism, Eusebius 
effectively had to collapse any distinction between different forms of pagan 
worship, as Coggan noted.657 The idea that ‘paganism’ was in any way a monolithic 
or co-ordinated system of beliefs is, as modern historians have increasingly come to 
                                                          
654 PE 1.4.6. 
655 PE 4.16.21. 
656 As at PE 4.15.6, 4.17.4. On Christ’s teaching as bringing about a decline of other immoral practices, 
see, for example: PE 1.4.11; DE 3.3.1, 3.6.32. 
657 Coggan, Pandaemonia, 50. Cf. Johnson, Ethnicity and Argument, 99. 
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recognise, highly inaccurate; rather, the very idea of ‘paganism’ was a creation of 
Christian apologists like Eusebius.658 Eusebius presents polytheistic worship in the 
PE not merely as inspired by demons, but as being originally alien to Greek society. 
The myths about the gods and the rituals of polytheistic worship, Eusebius 
suggests, initially came to Greece from the Phoenicians and Egyptians.659 It is these 
nations, he tells us, which ‘first began the error’.660 This allowed Eusebius to present 
all polytheistic worship as being essentially the same and therefore correspondingly 
all equally flawed. Moreover, it suggested that polytheistic worship, with its 
associated myths and rituals, was not necessarily to be associated with the 
‘civilising’ values of Hellenic society, since its origins were ‘barbarian’. Reflecting 
this association between ‘barbarism’ and the polytheistic worship that he saw as 
demon-inspired, Eusebius even described demons as ‘those other barbarians’ 
(ἄλλων τουτωνὶ βαρβάρων) in the LC.661 Here, Eusebius suggests that the physical 
attacks of earthly barbarians were paralleled in the invisible attacks of these 
demonic barbarians against human souls, through the spread of polytheism.662 As 
such, in turning away from traditional Greek religion, Christians need not be seen 
as simultaneously rejecting either Greek morality, or, indeed, Greek culture. 
In associating demons with a series of other negative concepts, from 
irrationality, through tyranny and darkness, to immorality, Eusebius was amply 
demonstrating how he could reach the conclusion that all demons were bad. 
Eusebius’ demons are unambiguously wicked, malevolent not by creation, but – far 
                                                          
658 P. Athanassiadi and M. Frede, ‘Introduction’, in Athanassiadi and Frede, eds., Pagan Monotheism in 
Late Antiquity (Oxford: Clarendon, 1999), 5. 
659 PE 1.6.1-4, 1.9.19, 3.4.5. 
660 PE 1.6.4: …ἀπαρξαμένων τῆς πλάνης. 
661 LC 6.21. 
662 LC 7.1-2. 
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worse – by choice. That Eusebius’ demons should so completely lack any form of 
redeeming feature is striking, but hardly unusual among early Christian writers. 
What is, however, particularly noteworthy about his presentation of the demonic is 
the way in which his demons appear to form an essential part of a cosmos that is 
completely polarised between the hostile opposing forces of good and evil. Not only 
are demons portrayed as wicked, they are consistently contrasted with, and shown 
as hostile to, everything that was good in the universe. This division between good 
and evil provided in turn the basic structure that underpinned Eusebius’ broader 
thought. Throughout Eusebius’ works, we find every negative concept repeatedly 
tied to the demonic realm, while everything good and every benefit to humankind 
is associated with God. Recognising that Eusebius’ thought is dominated in this 
way by his perception of a complete division, even a battle, between the forces of 
good and evil in the universe can help us towards a better understanding of other 
areas of Eusebius’ thought. 
 
A ‘Dualistic’ View? 
The sharp divisions that recur throughout Eusebius’ thought in a variety of forms 
raise the question of whether his view of the universe may reasonably be seen as 
‘dualistic’. A note of caution is needed at the outset over the use of the term 
‘dualism’, since this was not coined until the early eighteenth century, initially to 
describe ancient Persian religion.663 It is therefore not a term that Eusebius would 
have applied either to his own thought, or to anyone else’s. Nevertheless, more 
                                                          
663 P.F.M. Fontaine, The Light and the Dark: A Cultural History of Dualism (Amsterdam: J.C. Gieben, 1986), 
vol. 6, xxii. 
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recent scholarship has adopted a much broader view of ‘dualism’ and it can be a 
useful term for describing particularly polarised systems of thought. A dualistic 
religious or philosophical system is usually considered to consist of two 
irreconcilably opposed groups or powers, one good and one evil, with no middle 
ground and no possibility of compromise between them.664 Yet, even within this 
broad definition, dualistic beliefs may take a variety of forms, as scholars of dualism 
have been keen to emphasise.665 Moreover, dualistic views may also appear beyond 
the fields of theological and philosophical speculation, with S. Laeuchli also 
identifying forms of ‘social’, ‘psychological’, and ‘ethical’ dualism.666 
Dualistic belief systems were not uncommon in the ancient world, and, even 
among early Christians, Eusebius would not have been alone in displaying a 
tendency towards dualism. Several, although by no means all, of the texts 
discovered at Nag Hammadi display clearly dualistic elements,667 while the views of 
some early Christian groups later deemed heretical, such as the Marcionites and the 
Valentinians, were condemned by their ‘orthodox’ opponents for positing more 
than one god.668 Yet, even within the canonical Gospels, there are passages, such as 
                                                          
664 Fontaine, in his multi-volume survey of dualism in the ancient world, offers the following definition 
of ‘dualism’: ‘two systems or concepts or principles or groups of people that are utterly opposed and 
cannot be reduced to one another; they exist alongside each other, without any intermediary term; one 
of the two is always thought to be of a much higher quality than the other’: Light and Dark 
(Amsterdam: J.C. Gieben, 1986), vol. 1, 263. Cf. S. Laeuchli, ‘Mithraic Dualism’, in Laeuchli, ed., 
Mithraism in Ostia: Mystery Religion and Christianity in the Ancient Port of Rome (Evanston, Il: 
Northwestern University Press, 1967), 61, who nevertheless considers such a definition of dualism to 
be unnecessarily restrictive. 
665 Laeuchli, for instance, noted the differences between the ‘dualistic elements’ present in the thought 
of Plato and Valentius, and the ‘ultimate dualism’ of the Manichaean system: ‘Mithraic Dualism’, 61. 
666 Ibid. 61-62. 
667 E. Pagels points to the Hypostasis of the Archons, On the Origin of the World and The Secret Book of John 
as examples: Gnostic Gospels (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979), 29. 
668 Pagels, Origin of Satan, 169; Pagels, Gnostic Gospels, 28-29. Such claims were, however, not 
necessarily accurate, at least in the case of the Valentinians, since Valentinian texts discovered at Nag 
Hammadi, such as the Gospel of Philip, display no evidence of dualism: Pagels, Origin of Satan, 171-77. 
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those dealing with Christ’s struggles with Satan in the wilderness, or his exorcisms 
of demons,669 that could lend themselves to dualistic interpretations.670 
Nevertheless, we should be extremely cautious about seeing some form of 
absolute, cosmic dualism, with two equal and opposed divine powers, in Eusebius’ 
thought. Eusebius, after all, strongly condemned dualistic groups like the 
Manichaeans,671 and considered himself part of the ‘orthodox’ tradition which 
proclaimed a faith in one, benevolent creator-God.672 Furthermore, as we have seen, 
Eusebius repeatedly emphasises, not only the moral inferiority of the demons, but 
also his belief that their power and insight were not equal to those of the true 
Christian God. As such, Eusebius avoids outright cosmic dualism, despite the wide 
polarities which he sees in the universe. Yet there remains an unresolved tension 
within his thought, between his belief in a benevolent and all-powerful God, and 
his view of demons as an evil and dangerous force openly operating within the 
cosmos. 
Of all the conceptual divisions within Eusebius’ thought, the most obvious is 
surely the moral divide between good and evil, manifested in a range of further 
distinctions between light and darkness, morality and immorality. As such, one 
might perhaps be justified in speaking of a ‘moral dualism’ within Eusebius’ 
thought. Yet despite this stark moral divide, Eusebius does not consider the 
representatives of these two moral poles – on the one hand God, and on the other 
the devil and his demons – to be entirely independent of each other. In fact, 
                                                          
669 For example: Matthew 4:1-11, 8:28-34; Mark 5:1-13; Luke 4:1-13, 8:26-33. 
670 Pagels has suggested that a form of ‘modified dualism... characterises the great majority of Christian 
teachings, based... on the conviction that God’s spirit constantly contends against Satan’: Origin of 
Satan, 177. 
671 HE 7.31.1-2. 
672 On which, see: Pagels, Gnostic Gospels, 28-29. 
148 
 
according to the logic of Eusebius’ account of the demons’ origins, not only demons, 
but also the devil must have been part of God’s creation. For Eusebius, as we have 
seen, demons were originally angels, who had fallen from their blessed state into a 
state of wickedness.673 Eusebius also makes it clear that God was the ‘maker’ 
(ποιητής) of the angels.674 As such, God must also be the ‘maker’ of the demons, and 
their leader, the devil.  
Nevertheless, this leaves unasked the somewhat problematic question of why 
an omniscient and benevolent deity would knowingly create beings capable of 
bringing suffering into the world. After all, Eusebius, as we saw above,675 elsewhere 
uses the same term, ποιητής, to describe the relationship between the diabolical 
leader of the demons and darkness.676 These wicked powers may be the immediate 
‘makers’ of darkness, but if God is, in turn, the ‘maker’ of the demons, then one 
might wonder what this means for the relationship between God and darkness. 
Given the primarily apologetic aims of the majority of Eusebius’ works, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that he fails to address this question directly. Yet in spite of his 
reticence, there are some tantalising hints in his works as to how he may have been 
able to reconcile his belief in the continuing presence of such wicked creatures in 
the universe with a belief in a just and merciful God. 
One such hint occurs in Eusebius’ discussion of the origin of the demons in 
book 7 of the PE. Here, after describing how some of the fallen angels were confined 
                                                          
673 PE 7.16.1-11. 
674 PE 4.5.4; cf. PE 13.15.9-10. 
675 Above, p. 127. 
676 PE 7.16.3. 
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to Tartarus by ‘the just decision and sentence of the great God’,677 Eusebius asserts 
that: 
ὧν βραχύ τι καὶ μικρὸν ἀπόσπασμα, γυμνασίου χάριν τῶν εὐσεβείας 
ἀθλητῶν ἀμφὶ γῆν καὶ τὸν ὑπὸ σελήνην ἀέρα καταλειφθέν, τῆς ἐν 
ἀνθρώποις πολυθέου πλάνης κατ’ οὐδὲν ἀθεότητος διαφερούσης 
συναίτιον γέγονε.678 
Of these, a petty and small remnant, left behind around the earth and 
the air below the moon for the sake of training the athletes of piety, 
became jointly responsible for the error of polytheism, which is in no 
way different from atheism, among men. 
In its suggestion that different groups of fallen angels had different fates, this 
account is somewhat reminiscent of the Enochic story of the Watcher angels, in 
which, while the fallen angels themselves were imprisoned in darkness at God’s 
command, the spirits of their offspring, the giants, remained free on earth to 
torment humankind.679 This passage therefore shows the influence on Eusebius’ 
thought of just one of the many accounts of demonic origins that were in circulation 
at the time. The crucial point here, however, is the implication that above these 
wicked demons stands a greater power, which is capable of restraining them, but 
which for whatever reason has chosen not to do so. By using the passive of the verb 
καταλείπω, Eusebius manages to avoid naming the power responsible, but 
following on from the previous sentence, in which it was God who had confined 
some of the fallen angels to Tartarus, we must infer the unnamed subject of the verb 
to be God. Eusebius’ use of the passive suggests that he was perhaps not entirely 
comfortable with the notion that his benevolent God might effectively be licensing 
                                                          
677 PE 7.16.7: …κρίσει δικαίᾳ καὶ ἀποφάσει τοῦ μεγάλου θεοῦ… 
678 PE 7.16.8. 
679 P.S. Alexander, ‘The Demonology of the Dead Sea Scrolls’, in P.W. Flint and J.C. VanderKam, eds., 
The Dead Sea Scrolls After Fifty Years: A Comprehensive Assessment vol. 2 (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 338-9. 1 
Enoch 10.1-22, 15.1-16.1. 
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the demons’ behaviour on earth, since it allows him to avoid making such an 
accusation explicit. 
Nevertheless, there is also some indication here of how Eusebius may have 
been able to see such an action as corresponding to God’s benevolence, when we are 
told that the reason some demons ‘were left behind’ was ‘for the sake of training the 
athletes of piety’ (γυμνασίου χάριν τῶν εὐσεβείας ἀθλητῶν). This is clearly a 
reference to the Christian martyrs of the persecutions. The portrayal of martyrs as 
victorious ‘athletes’ and contestants in the Greek athletic contest, or ἀγῶν, was 
common in much early Christian martyr literature,680 including Eusebius’ own. 
Throughout the De martyribus Palaestinae, as well as in the accounts of persecutions 
in the HE, Eusebius regularly applied such terminology to the martyrs.681 In using 
the phrase ‘the athletes of piety’, it is therefore evident that he had in mind the 
events of the persecutions. Moreover, as N. Kelley has pointed out, the use of such 
language represented martyrdom not only as a spiritual victory, but as ‘an 
enterprise which required training’.682 In suggesting that the role of the demons was 
in part to ‘train’ these ‘athletes of piety’, Eusebius is therefore perhaps suggesting 
that the struggle against these hostile figures might in some way serve a morally 
improving purpose. By contributing to the moral exercises of these Christian 
                                                          
680 See, for example: Martyrdom of Polycarp 18-19; Acts of Carpus, Papylus and Agathonice [Greek] 35; 
Martyrs of Lyons 1.17, 1.36; Martyrdom of Apollonius 47; Martyrdom of Dasius 9.2. On Christian martyr 
discourse, see: N. Kelley, ‘Philosophy as Training for Death: Reading the Ancient Christian Martyr 
Acts as Spiritual Exercises’, Church History 75 (2006), 723-47; L.L. Thompson, ‘The Martyrdom of 
Polycarp: Death in the Roman Games’, Journal of Religion 82 (2002), 27-52; Z. Stewart, ‘Greek Crowns 
and Christian Martyrs’, in E. Lucchesi and H.D. Saffrey, eds., Mémorial André-Jean Festugière: Antiquité 
Paienne et Chrétienne (Geneva: Cramer, 1984), 119-24. This language is also found in 4 Maccabees: J. 
Corke-Webster, ‘Mothers and Martyrdom: Familial Piety and the Model of the Maccabees inn Eusebius 
of Caesarea’s Ecclesiastical History’, in Johnson and Schott, eds., Tradition and Innovations, 64. See, for 
example: 4 Macc. 6:10, 17:15. 
681 See, for example: Mart. Pal. [SR] 3.1, 4.4, 6.6, 9.3, 11.4, 11.18, 11.22, 11.23, 13.1, 13.11; HE 1.1.2, 7.12.1, 
8.3.1, 8.6.5, 8.7.1, 8.8.1. 
682 Kelley, ‘Philosophy as Training for Death’, 727. 
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athletes, the demons would unwittingly be helping to prepare them for the ultimate 
spiritual fulfilment – the victory – of martyrdom. This sense that the role of the 
demons might in this case ultimately be beneficial is further reinforced by Eusebius 
use of the word χάριν here, since this word had generally positive connotations, 
conveying a sense of goodwill, or favour.683 As such, the implication is that, in 
supplying the demons as a means of moral training for the pious, God is in fact 
demonstrating his benevolence, helping people towards salvation. It is important to 
note, however, that it would only be by successfully resisting the hostile actions of 
the demons that this beneficial effect might be achieved. 
There is, of course, no suggestion that the demons might consciously be 
working for the benefit of humankind; rather, they would at best be the unwitting 
agents of God’s greater plan for human salvation. Moreover, the structure of this 
sentence leaves intriguingly open the question of God’s role in permitting the 
demons to encourage polytheistic worship. The reason why they are permitted to 
remain on earth is given as ‘training the athletes of piety’; however, once they have 
been allowed to remain, Eusebius suggests that they then proceed to encourage the 
development of polytheism. Eusebius seems willing to allow that persecutions and 
martyrdoms might have had a potentially corrective or improving aspect, without 
being able to see any similar benefit in the existence of polytheism. Eusebius does 
not make it clear whether he believed that the demons, once they had been allowed 
to remain for one, ultimately benevolent, purpose, had then effectively exceeded 
their mandate and begun to work other kinds of evil, or whether he felt that all 
demonic activity must, in some obscure way, be serving God’s greater plan. Either 
                                                          
683 LSJ, s.v. χάρις. Cf. PGL s.v. χάρις. 
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way, this one brief phrase demonstrates that, however polarised Eusebius’ cosmos, 
he avoided outright dualism by placing the demons ultimately under God’s power. 
Although this suggestion that God might at times use the demons to serve his 
own ends is rare in Eusebius, this is not the only place where we find him allowing 
for the possibility that God might sometimes permit human suffering in order to 
achieve an ultimately positive goal. Once again, it is only in the context of the 
persecutions that Eusebius seems prepared to entertain this possibility. Describing 
an abortive attempt by the emperor Aurelian to persecute the church, Eusebius 
suggests at HE 7.30.20-21 that he was prevented by God, demonstrating, in 
Eusebius’ view: 
…ὡς οὔποτε γένοιτ’ ἂν ῥαστώνη τοῖς τοῦ βίου ἄρχουσιν κατὰ τῶν 
τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἐκκλησιῶν, μὴ οὐχὶ τῆς ὑπερμάχου χειρὸς θείᾳ καὶ 
οὐρανίῳ κρίσει παιδείας ἕνεκα καὶ ἐπιστροφῆς… τοῦτ’ ἐπιτελεῖσθαι 
συγχωρούσης.684 
…that at no point would it be easy for the rulers of this life to come 
down against the assemblies of Christ, unless the hand fighting on our 
behalf, in godly and heavenly judgement for the sake of education and 
correction… should order this to happen. 
While the phrase ‘the rulers of this life’ (τοῖς τοῦ βίου ἄρχουσιν) is ostensibly a 
reference to earthly emperors such as Aurelian, it is also reminiscent of Paul’s 
famous remark that ‘our struggle is not against enemies of blood and flesh, but 
against the rulers, against the authorities, against the cosmic powers of this present 
darkness’.685 As such, we once again find Eusebius implying that the enemies of the 
virtuous, be they earthly or demonic, might take action against the church only 
                                                          
684 HE 7.30.21. 
685 Eph. 6:12, NRSV trans.: ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἡμῖν ἡ πάλη πρὸς αἷμα καὶ σάρκα, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰς ἀρχάς, 
πρὸς τὰς ἐξουσίας, πρὸς τοὺς κοσμοκράτορας τοῦ σκότους τούτου. 
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when God allowed.686 In this case, Eusebius suggests that God in fact intervened to 
prevent the persecutions, by bringing about Aurelian’s death; however, slightly 
later, we find God permitting persecutions to go ahead, by removing his protection 
from the church.687 Eusebius leaves us in no doubt that he considers this to be 
entirely justified by the growing dissentions and conflicts within the church at that 
time: he sees it as a ‘godly judgement’ (ἡ θεία κρίσις), and considers that God was 
simply ‘conducting his supervision’ (τὴν αὐτῆς ἐπισκοπὴν ἀνακίνει).688 Quoting 
from Psalm 88(89):42, Eusebius goes even further, claiming that during these 
persecutions, God not only removed his protection from the church, but even 
‘exalted the right hand of his foes’ (ὕψωσεν γὰρ τὴν δεξιὰν τῶν ἐχθρῶν αὐτοῦ).689 
Eusebius is thus offering a slightly different interpretation of the persecutions here, 
in which they are not simply the work of hostile and malevolent demons, inflicted 
on an innocent population, but rather an instrument of God’s justice. Their purpose, 
however, is not simply punitive; instead, Eusebius suggests that God might have 
allowed this suffering for the essentially merciful purpose of correcting human 
error, thus leading people back to the path of virtue and salvation. Eusebius’ use of 
the word παιδείας at HE 7.30.21 is suggestive: God wishes to ‘educate’ people, to 
help them to improve themselves. Even his punishments might thus, in Eusebius’ 
view, ultimately be seen as evidence of his benevolence. 
 
 
                                                          
686 Cf. HE 8.1.6, where Eusebius asserts that God’s protection prevents a ‘wicked demon’ (δαίμων 
πονηρὸς) from undermining the prosperity of the church. 
687 HE 8.1.7-9. 
688 HE 8.1.7. 




It therefore seems that, for Eusebius, there was ultimately only one power in true 
control of events in the universe, and that power was the benevolent Christian God. 
Thus, while we must see demons in Eusebius as a powerful force, capable of 
disrupting human salvation, enslaving the gullible and drawing people away from 
God, there was clearly no doubt in Eusebius’ mind about who the eventual victor in 
this greater cosmic conflict would be. The power of the Christian God far 
outweighed that of the demons, who were, ultimately, only part of God’s creation. 
Eusebius’ presentation of the demonic thus leaves a number of questions 
tantalisingly unanswered. There remain a number of inherent tensions in his 
thought, which we cannot hope to resolve here. For instance, while Eusebius 
appears tentatively to find possible benefits lying behind the persecutions, he does 
not offer a similar explanation of why his benevolent God might have permitted the 
demons to encourage polytheism, with its attendant suffering and immorality. 
Eusebius’ unmistakable view of demons as a hostile and terrifying force to be 
feared, combatted, and condemned therefore sits at times rather uncomfortably 
with his faith in the supreme power and benevolence of God. 
In view of Eusebius’ primarily apologetic aims, we should not expect to find a 
solution to these tensions in his works, since at no point was his purpose principally 
to outline or explain the function of demons within the universe. Moreover, we 
should certainly not attempt to smooth out any inconsistencies, or to look for 
intellectually satisfying answers to questions that Eusebius may not even have 
asked himself. This would be to run the risk of distorting Eusebius’ thought. 
Instead, we must simply accept this complex – at times, almost paradoxical – 
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cosmology as the structure which underpinned his thought on other issues. While 
some of the theological nuances of this system remain obscure to us – indeed, they 
might have been obscure even to Eusebius himself – the basic outline of Eusebius’ 
cosmology is unmistakable. Eusebius envisaged a universe structured and 
energised by a fundamental division between the cosmic forces of good and evil. 
Ideas about demons, as the representatives of one of these poles, cannot be neatly 
excised from other areas of Eusebius’ thought, any more than his ideas about God 
or Christ can be set aside by scholars who wish to understand his views. Thus, in 
order to appreciate Eusebius’ thought on any topic, including his political thought, 
we must remain constantly alert to the presence of demons in his work, 
remembering to see them as a hostile and consistently threatening force, against 
which the virtuous must constantly struggle. By recognising the importance of 
demons for Eusebius, I will show in future chapters that we can gain valuable new 
insights into key areas of his thought – his ideas of moral responsibility, his 




DEMONIC INFLUENCE AND HUMAN RESPONSIBILITY 
Although they have rarely received the attention they deserve in studies of 
Eusebius’ works, questions of human morality, of virtue and vice, and the 
responsibility for evil lie at the heart of many of Eusebius’ most pressing concerns 
as a writer. As an apologist and church leader in a period when Christians were 
adjusting to a new position of imperial favour, he was able to offer instruction in 
what he felt it meant to be a true and virtuous Christian, and how such virtue might 
be achieved. As an historian, he faced the challenge of explaining the apparent 
injustice of earlier persecutions in a manner consistent with a belief in a just and 
omnipotent God. Writing of Constantine’s career, there was the issue of Licinius’ 
transformation from virtuous Christian hero to vicious persecutor to address, and 
finally, as the champion of his own doctrinal views, he had to engage with those 
‘heretics’ he considered to have strayed from the route to virtue and salvation. 
Issues of human moral responsibility therefore had both a theological and a 
practical significance for Eusebius, occupying a central place both in his 
understanding of salvation and divine justice, and also in his vision of Christian 
identity. 
Few scholars, however, have chosen to examine these issues in much detail. 
Jean Sirinelli, for instance, touched briefly on the role of human ‘free will’ in 
Eusebius’ works, finding it to be ‘the key to Eusebius’ thought’.690 He did so, 
however, not in order to explore Eusebius’ views on moral responsibility, but rather 
                                                          
690 Sirinelli, Les vues historiques, 359: ‘…elle est la clef de la pensée d’Eusèbe’. Cf. Amand, Fatalisme et 
liberté, 355; Lyman, Christology and Cosmology, 102. 
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as part of a discussion of Eusebius’ understanding of divine providence.691 
Moreover, Sirinelli paid no attention to the many problems involved in applying a 
term such as ‘free will’ to thinkers of this period,692 and failed to looked much 
beyond Eusebius’ most strident statements on the subject of external necessity and 
human responsibility in the PE. Although this work undoubtedly contains 
Eusebius’ most comprehensive discussion of many of the issues surrounding 
human responsibility and accountability, most of Eusebius’ statements on the 
subject, particularly in book 6, occur in the context of a broader rebuttal of the 
doctrine of an all-powerful Fate. As a result, they cannot be said to provide a 
complete picture of Eusebius’ understanding of these issues. By restricting his focus 
in this way, Sirinelli therefore missed the opportunity to reach a more nuanced 
understanding of Eusebius’ views by comparing them with the examples of human 
virtue and vice found in some of Eusebius’ other works, such as the HE and VC. 
Similarly, while J.R. Lyman devoted a brief section of her book on Christology 
and Cosmology to Eusebius’ views on ‘human nature and will’, she too focused 
mainly on the longer discussions of the subject in the PE, DE and Theophania.693 
Elsewhere, although Aaron Johnson has rightly drawn attention to the way in 
which Eusebius’ works helped to shape an emerging sense of Christian identity,694 
his particular focus on discourses of ethnicity means that he largely ignores 
questions about human responsibility and the attainment of virtue – questions 
which would surely have been crucial in forming a shared understanding of what it 
                                                          
691 Ibid. 339-63. Chesnut similarly focused on the relationship between human ‘free will’ and divine 
providence in Eusebius: First Christian Histories, 61-90. 
692 On which, see below, p. 160-63. 
693 Lyman, Christology and Cosmology, 100-06. 
694 Johnson, Ethnicity and Argument. 
158 
 
meant to be a ‘good’ Christian. A full examination of the issue of human moral 
responsibility in Eusebius’ works is therefore long overdue. 
In particular, it is essential to explore how Eusebius presents the relationship 
between demons and humans when assessing his views on human responsibility. 
Eusebius’ works provide countless examples of interaction between demonic and 
human agents, notably in the commission of wicked acts and vicious behaviour, 
which have been ignored in previous scholarship. These examples can provide a 
fresh perspective on Eusebius’ understanding of human freedom of action and 
moral accountability. They take us beyond the more theoretical discussions of the 
PE and allow us to observe his views ‘in action’, bringing to the fore questions 
about the balance between external influence and human free choice. They show 
how people might succumb to wickedness and thus, conversely, provide an insight 
into how Eusebius felt people might avoid evil. Moreover, observing how Eusebius 
presents the relationship between humans and demons can also help to shed light 
on how he pictured the opposite relationship, between humans and the divine. 
Above all, the role of the demonic in encouraging human wickedness ought to be 
examined simply because a threatening demonic presence was central to Eusebius’ 
understanding of the universe. As David Brakke has noted, early Christian ‘ethical 
life… took place within the context of cosmic struggle’ against the devil and the 
forces of evil.695 For Eusebius, questions about how and why humans might be 
drawn to sin cannot be separated from questions about precisely how demons, as 
part of their battle against God, act with or upon their human victims. The issue of 
                                                          
695 Brakke, Demons and the Making of the Monk, 10. 
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human moral responsibility is inseparably connected in Eusebius’ works with 
questions about demonic responsibility for wickedness. 
It is important to note at the outset, however, that even when approaching 
Eusebius’ understanding of human responsibility from this new perspective, there 
will be aspects of his thought that remain frustratingly obscure. At times, Eusebius’ 
ideas might appear somewhat vague or circular – Sirinelli considered Eusebius’ 
discussion of the relationship between human ‘free will’ and divine providence to 
be ‘fragile’ and ‘inadequate’.696 Moreover, the challenges involved in dealing with 
subjects as complex as human freedom of action and moral responsibility are not 
small. Ancient and modern terminologies rarely correspond in this area. For 
instance, as with many ancient thinkers, the issue of moral responsibility is 
discussed by Eusebius mainly in terms of praise and blame, or reward and 
punishment,697 and we should therefore not expect to find a clear and consistent 
term for ‘moral responsibility’ in Eusebius’ works. Similarly, a term such as ‘free 
will’ has become so heavily burdened with the concerns of centuries of later 
philosophers as to pose particular problems for anyone attempting to understand 
earlier debates. As a result, any attempt to understand Eusebius’ thought in this 
area must begin, not with modern terms and later concerns, but with close attention 
both to the expressions which Eusebius favoured and to the debates of his own time 
with which he was engaging. 
                                                          
696 Sirinelli, Les vues historiques, 362: ‘…la fragilité ou plutôt l’insuffisance de la thèse soutenue par 
Eusèbe.’ 
697 Bobzien has noted that the Stoics similarly discussed moral responsibility in terms of praise and 
blame: S. Bobzien, ‘Stoic Conceptions of Freedom and their Relation to Ethics’, in R. Sorabji, ed., 
Aristotle and After (London: Institute of Classical Studies, 1997), 73. Sorabji likewise takes the allocation 
of praise and blame as indicative of moral responsibility in Aristotle and Epictetus: R. Sorabji, Emotion 
and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 
326, n. 55, 332. 
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It is therefore only by treating Eusebius’ thought on its own terms, and paying 
attention to a wide range of his works that we can hope to reach a proper 
understanding of his views on human agency and moral responsibility. This 
approach makes it clear that, for Eusebius, as for many early Christians, 
maintaining human accountability was of central importance to his conception of 
salvation. The belief that people were responsible and therefore answerable for their 
decisions, both good and bad, allowed for the administration of justice, particularly 
divine justice, and meant that the reward of salvation could be seen as fairly 
bestowed. Yet it also reveals that, despite the heavy emphasis on human 
responsibility in his works, Eusebius did not believe that people always acted 
entirely independently. His understanding of human behaviour allowed 
considerable room for external influence, for better or worse, without, however, 
removing people’s ultimate responsibility for the actions they carried out. In 
Eusebius’ view, human virtue and vice were each a partnership between humans 
and an external spiritual power. Such a view may be characterised as 
simultaneously empowering and dispiriting – Eusebius’ understanding of human 
responsibility allowed people a role in securing their own salvation, but at the same 
time placed considerable obstacles in their path, most notably in the form of 
threatening and hostile demons. 
 
Background 
Discussions of the issues of human agency and moral responsibility – particularly 
among early Christian writers like Eusebius – are frequently approached by 
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scholars in terms of a question of ‘free will’.698 There are, however, considerable 
risks involved in applying this term to ideas expressed in the early fourth century. 
Although for many years scholars assumed that free will was such a basic and 
fundamental concept that all people, including those in the ancient world, must 
have shared it, recent scholarship has come to recognise instead that ‘free will’ is in 
fact a ‘technical, philosophical notion’, one that was developed by philosophers and 
gradually changed over time.699 As a result, scholars have pointed out that early 
Greek philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle and the early Stoics make no reference 
to a concept of free will,700 and have tried instead to determine when the notion was 
first articulated, by tracing its gradual development through the debates of 
Classical, Hellenistic and early Christian philosophy.701 Although some have 
detected elements of a notion of will as early as the Stoic Epictetus in the second 
century CE,702 others feel we must wait until Augustine in the late fourth and early 
fifth century to find the concept expressed in anything even approaching its modern 
                                                          
698 See, for example: Lyman, Christology and Cosmology, 6, 161; H. Crouzel, ‘Theological Contruction and 
Research: Origen on Free-Will’, trans. B. Drewery, in R. Baukham and B. Drewery, eds., Scripture, 
Tradition and Reason: A Study in the Criteria of Christian Doctrine. Studies in Honour of R.P.C. Hanson 
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988), 239-65; Sirinelli, Les vues historiques, 358-59; G.F. Chesnut, ‘Fate, Fortune, 
Free Will and Nature in Eusebius of Caesarea’, Church History 42 (1973), 165-82; C.J. Eppling, A Study of 
the Patristic Doctrine of Free Will, unpublished Masters Thesis, Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 
Wake Forest, North Carolina, 2009. This is not exclusively a problem for early Christian authors – 
similar concerns have been raised about scholarship on ideas of agency in Plotinus: E. Eliasson, The 
Notion of That Which Depends On Us in Plotinus and Its Background (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 2. 
699 M. Frede, A Free Will: Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought, ed., A.A. Long (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2011), 2. Moreover, as Frede pointed out, the concept of ‘free will’ is dependent on 
having an understanding not only of ‘will’, but also of ‘freedom’, and ‘a notion of a will is not 
necessarily a notion of a will which is free’: A Free Will, 7. Cf. R. Sorabji, ‘The Concept of the Will from 
Plato to Maximus the Confessor’, in T. Pink and M.W.F. Stone, eds., The Will and Human Action: From 
Antiquity to the Present Day (London: Routledge, 2004), 6. 
700 Frede, A Free Will, 19; Bobzien, ‘Stoic Conceptions of Freedom’, 73. 
701 See, in particular: Frede, A Free Will; A. Dihle, The Theory of Will in Classical Antiquity (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1982); Sorabji, ‘The Concept of the Will’. 
702 Frede, A Free Will, 46. 
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form.703 Moreover, even if Augustine found a means of expressing an idea of ‘free 
will’ in Latin, it does not necessarily follow that the concept was similarly available 
in Greek,704 and some scholars have indeed suggested that it was not until Maximus 
the Confessor in the seventh century that a standard Greek term for will (θέλησις) 
appeared.705 Wherever one chooses to locate the origin of the concept of ‘free will’, 
however, the problem with applying the term to a writer like Eusebius is clear. 
Since ‘free will’ is not a fixed, universal notion, but rather a shifting, invented 
concept, gradually changing and developing over time, applying it to Eusebius’ 
works risks imposing an alien, anachronistic idea on his thought. 
The difficulty with using the concept of free will to approach ancient thought 
is further exacerbated by considerable terminological confusion. A wide range of 
Greek words and phrases, including among others ἡ προαίρεσις, τὸ αὐτεξούσιον, 
τὰ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν, ἡ βούλησις and ἡ θέλησις have all been translated as ‘will’ or ‘free 
will’, yet it is clear that such a variety of expressions must each have had particular 
connotations, if not entirely different meanings, which might easily be lost in 
haphazard translation.706 Scholars, however, who try to find just one word for ‘free 
will’ face falling into the trap of implying that there was one set concept which 
people would generally have understood by that particular word. The fact that 
                                                          
703 Sorabji, Emotion, 319. Sorabji does, however, trace the gradual development of the notion back much 
further. Cf. Sorabji, ‘The Concept of the Will’, 6. Kahn, by contrast, suggests that Augustine only 
‘begins but does not complete the task of working out a Christian theory of will’: C.H. Kahn, 
‘Discovering the Will: From Aristotle to Augustine’, in J.M. Dillon and A.A. Long, eds., The Question of 
‘Eclecticism’: Studies in Later Greek Philosophy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 237. 
704 As Dihle noted: Theory of Will, 143. 
705 J.D. Madden, ‘The Authenticity of Early Definitions of Will (thelesis)’, in F. Heinzer and C. 
Schonnorn, eds., Maximus Confessor: Actes du Symposium sur Maxime le Confesseur, Fribourg, 2-5 
Septembre 1980 (Fribourg: Éditions Universitaires Fribourg Suisse, 1982), 61-2. 
706 As Frede noted: A Free Will, 102. Eliasson’s work on Plotinus similarly highlights the need to ‘avoid 
translating different terms relating to different issues by one and the same modern term’: That Which 
Depends On Us, 15. 
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scholars have come to completely different conclusions about the appropriate Greek 
term for ‘free will’ serves only to illustrate the confusion which might arise from 
such an approach.707 Thus, rather than trying to find an expression for ‘free will’ in 
Eusebius’ works, and thereby perhaps distorting his ideas, it will be far more 
helpful to try to consider his thought on its own terms, by paying careful attention 
to the vocabulary which Eusebius actually employed. Since the purpose of this 
chapter is not to determine how far Eusebius may have shared a modern notion of 
free will – if such a notion even exists708 – but rather to gain greater insight into his 
understanding of human responsibility and morality, both the concept and the 
terminology of ‘free will’ will be best avoided here.709 
However, acknowledging that it can be inappropriate to apply the concept of 
‘free will’ to ancient writers does not mean denying that these writers were 
interested in questions of moral responsibility and the attribution of praise and 
blame, which might, to a modern reader, seem to fall within the scope of a ‘free will 
problem’.710 Michael Frede insisted on the importance of distinguishing between 
‘the belief in a free will and the ordinary belief that at least sometimes we are 
responsible for what we are doing’, arguing that the latter belief could exist without 
                                                          
707 For instance, Kahn considered to autexousion to be the best Greek ‘technical expression for free will’, 
yet, according to Frede, ‘the standard Greek term for the will is prohairesis’: Kahn, ‘Discovering the 
Will’, 250; Frede, A Free Will, 8. 
708 As Kahn has noted, even today ‘there is no single concept designated by the will’: ‘Discovering the 
Will’, 235. Cf. Frede, A Free Will, 5; T. Pink, and M.W.F. Stone, ‘Introduction’, in Pink and Stone, eds., 
The Will and Human Action: From Antiquity to the Present Day (London: Routledge, 2004), 1; Sorabji, ‘The 
Concept of the Will’, 7. 
709 Cf. Eliasson, That Which Depends On Us, which similarly rejects the unhelpful terminology of ‘free 
will’ for the study of τὰ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν in Plotinus. 
710 Huby identified two historical ‘free will problems’: firstly the relationship between free will and 
predestination, which he saw as ‘mainly theological’, and secondly, the relationship between free will 
and determinism, which might raise questions of human moral responsibility: P. Huby, ‘The First 
Discovery of the Freewill Problem’, Philosophy 42 (1967), 353. 
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the former.711 Certainly when we look at the works of ancient and early Christian 
authors, we find that many of them were greatly exercised by issues of moral 
responsibility and accountability.712 Particularly from the second century CE 
onwards, the desire of philosophers of other schools to oppose what they saw as the 
universal determinism of the Stoic doctrine of fate (εἱμαρμένη) brought to the fore 
the question of the relationship between external forces and human freedom of 
action.713 Although, as C. Stough has pointed out, the Stoic position was frequently 
misrepresented, or misunderstood by its critics, the Stoic notion of fate appeared to 
many of their opponents to undermine the basis of morality and systems of 
justice.714 The Aristotelian commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias in the second 
century CE criticised the deterministic notion of fate partly on the grounds that the 
idea ‘offers nothing apart from an advocate for those who are bad’.715 For 
Alexander, it seems that maintaining human freedom of action was a matter of 
considerable ethical importance. 
However, Robert Wilken has suggested that, while the issue of human 
freedom of action was seen by classical philosophers primarily as a matter of ethics, 
for early Christians, it became, above all, a ‘theological problem’.716 Although this 
                                                          
711 Frede, A Free Will, 4. 
712 Dihle, Theory of Will, 107-13. For example: Orig. De Princ. 3.1.1-6; Tatian Orat. 7; Justin 1 Apol. 43.7-8; 
Clement of Alexandria, Paed. 1.8.69.1; Alexander of Aphrodisias, De fato 19.190.1-5. 
713 S. Bobzien, ‘The Inadvertent Conception and Late Birth of the Free Will Problem’, Phronesis 43 
(1998), 173-75. On non-Christian critiques of the Stoic doctrine of fate, see Frede, A Free Will, 89-101. 
714 C. Stough, ‘Stoic Determinism and Moral Responsibility’, in J.M. Rist, ed., The Stoics (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1978), 207. Indeed, the Stoics themselves maintained that their 
determinist system was entirely compatible with a belief in human moral responsibility, and Frede has 
even suggested that the Stoic approach to this issue provided the basis for Christian ideas about free 
will: A Free Will, 89. 
715 Alexander of Aphrodisias, De fato 16.187.27-28: οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλ’ ἢ συνηγορίαν τοῖς κακοῖς τὸ 
δόγμα τοῦτο προξενεῖ. 
716 R.L. Wilken, ‘Free Choice and the Divine Will in Greek Christian Commentaries on Paul’, in W.S. 
Babcock, ed., Paul and the Legacies of Paul (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1990), 127. 
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distinction is overly simplistic, since ethical considerations remained central to 
many early Christian discussions of the issue,717 including those of Eusebius,718 it is 
nevertheless true that Christians faced the additional problem of theodicy when 
addressing this question. For Christians, the need to reconcile their belief in a 
benevolent divine providence with undeniable examples of human wickedness and 
suffering in the world made questions of the origin of evil and human responsibility 
matters of pressing theological significance.719 Moreover, as a result of their belief in 
divine providence, early Christians also found themselves accused of determinism 
by their opponents.720 The Octavius of Minucius Felix records the accusation that 
Christians have simply replaced a belief in fate with a belief in God.721 This is 
immediately followed by the further criticism that, as a result, the notion of a final 
judgement is inherently unjust, since it would punish people for actions over which 
they had no control.722 Perhaps partly in order to rebut such accusations, many early 
Christian writers argued strongly against a determinist view of the universe.723 
Opposing the idea of ‘fated necessity’ (εἱμαρμένης ἀναγκην), Justin Martyr argued 
instead that people possessed ‘free choice’ (ἐλευθέρᾳ προαιρέσει) over their 
actions.724 The only kind of ‘fate’ which Justin was prepared to admit was that both 
the good and the wicked would inevitably receive the reward or punishment which 
                                                          
717 See, for example: Justin Martyr, 1 Apol. 43.1-5; Orig. De Princ. 3.1.5-6, Tatian, Orat. 7. 
718 See, for example: CH 45.1-2. 
719 S. Bobzien, Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 411. 
Bobzien notes that Platonists also faced a similar problem within their philosophical system, unlike 
Stoics and Peripatetics, whose systems were ‘internally coherent’ and who thus avoided this particular 
‘free will problem’, 411. 
720 Wilken, ‘Free Choice and Divine Will’, 126. 
721 Min. Felix Oct. 11.6, cited in Wilken, ‘Free Choice and Divine Will’, 126. 
722 Ibid.: igitur iniquum iudicem fingitis, qui sortem in hominibus puniat, non voluntatem. 
723 Wilken, ‘Free Choice and Divine Will’, 126. 




their actions merited.725 Tatian likewise argued that people possessed freedom of 
action, which allowed for the distribution of both praise and blame.726 For both 
Tatian and Justin, defending human freedom of action was linked both to a defence 
of divine justice and simultaneously to the maintenance of system of ethics. 
Discussions of human freedom and responsibility from both an ethical and a 
theological standpoint were thus widespread among both Christian and non-
Christian thinkers in the centuries before Eusebius was writing.  
Eusebius was clearly both aware of, and deeply engaged by, these debates, 
and his most extensive discussions of the issue of human responsibility, which are 
to be found in book 6 of the PE and chapters 45 to 48 of the Contra Hieroclem, occur 
as part of broader refutations of a determinist doctrine of fate or necessity.727 
Eusebius’ arguments contain echoes of both Christian and non-Christian 
approaches to the topic. He cites Alexander of Aphrodisias’ treatise at length in the 
PE,728 while his claim that a determinist view of fate or necessity would remove all 
basis for praise and blame is also reminiscent of the arguments of Tatian and 
Justin.729 For a writer like Eusebius, who frequently uses examples of divine 
punishment and reward as evidence of the power of the Christian God, maintaining 
the justice of such divine interventions would have been of paramount importance. 
Yet it is also clear from his suggestion that belief in an all-powerful fate would lead 
to indolence and undermine the need for such valuable pursuits as philosophy and 
                                                          
725 Justin Martyr 1 Apol. 43.7: Ἀλλ’ εἱμαρμένην φαμὲν ἀπαράβατον ταύτην εἶναι, τοῖς τὰ καλὰ 
ἐκλεγομένοις τὰ ἄξια ἐπιτίμια, καὶ τοῖς ὁμοίως τὰ ἐναντία τὰ ἄξια ἐπίχειρα. 
726 Tatian, Orat. 7. 
727 Particularly PE 6.6, which is headed: ‘Refutation of the argument concerning fate’ (Ἀνασκευαστίκα 
τοῦ περὶ εἱμαρμένης λόγου). 
728 PE 6.9, paraphrasing Alexander, De fato 3.166.22-5.169.6, 6.170.12-18, 6.171.12-16, 8.172.25-173.10, 
8.174.20-25, 9.176.13, 12.180.29-181.5, 18.188.17-19.189.12. 
729 CH 45.1-2. 
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piety that this was not simply a question of theodicy for Eusebius.730 In his view, 
asserting human responsibility over external necessity or compulsion was also a 
matter of practical ethics and earthly justice. 
As a result, it is hardly surprising that Eusebius should argue so strongly in 
favour of human responsibility in works such as the PE and CH. However, it is 
essential to bear in mind the broader context of this debate when examining 
Eusebius’ statements in these works. The polemical nature of these sections 
provides little scope for a nuanced or complex exposition of Eusebius’ views on 
human freedom of action. Instead, we find mainly forthright assertions of the 
responsibility of rational creatures for their behaviour.731 Although it is, of course, 
undeniable that Eusebius consistently sought to maintain human responsibility, 
looking beyond these sections of his apologetic works to the examples of human 
virtue and vice that appear in some of his more historical works suggests that there 
was rather more to his views than his straightforward assertions of human 
responsibility might imply. 
At VC 3.26.1, for instance, Eusebius states that ‘at one time impious men, or 
rather, the whole race of demons through them, eagerly brought about the 
transmission to darkness and a forgotten place’ of Christ’s tomb.732 Similarly, in the 
HE, Eusebius suggests that accusations of magical practices levelled against 
Christians were ultimately the work of the devil, asserting that ‘it was through the 
activity of the devil that such magicians took on the name of the Christians to 
                                                          
730 CH 48.1; PE 6.6.5-6, 6.6.17. 
731 For example: CH 48.1; PE 6.6.20-21, 6.6.72. 
732 ἄνδρες μὲν γάρ ποτε δυσσεβεῖς, μᾶλλον δὲ πᾶν τὸ δαιμόνων διὰ τούτων γένος, σπουδὴν ἔθεντο 
σκότῳ καὶ λήθῃ παραδοῦναι τὸ θεσπέσιον ἐκεῖνο τῆς ἀθανασίας μνῆμα... 
168 
 
slander zealously the great mystery of piety with magic and, through these means, 
to disparage the doctrines of the church’.733 In both of these cases, Eusebius appears 
to suggest that responsibility for the wicked act in question might not lie exclusively 
with the human beings who carried it out. These examples bring the question of the 
relationship between personal responsibility and external influence intriguingly to 
the fore. Examining such cases of interaction between humans and demons can 
therefore help to shed more light on Eusebius’ understanding of human moral 
responsibility, by showing if, where, and how Eusebius set any limits to human 
responsibility. 
 
Responsibility and Προαίρεσις 
Clearly it is unhelpful, if not inappropriate, to apply the concept of ‘free will’ to 
Eusebius’ thought. Rather than restricting our discussion of Eusebius’ views by 
imposing on his works a concept which there is no evidence to suggest Eusebius 
possessed, it will be more helpful to consider what Eusebius may have meant by 
some of the terms he did use. Although translators of Eusebius’ works have, in the 
past, turned a range of words and phrases, such as τὸ αὐτεξούσιον, ἡ προαίρεσις, 
and τὰ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν, into ‘free will’,734 a careful examination of Eusebius’ use of these 
                                                          
733 HE 3.26.4: ἦν δ’ ἄρα διαβολικῆς ἐνεργείας διὰ τοιῶνδε γοήτων τὴν Χριστιανῶν προσηγορίαν 
ὑποδυομένων τὸ μέγα τῆς θεοσεβείας μυστήριον ἐπὶ μαγείᾳ σπουδάσαι διαβαλεῖν διασῦραί τε δι’ 
αὐτῶν τὰ… ἐκκλησιαστικὰ δόγματα. The fact that one of the activities of these magicians was ‘to 
slander’ (διαβαλεῖν) the church further connects them and their actions to the devil, since the Greek 
word for the devil (διάβολος) was derived from the verb διαβάλλω. On the etymology of this word, 
see: Riley, ‘Devil’, in Van Der Toorn et al., eds., Dictionary of Deities and Demons, 463. Here, Eusebius is 
picking up on an idea expressed by Justin, who had suggested that Menander was driven to practise 
magical arts by demons. Eusebius cites the relevant passage of Justin (1 Apol. 26) at HE 3.26.3. 
734 Gifford’s translation of the PE is particularly generous in its use of ‘free will’, using it to translate a 
variety of expressions. The Preparation for the Gospel, trans. with intro. E.H. Gifford, 2 vols. (repr. Grand 
Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1981): προαιρετικὴν (PE 5.9.12), i.214; τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμιν (PE 6.6.29), i.265; τὸ 
αὐθεκούσιον (PE 6.6.33), i.265; τὸ τῆς ἐφ’ ἡμῖν προαιρέσεως (PE 6.6.34), i.266; προαιρέσεως 
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terms reveals the most important concept in his understanding of moral 
responsibility to be προαίρεσις, which might loosely be translated ‘deliberate 
choice’. Frequency of appearance alone suggests that, of these terms, προαίρεσις 
was the most significant for Eusebius. Eusebius uses forms of the word προαίρεσις 
almost 40 times in the PE alone, with a further 18 appearances in quotations. By 
contrast, forms of αὐτεξούσιος and αὐθεκούσιος appear only 31 times in total in 
the PE, of which 10 are in quotations.735 Setting aside quotations, then, in the PE 
Eusebius uses προαίρεσις almost twice as much as αὐτεξούσιος and αὐθεκούσιος 
combined. In Eusebius’ view it was προαίρεσις, the capacity for people to choose 
between right and wrong, that allowed praise and blame to be assigned. As a result, 
discovering what Eusebius considered the conditions of προαίρεσις to be is 
essential to understanding how and where he felt moral responsibility could be 
attributed. 
It is in the CH that we find Eusebius’ clearest statement of the significance of 
προαίρεσις – for him, it is προαίρεσις that leads a person into either virtue or vice. 
At CH 47.1-2, Eusebius argues that, as a result of both divine law and human 
nature, people are ultimately responsible for themselves, describing the human soul 
as ‘self-governor and judge, leader and lord of itself’.736 Yet he does not suggest that 
this autonomy is without limit; rather, it extends only as far as τὰ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν (‘the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
ἐλευθέρας (PE 6.6.72), i.274. See also: The Proof of the Gospel, trans. W.J. Ferrar (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Baker Book House, 1981): τῆς αὐθεκουσίου… αἱρεσεως (DE 4.1.4), i.163; τῇ αὐτεξουσιότητι (DE 
4.6.8), i.175; Philostratus: The Life of Apollonius of Tyana, The Epistles of Apollonius and the Treatise of 
Eusebius, ed. and trans. F.C. Conybeare, LCL (London: Heinemann, 1912): αὐτοκρατορικὸν (CH 6.4), 
501. 
735 Thesaurus Linguae Graecae search for προαιρε-, αὐτεξουσ-, and αὐθεκουσ-. 




things which are up to us’),737 a phrase which had long been used to describe human 
agency in debates about moral responsibility.738 These ‘things which are up to us’ 
are then further defined by Eusebius as ‘those things which happen according to 
choice (προαίρεσίν) and action’.739 
In associating προαίρεσις with that which is ‘up to us’, Eusebius was 
conforming to a long philosophical tradition reaching back to Aristotle.740 Aristotle 
had argued that, while we might wish (βούλησις) for impossible things,741 choice 
(προαίρεσις) was not concerned with things that were impossible (τῶν 
ἀδυνάτων).742 As a result, Aristotle concludes that ‘it seems that προαίρεσις is 
about the things which are up to us (τὰ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν)’.743 Moreover, for Aristotle, 
προαίρεσις had been closely connected with the attainment of virtue.744 Similarly, 
Eusebius makes it clear that, in his opinion, the things which are ‘up to us’ include 
matters of virtue and vice, asserting that ‘out of the things which are up to us, each 
person acquires by choice itself an impulse towards one or the other of virtue or 
wickedness’.745 For Eusebius, then, the concept of προαίρεσις was inseparable from 
questions of virtue and vice, and thus from his understanding of moral 
responsibility. People were in his view responsible for the things that were in their 
power to control, including the choice between good and bad. 
                                                          
737 Ibid. 
738 Bobzien, ‘Stoic Conceptions of Freedom’, 72. See, for example, Alexander of Aphrodisias, De fato 12. 
739 CH 47.2: …ὅσα γένοιτ’ ἂν κατὰ προαίρεσίν τε καὶ πρᾶξιν… 
740 See: Frede, A Free Will, 19-30, on the significance of choice in Aristotle. Προαίρεσις also occupied a 
particularly prominent place in the thought of the second-century CE Stoic Epictetus, who also 
associated it with τὰ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν and the issue of responsibility: Sorabji, Emotion, 332-33, citing Epictetus, 
Discourses 1.22.10. 
741 Arist. Nic. Eth. 3, 1111b23-24. 
742 Ibid. 3, 1111b21-22. 
743 Ibid. 3, 1111b30-31,: ὅλως γὰρ ἔοικεν ἡ προαίρεσις περὶ τὰ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν εἶναι. Cf. 3, 1113a9-12. 
744 Ibid. 3, 1111b6. 




The significance of προαίρεσις in determining whether a person was virtuous 
or wicked is reflected in Eusebius’ description of the demons’ initial fall from 
heaven in the PE. Here, as we have seen, the key distinction drawn between the 
demons and their angelic counterparts is one of προαίρεσις. Demons and angels 
should not, in Eusebius’ view, bear the same name as each other, even though 
ontologically they are essentially the same, primarily because they are different ‘in 
their choice’ (τὴν προαίρεσιν).746 It is, above all, their προαίρεσις of good or evil 
that defines each of these groups. Thus, while the focus in the CH is on the 
προαίρεσις of human beings (ἀνθρώποι),747 it seems that Eusebius felt προαίρεσις 
to lie at the heart of the responsibility of other rational creatures as well, be they 
human, angelic, or demonic.748 This means not only that Eusebius’ discussions of 
demonic responsibility can help to shed light on his views of the responsibility of 
other rational beings, but also that any situation in which the προαίρεσεις of 
different rational creatures interact to produce either vice or virtue must raise 
questions about where he believed moral responsibility principally to lie. 
Crucially, Eusebius suggests that it was above all their προαίρεσις that made 
people vulnerable to the attacks of demons. The devil, Eusebius informs us, rapidly 
discovered that people could ‘fall into evil with ease from their own thoughts 
through their self-determined choice (προαίρεσιν)’.749 This is in spite of the fact that 
Eusebius also held that the soul – the home of προαίρεσις – was by nature inclined 
                                                          
746 PE 4.5.5. See the discussion above, p. 130-31. 
747 CH 47.1-2. 
748 It is essential to remember that, in spite of the heavy emphasis which Eusebius placed on the 
irrationality of demonic behaviour, he nevertheless considered them to be rational creatures: PE 
13.15.6. 




to follow a virtuous path.750 Such a view would surely have meant that Eusebius 
considered any person who went against this natural inclination to be even more 
deserving of condemnation.751 Nevertheless, for Eusebius it was this very ability of 
the soul to choose the worse as well as the better path that made possible the 
attribution of either praise or blame, as appropriate.752 Προαίρεσις was therefore at 
the heart of Eusebius’ ethical thought; it also appears to have served an important 
role in his theodicy, helping to absolve God of responsibility for evil. At PE 6.6.47, 
Eusebius declares that ‘the source of wickedness’ (τῆς κακίας πηγή) is to be found 
‘only in the self-chosen movement of the soul’ (ἐν μόνῃ τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς 
αὐτοπροαιρέτῳ κινήσει). The role of the soul’s προαίρεσις in the generation of evil 
is then reinforced a few lines later, when Eusebius remarks that wickedness ‘is a 
work of choice but not of nature’ (προαιρέσεως ὂν ἀλλ’ οὐ φύσεως ἔργον).753 
Eusebius is thus able to pin the blame for evil on God’s creatures, rather than on 
God himself. In the light of this, it would be difficult to over-state the significance of 
προαίρεσις in Eusebius’ thought. For him, it was what determined virtue or vice, 
praise or blame and, thus, ultimately, reward or punishment. 
Προαίρεσις, however, was not a capacity shared by the whole of creation; 
rather, Eusebius held that it was exclusive to rational beings and linked it 
repeatedly to the reasoning powers of the soul. For Eusebius the human soul was 
characterised above all by its rationality, which was not only a gift from God, but 
                                                          
750 PE 6.6.47-9. 
751 PE 6.6.51. 
752 PE 6.6.49. 
753 PE 6.6.51: φαύλως δὲ ὅτε πράττει, οὐ τὴν φύσιν αἰτιατέον· οὐ γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν, παρὰ φύσιν δὲ 
αὐτῇ γίνεται τὸ φαῦλον, προαιρέσεως ὂν ἀλλ’ οὐ φύσεως ἔργον. In this, Eusebius was echoing the 
opinion of Origen, who had similarly blamed προαίρεσις rather than nature for the generation of evil: 
Orig. Comm. in Matt. 10.11.38-40. 
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also the means by which humankind could be said to bear the image of God.754 By 
locating προαίρεσις within the soul, Eusebius was therefore associating it closely 
with rationality. Indeed, Eusebius went so far as to combine ‘reason (λογισμὸν) and 
the choice (προαίρεσιν) which is up to us’, declaring them to be ‘by nature of the 
soul’.755 By contrast with this, those ‘things not up to us’ (τὰ οὐκ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν) – things 
unconnected with προαίρεσις – were said to be ‘without soul and irrational’ 
(ἄψυχά τε ὄντα καὶ ἄλογα).756 
This sense that rationality was a key condition of προαίρεσις for Eusebius is 
further strengthened by the striking distinction which he draws between the soul 
and the human body, even describing them at one point as ‘opposites’ 
(ἐναντίων).757 Although Eusebius explicitly denies that the material body is evil,758 
he presents it as distinctly inferior to the soul. Where the soul is rational and 
immortal, the body is irrational and subject to death and decay.759 When Eusebius 
connects προαίρεσις and the ‘things which are up to us’ to the soul, he also makes it 
clear that the ‘things not up to us’ are those which ‘concern the body and external 
things’ (περὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὰ ἐκτός).760 The irrational body thus lies outside the 
realm of rational προαίρεσις. Indeed, Eusebius even suggests that it might be 
necessary for προαίρεσις, characterised by reason, to act directly counter to the 
                                                          
754 For example: PE 3.10.6: ψυχὴ μὲν οὖν λογικὴ καὶ ἀθάνατος καὶ νοῦς ἀπαθὴς ἐν ἀνθρώπου φύσει 
εὖ μοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι εἰκόνα καὶ ὁμοίωσιν ἀποσῴζειν θεοῦ, καθ’ ὅσον ἄυλος καὶ ἀσώματος νοερά 
τε καὶ λογικὴ τὴν οὐσίαν συνέστηκεν... Cf. PE 7.4.3; 7.10.9; 13.3.44, and the discussion in Chapter III 
above, p. 135. 
755 PE 6.6.29: γένοιτ’ ἂν οὖν τῶν ὄντων ἐν ἡμῖν τὰ μὲν κατὰ λογισμὸν καὶ προαίρεσιν τὴν ἐφ’ ἡμῖν 
γιγνόμενα, οἷα τὰ κατὰ φύσιν ψυχῆς… 
756 CH 47.2. 
757 PE 6.6.26. 
758 PE 6.6.47. 
759 PE 6.6.26: …καὶ τοῦ μὲν ἀλόγου, τῆς δὲ λογικῆς τυγχανούσης, καὶ πάλιν τοῦ μὲν φθαρτοῦ, τῆς 
δὲ ἀφθάρτου, καὶ θατέρου θνητοῦ, θατέρας δὲ ἀθανάτου… 
760 CH 47.2. 
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body, arguing that ‘προαίρεσις, persuaded by wise arguments... strikes away the 
nature of the body’.761 This opposition between προαίρεσις and the irrational body 
reinforces the idea that rationality was central to Eusebius’ understanding of 
προαίρεσις and thus of responsibility. Yet in associating προαίρεσις so closely with 
the capacity for reasoning, Eusebius leaves open the question of where 
responsibility might lie in cases where rationality is lacking. 
A second key condition of προαίρεσις for Eusebius was that it should be free, 
and unconstrained.762 Eusebius describes humankind’s ‘more divine part’ (τῇ 
θειοτέρᾳ μοίρᾳ) – the soul, and home of προαίρεσις – as possessing its ‘own 
freedom’ (τὴν οἰκείαν ἐλευθερίαν).763 This is in contrast to the ‘nature of the body’ 
(φύσει σώματος) to which it seems people are enslaved. Eusebius suggests that 
people must ‘be slaves to’ (δουλεῦον) the body, and further describes people as 
‘both slave and free’ (καὶ δοῦλον εἶναι τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ ἐλεύθερον) in relation to 
their body and soul respectively.764 For Eusebius, it seems that this human freedom 
consisted of two main kinds: freedom from external constraint, and freedom to make 
an alternative choice. The idea that προαίρεσις must be free from external 
constraint is emphasised by the contrast which Eusebius draws between 
προαίρεσις and ‘external necessity’ (τῆς ἔξωθεν ἀνάγκης).765 For him, the two 
                                                          
761 PE 6.6.35: …ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις λόγοις σώφροσιν ἀναπεισθεῖσα… παρακρούεται τὴν τοῦ σώματος 
φύσιν… 
762 CH 47.2. 
763 PE 6.6.26: ...τοτὲ δὲ τῇ θειοτέρᾳ μοίρᾳ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀσπαζόμενον ἐλευθερίαν· 
764 Ibid.: ὡς καὶ δοῦλον εἶναι τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ ἐλεύθερον, τοιαύτην τινὰ παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ… 
κεκληρωμένον ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος ἐπιμιξίαν. 
765 PE 6.6.11. Cf. PE 5.5.13. 
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stand in opposition to each other, since acting under the constraint of necessity or 
fate would in his view remove any grounds for praise or blame.766 
This is further reflected in Eusebius’ frequent use of words such as 
αὐτεξούσιος, αὐθεκούσιος and ἐλεύθερος to describe either προαίρεσις, or related 
words for choice, such as αἵρεσις.767 At DE 4.1.4, for instance, Eusebius asserts that 
God created ‘the souls of men supplied by nature with unconstrained freedom 
(ἐλεύθερον) of self-determined choice (τῆς αὐθεκουσίου αἱρεσεως) between the 
good and the opposite’.768 Although in modern translations of Christian authors, 
including Eusebius, the term αὐτεξούσιος is sometimes rendered as ‘free will’,769 its 
original meaning among Greek philosophers was simply ‘in one’s own power’.770 
This meaning reflects Eusebius’ insistence that προαίρεσις relates only to τὰ ἐφ’ 
ἡμῖν, those ‘things which are up to us’, further reinforcing the sense that 
προαίρεσις in Eusebius is possible only for things lying within a person’s control, 
and thus must be free from external compulsion. For Eusebius, what this freedom 
from external constraint means, it seems, is that people should have the opportunity 
to make an alternative choice. Eusebius argues that because of ‘self-determined 
freedom’ (τῆς αὐτεξουσίου ἐλευθερίας), it is possible to praise someone for their 
‘choice of the better’ (τὴν τῶν κρειττόνων αἵρεσιν), since they also possess the 
                                                          
766 PE 6.6.5-6. 
767 For example: PE 6.6.41, 6.6.63, 6.6.72, 7.18.8; HE 10.4.57; DE 4.1.4, 4.9.5, 4.10.1; De eccl. theol. 3.15. 
768 …προσέτι δὲ ψυχὰς ἀνθρώπων ἀφετον καὶ ἐλεύθερον ἐπὶ τῆς αὐθεκουσίου περὶ τὸ καλὸν ἢ 
τοὐναντίον αἱρεσεως τὴν φύσιν ἐπαγομένας… 
769 See, for example: Origen, Traité des principes, vol. iii, ed. and trans. H. Crouzel and M. Simonetti, 
Sources Chrétiennes 268 (Paris: Éditions du cerf, 1980), 19 (Orig. De Princ. 3.1.1); The Proof of the Gospel, 
trans. W.J. Ferrar, i.175 (DE 4.6.8); Clement of Alexandria, Les Stromates: Stromate V, vol. i, ed. with 
intro. A. Le Boulluec and trans. P. Voulet, Sources Chrétiennes 278 (Paris: Éditions du cerf, 1981), 29 
(Clem. Str. 5.1.3.2), 163 (Clem. Str. 5.13.83.1). See also the definitions offered in PGL, s.v. αὐτεξούσιος, 
αὐτεξουσίως. 
770 See: Frede, A Free Will, 75; Kahn, ‘Discovering the Will’, 250. 
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freedom to choose ‘the opposite’ (τὴν ἐναντίαν).771 Thus, in Eusebius’ view, 
προαίρεσις, and consequently moral responsibility, are dependent not only on a 
person’s rationality, but also on their freedom to choose between at least two 
alternative courses of action. 
Yet, while Eusebius believed freedom to be a necessary condition of 
προαίρεσις, he also suggests that this freedom could, at times, be compromised or 
challenged. One source of these challenges was the human body, subject, as it was, 
to passions and desires. This, however, was not the main challenge, for Eusebius 
argues that it ought to be possible for προαίρεσις to overcome the weaknesses of 
the body.772 More intriguing is Eusebius’ suggestion that a person’s προαίρεσις 
might be influenced, for better or worse, by other, external προαίρεσεις. Eusebius 
argues that, while the body is affected by external needs and desires, ‘so sometimes 
also προαίρεσις, troubled by numberless external προαίρεσεις, is persuaded by its 
self-determined opinion to deliver itself up to external things and sometimes it ends 
up better and sometimes worse. For just as being with the wicked makes one bad, 
so again on the other hand the company of the good makes for improvement.’773 
Although Glen Chesnut read this as referring simply to the influence of ‘a general 
                                                          
771 PE 6.6.49: …διὰ δὲ τῆς αὐτῇ δεδωρημένης αὐτεξουσίου ἐλευθερίας τὴν τῶν κρειττόνων αἵρεσιν 
ἐπαίνου καὶ ἀποδοχῆς ἀξίαν ἀποφήνας γερῶν τε καὶ μειζόνων ἐπάθλων τῶν ἐπὶ τοῖς 
κατορθουμένοις, ὅτι μὴ βεβιασμένως, γνώμῃ δὲ αὐτξουσίῳ κατώρθου, παρὸν καὶ τὴν ἐναντίαν 
ἑλέσθαι. Cf. PE 6.6.51; DE 4.1.4. This notion that προαίρεσις must be a choice of alternatives was a 
comparatively recent development. As Frede has shown, it is found in Alexander of Aphrodisias’ De 
fato, in which praise and blame are connected with the ability to choose the better or worse of two 
options (Alexander of Aphrodisias, De fato 12; Frede, A Free Will, 100), but for earlier philosophers, 
such as Aristotle, this had not necessarily been the case. Frede suggests that ‘the choice one makes in 
Aristotle is not, at least necessarily, a choice between doing X and not doing X, let alone a choice 
between doing X and doing Y. It is a matter of choosing to do X, or failing to choose to do X, such that 
X does not get done’: Frede, A Free Will, 28-29. 
772 PE 6.6.34-35. 
773 PE 6.6.42: …οὕτως ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ προαίρεσις ὑπὸ μυρίων ἔξωθεν ἐνοχλουμένη προαιρέσεων, 
αὐτεξουσίῳ γνώμῃ πεισθεῖσα, ἑαυτὴν τοῖς ἔξωθεν ἐπιδίδωσι καὶ τοτὲ μὲν βελτίων, τοτὲ δὲ χείρων 




and pervasive social pressure’,774 it is unlikely, given Eusebius’ strong belief in the 
threat posed by demons, that he would have been thinking solely of other human 
προαίρεσεις here. Indeed, in the LC, Eusebius suggests that while human enemies 
direct their attacks against the body, invisible, spiritual enemies focus their 
attention on attacking the invisible soul, where προαίρεσις was located.775 This 
suggests that we should see this reference to external προαίρεσεις as referring as 
much to spiritual, as to other human προαίρεσεις. It therefore seems that, in 
Eusebius’ view, it was possible for demons to compromise the independence of 
human προαίρεσις, raising the question of where responsibility for wickedness 
might lie in such cases. 
 
Demonic Influence 
For Eusebius, then, any discussion of the issue of responsibility must be approached 
primarily in terms of προαίρεσις. It was προαίρεσις – a choice which must be both 
free and made by a rational being – that in his view determined between virtue and 
vice, and thus whether a person deserved punishment or reward. Yet this close 
association between προαίρεσις, rationality and freedom leads inevitably to 
questions about how and if Eusebius believed responsibility should be assigned in 
situations where one, or both, of the conditions of προαίρεσις were not met – in 
other words, where either rationality or freedom was compromised. This issue is of 
particular relevance for Eusebius’ discussions of the relationship between demons 
                                                          
774 Chesnut, First Christian Histories, 82; cf. Chesnut, ‘Fate, Fortune, Free Will and Nature’, 178. See also 
Berkhoff, who suggested, presumably on the basis of this passage, that Eusebius believed a person’s 
free action could be compromised by ‘the free will of other people’ (‘durch den freien Willen anderer 
Menschen’): Die Theologie, 104. 
775 LC 7.1. 
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and humans, since he so often presents those humans he believed to be in the power 
of demons as irrational,776 and even, at times, as enslaved to demons.777 We must 
therefore ask whether Eusebius believed that this demonic influence in any way 
lessened people’s responsibility for their sins. 
In spite of Eusebius’ insistence in works such as the CH and PE that people 
must bear responsibility for their own actions, there is nevertheless some suggestion 
in his other works that those acting at the instigation of demons might merit 
sympathy as much as condemnation. In the VC, Eusebius suggests that 
Constantine’s response to the behaviour of schismatic congregations in Africa – 
congregations which Eusebius believed to lie under demonic influence778 – was less 
one of anger than of pity, reporting that the emperor ‘grieved excessively 
(ὑπεραλγοῦντα) at the senselessness of the mentally injured’.779 Similarly, Eusebius 
claims that Constantine believed the Donatists ‘should be pitied rather than 
chastised’, because they were ‘either entirely deranged or stung into madness by the 
wicked demon’.780 The suggestion seems to be that, deprived of their rationality by 
demons, the human agents in this case were no longer responsible for their crimes. 
                                                          
776 For example: HE 7.31.1, 10.8.9-10; VC 1.45.2-3; LC 7.7, 9.13; Theoph. 1.78, 2.1; PE 4.17.3. 
777 For example: LC 5.3; PE 4.17.4; DE 4.9.8; VC 1.13.3. This appears to have puzzled J. Robertson, who 
noted that Eusebius seems to deny the loss of ‘free will’, despite presenting some humans as the slaves 
of demons: Christ as Mediator: A Study of the Theologies of Eusebius of Caesarea, Marcellus of Ancyra and 
Athanasius of Alexandria (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 63. 
778 Eusebius repeatedly suggests in the VC that divisions within the church, including the Donatist 
schism, were the work either of a ‘wicked demon’ or of ‘envy’, which, as we have seen, often 
characterised demonic activity in Eusebius’ works: VC 1.45.2-3, 2.61.3-4, 3.4.1, 3.59.1-2. 
779 VC 3.4.1: …ὑπεραλγοῦντα τῆς τῶν φρενοβλαβῶν ἀπονοίας. 
780 VC 1.45.3: μὴ γὰρ σωφρονούντων εἶναι ἀνδρῶν τὰ τολμώμενα ἀλλ’ ἢ πάντῃ παρακοπτόντων ἢ 
ὑπὸ τοῦ πονηροῦ δαίμονας οἰστρουμένων, οὓς ἐλεεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ κολάζεσθαι χρῆναι. Cf. HE 
7.17.1, in which the Christian senator Astyrius is reported to have felt pity for the non-Christian 
citizens of Caesarea Philippi when he observed one of their festivals, since he believed that they were 
deluded by the influence of demons.  
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However, as H.A. Drake has shown, in spite of Eusebius’ attempts in the VC 
to tie Constantine’s religious views to his own, there are several hints in this work 
that the two were not in complete agreement on theological matters.781 In particular, 
Eusebius appears to have felt that Constantine was too lenient in the standards of 
piety and ethical behaviour required of new Christian converts. At VC 4.54.2-3, for 
instance, Eusebius comes closer than at almost any other point in the VC to 
criticising Constantine directly. Here, Eusebius refers to people who ‘crept into the 
church and falsely assumed the name of Christians’,782 clearly describing those who 
had converted since Christianity had found imperial favour. He suggests, however, 
that Constantine was too trusting of these people’s ‘outer form’ (τῷ σχήματι),783 
implying that he thought Constantine ought to have required more of those wishing 
to convert than simple profession of the Christian name. This apparent discrepancy 
between the attitudes of Eusebius and Constantine also illustrates that, in his 
concern with virtue and justice, Eusebius was not thinking only on a cosmic scale, 
but was motivated by the practical challenges facing the church as it met a new 
wave of converts. It thus seems that Eusebius and Constantine may have differed in 
where they chose to set the parameters of virtue and vice. Moreover, Eusebius’ use 
of the verb ὑπεραλγύνω at VC 3.4.1, with its suggestion of excessive grief, implies 
that he believed the emperor to have taken his sympathy rather too far. We should 
therefore be cautious about reading these references to Constantine’s reaction as 
representative of Eusebius’ own views. Nevertheless, it does suggest that there was 
                                                          
781 Drake, ‘What Eusebius Knew’, 34-35. 
782 VC 4.54.2: …τῶν τὴν ἐκκλησίαν ὑποδυομένων καὶ τὸ Χριστιανῶν ἐπιπλάστως σχηματιζομένων 
ὄνομα. 
783 VC 4.54.3. 
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more than one acceptable response to the issue of human transgression in this 
period. 
The idea that those committing wicked acts might not be entirely culpable for 
their actions, but might instead merit sympathy did have some precedent in earlier 
Greek thought. In the Timaeus, Plato had made the striking claim that it was wrong 
to blame the wicked for their actions,784 since wickedness arose, not voluntarily, but 
rather ‘the one who is bad becomes bad through some wicked habit of the body and 
uneducated rearing’.785 Thus wickedness might be seen to have, in part, a physical 
cause, but also to arise from a failure of education – that is, arguably, from 
unsuitable external influence. In consequence, Plato suggests that ‘the parents are 
always more responsible than the children, and the ones doing the educating more 
than those educated’.786 In other words, it seems that Plato is suggesting that those 
who encourage, or at least fail to check, wickedness in others are more at fault than 
those actually committing wicked deeds. At the very least, he is challenging the 
view that a wicked person is entirely responsible for their crimes. 
Although, as Christopher Gill has pointed out, such a view was certainly not 
representative of Greek philosophy more broadly, and was not even much repeated 
in Platonic thought, Plato’s further claim in the Timaeus that ‘no one does wrong 
voluntarily’ was much more widely shared.787 Plato made similar statements 
                                                          
784 See: C. Gill, ‘The Body’s Fault? Plato’s Timaeus on Psychic Illness’, in M.R. Wright, ed., Reason and 
Necessity: Essays on Plato’s Timaeus (London: Duckworth, 2000), 59-84, discussing Plato Tim. 86b-87b. 
785 Plato Tim. 86e: …διὰ δὲ πονηρὰν ἕξιν τινὰ τοῦ σώματος καὶ ἀπαίδευτον τροφὴν ὁ κακὸς 
γίγνεται κακός… 
786 Ibid. 87b: ὧν αἰτιατέον μὲν τοὺς φυτεύοντας ἀεὶ τῶν φυτευομένων μᾶλλον καὶ τοὺς τρέφοντας 
τῶν τρεφομένων… 
787 Gill, ‘The Body’s Fault?’, 61-62; Plato Tim. 86d: κακὸς μὲν γὰρ ἑκὼν οὐδείς. 
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throughout a range of his works,788 and this view became characteristic of much 
Greek thinking about human action and responsibility.789 In essence, this idea seems 
to have been that, since moral failings were as harmful to the wicked person as to 
others, such a person must be acting in ignorance of his or her true interests, and 
therefore involuntarily.790 This person ought therefore to be pitied rather than 
blamed.791 Although Eusebius does not directly quote this section of the Timaeus, the 
widespread currency of this idea in Greek thought makes it highly unlikely that he 
would have been unaware of it. Indeed, as T.D.J. Chappell has argued, the notion 
that wickedness must be involuntary posed considerable problems for early 
Christian writers who, like Eusebius, were also steeped in the traditions of Greek 
philosophy, since it was flatly contradicted by Scripture.792 As a result, the question 
of how human sin might occur was a pressing one for Christian writers. Moreover, 
it is clear that, within the philosophical tradition, outright condemnation was far 
from being the only possible reaction to those perceived to be acting in an immoral 
way. 
It is significant, therefore, that the emphasis throughout Eusebius’ works 
remains very heavily on the punishment of wrongdoers, including those he 
presents as acting at the instigation of demons. For instance, Eusebius suggests in 
the VC and LC that those of Constantine’s imperial predecessors who persecuted 
Christians were in some way enslaved to demons,793 surely implying that they must 
                                                          
788 Gill, ‘The Body’s Fault?’, 62, citing Plato Prot. 345d-e; Gorg. 509e; Laws 731c, 734b. 
789 T.D.J. Chappell, Aristotle and Augustine on Freedom: Two Theories of Freedom, Voluntary Action and 
Akrasia (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1995), 177. 
790 See: M.M. Mackenzie, Plato on Punishment (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), 141, 156. 
791 Ibid. 156. 
792 Chappell, Aristotle and Augustine, 177-78. 
793 LC 5.3; VC 1.13.3. 
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lack the freedom necessary for προαίρεσις. Similarly, he frequently presents these 
figures, and others he felt to be in the power of demons as acting irrationally, or as 
in the grip of a form of madness,794 again apparently denying them one of the 
necessary conditions of προαίρεσις. Yet this did not prevent him describing in 
graphic detail some of the punishments supposedly inflicted on these people as a 
consequence of their actions.795 Since Eusebius held that these punishments came 
directly from God, he presumably felt them to be entirely justified, meaning that he 
must still have considered these people to be to a large degree responsible for their 
actions. It therefore seems that, for Eusebius, if not necessarily for Constantine, the 
suggestion of external demonic influence was not enough to remove responsibility 
from the human wrongdoer. We must therefore ask how Eusebius was able to 
reconcile his evident belief in the culpability of his human sinners with the 
suggestion that they were not acting entirely independently. 
First, it is essential to note that, for Eusebius, the demonic threat to 
humankind did not consist solely or even primarily in the kind of demonic 
possession which he believed could be cured through exorcism. The gospels 
famously contain various accounts of Jesus performing an exorcism to free a man 
from the control of demons.796 Here the possessed man is not presented as being to 
blame for his predicament; he is not punished or held to account for his actions 
whilst under demonic control. Rather, on being released from the demons he 
appears to have returned to his true state, and his reaction is one of gratitude. This 
kind of demonic attack therefore involves causing immediate harm to a person, 
                                                          
794 HE 7.31.1, 10.8.9-10; VC 1.45.2-3; LC 7.7, 9.13; SC 13.6; Theoph. 1.78, 2.1; PE 4.17.3. 
795 VC 1.57.2, 1.58.4-59.1; HE 8.16.3-5. 
796 Matthew 8:28-34; Mark 5:1-20; Luke 8:26-33. 
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who is depicted as a victim of the demons. This idea that bad demons might bring 
physical harm in the form of sickness or natural disasters was also shared with non-
Christians.797 Eusebius was undoubtedly familiar with this view of demons, and we 
can find echoes of the gospel exorcism stories in his own works.798 Eusebius even 
suggests that exorcisms using Jesus’ name to drive out demons continued to be 
effective in his own time.799 
Similarly, in his discussion of oracles in the DE, Eusebius appears to suggest 
that some of those making oracular predictions may have fallen so completely 
under the influence of demons that they were ‘like a corpse’ (οἷα νεκρὸν) and were 
no longer capable of acting for themselves.800 Such cases, however, are extremely 
unusual in Eusebius. Even in this case, Eusebius was making a point about the 
fallibility of pagan oracles, rather than about the nature of the demonic threat in 
general. Moreover, Eusebius suggests that the name of μαντεία given by the Greeks 
to this state indicates that it was ‘like a madness’ (ὥσπερ τινὰ μανίαν).801 In the 
suggestion that μαντεία may be comparable to, but is not identical with μανία, it is 
clear that Eusebius believed that madness could also take other forms. Thus, when 
Eusebius describes those he believed to be in the power of demons as mad or 
irrational, he would not necessarily have had in mind the kind of complete demonic 
possession outlined here or in the gospel exorcism stories. In fact, overall, Eusebius’ 
concern about the demonic threat appears to have focused less on this kind of 
complete possession than on a more insidious form of attack, which, in leaving 
                                                          
797 For example: Porph. De Abst. 2.40.1. 
798 For example: PE 5.17.13; CI 95.18-19. 
799 CH 4.2. 




human responsibility intact, posed a threat not only to the present well-being of 
humankind, but also to its future salvation. 
Eusebius rarely presents demons as in any way coercing their human victims. 
Demons are associated with trickery and deceit, but there is little suggestion of force 
– an omission which is of considerable importance in maintaining human 
responsibility. For Eusebius, demonic influence is most often characterised in terms 
of πλάνη and ἀπάτη, both of which meant ‘error’ or ‘deceit’.802 In particular, 
Eusebius suggests that demons used their limited powers to create the false 
impression that they could predict the future, or cure diseases, thereby tricking 
people into worshipping them, rather than the true God.803 They are not shown as 
forcing people to worship them, but adopt more subtle tactics instead. In fact, 
Eusebius is so far from suggesting that demons compel people to act that he even 
argues that some humans might at times be capable of coercing demons. Discussing 
the practice of magic, Eusebius claims that some demons may be ‘dragged down 
and constrained by vulgar men’.804 When this happens, the demons are said to be 
acting ‘by force and necessity’ (βίᾳ καὶ ἀνάγκῃ).805 Eusebius raises this point in 
order to argue that such demons are not truly divine,806 rather than as part of a 
broader discussion of responsibility, and he therefore does not elaborate on how 
blame for any wickedness might be apportioned in such a case. Nonetheless, it 
suggests that, for Eusebius, in spite of humans’ ontological inferiority, the demons 
                                                          
802 See, for example: ἀπάτη: PE 4.21.6, 5.2.1, 6.6.3, 6.11.82, 7.10.15, 7.16.10; DE 9.14.7; SC 13.6; HE 7.17.1; 
CI 130.21. πλάνη: PE 4.14.10, 4.15.6, 6.6.3, 6.11.82; DE 4.9.8, 5.4.2, 6.20.12, 9.1.7; SC 16.3; CI 107.7; 263.6-
7; 266.5; 273.10-11; HE 7.17.1; Fr.Luc., PG 24.553.25; CPs, PG 23.821.6. 
803 PE 5.2.1; VC 3.56.1. 
804 PE 5.9.10: …τοῖς τυχοῦσιν ἀνθρώποις ὑποσύρεσθαι καθέλκεσθαί… 
805 PE 5.9.13. 
806 PE 5.9.12. 
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did not necessarily have the power to coerce people into sin. Yet this should not be 
seen as decreasing the severity of the demonic threat; rather, it is surely their failure 
to compel humans that makes demons so dangerous. External compulsion would 
have removed one of the necessary conditions of προαίρεσις, and thus have 
removed human responsibility for sin. With that human responsibility intact, on the 
other hand, demons could not only torment people in this life, but might also lead 
them to act in a manner that would jeopardise their ultimate salvation. 
Rather than compelling people to serve them, it seems that Eusebius believed 
that demons acted on existing human weaknesses in order to lure people into sin. In 
the PE, Eusebius agrees with Porphyry’s suggestion that wicked demons ‘excite the 
desires of men’ (τὰς ἐπιθυμίας τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐκκαίειν), in order to encourage 
people to follow them.807 Rather than implanting into people a wickedness which is 
not already there, it would seem that demons take advantage of natural human 
weaknesses, such as the inclination of the inferior body towards passion, in order to 
incite people to sin.808 This idea is reflected in one of Eusebius’ most detailed 
descriptions of how a soul might fall into the power of demons, where the emphasis 
is again very strongly on the role of passions in leading to wickedness. In his speech 
on the Church at Tyre, Eusebius describes how ‘by the envy and jealousy of the evil-
loving demon, it [the soul] became of its self-determined choice a lover of passion 
and a lover of evil.’809 Immediately below, Eusebius shows how this fallen soul was 
then subjected to still more demonic attacks, as ‘a destructive demon and savage 
                                                          
807 PE 4.21.6; Cf. Porph. De Abst. 2.40.3. 
808 PE 6.6.35. 
809 10.4.57: ἀλλὰ γὰρ φθόνῳ καὶ ζήλῳ τοῦ φιλοπονήρου δαίμονος φιλοπαθὴς καὶ φιλοπόνηρος ἐξ 
αὐτεξουσίου αἱρέσεως γενομένη… 
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mental beasts… light a fire beneath it with their passions, as if burning it with the 
missiles of their own wickedness’.810 Demons have a role to play in encouraging 
wickedness and vice, but Eusebius is careful to stress that this encouragement does 
not remove human responsibility, by pointing out that the choice remains ‘self-
determined’ (αὐτεξούσιος). For Eusebius the demonic threat therefore seems to 
involve exploiting a person’s existing weaknesses in order to lead them to make a 
flawed choice for which they must then bear responsibility. 
This is reflected in Eusebius’ description of the ‘savage beasts’ which attack 
the fallen soul in his speech on the Church at Tyre as νοητός.811 Eusebius’ frequent 
association of demons with wild beasts makes it clear that by ‘savage beasts’ he is 
again referring to demons.812 His use of the word νοητός suggests that he may have 
held a view of demonic influence similar to that found earlier in the works of 
Origen. For Eusebius, things which were νοητός were incorporeal and rational, 
associated with the mind rather than with the physical senses.813 This therefore 
corresponds to Eusebius’ claim that demons mount ‘invisible’ attacks,814 and further 
fixes these attacks in a mental or intellectual, rather than a physical sphere. 
This is reminiscent of Origen’s suggestion that demons generate wicked 
thoughts to encourage people into sin.815 Yet Origen is clear that this external 
influence does not remove human responsibility. Drawing on the Stoic idea of ‘first 
movements’, in which it was held that a person must choose to assent to an initial 
                                                          
810 HE 10.4.58: …ἀλλά τις φθοροποιὸς δαίμων καὶ θῆρες ἄγριοι νοητοί, οἳ καὶ τοῖς πάθεσιν οἷα 
πεπυρακτωμένοις τῆς σφῶν κακίας βέλεσιν αὐτὴν ἐξυφάψαντες… 
811 HE 10.4.57. 
812 As, for instance, at VC 1.49.1; HE 10.4.14; Theoph. 3.13, 3.55. See the discussion above, p. 133-34. 
813 PE 11.7.1, 11.9.3. 
814 LC 7.1-2. 
815 On Origen, see: Sorabji, Emotion, 346-47, citing Orig. De Princ. 3.2.4. 
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impression from outside before it could become a full internal emotion, or 
passion,816 Origen insists that such thoughts are only ‘an inducement, provoking us 
either to good or to evil’.817 According to Origen, it is quite possible for people to 
‘throw the vicious suggestions away from us’.818 Although Eusebius does not 
explore this issue in the same depth as Origen, given his familiarity with Origen’s 
works, he would undoubtedly have been aware of this idea. In his suggestion that 
the demonic threat is concentrated mainly in mental, rather than physical attacks, 
Eusebius appears to be echoing this idea. Temptation and trickery, rather than 
compulsion, lie at the heart of Eusebius’ understanding of the demonic threat, thus 
leaving human responsibility intact. Nevertheless, the process that Eusebius is 
describing in these passages from the speech on the Church at Tyre still refers to a 
soul in which the conditions for προαίρεσις are met: the soul is both rational,819 and 
it is able to act independently. It is only once this initial choice has been made that 
the soul then falls more fully under the power of demons.820 As a result, this 
description tells us little about how Eusebius felt human responsibility might be 
maintained even in those cases where a soul is said to be entirely in the power of 
demons. 
It was due in large part to the significance which he attached to this initial 
προαίρεσις of wickedness that Eusebius was able to maintain the responsibility 
even of those people he saw as enslaved to, or acting irrationally under the 
                                                          
816 On Stoic ‘first movements’, see Sorabji, Emotion, 66-75; on the adaptation of these ideas by early 
Christian thinkers, particularly Origen and Evagrius Ponticus, see ibid. 343-71. 
817 Orig. De Princ. 3.2.4: …incitamentum provocans nos uel ad bona uel ad mala, in Rufinus’ Latin 
translation. 
818 Ibid.: …abicere a nobis prauas suggestiones… 
819 HE 10.4.55-56. 
820 HE 10.4.57. 
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influence of demons. This emerges most clearly from some of Eusebius’ comments 
in the VC and LC. Even while describing Constantine’s non-Christian predecessors 
as the slaves of demons, Eusebius is in fact subtly presenting them as partners in 
their own enslavement. At LC 5.3, Eusebius suggests that a non-Christian ruler 
would have ‘stamped (τετυπωμένος) on his soul (τῇ αὐτοῦ φυχῇ) numberless 
falsely drawn icons of demons’, and thereby have ‘attached himself to numberless 
embittered masters’ (ὁ μυρίους καθ’ ἑαυτοῦ πικροὺς δεσπότας ἐφειλκυσμένος).821 
Here, the participles used – τετυπωμένος from τυπόω, ‘to stamp, form, or engrave’, 
and ἐφειλκυσμένος from ἕλκω, ‘to draw or drag’ – are both given in the middle 
voice.822 Since the middle voice generally carried the sense of a reflexive action – 
that is of an action performed on or for oneself – the use of this voice here gives 
greater agency in this process to the unnamed rulers than the use of the plain active 
participle would have done. The implication is that these rulers were actively 
involved in bringing about their own enslavement to demons – they have 
effectively handed themselves over to the demons. In the case of ἐφειλκυσμένος, 
this is further reinforced by the use of the reflexive pronoun ἑαυτοῦ (himself). 
Similarly, when describing Constantine’s predecessors in the VC, Eusebius 
claims that ‘by means of the mix-up of the evils of lawless idolatry, they first 
enslaved themselves and afterwards all of their subjects to the errors of wicked 
demons’ (καὶ οἱ μὲν συγχύσει κακῶν εἰδωλολατρείας ἐκθέσμου σφᾶς αὐτοὺς 
πρότερον κἄπειτα τοὺς ὑπηκόους ἅπαντας πονηρῶν δαιμόνων πλάναις 
                                                          
821 πῶς δ’ ἂν τὸ μίμημα τῆς μοναρχικῆς ἐξουσίας οἷός τε ἂν εἴη φέρειν ὁ μυρίας 
ἐψευδογραφημένας δαιμόνων εἰκόνας τῇ αὐτοῦ φυχῇ τετυπωμένος; πῶς δ’ ἄρχων καὶ τῶν ὅλων 
κύριος ὁ μυρίους καθ’ ἑαυτοῦ πικροὺς δεσπότας ἐφειλκυσμένος… 
822 Lunn-Rockliffe has highlighted the need to pay greater attention to grammatical agency in early 
Christian discussions of agency and sin, particularly in relation to the devil’s fall: ‘Diabolical Problem’. 
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κατεδουλοῦντο…).823 Once again, the verb – κατεδουλοῦντο – is given in the 
middle voice, providing the same sense of an action performed to or upon oneself. 
These emperors are thus also shown as participating in their own enslavement; they 
are not passive victims of the demons. It would seem, therefore, that even those 
humans who were enslaved to demons must bear some of the responsibility for 
their situation, and thus for their subsequent actions, since their enslavement was 
not involuntary or imposed on them from outside. Rather, Eusebius stresses that 
they made an initial choice to put themselves into the power of demons. Whether or 
not their freedom to act, and even their rationality, was compromised thereafter, 
their initial choice of wickedness had met the conditions of responsible προαίρεσις. 
Thus, even in cases where Eusebius presents his human wrongdoers as 
having fallen entirely under the influence of demons, he is not removing their 
responsibility, but presenting almost a partnership of wickedness, in which the 
human as much as the demonic agents have chosen to participate. Whether or not 
Eusebius would have agreed that such people deserved pity, he certainly felt that 
they also merited punishment, since, in his opinion, responsibility occurred at the 
moment of the initial προαίρεσις of wickedness. In this way, Eusebius was able to 
maintain the justice of divine punishments directed even against those he held to be 
under the influence of demons. 
 
Escaping Demonic Influence 
For Eusebius, the fact that human moral responsibility was maintained, even among 
those whom he considered to be acting under the influence of demons, was key to 
                                                          
823 VC 1.13.3. 
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the nature of the demonic threat. Rather than simply causing harm in the present 
life, demons were also able to lead people to act in a way that, because of human 
προαίρεσις, would jeopardise their salvation in the next life. As a result, from 
Eusebius’ perspective, it would have been crucial for people to secure themselves 
against this demonic threat. As scholars have recognised, many early Christians 
believed that their faith provided them with protection from the attacks of hostile 
demons.824 Indeed, this belief is said to have formed part of the new faith’s appeal.825 
To an extent, Eusebius clearly shared this view. There is no doubt that he held 
the power of the Christian God to be much greater than that of the demons,826 and 
he makes it clear that invoking the name of Christ could be used to drive out and 
destroy demons in cases of demonic possession.827 However, when it came to the 
more insidious and ultimately more harmful demonic challenge to human 
salvation, Eusebius’ works suggest that simple, passive acceptance of the Christian 
faith was not, on its own, enough to ensure a person’s safety. While Eusebius was 
adamant that God would support and protect his followers, he also implied that 
people must somehow earn this protection. For Eusebius, ensuring security from 
demonic influence required active engagement on the part of humankind, largely 
through the cultivation of virtue. 
There remains, of course, a strong sense in Eusebius’ works that God could, 
and frequently would, intervene in earthly affairs in order to protect his followers 
from harm. After all, as several scholars have observed, the active involvement of 
                                                          
824 Ferguson, Demonology, 129; Martin, Inventing Superstition, 238. 
825 Ferguson, Demonology, 129. 
826 See, for example: PE 5.17.13. 
827 CH 4.2. 
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God in the affairs of humankind was of considerable importance to Eusebius’ 
understanding of history.828 While this involvement is often seen in Eusebius’ works 
in the form of divine punishment of human wrongdoers,829 at times Eusebius also 
shows God acting in advance to protect the church and promote Christianity. In the 
HE, Eusebius suggests that the emperor Aurelian, on the point of initiating a 
persecution of the Christians, was prevented from doing so by ‘godly justice’ (θεία 
δίκη).830 Hence, it seems, Christians could expect their God to offer them some 
protection from their enemies. 
Nevertheless, Eusebius makes it clear that this protection was conditional and 
could be removed at any point.831 In particular, it seems that it was only by 
maintaining high standards of virtue that people could hope to secure God’s 
protection. Describing the soul’s fall into wickedness and sin as part of his speech 
on the Church at Tyre, Eusebius notes how, once the soul had embraced passion 
and wickedness, ‘God withdrew from it such that it was deprived of a guardian’.832 
At this point, deprived of the support of God, the soul is said to have fallen easily 
and completely under the influence of demons.833 By abandoning virtue, the soul 
had also lost God’s protection. This sense that divine protection was conditional 
upon the maintenance of high standards of behaviour is further reflected in 
Eusebius’ presentation of the persecution of the church. For a while, Eusebius 
suggests that the church was able to grow and prosper, since ‘no envy held it back, 
                                                          
828 For example: Lyman, Christology and Cosmology, 83; Hollerich, Eusebius’ Commentary on Isaiah, 67; 
Wallace-Hadrill, Eusebius of Caesarea, 168-89. 
829 For example: Mart. Pal. [SR] 7.7-8; HE 8.App.1-6; VC 1.57.1-3. 
830 HE 7.30.21. 
831 Ibid. 
832 HE 10.4.57: …ὑπαναχωρήσαντος αὐτῆς τοῦ θείου ὡς ἂν ἔρημος προστάτου… 
833 HE 10.4.57-8. 
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nor did some wicked demon malign it or hinder it with the plots of men, as long as 
a divine and heavenly hand protected and watched over its own people, as a thing 
that was indeed worthy’.834 However, when the standards of piety within the 
church began to slip and Christians turned to ‘weakness and indolence’ 
(χαυνότητα καὶ νωθρίαν),835 Eusebius declares that God removed his protection 
and permitted the demonic and human enemies of the church to begin the 
persecutions.836 For Eusebius, then, we can see that, both at the level of the 
individual soul and on a broader scale for the entire church community, divine 
protection was available only where it was merited. Simply to be a member of the 
Christian church was not enough, unless one also abandoned such vices as passion, 
laziness, and complacency. 
It was therefore not sufficient, in Eusebius’ opinion, simply to rely on the 
protection of God in order to secure oneself against the demonic threat. In order 
both to earn this protection in the present life, and, just as importantly, to ensure 
one’s salvation in the next life, a person needed to play an active role in resisting 
demonic attacks. For Eusebius, these attacks took two main forms, each focusing on 
a different way of straying from the path of salvation. In the DE, Eusebius identifies 
two principal ways in which a person might put their salvation at risk: either by 
embracing false doctrine, be it heresy or polytheism, or by adopting a vicious 
lifestyle. Eusebius interprets the prophecy concerning the division of the Mount of 
Olives at Zacharias 14:4, in which it was warned that the mountain would split in 
                                                          
834 HE 8.1.6: …οὐδεὶς ἀνεῖργεν φθόνος οὐδέ τις δαίμων πονηρὸς οἷος τε ἦν βασκαίνειν οὐδ’ 
ἀνθρώπων ἐπιβουλαῖς κωλύειν, ἐς ὅσον ἡ θεία καὶ οὐράνιος χεὶρ ἔσκεπέν τε καὶ ἐφρούρει, οἷα δὴ 
ἄξιον ὄντα, τὸν ἑαυτῆς λαόν. 
835 HE 8.1.7. 
836 HE 8.1.7-9. 
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four directions, as representing ‘the cracks and heresies and ethical falling away in 
life which have happened and are still happening now within the church of 
Christ’.837 Two of these divisions, Eusebius suggests, represent ‘two types of 
behaviour in turn among those who fall off from the church – one which is mistaken 
in ethics and another which drops off from healthy and correct knowledge’.838 Later 
on, Eusebius reiterates this division of wickedness into two identifiable kinds, when 
he describes ‘two groups of unseen enemies and wicked demonic foes, waging war 
in various ways against the whole race of men, one of them always and in every 
place encouraging among men idolatry and false teachings in our doctrines, while 
the other is working towards the destruction of souls in their ethics’.839 In order to 
obtain salvation people would therefore need to combat demonic attacks on two 
fronts, by avoiding both moral and doctrinal error. While embracing the ‘orthodox’ 
Christian faith would surely have been enough in Eusebius’ view to avoid the latter 
fault, the equally important question of how virtue was to be achieved in the face of 
demonic encouragement of vice was considerably more difficult. 
For Eusebius, it appears that the key to escaping demonic influence was the 
condition of a person’s soul. As we have seen, Eusebius believed demons to direct 
their attacks primarily against the rational human soul and he also suggested that it 
was the quality of a person’s soul that determined the kind of spiritual being that 
might be able to gain access to it. According to Eusebius, ‘it is not possible for them 
                                                          
837 DE 6.18.28: …τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἐκκλησίας γενόμενά τε καὶ εἰσέτι νῦν γινόμενα σχίσματα 
καὶ τὰς αἱρέσεις τάς τε ἠθικὰς κατὰ τὸν βίον ἀποπτώσεις… 
838 DE 6.18.31: …τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκκλησίας ἀποπιπτόντων δύο πάλιν δηλοῦσθαι τρόπους, τόν τε κατὰ 
τὸ ἦθος ἁμαρτάνοντα καὶ τὸν τῆς ὑγιοῦς καὶ ὀρθοδόξου γνώσεως ἐξολισθαίνοντα… 
839 DE 7.1.103: …δύο στίφη ἀοράτων ἐχθρῶν καὶ πολεμίων δαιμόνων πονηρῶν, τὸ πάντων 
ἀνθρώπων γένος διαφόρως πολεμούντων, ἓν μὲν τῶν τάς ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἐνεργούντων ἀεὶ καὶ 




[the demons] to draw near to a pure soul on account of the dissimilarity between 
them’.840 By contrast, a soul which has been ‘cleansed of every mark and all 
defilement, and ordered both by moderation and justice and by other virtues’841 
would be ready to receive a ‘godly spirit’ (θείου πνεύματος).842 As a result, the best 
defence against the temptations and deceits of the demons was a pure soul. 
In outlining how a person might set about achieving purity of soul, Eusebius’ 
dichotomy between the body and the soul is once again very much in evidence. 
Eusebius argues that, while the body ‘rejoices according to nature in all pleasures’, 
the προαίρεσις, ‘out of a desire for virtue, is glad of a life of hard work and 
roughness’.843 Bodily nature is thus shown as incompatible with the attainment of 
virtue, which belongs to the προαίρεσις of the soul. In order to achieve virtue then, 
the soul must overcome ‘the nature of the body’ (τῆς τοῦ σώματος φύσεως), with 
its desires for sex, food, and drink.844 Once again, this is a matter of προαίρεσις – a 
person must independently (αὐθεκουσίως) choose to heed ‘ascetic exhortations’ 
(ἀσκητικὰς προτροπὰς) towards ‘abstinence from food’ (ἀσιτίαις) and 
‘steadfastness’ (καρτερίαις), ignoring the needs and temptations of the body.845 For 
Eusebius, then, attaining virtue was the concern of προαίρεσις, and, as such, a 
matter of personal responsibility. A virtuous lifestyle began with controlling the 
body, and evidently necessitated self-discipline and moderation. 
                                                          
840 PE 4.21.4: καθαρᾷ γὰρ μὴ δύνασθαι ψυχῇ πλησιάζειν διὰ τὸ ἀνόμοιον… 
841 PE 5.15.4: …παντὸς ῥύπου καὶ πάσης κηλῖδος κεκαθαρμένῃ σωφροσύνῃ τε καὶ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ 
ταῖς ἄλλαις ἀρεταῖς κεκοσμημένῃ. 
842 PE 5.15.5. 
843 PE 6.6.36: καὶ αὖ πάλιν ἡ μὲν κατὰ φύσιν πάσαις ἡδοναῖς χαίρει… ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις ἀρετῆς 
ἐπιθυμίᾳ τὸν ἐπίπονον καὶ τραχὺν ἠσπάσατο βίον. 
844 PE 6.6.35. 
845 Ibid.: …ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις λόγοις σώφροσιν ἀναπεισθεῖσα καὶ τινας ἀσκητικὰς προτροπὰς 
αὐθεκουσίως ἀγαπήσασα, πολυημέροις ἀσιτίαις καὶ καρτερίαις παρακρούεται τὴν τοῦ σώματος 
φύσιν, ἀρετῇ λογισμοῦ κρίνασα τοῦτο καὶ ἑλομένη. 
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Resisting the temptations of the body was, however, only one of the 
challenges facing those who wished to achieve virtue; there was also the problem of 
malign external influence to contend with. As we have seen, Eusebius felt this too 
could tempt people away from a life of virtue.846 In order to combat this, Eusebius 
advocates practising ‘philosophy’ (φιλοσοφεῖν).847 Eusebius does not immediately 
offer any explanation here of what such a practice might involve; however, by 
taking account of a range of statements from elsewhere in the PE, we can see that 
Eusebius regarded the practice of philosophy as a combination of pious 
contemplation of the divine with ascetic self-discipline. Later in the PE, Eusebius 
notes that some rational souls – those of the demons – succumbed to ‘the opposite 
of the good’ because of their ‘neglect’ (ὀλιγωρίᾳ) of their ‘study of the greatest 
one’.848 Since Eusebius had earlier grouped together ‘philosophy’ (φιλοσοφία) and 
‘piety’ (εὐσέβεια) as two of the valuable pursuits which would have no place in a 
universe governed by fate,849 we may conclude that he considered philosophy to 
include in large measure the contemplation of the divine. 
It would, however, be wrong to suggest that Eusebius considered philosophy 
to be simply an intellectual pursuit. Towards the end of PE 6.6, Eusebius notes that 
Christian converts value a philosophy that is not comprised of doctrines (λόγοις), 
but of actions (ἔργων).850 When taken together with his statements earlier in the 
same chapter about the need for people to heed ‘ascetic exhortations’ in order to 
                                                          
846 PE 6.6.42. 
847 PE 6.6.43. 
848 PE 13.15.10: …τό τε τῷ καλῷ ἐναντίον ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ δέξοιτ’ ἂν ὀλιγωρίᾳ τῆς περὶ τὸ κρεῖττον 
σχολῆς… 
849 PE 6.6.5. 
850 PE 6.6.71: ...φιλοσοφίαν οὐ τὴν ἐν λόγοις, τὴν δὲ δι’ ἔργων προτιμῆσαι. 
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resist bodily temptation,851 this statement suggests that, for Eusebius, passive 
acknowledgement of the supremacy of the Christian God was not, on its own, 
enough to provide effective protection from malign influence. Rather, a 
combination of active contemplation of the divine with self-discipline and personal 
moderation was required. 
This sense that an active and engaged form of piety was particularly to be 
valued can be seen in Eusebius’ presentation of Constantine. Eusebius’ pious 
emperor prays regularly,852 consults theological advisers,853 and takes a lively 
interest in matters of theological significance.854 By contrast, Eusebius has a low 
opinion of those recent converts at Constantine’s court who appear to him to be less 
sincere in their faith.855 Moreover, we know from the DE that Eusebius considered 
the ascetic lifestyle to be of considerable merit. At DE 1.8, Eusebius describes how 
Christians have been instructed in two distinct forms of piety – a more advanced 
form, in which all worldly ties are renounced, and a slightly lower form, in which 
involvement in worldly pursuits such as marriage and politics is permitted, as long 
as some time is still set aside for the study of the divine.856 For Eusebius, it seems 
that the maintenance of virtue was an active process, requiring, at the very least, 
considered engagement with Christian teaching and, as far as possible on top of 
this, the self-moderation of an ascetic lifestyle. 
For Eusebius, then, resisting the attacks of demons was an on-going task, 
calling for constant vigilance. Indeed, he even warns his readers that ‘it is necessary 
                                                          
851 PE 6.6.35. 
852 VC 4.22.1. 
853 VC 3.1.5. 
854 For example: VC 2.63.1, 4.29.1-5, 4.41.2-4. 
855 VC 4.54.2. 
856 DE 1.8.1-4. 
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throughout everything to be watchful against the fraudulent wicked arts’ of 
demons and the devil.857 In combating this threat, Eusebius evidently felt that the 
cultivation of virtue had a large part to play. For this, however, people largely had 
to take responsibility themselves. They could not rest complacent in the assumption 
of God’s protection. Moreover, it is notable that Eusebius’ understanding of how 
virtue might be attained appears to involve more than one rather circular process. 
For Eusebius, virtue and purity of soul are the best defence against demons. Yet, in 
order to build this defence, it is first necessary to resist the attacks of demons by 
living virtuously. Similarly, God can offer protection from demons, but will do so 
only for those who have already successfully resisted demonic attempts to draw 
them into wickedness. As a result, it seems as though virtue for Eusebius must be 
almost a self-sustaining state. The same would appear to be true of vice: the fallen 
soul of HE 10.4.57-58 loses the protection of God because it has chosen wickedness 
over virtue. This then leaves it fully under the influence of the demons, thereby 
encouraging further wickedness. 
This sense that virtue and vice could be self-perpetuating might appear to 
suggest that Eusebius held the view that a person’s moral disposition was 
essentially fixed and unchanging. This is certainly how Drake reads Eusebius’ 
presentation of character in the VC.858 Such a position would also reflect a view 
common to many schools of ancient philosophy, in which a state, at least of true 
virtue, once achieved could not then be lost.859 However, the events of Eusebius’ 
                                                          
857 PE 7.10.15: …χρῆναι διὰ παντὸς ἐγρηγορέναι πρὸς τὰς τοῦ δηλωθέντος κακοτέχνους 
ῥαδιουργίας. 
858 Drake, ‘What Eusebius Knew’, 34. 
859 Frede, A Free Will, 29. 
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lifetime would surely have made a static view of moral character difficult to 
maintain. The persecutions alone would have provided numerous examples of 
people renouncing their faith, thereby in Eusebius’ view moving from a virtuous 
state to one of wickedness and jeopardising their salvation in the process.860 Sure 
enough, the overall impression created by a range of examples in Eusebius’ 
historical and biographical works contradicts the notion that the human character 
must remain permanently set in either virtue or vice. In the HE in particular, we 
find examples of people turning, not merely from vice to virtue, which non-
Christian philosophy had been prepared to accept,861 but crucially also from virtue 
to vice.862 In bringing about these transformations, Eusebius implies that external 
influence, either divine or demonic, was heavily involved. Despite his ideas about 
how virtue might be maintained, it therefore seems that Eusebius did not in fact 
believe virtue to be a secure or a permanent state. 
The basis of Drake’s reading of Eusebius’ view of the human character is, at 
best, fragile. It is built on little more than the belief that most ancient writers ‘had an 
essentially static conception of personality and character’, and on the claim that no 
alternative evidence has been put forward to suggest that Eusebius diverged from 
this supposed ancient consensus.863 However, as Gill has shown, the idea that 
ancient writers had an entirely static view of character is misleading, and arose from 
                                                          
860 HE 8.2.3. Here, although he refuses to dwell on them, Eusebius does make passing reference to 
those who had ‘completely shipwrecked their salvation’ (τῶν εἰς ἅπαν τῆς σωτηρίας 
νεναυαγηκότων) in the persecutions, showing that he was fully aware of this difficulty. 
861 Gill, ‘Character-Development’, 470, 478-82. 
862 For example: vice to virtue: HE 8.17.1-2, describing Galerius’ decision to end the persecution; virtue 
to vice: HE 10.8.1-19, describing Licinius. 
863 Drake, ‘What Eusebius Knew’. 
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a misunderstanding of the nature of ancient biography.864 Gill suggests that, while 
many ancient biographies are largely silent on the process by which a personality 
might develop, the notion that character was constantly being formed, even 
throughout adulthood, was in fact central to their purpose.865 For Plutarch, for 
instance, one reason to write biography was to provide examples, either to emulate 
or to avoid, in order that the reader might improve their own character.866 Rather 
than reflecting the view that character was fixed, Gill suggests that the failure of 
ancient biographers to engage with questions of character development was a result 
instead of the desire of these writers to present their audience with fully formed 
exemplars on which moral judgements might then be passed.867 Moreover, as Gill 
points out, the idea that people in the ancient world had little idea that character 
might be subject to change is at odds with the concerns of much philosophical 
writing, in which considerable attention is paid to questions of moral and ethical 
improvement.868 Thus it seems that ancient writers were quite comfortable with the 
idea that a character might develop from a state of vice to one of virtue. 
Admittedly, Drake’s assertion that Eusebius believed character to be fixed is 
based not on examples of wickedness, but rather on the virtuous example of 
Constantine. The notion that a person who had truly achieved virtue might have 
been capable of falling back into vice was undoubtedly considerably more 
                                                          
864 Gill, ‘Character-Development’, 469-87. 
865 Ibid. 476. 
866 Plut. Aem. 1, cited in Gill, ‘Character-Development’, 472. 
867 Gill, ‘Character-Development’, 472-73. 
868 Ibid. 469. Alexander of Aphrodisias in fact criticises his determinist opponents for writing works 
designed to bring about improvement in their readers, since if a person’s actions were predetermined 
by fate then there would be no point in trying to change their character: De fato 18. Alexander clearly 
expected his audience to agree that the purpose of such works was to bring about change through 
persuasion, suggesting that a belief that people were capable at least of change for the better must have 
been fairly widespread. 
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problematic for ancient thinkers. Many schools of philosophy maintained that a 
virtuous person could only act virtuously.869 Hence once a person had achieved 
virtue, it was no longer possible for them to return to a state of wickedness or 
ignorance. As a result, Gill acknowledges that some – although by no means all – 
ancient biographers, most notably Plutarch, were troubled by examples of 
‘degeneration of character in adult life’, because this conflicted with their 
understanding of what it meant to be good, rather than because they considered 
character to be permanently fixed.870 Even so, Drake’s focus on the VC is hardly 
conducive to drawing a balanced picture of Eusebius’ views on character. As has 
been widely recognised, Eusebius was not seeking to provide an accurate 
representation of what he saw as Constantine’s personality in the VC, but rather to 
produce a paradigm of a virtuous Christian ruler.871 There was therefore good 
reason for Eusebius to present Constantine as consistently virtuous, regardless of 
his views on whether or not personalities might change. It is therefore necessary to 
look further than the example of Constantine in order properly to appreciate 
Eusebius’ understanding of character. Moving beyond the VC, it becomes clear that 
Eusebius did acknowledge the possibility of a character changing from a state of 
virtue to one of vice. 
The career of Licinius, outlined in the HE and VC, provides Eusebius’ most 
striking example of a character perceived to have turned from virtue to wickedness. 
Here we see a figure, initially lauded by Eusebius in book 9 of the HE as the 
                                                          
869 Frede, A Free Will, 29; Gill, ‘Character-Development’, 479-80. 
870 Gill, ‘Character-Development’, 479-82, quotation at 482. 
871 For example: Johnson, Ethnicity and Argument, 195; Cameron and Hall, Life of Constantine, 12; 
Cameron, ‘Construction’, 164. 
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virtuous partner of Constantine and pious champion of God,872 transformed into a 
demon-worshipping persecutor.873 Of course, Licinius’ complex portrayal in the HE 
owes much to the changing circumstances in which this work was written – 
Licinius’ defeat by Constantine made it politically inexpedient for positive 
references to Licinius to remain unaltered.874 Even so, Eusebius’ presentation of 
Licinius’ change for the worse is consistent between the VC and HE, and 
demonstrates how he may have believed a such a change of character could occur. 
In both works, Licinius’ turn towards wickedness is characterised above all as a 
descent into madness and irrationality,875 thereby associating him with demons, 
which are also frequently characterised in this way. Moreover, in the VC, Eusebius 
presents the conflict between Constantine and Licinius almost as a conflict between 
their rival deities – with Constantine’s Christian God triumphing over Licinius’ 
demonic spirits.876 As such, it appears that for Eusebius, Licinius’ change of 
character involved exchanging the beneficial influence of God for the harmful 
influence of demons. 
Of course it could be argued that, rather than representing a dramatic change 
of character, this was simply an example of a consistently wicked character finally 
being revealed. Such a theme was not unknown to ancient biography and can be 
found in both Suetonius’ and Tacitus’ treatment of Tiberius.877 Eusebius does in fact 
suggest that Licinius was capable of deception in his dealings with Constantine, in 
                                                          
872 HE 9.10.1-3; 9.11.8. 
873 HE 10.8.2-19. 
874 On the composition of this work, see above, p. 46-51. 
875 HE 9.9.1, 9.9.12, 10.8.2, 10.8.9, 10.9.2; VC 1.50.2, 1.56.1-2. 
876 VC 2.4.1-2.10.2. As M.S. Williams has also previously noted: Authorised Lives in Early Christian 
Biography: Between Eusebius and Augustine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 39. 
877 Gill, ‘Character-Development’, 482, citing Suet. Tib. 42.1, 57.1, 61.1 and Tac. Ann. 1.4.3, 5.3, 6.51.3. 
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an attempt to disguise his true intentions.878 However, the idea of previously hidden 
wickedness does not sit comfortably with Eusebius’ earlier suggestion that God had 
supported Licinius to his military victories.879 It might, in Eusebius’ view, have been 
possible for a person to conceal their vicious character from other people, but surely 
not from God. Indeed, according to Eusebius it was God who had revealed Licinius’ 
deception to Constantine.880 Moreover, when describing Licinius’ transformation, 
Eusebius states that he ‘left off the imitation of the good and pursued instead the 
depravity and wicked ways of the impious tyrants’.881 This not only indicates a 
definite change, but also suggests that this change occurred as a result of swapping 
the influence of virtuous external προαίρεσεις for wicked external influence, in a 
manner consistent with that outlined by Eusebius at PE 6.6.42. This sense that 
Licinius underwent a definite change of character is echoed at VC 2.1.1, where 
Eusebius describes how Licinius ‘threw himself down to the depth of those who 
fight against God’.882 This phrase, with its idea of movement, similarly suggests an 
unmistakable change. In the case of Licinius, Eusebius therefore presents a example 
of a character changing from virtue to vice, largely as a result of a change in the 
external forces influencing it. 
Thus it seems that, for Eusebius, even the most dramatic change of character 
could be explained. Crucially, it appears that by allowing a role for external 
influence, particularly demonic influence, in shaping people’s choices, Eusebius was 
able to provide an explanation for a phenomenon that classical philosophers had 
                                                          
878 HE 10.8.5. 
879 HE 9.10.3. 
880 HE 10.8.5-6. 
881 HE 10.8.2: …μιμήσεως μὲν τῆς τῶν καλῶν ἀπελιμπάνετο, τῆς δὲ τῶν ἀσεβῶν τυράννων 
μοχθηρίας ἐζήλου τὴν κακοτροπίαν… 
882 …ἐπὶ τὸν τῶν θεομάχων βυθὸν κατεκρημνίζετο… 
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struggled to understand – the transformation of a previously good character into a 
state of wickedness. While this was something of a departure from classical views of 
virtue, Eusebius was not alone among early Christian writers in suggesting that 
goodness was not a permanent state, at least for humans. Tatian had insisted that 
only God was unchangeably good, while the humans, angels and demons he had 
created, possessing a changeable nature, were left free to choose between good and 
evil.883 Origen had similarly insisted that people were not permanently set by nature 
in a state of either goodness or wickedness.884 Thus, for Origen, as for Eusebius, 
even a soul which had reached the peak of virtue was still at risk of falling back into 
wickedness.885 
The implications of this are significant. For Eusebius, no one, even the most 
virtuous, could ever secure complete immunity from the attacks of the demons. At 
no point was salvation guaranteed. However, while this might seem a rather 
pessimistic view, other examples in Eusebius’ works present a more optimistic 
picture. While the malign external influence of the demons provided a constant 
challenge to the virtuous, Eusebius also suggests that the beneficent influence of 
God might guide people towards virtue. As a result, a person need not be trapped, 
even in a state of the deepest sin, forever. 
This emerges most clearly from Eusebius’ presentation of the deaths of some 
of the persecuting emperors in the HE. In Eusebius’ more historical works, 
particularly the HE, there is a strong connection drawn between a person’s end and 
                                                          
883 Frede, A Free Will, 120, citing Tatian, Orat. 7.1. 
884 Orig. Comm. in Matt. 10.11.57-62. Cf. Justin 1 Apol. 43.1-5. 
885 Orig. Comm. in Matt. 10.11.67-78. See: Frede, A Free Will, 121-22. 
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the standard of their behaviour.886 Constantine’s father Constantius, an emperor 
who, in Eusebius’ reports, favoured the Christians, is the only member of the 
imperial college permitted a peaceful and pain-free death in the HE.887 The deaths of 
his imperial colleagues who are said to have persecuted Christians are, by contrast, 
preceded by extreme physical suffering.888 Yet in dwelling on the obvious, graphic 
punishments of the persecutors, it is easy to overlook the fact that in at least two 
cases, the emperors involved had ended the persecutions before their deaths. Both 
Galerius and Maximin are said to have issued edicts in favour of Christians shortly 
before their deaths. In both cases, this final change of heart is reported to have 
resulted in an immediate reward. Maximin, we are told, ‘suffered less than he 
should have suffered’, in spite of the considerable physical pain he is supposed to 
have endured.889 Meanwhile Galerius, whose divinely sent punishment is said to 
have encouraged his change of heart, was ‘at once, although not for long, delivered 
from his sufferings’.890 His reward was to be relieved of his pain, albeit through 
death. For these two figures, it appears that a single, virtuous προαίρεσις has been 
rewarded, although it is not enough to cancel out completely the punishment for 
their many, earlier wicked προαίρεσεις. In Eusebius’ view, each προαίρεσις, 
whether good or bad, mattered. Each would be recognised and duly rewarded or 
                                                          
886 HE 8.App.1-6; VC 1.17.1. A similar concern famously informs Lactantius’ De mortibus persecutorum, 
written mostly likely in 314-15 and therefore roughly contemporary with the HE. See Lact. DMP 30, 33-
35, 49. On the dating of this work, see: J.L. Creed, ‘Introduction’, in Lactantius, De mortibus 
persecutorum, ed. and trans. J.L. Creed, Oxford Early Christian Texts (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984), xxxiii-
xxxv. 
887 HE 8.App.4. 
888 HE 8.App.1-4. 
889 HE 9.10.13: …ἧττον ἢ παθεῖν αὐτὸν χρῆν δήπου πάθων… 
890 ΗΕ 8.App.1: …αὐτίκα καὶ οὐκ εἰς μακρὸν τῶν ἀλγηδόνων ἀπαλλαγεὶς… 
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punished by God. By changing their προαίρεσεις, a person might thus free 
themselves from sin. 
Eusebius’ belief in the value of every choice for determining a person’s path is 
further reflected in his attitude towards those Christians he would have considered 
to have ‘lapsed’ from the faith. In the light of his insistence on the punishment of 
wrongdoers, it might appear surprising that Eusebius is tolerant of Christians who 
had recanted their faith during the persecutions, but who had later repented. 
Discussing the Novatianist schism of the third century, in which the followers of 
Novatus had refused to admit such Christians back into the congregation, Eusebius 
is highly critical of the Novatianist stance, calling it ‘brother-hating and very anti-
human’.891 Instead he applauds those ‘orthodox’ bishops who excommunicated 
Novatus and declared that any lapsed Christians who repented should be 
welcomed back into the church. Eusebius was not, of course, condoning their sins, 
but he insisted that these people should be ‘healed and treated by the medicines of 
repentance’.892 For Eusebius, then, repentance could have healing properties, 
helping to undo the damage caused by previous sins. Since each individual decision 
mattered, a person could change at any point. 
Moreover, the idea that people were capable of changing for the better 
appears to have been central to Eusebius’ understanding of the purpose of divine 
punishments. For Eusebius, the punishments sent by God to the wicked were not 
simply retributive, but, far more importantly, corrective. Eusebius insists that God 
cannot create any kind of evil, and that even his punishments, which might appear 
                                                          
891 HE 6.43.2: …τῇ μισαδέλφῳ καὶ ἀπανθρωποτάτῃ γνώμῃ… 
892 Ibid.: …ἰᾶσθαι καὶ θεραπεύειν τοῖς τῆς μετανοίας φαρμάκοις. 
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harmful, are in fact intended ‘not for the harm of those being punished, but for their 
benefit and use’.893 As a result, Eusebius likens God’s punishments to a doctor’s 
treatment of his patients – he may offer ‘painful and sharp treatments’ but these are 
ultimately intended to cure the patient.894 This can be seen in the example of 
Galerius, whose divinely sent physical suffering is eventually said to have led him 
towards a more virtuous path, by causing him to end his persecution of the 
Christians.895 
Perhaps even more significant for Eusebius, however, was the role that such 
punishments might play in deterring future wrongdoing by others. Eusebius 
suggests that the difference between the deaths of virtuous emperors like 
Constantine’s father Constantius and those of the persecutors demonstrates the way 
in which God will reward virtue and vice.896 More than once, he criticises Licinius 
for failing to take heed of the many examples of the punishment of persecutors.897 It 
seems that, for Eusebius, Licinius’ wickedness was compounded by the fact that 
God had supplied him with many examples to guide him towards making virtuous 
choices, leaving little excuse for his failure to do so. Eusebius’ understanding of 
divine justice was thus underpinned by his belief that people were capable of moral 
improvement by improving the choices they made. For those who chose to follow it, 
Eusebius believed that God would provide guidance to help people to achieve 
virtue and salvation.  
                                                          
893 PE 13.3.39: …οὐκ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ τῶν τιμωρουμένων, ἐπ’ ὠφελείᾳ δὲ καὶ συμφέροντι… 
894 Ibid.: ὥσπερ ἂν ἰατρὸς ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ τῶν καμνόντων κακὰ νομίζοιτο προσφέρειν τὰς ἀλγεινὰς 
καὶ πικρὰς θεραπείας. 
895 HE 8.17.1.  
896 VC 1.17.1. 
897 HE 10.8.2; HE 10.8.9; VC 1.59.2. 
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The boundary between virtue and vice was thus a porous one for Eusebius. 
People did not possess a fixed nature or pre-determined character, but rather 
shaped their own path through the choices they made. Moreover, the significance of 
every single choice meant that, for Eusebius, virtue and vice were never 
permanently set. Yet in his understanding of how people might switch between 
these two opposing states, Eusebius did not only have room for human freedom of 
choice. While this was undoubtedly crucial in his view to maintaining human moral 
responsibility, he also assigned a prominent place to external influence. If 
wickedness for Eusebius was a partnership between humans and demons, then 
goodness was likewise a partnership between humans and the divine, whenever 
people welcomed God’s guidance and correction. In Eusebius’ understanding of 
salvation we therefore find a combination of God’s grace with human freedom and 
responsibility. Salvation might be dependent on a person achieving virtue in their 
own right, but Eusebius did not believe that God left people without any guidance 
on how that virtue was to be achieved. 
 
Conclusions 
Recognising the importance of προαίρεσις in Eusebius’ thought is crucial to 
understanding his views on moral responsibility. It was this concept that enabled 
him to absolve God of responsibility for the evil of the persecutions, allowing him to 
place the blame squarely with humankind instead. Moreover, rather than a cruel 
and merciless punishment, the persecutions thus become a generous and merciful 
remedy, which, thanks to people’s ability to change their προαίρεσεις, can lead 
people back to salvation. Similarly, the notion of προαίρεσις helped to explain the 
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dramatic and troubling change of character seen in the figure of Licinius. For 
Eusebius, humankind’s freedom to exercise προαίρεσις meant that people could 
slip between states of virtue and vice. Eusebius has previously been characterised as 
an optimist as a result of his belief in human progress,898 and, to an extent, this 
assessment is justified. His message that, as a result of their free choice, even the 
most depraved sinners might attain redemption is certainly a positive one. Yet the 
associated idea that everyone, even the most virtuous, remains capable of falling 
back into sin as a result of this same free choice leaves little room for complacency 
or triumphalism. 
For προαίρεσις was not only the key to salvation in Eusebius’ thought, it also 
lay at the centre of his conception of the demonic threat. Eusebius’ demonic threat 
did not focus primarily on physical or earthly harm, but rather on attempts to derail 
the progress of the church, and undermine human salvation. For Eusebius, it was 
προαίρεσις that made this aspect of the demonic threat possible. By allowing 
humans to be held responsible for their sins, even those committed as a result of 
external temptation or under malign influence, human προαίρεσις gave demons the 
opportunity to lead people to jeopardise their own salvation. Clearly, as Lyman 
recognised, Eusebius saw salvation as the result of co-operation between divine 
grace and human free choice,899 yet to focus only on this positive aspect of Eusebius’ 
understanding of moral responsibility risks distorting his views. Eusebius believed 
his audience to live in a world populated by a variety of spiritual forces, many of 
                                                          
898 Lyman, Christology and Cosmology, 123; Chesnut, First Christian Histories, 119. 
899 Lyman, Christology and Cosmology, 99. 
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which he saw as malevolent in intent. The risk of slipping into sin as a result of 
malign external influence was thus one that could not be ignored. 
This understanding of the relationship between προαίρεσις and the demonic 
threat also helped to shape Eusebius’ ideas about Christian identity, and about the 
standards of behaviour required of those who wished to be identified as virtuous 
Christians. Given the importance which Eusebius attached to correct belief in 
securing salvation, membership of the ‘orthodox’ church would have been the first 
of these requirements. Yet, whilst it is clear that, for Eusebius, salvation could not be 
secured outside the body of the church, passive and unthinking adherence, even to 
orthodox doctrine, was not by itself enough either to indicate or to ensure a person’s 
virtue. In Eusebius’ view, the pursuit of virtue and hence of freedom from demonic 
influence was a struggle that must be undertaken at the level of the individual soul. 
In this, people would receive help, both from their God-given inclination towards 
goodness, and from the guidance which God supplied in the visible world through 
the administration of divine justice. They would also, however, face the challenge of 
demonic temptation. Membership of the church must be supplemented by the 
cultivation of a pious and virtuous lifestyle in order to ensure that people did not 
fall into the power of demons. Thus Christian identity for Eusebius was tied not 
merely to membership of the church community, but to the continual struggle 




DEMONIC ACTIVITY AND HISTORICAL PROGRESS 
Eusebius’ great value to later historians arguably lies to a significant degree in his 
position as a witness to the dramatic religious and political changes of the early 
fourth century. Eusebius lived through periods of uneasy toleration for the 
Christian church, of direct persecution, and, finally, of official recognition and 
imperial patronage, and many of these changes are recorded in his works. Yet 
Eusebius’ presentation of these events is rarely straightforward. While the 
accusations of outright fraud levelled against Eusebius by earlier scholars like Jacob 
Burckhardt are somewhat unfair in seeking to judge Eusebius by the standards of 
later historiography,900 there can be no doubt that, as many scholars have noted, 
Eusebius’ attitude towards the developments of the period – particularly the 
political developments – was heavily shaped by his perception of how these events 
fitted into the broad sweep of history as a whole.901 According to Glen Chesnut, 
Eusebius used his ‘theory of history to justify both the power of the Roman state 
and the authority of the emperor’.902 More than this, however, Eusebius’ ideas about 
history also influenced his reading of the role of the church and its leaders and were 
closely linked to his understanding of how salvation might be achieved. 
Consequently, an understanding of Eusebius’ views on the nature, purpose and 
overall direction of history is essential to an accurate appreciation of his 
presentation of the events and leading figures of the Constantinian era. 
                                                          
900 Burckhardt, The Age of Constantine, 283. 
901 See, for example: Hollerich, Eusebius’ Commentary on Isaiah, 67; Lyman, Christology and Cosmology, 88; 
Wallace-Hadrill, Eusebius of Caesarea, 168-89; Ruhbach, ‘Politische Theologie’, 236-58, 242. 
902 Chesnut, First Christian Histories, 91. 
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Yet, despite long-standing interest in Eusebius’ ideas about history,903 there 
remain several substantial problems with the existing interpretations of his views 
on the subject. First and most serious is the fact that scholars, almost without 
exception, present Eusebius as a triumphant optimist, so dazzled by the prosperity 
of the church in his later life that he was led to unrestrained celebration of present 
political and religious circumstances.904 There is therefore a tendency to suggest that 
Eusebius saw the events of his lifetime as falling at the very end of history, and 
representing both its climax and pinnacle. In D.S. Wallace-Hadrill’s view, Eusebius 
felt that he stood at ‘the peak to which all human history had been moving’.905 
However, this optimistic picture of Eusebius’ thought is somewhat undermined by 
the repeated appearance of hostile and threatening demons throughout a range of 
his works. Even in some of Eusebius’ latest and arguably most triumphalist works, 
such as the VC and later books of the HE, demonic activity continues to feature,906 
yet scholars arguing for Eusebius’ triumphalism have so far failed to engage with 
such references to the demonic threat. When demons are restored to their proper 
place in Eusebius’ historical vision it becomes clear that this traditional portrayal of 
Eusebius as straightforwardly optimistic cannot be so easily maintained. As a result, 
our understanding of how he interprets the events of his own day also requires 
some refining. 
                                                          
903 Important monographs include: Chesnut, First Christian Histories; Sirinelli, Les vues historiques; 
Grant, Eusebius as Church Historian. 
904 See, for example: W.H.C. Frend, Martyrdom and Persecution in the Early Church: A Study of a Conflict 
from the Maccabees to Donatus (Oxford: Blackwell, 1965), 544-45; Trompf, Early Christian Historiography, 
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905 Wallace-Hadrill, Eusebius of Caesarea, 182. Cf. Ruhbach, ‘Politische Theologie’, 254; Eger, ‘Kaiser und 
Kirche’, 97-115; Sirinelli, Les vues historiques, 482-83; Coggan, Pandaemonia, 61; Martin, Inventing 
Superstition, 223-24. 
906 For example: VC 1.13.3, 1.49.1, 2.73.1, 3.55.2-3; HE 8.1.6, 8.14.5, 10.8.2. 
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Stemming from this first problem, there is a second, related difficulty, which 
is that some scholars have tended to try to distinguish between Eusebius’ view of 
the ‘Church’ and that of the ‘Empire’.907 Yet, as Drake has argued, drawing such a 
clear division between the two in this period is ‘dangerously and profoundly 
misleading’.908 Having made this distinction, they have disagreed about which of 
these bodies Eusebius supposedly held to be more important. Believing that 
Eusebius saw his own time as falling at the very end of history, several scholars 
have argued that he held a form of ‘realised eschatology’.909 This phrase, which is, of 
course, a modern imposition with no parallel in the ancient sources, is used to 
describe the idea that Eusebius believed God’s ‘kingdom of promise’ to have been 
already fulfilled – or ‘realised’ – in the present time.910 This is felt to be in conflict 
with more ‘traditional’ or ‘conventional’ eschatology, in which the promised 
kingdom is said to await the virtuous after the second coming of Christ and the last 
judgement.911 
Such a straightforward distinction between ‘conventional’ and ‘realised’ 
eschatology is, however, difficult to maintain, particularly for the early centuries of 
                                                          
907 Hollerich, for instance, distinguishes between the ‘institutional church’ and the empire: Eusebius’ 
Commentary on Isaiah, 201. 
908 H.A. Drake, ‘Church and Empire’, in S.A. Harvey and D.G. Hunter, eds., The Oxford Handbook of 
Early Christian Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 457. 
909 The expression is used to describe Eusebius’ thought by: Hollerich, Eusebius’ Commentary on Isaiah, 
196-97, 201; by B.E. Daley, The Hope of the Early Church: A Handbook of Patristic Eschatology (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), 77; by Martin, Inventing Superstition, 224; and, in German 
(‘realisierte Eschatologie’), by Ruhbach, ‘Politische Theologie’, 253. It is not, however, exclusively used 
of Eusebius. Daley also uses the expression to refer to elements of the thought of Cyprian and desert 
fathers including Antony: The Hope, 43, 71. 
910 Daley, The Hope, 78. This view of Eusebius’ eschatology is widespread, even where the precise 
expression ‘realised eschatology’ is not used. See, for example: H.-G. Opitz, ‘Euseb von Caesarea als 
Theologe’, Zeitschrift für die Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft 34 (1935), 14; Eger, ‘Kaiser und Kirche’; 
Sirinelli, Les vues historiques, 482-83; Wallace-Hadrill, Eusebius of Caesarea, 173, 187; Farina, L’impero, 83; 
G.H. Williams, ‘Christology and Church-State Relations in the Fourth-Century’, Church History 20:3 
(1951), 17; and the discussion in Hollerich, Eusebius’ Commentary on Isaiah, 196-201. 
911 For example: Wallace-Hadrill, Eusebius of Caesarea, 188-89.  
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the current era. Daley’s survey of eschatological thought in the first five centuries 
CE highlights such a variety of views that it is difficult to see how one can 
reasonably speak of a ‘conventional’ doctrine.912 Moreover, Daley suggests that one 
of the few over-arching features of early Christian eschatology was its ‘realism’, the 
sense of an intimate connection between this world and the promised kingdom.913 
This must lead us to question just how much more ‘realised’ Eusebius’ eschatology 
was than that of other early Christian thinkers. Indeed, scholars seem to vary in 
their assessment of what was involved in Eusebius’ ‘realised’ eschatology. While 
the older view suggests that Eusebius’ eschatology involved largely downplaying 
ideas of a second coming and final judgement,914 Hollerich finds a continuing belief 
in such events to be completely compatible with a ‘realised eschatology’.915 A 
contrast between ‘traditional’ and ‘realised’ eschatology therefore has considerable 
potential to mislead and confuse. 
Yet following the suggestion that Eusebius saw the eschatological kingdom 
realised in the present, scholars have sought to locate that kingdom more precisely 
in either the Christian church or the Roman empire. The older view, put forward by 
scholars such as Eger, is that by the end of his life Eusebius had come to see God’s 
prophetic promises as being fulfilled in the newly Christian empire under 
Constantine.916 Such an interpretation clearly owes far more to Eusebius’ later 
panegyrical works on Constantine, the VC and LC, than to some of his earlier 
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apologetic and exegetical works.917 More recently, however, this view has been 
challenged by scholars such as Hollerich and Johnson who have stressed by contrast 
the continuing significance of the church in Eusebius’ works.918 As a result, 
Hollerich suggested that it is the church, rather than the empire that should be seen 
as the locus of Eusebius’ ‘realised eschatology’.919 
However, while this work has been invaluable in challenging traditional 
assumptions about Eusebius’ attitude towards the empire, it not only continues to 
perpetuate the idea that Eusebius’ interest lay principally in either the church or the 
empire as separate and clearly identifiable bodies, but also suggests that the two 
must in some way have been in competition for him. Even if there is no suggestion 
of an outright tension between the two, some form of competition is implied by the 
idea that attributing greater importance to one must mean downplaying the 
significance of the other.920 If, however, in recognising the continuing role of 
demons in Eusebius’ historical vision, we dismiss the idea that Eusebius saw the 
kingdom of God as already fulfilled on earth, we no longer need to determine 
whether Eusebius believed that kingdom to be located in either the church or the 
empire. This leaves us free to explore instead how Eusebius viewed the events of his 
lifetime within the broad sweep of history as a whole. When we do this, we can see 
that Eusebius was not interested in either the church or the empire as impersonal 
                                                          
917 As Hollerich noted: Eusebius’ Commentary on Isaiah, 202. 
918 Hollerich, Eusebius’ Commentary on Isaiah, 201; Johnson, Ethnicity and Argument, 184-85, 193. It is 
worth noting that Hollerich and Johnson focus on, respectively, the exegetical CI, and the apologetic 
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919 Hollerich, Eusebius’ Commentary on Isaiah, 201. 
920 While denying that Eusebius saw the church as a ‘rival’ to the empire, Hollerich nevertheless 
suggests that, in comparison with the church, the empire was only ‘a secondary phenomenon, a reality 
of a lesser order’: Eusebius’ Commentary on Isaiah, 33. 
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‘institutions’, but rather in their leaders as a united group of virtuous Christian 
exemplars, guiding their followers on their individual journeys away from demons 
and towards God. 
The purpose of this chapter is therefore twofold. First, by drawing attention to 
the continuing role of hostile demons in Eusebius’ understanding of history, it will 
challenge traditional assumptions about Eusebius’ triumphal interpretation of the 
events of his lifetime. Second, it will propose an alternative approach to Eusebius’ 
understanding of these events, suggesting that they are best viewed, not as standing 
at the culmination of history, but rather as forming simply one stage in an on-going 
process of salvation within history. Moreover, it will show that, since history had 
not yet reached its climax for Eusebius, any celebration of present prosperity was 
tempered in his works by warnings against complacency. 
 
The Role of Demons in History 
For Eusebius, demonic activity was an inescapable feature of history, observable not 
only in the distant past, but also in more recent events, up to and including the 
events of his own lifetime. Although several scholars have already noted that, for 
Eusebius, history was not driven exclusively by human activity,921 they have tended 
to focus on the role of the divine in directing events and have overlooked the 
important role also played by lesser spiritual beings, such as demons and angels, in 
Eusebius’ historical scheme. Lyman, for instance, has outlined how Eusebius felt 
historical events to be the result of free human action working under the guidance 
                                                          
921 For example: Chesnut, First Christian Histories, 86-87; Lyman, Christology and Cosmology, 83; 




of divine providence through a process of synergeia, or co-operation,922 yet she did 
not give any consideration to the question of how demonic activity might also fit 
into this framework. Even where scholars in the past have noted the importance of 
demons within Eusebius’ understanding of history,923 they have rarely made more 
than passing reference to the subject, and have not attempted to explore in any 
detail what this might mean for our understanding of Eusebius’ interpretation of 
the past. 
Rather more seriously, some scholars have been led, largely on the basis of 
comments in the PE, to the erroneous conclusion that Eusebius believed demonic 
activity to have ceased altogether long before his lifetime.924 Thus, even if demons 
are seen to have had a role in Eusebius’ understanding of some historical periods, 
their activity is held to be safely confined to the distant past. This only contributes 
further to the sense that Eusebius’ attitude was one of gloating triumphalism, since 
it suggests that he believed a once-potent threat to have been effectively 
neutralised.925 This picture, however, is based on only a partial reading of Eusebius’ 
works and cannot be sustained when comments from some of Eusebius’ other 
works, like the VC and later books of the HE, which deal with events from Eusebius’ 
                                                          
922 Lyman, Christology and Cosmology, 99, 102. Lyman uses the term ‘free will’ without specifying to 
which Greek term she is referring, but it seems clear that she has in mind the kind of unconstrained 
choice which Eusebius saw as central to moral responsibility. Cf. Chesnut, First Christian Histories, 82, 
84, 86-87; Chesnut, ‘Fate, Fortune, Free Will and Nature’, 180. 
923 See, for example: A. Momigliano, ‘Pagan and Christian Historiography in the Fourth Century AD’ 
in ead., ed., The Conflict Between Paganism and Christianity in the Fourth Century (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1963), 90; Eger, ‘Kaiser und Kirche’, 102-03; Chesnut, First Christian Histories, 103; Wallace-
Hadrill, Eusebius of Caesarea, 149, 182; Trompf, Early Christian Historiography, 133. 
924 Johnson, Ethnicity and Argument, 168. Also: P.R.L. Brown, ‘Eusebius, Constantine and the Future of 
Christianity’, unpublished Annual Nicolai Rubinstein Lecture, Queen Mary, University of London, 21st 
March 2013.  
925 Even Coggan, who is prepared to admit that in Eusebius’ view demons ‘may still exist 
cosmologically’, suggests that they were held to have been already defeated, suggesting that ‘their 
power to dominate… has been broken in the Christian power of salvation’: Pandaemonia, 198. 
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own lifetime, are also taken into consideration. What we see when we look at 
Eusebius’ works as a whole is that in his view the struggle of pious humans to 
escape from demonic influence was an on-going feature of all historical time, 
including his own time. It was, moreover, crucial to his understanding of salvation. 
Early human history for Eusebius was the story of a rapid decline into 
ignorance and barbarism, followed by a slow and difficult progress back towards 
God.926 These changes in the human condition were linked, moreover, to the waxing 
and waning of demonic influence among humankind, as demonic tyranny was 
gradually replaced by the beneficial instruction of the Logos.927 In part, of course, 
human free choice was also responsible for the initial fall of humankind away from 
God – in the PE, Eusebius describes how humans lost their original place ‘in a 
paradise of the good, among the divine choruses’,928 as a result of their ‘self-
determined choice’ (αὐθεκουσίῳ αἱρέσει).929 It appears that Eusebius is thinking 
here of the fall of Adam, which saw humankind descend into a state of mortality.930 
Overall, however, Eusebius shows remarkably little interest in this initial fall, 
                                                          
926 For a summary of Eusebius’ views, see: HE 1.2.17-23 and DE 8.Praef.5-11. In his discussion of the 
idea of progress in Eusebius’ works, Johnson argues, in line with his interest in ‘ethnic argumentation’, 
that ‘historical progress was a nation-specific affair’ for Eusebius. Johnson suggests that, while most 
nations are presented as having been subject to decline, the ancient Hebrews are said to have enjoyed 
progress – this, he feels, removes any apparent tension between the themes of decline and progress in 
Eusebius: Johnson, Ethnicity and Argument, 237-39. However, while it is certainly true that Eusebius 
presents different nations as suffering decline and experiencing progress at different rates and in 
different historical periods, all nations at some point are said to have experienced both. Yet, by 
recognising that, for Eusebius, human decline and progress were the result of fluctuations in an on-
going cosmic struggle between demons and the Logos, it is similarly clear that there was no 
contradiction between ideas of decline and progress for Eusebius. 
927 DE 4.9-10. 
928 PE 7.18.7: λέγει δ’ οὖν τὰ λόγια ὡς ἄρα τὴν πρώτην ἀνθρώπου φύσιν δυνάμει θείαις καὶ 
ὁμοιώσει θεοῦ κοσμήσας ὁ παμβασιλεὺς ἁρμόδιον οἷς ἐδωρήσατο τὴν πρώτην ἀπεκλήρωσε 
διατριβὴν τοῦ βίου ἐν ἀγαθῶν παραδείσῳ, χορείαις συγκαταλέξας θείαις. 
929 PE 7.18.8. Cf. HE 1.2.19 (τῆς... αὐτοπροαιρέτου κακίας). 
930 PE 7.18.7-8. 
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devoting far more attention to what happened to humankind once it was in this 
mortal state. 
It was following this initial fall that the detrimental influence of the demons 
became crucial for Eusebius. In the period immediately after the fall, human beings 
are still not said to have sunk to their lowest point. Instead, we are told that God, in 
his benevolence, ‘established heavenly angels as their guardians and curators, like 
leaders of a herd and shepherds’.931 Since they were unable to recognise the true 
God, these angels encouraged the humans under their protection to worship the 
stars, sun and moon instead, as the best alternative.932 That humans then sank still 
lower, into a state of complete wildness and irrationality was, for Eusebius, the 
result of demonic and diabolical plotting. The devil and his demons, envious of 
God’s care for humankind, succeeded in overthrowing the governance of the 
angels, as the devil ‘dragging down the cities from better places, and the souls of 
many to every kind of wickedness with the enticements of pleasure, and omitting 
no manner of contrivance, with shameful stories of the gods and licentious 
narratives, put before his captives pleasing things and pleasure, through the 
cunning deceit of the demons’.933 This suggestion that demons used ‘shameful 
stories of the gods’ to draw people away from the true, Christian God would appear 
to be a reference to the argument, common among early Christian apologists and 
                                                          
931 DE 4.6.9: …προστάτας αὐτῶν καὶ ἐπιμελητάς, ὥσπερ τινὰς ἀγελάρχας καὶ ποιμένας, θείους 
ἀγγέλους κατεστήσατο… 
932 DE 4.8.1. 
933 DE 4.9.6: ἔσειε δῆτα τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν κρειττόνων στάσεως τὰς πόλεις, καὶ τοῖς τῆς ἡδονῆς δελέασιν 
ἐπὶ πᾶν εἶδος φαυλότητος τὰς τῶν πολλῶν κατέσπα ψυχάς, οὐδένα τε μηχανῆς καταλιπὼν 
τρόπον, μύθοις περὶ θεῶν αἰσχροῖς καὶ διηγήμασιν ἀκολάστοις τὰ φίλα καὶ πρὸς ἡδονὴν τῶν 
ἁλισκομένων δι’ ἐντέχνου δαιμόνων ἀπάτης προυβάλλετο. 
219 
 
fully endorsed by Eusebius,934 that demons lay behind and inspired pagan worship. 
It also recalls Eusebius’ earlier dismissal of the ‘widespread and more legendary’ 
(πανδήμου καὶ μυθικωτέρας) theology of the Greeks in the PE.935 Here Eusebius 
criticises the mythological stories of the traditional gods and heroes for associating 
the divine with actions that would be considered criminal if conducted by 
humans.936 He notes that even some Greeks had felt so uncomfortable about these 
stories that they sought to explain them away with allegories.937 Thus we find 
demons being associated with the spread of classical mythology, which had led, in 
Eusebius’ mind, not only to impiety, but also to immorality. 
For Eusebius, the moral and religious history of humankind was thus 
inextricably linked to the greater cosmic struggle taking place between God and his 
angels and the devil and his demons. Humankind’s descent into barbarism was the 
consequence of demonic deceit; their salvation depended upon them freeing 
themselves from the influence of these tyrannical overlords. In this process, 
however, humankind was not alone. Their relentless fall was in Eusebius’ view 
arrested only by the benevolent intervention of the Logos, who ‘shone some short 
and faint rays of his personal light through the prophet Moses and through the god-
beloved men who came before him and after him’ in order to help people improve 
their condition.938 These early seeds of virtue and understanding were spread at first 
                                                          
934 See Chapter II above, p. 93. 
935 PE 2.5.1. 
936 PE 2.4.1-3. 
937 PE 2.4.4-6. Here Eusebius appears to have in mind earlier Greek philosophers, particularly Plato – 
see PE 2.6.21-24. 
938 DE 4.10.4: …εἰκότως ἐκεῖνος ὁ θεὸς λόγος, ὁ τῶν ὅλων σωτήρ... τέως μὲν βραχείας τινὰς καὶ 
ἀμυδρὰς τοῦ ἰδίου φωτὸς ἀκτῖνας διὰ προφήτου Μωσέως τῶν τε πρὸ αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν μετ’ αὐτὸν 
θεοφιλῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐξέλαμπεν… 
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through the Hebrew prophets,939 only gradually filtering through to the other 
human nations.940 It was only once enough progress had been made that the time 
became right for the incarnation.941 At this point, humankind made a great leap 
forwards, as the Logos ‘mastered with great and divine power’ the demons who 
had been largely in control until that point.942 The incarnation was thus clearly an 
important historical turning-point for Eusebius and a crucial event in the 
weakening of demonic power. It should not, however, be seen as the end of the 
story. 
Unfortunately, however, this is precisely how some scholars have chosen to 
read Eusebius’ accounts of demons in the PE and DE, arguing that the incarnation 
marked a fundamental change in Eusebius’ view of the demonic. According to 
Johnson, the incarnation and the period immediately following it saw the complete 
‘destruction of demonic power’ in Eusebius’ view.943 This argument is based mainly 
on Eusebius’ discussions of demons in the PE, and on three passages of this work in 
particular. Two of these discuss the apparent ending of the practice of human 
sacrifice,944 while one describes the ‘death’ of a demon.945 At PE 4.15.6, Eusebius 
suggests that ‘the filth of polytheistic deceit’, which he believed to have been 
                                                          
939 Ibid. 
940 DE 8.Praef.10-11. 
941 DE 8.Praef.9-12. 
942 DE 4.10.13: τοὺς δὲ γε πάλαι ἀμφὶ τὰς ἀνθρώπων διατριβὰς πωτωμένους, ἀφανῶς τε καὶ 
ἐμφανῶς τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς καταδυναστεύοντας δαίμονας ἀλιτηρίους καὶ πνευμάτων ἀγρίων καὶ 
ἀπηνῶν γένη, τόν τε ἐν τούτοις τῆς κακίας ἐξάρχοντα, τὸν δεινὸν ἐκεῖνον καὶ ἀλάστορα, μεγάλῃ 
καὶ ἐνθέῳ δυνάμει τροπούμενος ἐχειροῦτο… 
943 Johnson, Ethnicity and Argument, 168. A similar view was also expressed by Peter Brown in his 
recent Nicolai Rubinstein lecture: Brown, ‘Eusebius, Constantine and the Future’. Cf. A.J. Droge, Homer 
or Moses? Early Christian Interpretations of the History of Culture (Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1989), 184. 
Likewise, while Coggan accepts that Eusebius and other Christians of his time did not believe all 
demonic activity to have ceased with the incarnation, she nevertheless suggests that the incarnation 
was believed to have fundamentally changed the way in which Christians interacted with the 
demonic: Pandaemonia, 194. 
944 PE 4.15.5-6, 4.17.4. 
945 PE 5.17.1-14. 
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encouraged by demons, was ‘slackened and reduced at no other time than that of 
Hadrian, when in the manner of a light Christ’s teaching was already shining on 
every place’.946 However, it is important to note that what Eusebius is describing 
here is, at most, a reduction in polytheistic worship, which was in fact only one of 
the various methods by which he believed demons might try to draw people away 
from God. Thus, even in the most generous interpretation, this statement cannot be 
taken to imply the ending of all demonic power. 
Moreover, when this claim is examined in the context of the passage as a 
whole, it becomes clear that Eusebius is discussing, not even the end of all 
polytheistic worship, but merely of what he felt to be one of its worst features – 
human sacrifice. Immediately before his remarks at PE 4.15.6, Eusebius asks how 
anyone could imagine that good demons, let alone true divinity, would require the 
‘most profane’ (ἀσεβεστάτη) and ‘most unholy’ (ἀνοσιωτάτη) practice of human 
sacrifice.947 He follows this by arguing that ‘some offered their sons, others their 
daughters, and others even themselves to the sacrifices of the demons’.948 Eusebius’ 
remarks about the decline of polytheistic worship therefore occur in the context of a 
discussion of human sacrifice and refer only to the supposed elimination of this 
practice. A similar statement at PE 4.17.4, when considered in the context of the 
surrounding discussion, can likewise be seen to refer only to the ending of human 
sacrifice, rather than to the destruction of all demonic influence. Thus, while these 
                                                          
946 φέρ’ οὖν ἐλέγξωμεν καὶ ἀποδείξωμεν ὁπόσον ἡ τῆς πολυθέου πλάνης λύμη τοῦ βίου τῶν 
ἀνθρώπων πρὸ τῆς τοῦ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν εὐαγγελικῆς διδασκαλίας ἐκράτει. λελύσθαι γὰρ αὐτὴν 
καὶ καθῃρῆσθαι οὐκ ἄλλοτε ἢ κατὰ τοὺς Ἁδριανοῦ χρόνους, φωτὸς δίκην ἤδη διαλαμπούσης ἐπὶ 
πάντα τόπον τῆς τοῦ Χριστοῦ διδασκαλίας. 
947 PE 4.15.5. 




passages can legitimately be taken to indicate a weakening, or at least a change, in 
demonic power in the wake of the incarnation, they do not suggest that demonic 
power had ended completely. 
The second passage that has been taken by some scholars to indicate 
Eusebius’ belief in the ending of demonic power is found at PE 5.17.1-14.949 Here, 
Eusebius cites a lengthy passage from Plutarch’s De defectu oraculorum, in which 
Plutarch relates the story of the death of the god Pan.950 Once again, however, it is 
essential to consider this passage in the broader context of the work as a whole. The 
PE had a strongly apologetic purpose and sought to demonstrate to its readers that 
Christianity was superior to pagan forms of worship.951 It therefore served 
Eusebius’ apologetic argument well to suggest that the power of the pagan demon-
gods was no match for the truly divine power of the Christian God and his Logos. 
As Coggan noted, Eusebius used this story about the death of Pan as ‘an apologetic 
weapon’ with which to attack pagan religion.952 By suggesting that demons could be 
subject to death, Eusebius was demonstrating that they were not fully divine. 
Moreover, Eusebius glosses Plutarch’s passage with the comment that this 
death took place during the reign of Tiberius, when Christ was ‘undertaking his 
                                                          
949 Johnson further supports his argument by citing Eusebius’ brief references to demonic death at PE 
5.5.4 and 5.16.4: Ethnicity and Argument, 168. However, the key passage is the one at PE 5.17.1-14, on 
Plutarch’s story of the death of ‘Great Pan’, which has also been used to support the view that 
Eusebius believed demonic power to have ended or at least to have been drastically reduced by both 
Coggan and Peter Brown: Coggan, Pandaemonia, iii, 194; Brown, ‘Eusebius, Constantine and the 
Future’. Of the two additional passages which Johnson cites, one simply directs the reader forward to 
the discussion of the death of ‘Great Pan’, which follows immediately afterwards, while the other is a 
reference to a slightly different passage of the same work by Plutarch, De defectu oraculorum. As a 
result, neither really adds any weight to Johnson’s claim. 
950 PE 5.17.1-12, citing Plut. De Defect. Orac. 418e-420a. 
951 As Eusebius himself suggests: PE 1.5.11-12, and as both Coggan and Johnson recognise: Coggan, 
Pandaemonia, 17-18; Johnson, Ethnicity and Argument, 11. 
952 Coggan, Pandaemonia, iii. 
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teachings among men’ (τὰς σὺν ἀνθρώποις ποιούμενος διατριβὰς).953 Eusebius 
thus directly links the death of this particular demon with the effects of Christ’s 
work, thereby again demonstrating the greater power of Christian divinity. There 
can be no doubt that Eusebius wished to suggest here that demonic power was 
considerably weakened at the incarnation of Christ and even that some demons 
may have died. However, in view of the fact that this argument suited Eusebius’ 
apologetic aims so well, we should be very cautious about suggesting that this 
passage on its own can provide a full and accurate picture of the effect Eusebius 
believed the incarnation to have had on demonic power. Whatever his feelings on 
the subject, Eusebius’ argument would have been much less forceful if he had taken 
the time to explain at length that only some demons had died or suffered a 
reduction in their power. However, if we look elsewhere in his works, and even 
elsewhere in the PE, we find that this is exactly what Eusebius appears to have 
believed. 
Even within the PE itself, we can find hints that Eusebius did not consider all 
demonic power to have ended at the incarnation. At PE 4.16.22, he points to certain 
supposedly demon-inspired cult-practices that he claims are still occurring ‘even 
now’ (εἰσέτι νῦν) – indeed he even claims that these practices are similar in nature 
to earlier human sacrifices.954 Similarly, in the De solemnitate Paschali, Eusebius refers 
to demon-sent illnesses occurring ‘εἰσέτι καὶ νῦν’.955 Such statements suggest that 
Eusebius must have viewed any weakening of demonic power as fairly limited. 
Moreover, when we broaden our perspective beyond the PE to consider Eusebius’ 
                                                          
953 PE 5.17.13. 
954 ὅμοια γὰρ ταῦτα ταῖς ἀνθρωποθυσίαις.  
955 PG 24.697.20. 
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statements in some of his works which deal more thoroughly with the post-
incarnation history of humankind, such as the HE and VC, we encounter 
unmistakable evidence that Eusebius felt demons continued to pose a significant 
threat well into his own lifetime. Throughout these works we find Eusebius 
suggesting that demons and the devil were responsible for attempts to undermine 
the progress of the Christian church, either by inciting persecutions, or by 
encouraging the spread of alternative doctrines which Eusebius considered to be 
heretical.956 In the HE, persecutions of the past are regularly tied directly to the 
malign influence of demons. Here, we are told that it was the ‘envious’ (βασκάνῳ) 
and ‘good-hating demon’ (μισοκάλῳ δαίμονι) who encouraged accusations against 
Christians during the reign of Commodus,957 while slightly later Origen is said to 
have received particularly brutal treatment under persecution at the instigation of 
the ‘wicked demon’ (τοῦ πονηροῦ δαίμονος), who ‘drew up all his troops in 
contention with the man, and with every contrivance and power attacked him, 
falling especially upon him of all those against whom he was then making war’.958 
In this passage we can see the way in which Eusebius envisaged persecutions as 
being inspired principally by the devil, ably supported by the demonic ‘troops’ he 
commanded. 
Yet this activity should not be seen as confined safely to the distant past, for 
Eusebius also shows demons at work in the persecutions of his own lifetime. In his 
panegyric on the Church at Tyre, Eusebius attributes the recent persecutions to the 
                                                          
956 See, for example: HE 4.7.1-2, 6.39.5, 10.4.14; VC 1.49.1, 2.73.1.  
957 HE 5.21.2. 
958 HE 6.39.5: …τοῦ πονηροῦ δαίμονος ἐφαμίλλως τἀνδρι πανστρατιᾷ παραταξαμένου πάση τε 
μηχανῇ καὶ δυνάμει κατ’ αὐτοῦ στρατηγήσαντος παρὰ πάντας τε τοὺς τηνικάδε πολεμηθέντας 
διαφερόντως ἐπισκήψαντος αὐτῷ… 
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activity of the ‘evil-loving demon’ (φιλοπονήρου δαίμονος).959 Similarly, in the VC, 
Licinius’ measures against Christians in the eastern provinces – measures which 
Eusebius would have personally experienced – are said to have been encouraged by 
a ‘wicked demon’ (τοῦ πονηροῦ δαίμονος).960 This demonic activity is, moreover, 
directly linked to the growing prosperity of the church. The demon encourages 
Licinius to persecute the church partly at least because of resentment at the benefits 
being enjoyed by the church in the west under Constantine’s patronage.961 Thus, not 
only did Eusebius believe demonic activity to be continuing, it is clear that he did 
not consider the current prosperity of the church to provide any security from 
demonic attack. Indeed, it might even have the opposite effect of driving the 
demons to redouble their efforts. 
This sense that the earthly success of the church could not be depended upon 
is also seen in the HE, where Eusebius suggests that the persecutions were in fact 
permitted by God after the church fell into complacency and dissension as a result 
of its growing success.962 For Eusebius, prosperity for the church in one period did 
not necessarily mean long-term security; it was certainly no excuse to relax one’s 
guard against the potential attacks of the demons. Thus, success for the church did 
not mark the end of history for Eusebius; instead, it brought with it a new set of 
demonically inspired challenges, which needed to be fought in new ways. 
That the demonic threat remained ever-present for Eusebius, even after the 
unification of the empire under Constantine, can further be seen from the way in 
                                                          
959 HE 10.4.14. 
960 VC 1.49.1. 
961 VC 1.49.2. Cf. HE 5.21.1-2, where the demon is likewise driven to incite persecution by the period of 
relative calm which the church had been experiencing. 
962 HE 8.1.7. 
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which he attributes the spread of supposedly heretical doctrines to demonic and 
diabolical influence. In the HE, the heresies which Eusebius discusses are mainly 
those of previous centuries: Mani, the founder of Manichaeism, is described as the 
leader of a ‘demonic heresy’, or ‘sect’, and portrayed as the instrument used by 
demons and the devil to thwart human salvation.963 Similar language is also used of 
Menander, a follower of Simon Magus, and his disciples.964 The repeated association 
which Eusebius draws between heretics and demonic influence in the HE makes 
clear the strength of his belief that heresies were ultimately the work of the devil 
and his demonic associates.965 
Moreover, as with his discussions of the persecutions, demonic 
encouragement of heretical beliefs is as much a feature of Eusebius’ own lifetime as 
of the past. In the VC, we find similar language being applied to the spread of 
heresies throughout Constantine’s reign: ‘an evil demon’ (πονηροῦ τινος 
δαίμονος), we are told, lies behind the Donatist schism in Africa.966 Similarly, the 
Council of Tyre is said to have been called in an attempt to resolve disagreements 
that Eusebius considered to be inspired by the ‘good-hating envy’ (μισόκαλος 
φθόνος), which, as we saw above, was characteristic of demonic activity for 
Eusebius.967 Even when imperial persecution had ceased, then, Eusebius continued 
to see demonic activity at work undermining the church. In fact, Eusebius even 
                                                          
963 HE 7.31.1: Ἐν τούτῳ καὶ ὁ μανεὶς τὰς φρένας ἐπώωυμός τε τῆς δαιμονώσης αἱρέσεως τὴν τοῦ 
λογισμοῦ παρατροπὴν καθωπλίζετο, τοῦ δαίμονος, αὐτου δὴ τοῦ θεομάχου σατανᾶ, ἐπὶ λύμῃ 
πολλῶν τὸν ἄνδρα προβεβλημένου. 
964 HE 3.26.1; HE 4.7.1-15. 
965 As Pagels has shown, the idea that ‘heretics’ were acting under the influence of demons or the devil 
was commonplace among early Christian writers. As early as Paul, those spreading alternative 
doctrines had been attacked as the ‘ministers’ (διάκονοι) of Satan (2 Cor. 11.13-15), while in the second 
century, Irenaeus of Lyons in his Adversus Haeresis had frequently associated his opponents with the 
devil (For example: Iren. Adv. Haer. 1.27.4, 5.26.2): Pagels, Origin of Satan, 149-78. 
966 VC 1.45.2. 
967 VC 4.41.1. 
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suggests that the ending of the persecutions, far from marking the end of demonic 
attacks against the church, might simply lead the devil and demons to adopt a new 
strategy. In the HE, Eusebius remarks that, when persecutions were not an option, 
the demons would turn to spreading false doctrine instead: 
… πάλαι μὲν τοῖς ἔξωθεν διωγμοῖς κατ’ αὐτῆς ὡπλίζετο, τότε γε μὴν 
τούτων ἀποκεκλεισμενος, πονηροῖς καὶ γόησιν ἀνδράσιν ὥσπερ 
τισὶν ὀλεθρίοις ψυχῶν ὀργάνοις διακόνοις τε ἀπωλείας χρώμενος, 
ἑτέραις κατεστρατήγει μεθόδοις, πάντα πόρον ἐπινοῶν, ὡς ἂν 
ὑποδύντες γόητες καὶ ἀπατηλοὶ τὴν αὐτὴν τοῦ δόγματος ἡμῖν 
προσηγορίαν, ὁμοῦ μὲν τῶν πιστῶν τοὺς πρὸς αὐτῶν ἁλισκομένους 
εἰς βυθὸν ἀπωλείας ἄγοιεν, ὁμοῦ δὲ τοὺς τῆς πίστεως ἀγνῶτας δι’ ὧν 
αὐτοὶ δρῶντες ἐπιχειροῖεν, ἀποτρέποιντο τῆς ἐπὶ τὸν σωτήριον 
λόγον παρόδου.968 
… previously he [the ‘good-hating demon’] armed himself against it 
[the church] with persecutions from outside, but, being now shut out 
from this, using wicked men and sorcerers like ruinous instruments and 
messengers of destruction for souls, he waged war by other means, 
contriving in every way that sorcerers and cheats might insinuate 
themselves into the same name as our belief, and at the same time both 
lead into the depth of destruction those of the faithful caught by them, 
and turn away from the approach to the saving word those unaware of 
the faith, by the things which they did. 
For Eusebius, it seems that this alternative form of attack might pose even more of a 
threat than the persecutions had done, since it served the dual purpose both of 
discouraging new converts, and of leading existing Christians away from what 
Eusebius felt to be a ‘correct’ understanding of the divine. The idea that any 
historical event – be it the incarnation, the ending of persecution, or Constantine’s 
patronage of the church – had already brought humankind to a state of complete 
security, in which the demonic threat had been effectively neutralised, is therefore 
clearly foreign to Eusebius’ thought. 
                                                          
968 HE 4.7.1-2. 
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Instead, Eusebius presents the threat posed by demons as continually 
evolving and adapting to changing circumstances. In works such as the PE and DE, 
which deal at length with the pre-incarnation history of humankind, the emphasis is 
principally on the role of demons in encouraging polytheism and its associated 
vices. This contrasts with the HE and VC, where the discussion focuses almost 
entirely on events following the incarnation, and the role of demons in encouraging 
either persecution or heresy is more heavily stressed.969 This suggests that Eusebius 
may have considered the nature of the demonic threat to have changed following 
the incarnation, rather than ceasing altogether. As we have seen,970 Eusebius held 
that there were two principal means by which demons might divert people from the 
road to salvation – either by encouraging vice or by encouraging false belief, be that 
polytheism or heresy.971 For Eusebius, it seems that even as the influence of 
polytheism waned, the demons were finding new ways to encourage false belief. 
The encouragement of polytheism became the encouragement of ‘heresy’. With the 
growing success of the church, the demons were adopting new tactics, rather than 
retreating from the battle. Eusebius’ suggestion in the PE and DE that the pagan 
cults were in decline and that the demons of these cults were dying should 
therefore not be taken as an indication that he believed the demonic threat to lie 
                                                          
969 Sirinelli suggested by contrast that ‘la démonologie d’Eusèbe n’a d’autre function que d’expliquer 
l’erreur paienne’, Les vues historiques, 317. However, Sirinelli’s focus on Eusebius’ views in the period 
before the Council of Nicaea means that the VC is necessarily excluded from his study and, although 
the HE would qualify for consideration, in his treatment of Eusebius’ views of demons Sirinelli 
focused almost exclusively on the PE and DE. As a result, the emphasis of Eusebius’ discussion would 
certainly appear to be primarily the role of demons in encouraging polytheism. Coggan similarly felt 
that ‘the key aspect of Eusebius’ demonology is its utilisation as part of his apologetic polemical 
program against pagan religion’: Pandaemonia, 189. As with Sirinielli, Coggan’s exclusive focus on the 
PE leads her to miss some of the broader applications of Eusebius’ demonology which clearly appear 
in his other works. The conclusions of Coggan and Sirinelli on this point demonstrate the importance 
of looking at a range of Eusebius’ works in order to achieve a balanced picture of his views. 
970 See Chapter IV above, p. 192-93. 
971 DE 7.1.103. Cf. DE 6.18.31. 
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safely in the past. Rather, as Eusebius saw it, the demons in his own time were 
simply developing new and different challenges for the virtuous, most notably the 
spread of ‘false’ doctrine and dissension within the church. 
For Eusebius, then, human history was characterised – driven even – by the 
struggle between the demons and the Christian God or his Logos for human souls, a 
struggle which Eusebius saw as continuing throughout his lifetime and doubtless 
beyond. This was not, however, a struggle in which human beings were merely 
passive pawns; rather it was a struggle for salvation in which humankind was 
actively involved. Eger, one of the few scholars to have acknowledged – albeit 
cursorily – the prominent role of the demonic within Eusebius’ view of history 
nevertheless struggled to appreciate precisely how demons operated within 
Eusebius’ historical scheme.972 Eger identified two potential driving forces in 
Eusebius’ understanding of history: one was the development of free human action, 
the other the struggle between divine and demonic power. These he appears to 
have seen as incompatible, suggesting that Eusebius emphasises each of these at 
different points in the HE.973 However, as we have seen, human προαίρεσις meant 
that people were in fact drawn into this greater cosmic conflict and able to choose 
sides within it.974 It was partly by exploiting human προαίρεσις that demons 
maintained their struggle against God. Thus the distinction which Eger drew 
between these two historical forces is unnecessary and even misleading. 
Moreover, from the human perspective, the choice of whom to follow in this 
cosmic struggle would directly affect their salvation: a person’s damnation would 
                                                          
972 Eger, ‘Kaiser und Kirche’, 102-03. 
973 Ibid. 102 n.34. 
974 See Chapter IV above. 
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result from their choice to associate with demons, while their salvation would be 
secured only by active co-operation with the divine.975 In the DE, Eusebius notes 
how the Logos acted against demonic influence, ‘setting loose and altering those who 
placed their dependence on him from a licentious to a moderate life, from impiety to 
piety, from unrighteousness to righteousness, indeed even from the power of 
embittered demons to godly apprehension of true piety’.976 While the promise of 
salvation offered by the Logos was open to all, Eusebius suggests here that it 
remained a matter of individual human choice whether or not to take advantage of 
that offer. Similarly, in his discussion of fate and divine providence in the PE, 
Eusebius notes that providence directs everything that happens, including things 
that occur as a result of human action, not by dominating or diminishing human 
free choice, but rather by ‘working together and acting together with the things 
which are up to us’.977 Thus, for Eusebius, human embodiment and participation in 
historical time were not to be seen as a punishment, but rather an opportunity.978 
Indeed, as Lyman has argued,979 earthly history in Eusebius’ view was the 
sphere in which human beings might achieve salvation by striving to live a virtuous 
and pious life.980 At PE 7.18.9, Eusebius writes that ‘it is especially fitting to strive 
above all for piety and to correct the first mistake with the second opportunities, 
and to hurry towards the ascent and restitution (ἀποκατάστασιν) of what is right. 
                                                          
975 Lyman has noted the importance of co-operation between human and divine ‘will’ to Eusebius’ 
historical scheme, and particularly to his understanding of salvation: Christology and Cosmology, 99, 
102-03. Cf. Chesnut, First Christian Histories, 86-87. 
976 DE 4.10.14 (my emphasis): …μεθιστῶν τε καὶ μεταβάλλων τοὺς αὐτῷ προσανέχοντας ἐκ μὲν 
ἀκολασίας ἐπὶ σώφρονα βίον, ἐκ δὲ ἀσεβείας ἐπὶ εὐσέβειαν καὶ ἐξ ἀδικίας ἐπὶ δικαιοσύνην, ναὶ 
μὴν καὶ ἐκ τῆς τῶν πικρῶν δαιμόνων δυναστείας ἐπὶ τὴν ἔνθεον κατάληψιν τῆς ἀληθοῦς 
εὐσεβείας… 
977 PE 6.6.45: …συνεργοῦσα τε καὶ συμπράττουσα τοῖς ἐφ’ ἡμῖν… 
978Cf. Theoph. 1.69. 
979 Lyman, Christology and Cosmology, 100-02.  Cf. Young, Nicaea to Chalcedon, 22-23. 
980 PE 7.18.9-10. 
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For the end of the nature of man is not thus on earth, not turning downwards into 
destruction and perdition, but there from where the first man strayed’.981 This 
suggests that in his understanding of what salvation entailed, Eusebius held a view 
very similar to that of Origen. For Origen, salvation meant the return of humankind 
to its original state with God.982 
Eusebius’ use of the term ἀποκατάστασις here should not be taken to imply 
the idea of the universal salvation of all creatures, including demons and the devil, 
such as is often associated with Origen.983 Although Ilaria Ramelli has recently 
shown that Eusebius in many respects shared Origen’s understanding of 
ἀποκατάστασις, her discussion focuses on the salvation of humans and notes that 
the destruction of evil was seen as an essential prerequisite for human 
ἀποκατάστασις by Eusebius.984 The context of the passage at PE 7.18.9 makes it 
clear that Eusebius is referring only to humankind and it therefore seems that he is 
using the term in an older, less technical sense. As Morwenna Ludlow has shown, 
even by the time of Gregory of Nyssa later in the fourth century, the term 
ἀποκατάστασις had not yet acquired the exclusive meaning of universal salvation, 
and retained a broader sense of ‘restitution’ or ‘restoration’.985 This is clearly how 
                                                          
981 διὸ καὶ μάλιστα προσήκειν εὐσεβείας ἐν πρώτοις ἀντιποιεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ πρώτως πλημμεληθὲν 
δευτέροις αἰσίοις ἐπιδιοροῦσθαι σπεύδειν τε ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν οἰκείων ἀναδρομήν τε καὶ 
ἀποκατάστασιν. εἶναι γὰρ τέλος ἀνθρώπου φύσεως οὐχ ὧδε ἐπὶ γῆς οὐδ’ εἰς φθορὰν 
καταστρέφον καὶ ἀπώλειαν, ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖσε ὅθεν καὶ ὁ πρῶτος ἀπέσφηλε. 
982 Daley, The Hope, 58, citing De Princ. 1.6.2; 3.6.1. 
983 As Daley points out, however, while the idea that all creatures, including the devil and his demons, 
would eventually be saved was often attributed to Origen both by his theological opponents and by 
later scholars, Origen was by no mean unequivocal in his adoption of the idea: The Hope, 58-59. 
984 I.L.E. Ramelli, ‘Origen, Eusebius, the Doctrine of Apokatastasis, and its relation to Christology’, in 
Johnson and Schott, eds, Eusebius: Tradition and Innovations, 307-23, esp. 319. Cf.  Ramelli, The Christian 
Doctrine of Apokatastasis, 307-31; and, on the links between Origen and Eusebius’ views of apokatastasis, 
see also: Berkhoff, Die Theologie, 161-62. 
985 M. Ludlow, Universal Salvation: Eschatology in the Thought of Gregory of Nyssa and Karl Rahner 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 38. 
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Eusebius is using the term here – to indicate the idea that salvation was a journey 
back to an original state that had been lost. In this passage, Eusebius appears to 
have in mind a state prior to the fall of Adam – this, as we have seen, was, for 
Eusebius, a state of immortality, among the ‘divine choruses’ close to God.986 Thus, 
for Eusebius, it seems that humankind was not meant to achieve fulfilment on earth, 
but rather to use its time there in order to strive for the greater, spiritual rewards 
that awaited the virtuous among the ‘divine choruses’ of heaven. 
That this striving for virtue and hence salvation meant, for Eusebius, 
constantly fighting against the demons is evident from his description of the 
struggles of the martyrs in the HE. Here, Eusebius describes one of his aims as being 
to announce ‘the resistance of the athletes of piety and their much-enduring 
courage, and the trophies taken against demons, and the victories over the invisible 
enemies and the crowns over all these things’.987 For Eusebius, the victory of the 
martyrs is won over the demons – those demons, presumably, which were attacking 
the virtuous by means of the persecutions. However, as we have seen, persecution 
was simply one of several methods by which Eusebius thought the demons might 
try to derail human salvation. The martyrs might provide the most dramatic 
example of virtuous Christians achieving victory over the demons and thwarting 
their plans, but it seems logical that, for Eusebius, other pious humans, whether by 
maintaining a virtuous lifestyle in the face of the temptations of pleasure, or by 
                                                          
986 PE 7.18.7-8. 
987 HE 5.Praef.4: …τῶν εὐσεβείας ἀθλητῶν τὰς ἐνστάσεις καὶ τὰς πολυτλήτους ἀνδρείας τρόπαιά τε 
τὰ κατὰ δαιμόνων καὶ νίκας τὰς κατὰ τῶν ἀοράτων ἀντιπάλων καὶ τοὺς ἐπὶ πᾶσι τούτοις 
στεφάνους εἰς αἰώνιον μνήμην ἀνακηρύττων. 
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avoiding ‘heretical’ doctrines, were similarly fighting off the demons to secure the 
salvation that victory would bring them. 
In this struggle against the demons, however, human beings were by no 
means alone. Instead, Eusebius repeatedly suggests that humankind was led away 
from demons and towards the life of virtue that would earn them salvation by 
divine guidance and instruction. As many scholars have noted, the idea of the 
Logos-Christ as a teacher appears to lie at the core of Eusebius’ soteriology, and is 
particularly important in his understanding of the incarnation.988 This is not to 
suggest, of course, that Eusebius felt teaching to have been the only purpose of the 
incarnation.989 More than once, Eusebius shows that he was familiar with some of 
the different theories of the incarnation and crucifixion that were widespread 
among early Christian writers.990 These included the idea that the crucifixion 
represented a sacrifice to the devil to redeem humankind from his power,991 as well 
as the – not entirely compatible – notion that the crucifixion was necessary to 
demonstrate to the demons that Christ was superior to death.992 Yet, while Eusebius 
was happy to list these various theories, his references to them are little more than 
cursory, and he shows little interest in discriminating between them. Overall, the 
repeated references to the beneficial effect of Christ’s teaching, found throughout a 
                                                          
988 For example: Hollerich, Eusebius’ Commentary on Isaiah, 64; Wallace-Hadrill, Eusebius of Caesarea, 102; 
Lyman, Christology and Cosmology, 83, 122; Young, Nicaea to Chalcedon, 18; Johnson, Ethnicity and 
Argument, 185; Sirinelli, Les vues historiques, 279. 
989 As Robertson noted, this would be to misrepresent Eusebius’ views: Christ as Mediator, 65. 
990 See, for example: SC 15.9-11; Theoph. 3.57-60, 4.9; DE 4.12.6-9, 10.Praef.2-7, 10.8.37; De solemnitate 
Paschali, PG 24.696.23-27. As Lyman recognised: Christology and Cosmology, 122. On some of the various 
early Christian explanations for Christ’s incarnation and passion, see: Burton Russell, Satan, 83-84. 
991 Theoph. 3.59. Cf. DE 4.12.7. 
992 Theoph. 3.57. 
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variety of Eusebius’ works, leave a much stronger impression, and suggest that, in 
his view, this was by far the most important feature of the incarnation.993 
In particular, Eusebius often links the spread of divine teaching to a decline in 
demonic influence. In the PE, Eusebius credits Christ’s preaching with freeing 
people from their long-standing enslavement to demons.994 Similarly, in the DE, we 
are told that ‘when our saviour was brought bodily into the land of the Egyptians... 
the wicked powers living there before were likely not a little moved by his 
inexpressible power and agency, and especially (μάλιστα) when, through his 
teaching afterwards, a countless number of those living in Egypt, fleeing from the 
deceits of the demons, still even now agree that they know the one God of all’.995 
The use of μάλιστα here suggests that Eusebius may have seen Christ’s teaching as 
being even more effective in undermining demonic influence in Egypt than his 
physical presence in the territory as a child had been. 
For Eusebius, it seems that there were two principal aspects to this divine 
teaching. First, it served to counter false belief – early in the PE, Eusebius notes that 
as a result of ‘our saviour’s teaching’ people of various nations have abandoned 
their traditional belief in multiple gods and have instead come to recognise only the 
one, Christian God.996 Second, it also brought about a moral improvement. Eusebius 
claims that, as a result of divine instruction, people no longer practise such vices as 
                                                          
993 See, for example: PE 1.4.1, 1.4.6, 2.2.64, 2.4.1, 2.4.6, 3.5.5, 4.15.6, 4.17.4, 5.1.1, 6.Praef.1, 7.16.11; DE 
1.1.8, 1.6.1, 1.10.35, 3.6.35; Theoph. 5.18; Ecl. Proph. 125.20-24, 225.27-28; CI 279.4-9; SC 14.5, 14.12, 16.10. 
994 PE 4.21.2, 6.Praef.1, 7.16.11. 
995 DE 9.2.6: πλὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ σωματικῶς τοῦ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν ἐπικομισθέντος τῇ Αἰγυπτίων χώρᾳ... 
ἀπορρήτῳ δυνάμει καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ τὰς αὐτόθι τὸ πρὶν οἰκούσας πονηρὰς δυνάμεις εἰκὸς οὐ μικρῶς 
κεκινῆσθαι, καὶ μάλιστα ὅτε διὰ τῆς μετέπειτα διδασκαλίας αὐτοῦ μυρία πλήθη τῶν τὴν 
Αἴγυπτον οἰκούντων, τῆς τῶν δαιμόνων ἀποφυγόντα πλανήσεως, ἔτι καὶ νῦν τὸν τῶν ὅλων 
ὁμολογεῖ μόνον εἰδέναι θεόν. 
996 PE 1.4.9: …τοῦ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν διδασκαλίας… Cf. PE 1.1.10. 
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cannibalism, incest and human sacrifice.997 Instead, those who have turned towards 
the Christian God have learnt to relinquish passion and to live according to a more 
exacting standard (ἀκριβῶς).998 This apparent dual focus of divine teaching 
corresponds to Eusebius’ belief, highlighted above,999 that demons had two main 
means of diverting people from salvation – the encouragement of vice, and the 
instigation of false belief.1000 
Moreover, divine instruction for Eusebius did not begin and end with the 
incarnation. We can also see it in the improving influence of the Logos which 
Eusebius felt had prepared humankind for the incarnation.1001 Crucially, however, it 
is clear that Eusebius also believed this teaching to have continued long after the 
incarnation in the preaching of the apostles and those who came after them.1002 In 
the HE, we learn that people were also freed from demonically inspired polytheism 
‘by the power of Christ through the teaching of his disciples and their wonderful 
works.’1003 Thus, while the incarnation had a part to play in Eusebius’ 
understanding of salvation, it was not, for him, a completely definitive event. For 
Eusebius, salvation and the defeat of the demons were gradual processes, in which 
the long-term instruction of humankind in virtue and piety, rather than any 
particular one-off event, was key. 
As a result, Eusebius’ interpretation of the events of his later life, however 
much he might have welcomed these developments, cannot be seen as quite so 
                                                          
997 PE 1.4.6. 
998 PE 1.4.9. 
999 See Chapter IV above, p. 192-93. 
1000 DE 6.18.31, 7.1.103. 
1001 HE 1.2.21-3. 
1002 See, for example: DE 1.1.8, 1.8.1, 3.6.32, 4.12.9; HE 3.37.1. 




straightforwardly triumphalist as has often been the case in the past. This new focus 
on the role of the demonic in Eusebius’ view of history thus supports the challenge 
to the traditional reading of Eusebius’ attitude which was launched by Thielman in 
his 1987 article on Eusebius’ eschatology,1004 but which has rarely been pursued in 
more recent scholarship.1005 Against the traditional argument of scholars including 
Wallace-Hadrill and Sirinelli that Eusebius was so delighted by the success of the 
church under Constantine that in later life he lost interest in ideas of a second 
coming of Christ and a future, spiritual kingdom of God,1006 Thielman demonstrated 
that, throughout his works, Eusebius continued to emphasise the greater 
importance of spiritual over earthly concerns.1007 
Thielman therefore suggested that Eusebius continued throughout his life to 
anticipate a future spiritual fulfilment for the virtuous and argued moreover that 
the idea of a second coming and associated final judgement served an important 
function in Eusebius’ thought, allowing him to explain and to endure the evident 
deficiencies of earthly systems of justice.1008 The above discussion reinforces this 
view, by showing that, for Eusebius, salvation meant the restoration of a greater, 
spiritual state, while life in the earthly realm was merely a transitory stage in the 
                                                          
1004 Thielman, ‘Another Look’, 226-37. 
1005 Hollerich does, however, note that Thielman was right to ‘stress the more conventional aspects of 
Eusebius’ eschatology’: Eusebius’ Commentary on Isaiah, 196, n.115. Johnson has also suggested that his 
reassessment of the date of Eusebius’ Fragments on Luke would support Thielman’s argument that 
Eusebius continued to maintain his interest in the second coming and last judgement far beyond his 
early works, although this is by no means the main purpose of Johnson’s article: ‘Tenth Book of 
Eusebius’ General Elementary Introduction’, 160; cf. more recently, Johnson, ‘The Ends of 
Transfiguration’, 201-02, where Johnson again briefly questions scholars’ tendency to attribute a 
‘realised eschatology’ to Eusebius. 
1006 Wallace-Hadrill, Eusebius of Caesarea, 173, 187; Sirinelli, Les vues historiques, 482-83. Thielman also, a 
little unfairly, attributes this view to T.D. Barnes: ‘Another Look’, 226. It is unclear precisely how 
Thielman drew the conclusion that Barnes felt Eusebius to have little interest in the second coming, 
since Barnes makes it very clear that at least some of Eusebius’ works do contain discussion of the 
second coming: Barnes, C&E, 172-73. 
1007 Thielman, ‘Another Look’, 229, 231-32. 
1008 Ibid. 233-34. 
237 
 
process of achieving that salvation. Moreover, Eusebius’ continuing concerns about 
the potency of the demonic threat show that he cannot have seen his own era as the 
triumphant climax of the human struggle for salvation. Consequently, we cannot 
continue to accept the suggestion that Eusebius saw either the church or the empire 
as the fully realised kingdom of God on earth and we must therefore consider 
afresh how Eusebius viewed the events and people of his time. 
 
The Significance of Christian Leadership 
Clearly Eusebius did not consider himself to be standing triumphantly at the climax 
of history, but felt instead that humankind remained caught up in a dangerous 
struggle to gain freedom from demonic influence. Achieving this freedom, as we 
have seen, was in Eusebius’ view greatly facilitated by the spread of divine teaching 
and instruction, whether that was carried out by the divine Logos, the incarnate 
Christ, or his disciples. Just as the struggle against the demons was not seen by 
Eusebius as lying in the distant past, so the divine instruction necessary to securing 
salvation was also held by him to continue into the present day, facilitated now, not 
by the apostles, but by a new generation of virtuous Christian leaders. For Eusebius, 
real significance therefore lay, not in either the church or the empire, but rather in 
the figures of their leaders, the bishops and the Christian emperor. 
He presents these figures as teachers, instructing their followers in ‘correct’ 
doctrine and a godly lifestyle in order to free them from the demons and increase 
their chances of achieving salvation. They are shown as continuing the teaching of 
Christ, modelling themselves on his example and thereby spreading the saving 
Christian message. The conversion of Constantine and his patronage of the church 
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were undoubtedly significant for Eusebius, yet this significance lay, not in the fact 
that it marked the end of a historical struggle for salvation, but in the fact that, as 
part of this on-going struggle, it greatly strengthened the position of the virtuous. 
For the first time, political and religious leadership were united in Christian virtue. 
No longer would citizens of the empire be pulled in two different directions – away 
from demons if they followed the Christian bishops, but towards them if they chose 
to imitate their emperor. This would both facilitate the salvation of greater numbers 
of people and hasten the further decline of the demons. However, in order for these 
benefits to be maintained, it was necessary for Christian leaders to adopt both a 
high standard of virtue and a united front against the demons. Thus, even in a work 
which on the surface appears unshakably triumphant, like the VC, we see Eusebius 
repeatedly emphasising the importance of unity and the need to set high standards 
of virtue. 
In order to understand Eusebius’ attitude, it is important to note that, while 
Hollerich’s discussion in particular focuses on a division between the ‘Christian 
Church’ and ‘Roman Empire’,1009 thinking of Eusebius’ concerns primarily in terms 
of such impersonal institutions or structures is actually somewhat misleading. 
Throughout Eusebius’ works, the emphasis is often far more on the role of leaders, 
and particularly on their moral qualities, than on political or administrative 
structures and events.1010 For Eusebius, as the HE reveals, the Christian church may 
be largely identified with the episcopal hierarchy of which he was a part. The HE 
                                                          
1009 For example: Hollerich, Eusebius’ Commentary on Isaiah, 15, 201. 
1010 As Eusebius himself claims at the opening of the VC, when he declares that he will not focus on 
Constantine’s military activities, laws or peacetime government, but only on the character of the 
emperor himself: VC 1.11.1. 
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opens with a promise to record, among other things, ‘the successions from the holy 
apostles’ (τὰς τῶν ἱερῶν ἀποστόλων διαδοχὰς),1011 which it does primarily by 
listing the successive bishops of various major sees,1012 attempting where possible to 
make a connection between the first bishop of each see and one of the apostles.1013 
As Grant has highlighted, this idea of an unbroken succession from the apostles – 
and hence from Christ himself – serves to underscore for Eusebius the validity of 
the doctrine endorsed by the church, in opposition to both ‘heretics’ and pagans.1014 
Of course, Eusebius was not the first Christian writer to place such emphasis 
on this idea of ‘apostolic succession’. As Brent has shown, earlier writers including 
Irenaeus of Lyons and Clement of Rome had similarly argued that ‘correct’ 
Christian doctrine had been transmitted uninterrupted from the apostles by the 
succession of Christian bishops and teachers.1015 However, Eusebius’ emphasis on 
the important role of church leaders is not confined solely to the HE or to the idea of 
‘apostolic succession’. Hollerich has drawn attention to the prominence accorded to 
bishops in the CI, to the extent that Eusebius even suggests that the hierarchical 
distinctions of the church will be replicated after the second coming in the heavenly 
kingdom.1016 Elsewhere, Eusebius repeatedly stresses – perhaps for somewhat 
pragmatic personal reasons – the respect that Constantine accorded to the 
                                                          
1011 HE 1.1.1. 
1012 See, for example: HE 3.13.1-15.1, 3.34.1-35.1, 4.1.1, 4.4.1-5.5, 4.19.1-20.1, 5.6.1-5, 5.9.1, 5.12.1-2, 5.22.1, 
6.10.1-11.1, 7.2.1. 
1013 For example: HE 3.2.1, 3.4.3, 3.36.1-2, 4.5.3-5. For discussion of Eusebius’ attitude to the idea of 
‘apostolic succession’ in the HE, see: Grant, Eusebius as Church Historian, 45-59. 
1014 Grant, Eusebius as Church Historian, 46. 
1015 A. Brent, ‘Diogenes Laertius and the Apostolic Succession’, Journal of Ecclesiastical History 44 (1993), 
367-89. 
1016 Hollerich, Eusebius’ Commentary on Isaiah, 169, 186-88, citing CI 405.25-29, 161.17-18, 161.32-36. 
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bishops.1017 For Eusebius, bishops are the indispensable heart of the church, 
preserving and promoting the ‘true’ doctrine that he held to be essential for 
salvation. Consequently, asking what Eusebius believed the role of the church to be 
is, to a large degree, to ask what he considered his own role, and that of his peers, to 
be. 
In view of the heavy emphasis which Eusebius places on the role of Christian 
instruction and ‘correct’ doctrine in bringing people to salvation, it is important to 
remember that the role of the bishop within his community would have involved a 
large element of teaching. Through their preaching, the instruction of catechumens 
and, it might be hoped, the example of their own lifestyle, bishops and other 
members of the clergy were in a position to demonstrate to their congregations how 
best to develop Christian virtue. Although Eusebius’ homilies have been largely 
lost, it is clear from his surviving works that he took his role as a Christian teacher 
very seriously.1018 Many of his writings, such as the Quaestiones Evangelicae, or the 
now-lost treatise addressing the question of the large families fathered by the 
biblical patriarchs,1019 served an obviously explanatory purpose, responding to 
particular questions that either had been, or might be, raised about matters of 
doctrine or the interpretation of the scriptures. Some, like the Generalis elementaria 
introductio demonstrate many of the features of a genre of pedagogical literature 
common to both pagan and Christian education – the εἰσαγωγή.1020 Others are more 
subtly instructive – the PE and DE seek to answer the question of who the 
                                                          
1017 See, for example, VC 1.42.1, 3.6.1, 3.15.1, 4.27.2, 4.46.1. 
1018 On which, see the excellent recent discussion of Johnson: Eusebius, 51-83. 
1019 Mentioned at DE 1.9.20 and PE 7.8.29. 
1020 On the GEI as an εἰσαγωγή and its relationship to a similar work by Porphyry, the On the 
Philosophy from Oracles, see: Johnson, ‘Eusebius the Educator’, 99-118. On the educational aims of 
Eusebius’ works, see also the recent discussion of Johnson, Eusebius, 51-83. 
241 
 
Christians are, while the HE also helps to instruct Christians in how they should 
view themselves, by providing them with an understanding of their past as a 
community. In the VC, Eusebius expresses the hope that in this work ‘the mention 
of tales beloved of God may furnish study not without benefit but of great use for 
life for those well prepared in their soul’.1021 
Moreover, in the HE, Eusebius often lists the writings left behind by the 
earlier church leaders whose lives he records, carefully assessing their value and 
praising or critiquing the ideas they expressed, as he felt appropriate.1022 Often, such 
documents appear to be the most significant contributions of the bishops Eusebius 
lists. By contrast, Eusebius shows little interest in the development of any 
administrative or institutional structures. This corresponds to Brent’s suggestion 
that, for earlier Christian writers, the idea of an episcopal ‘apostolic succession’ was 
drawn at least in part from the idea of teaching successions within Greek 
philosophical schools, such as those outlined by Diogenes Laertius in his Successions 
of the Philosophers.1023 For Irenaeus, Brent suggests, it was correct teaching, rather 
than any priestly or ritual significance, that was preserved by the succession from 
the apostles.1024 Similarly, it seems that for Eusebius the role of a bishop, as a 
successor to the apostles, was, if not exclusively then at least substantially, that of a 
teacher. 
                                                          
1021 VC 1.10.4: …ἡ δὲ γε τῶν θεοφιλῶν διηγμάτων ὑπόμνησις οὐκ ἀνόνητον ἀλλὰ καὶ σφόδρα 
βιωφελῆ τοῖς τὴν ψυχὴν εὖ παρεσκευασμένοις ποριεῖται τὴν ἔντευξιν. 
1022 For example: HE 3.38.1-39.17, 4.21.1, 4.23.1-26.14, 5.26.1, 6.20.1-3, 7.20.1. 
1023 Brent, ‘Diogenes Laertius’, 368. Cf. D. DeVore on the parallels between Eusebius’ HE and the genre 
of philosophical biography: ‘Eusebius’ Un-Josephan History: Two Portraits of Philo of Alexandria and 
the Sources of Ecclesiastical Historiography’, Studia Patristica 66 (2013), 161-79. 
1024 Ibid. 380, citing Iren. Adv. Haer. 3.3.2-3. 
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Likewise, Eusebius’ interest, especially in the VC and LC – which have done so 
much to fuel the idea of Eusebius’ ‘realised eschatology’ – is not in the abstract 
notion of a Christian empire, but rather in the figure of Constantine himself, the 
Christian emperor. There is a crucial distinction to be drawn between Eusebius’ 
view of the Roman empire itself, particularly the pre-Constantinian empire, and his 
view of Constantine as a Christian leader who could, in his own way, be seen as 
fulfilling a role not unlike that of a bishop. That Eusebius, like Origen and Melito of 
Sardis before him,1025 held the Roman empire to have had a providential role in 
God’s historical design has long been recognised.1026 For Eusebius the Roman 
empire had facilitated the growth of Christianity by bringing peace between 
previously hostile nations, thereby making travel easier and enabling the spread of 
the Christian message.1027 To Eusebius, it was no coincidence that Christ had been 
born at the same time as the empire was established by Augustus; rather, it was 
evidence of God’s benevolent providence at work in history.1028 
However, as Johnson has noted, Eusebius’ presentation of the Roman empire, 
particularly in works written before Constantine’s conquest of the east, is not 
unequivocally positive.1029 At times, Eusebius suggests that Christianity flourished 
in spite of the Roman empire and its rulers, rather than because of them, arguing in 
the DE that the persecutions made it clear that ‘the confirmation of the word came 
                                                          
1025 Melito of Sardis, cited at HE 4.26.7-11; Origen, Cels. 2.30. 
1026 See, for example: Johnson, Ethnicity and Argument, 174-75; Sirinelli, Les vues historiques, 388; Cranz, 
‘Kingdom and Polity’, 55-56; Chesnut, First Christian Histories, 99-101; Hollerich, Eusebius’ Commentary 
on Isaiah, 188-90.; Verdoner, ‘Transgeneric Crosses’, 86; Eger, ‘Kaiser und Kirche’, 98. 
1027 DE 3.7.30-33. 
1028 DE 3.7.30-33; PE 1.4.4. 
1029 Johnson, Ethnicity and Argument, 176-85. 
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not from the design of men, but from the power of God’.1030  Even when the 
persecutions are said to have fulfilled the ultimately beneficial purpose of correcting 
the errant church, Eusebius is quick to stress that this does not remove the need to 
punish the Roman persecutors.1031 In Johnson’s view, references such as these allow 
Eusebius to draw a distinction between Christianity and the Roman empire, and to 
highlight the primary importance of the church, rather than the empire, in 
facilitating the spread of Christianity.1032 However, they also demonstrate that for 
Eusebius the character of the empire was shaped largely by the character of its 
leaders. In spite of his evident sense that Christianity had benefitted from the 
existence of the Roman empire, Eusebius refused to celebrate the empire itself 
unreservedly as long as its leadership remained hostile to Christians. 
This, of course, changed with Constantine’s accession to sole rule – a 
development that led to the passing of legislation in favour of the Christian church, 
as well as to practical financial support enabling the building of new churches, and 
in some cases to the destruction of pagan shrines. These measures are famously 
celebrated in the VC.1033 However, Eusebius’ emphasis in this work, as well as in the 
LC, is not exclusively on these official actions of the emperor. Just as or even more 
important were Constantine’s personal qualities, which allowed him, in Eusebius’ 
view, to fulfil the role of a Christian teacher.1034 Eusebius makes this point quite 
                                                          
1030 DE 3.7.36: …ὅτι μὴ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἦν βουλῆς ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ δυνάμεως ἡ τοῦ λόγου 
σύστασις. See Johnson, Ethnicity and Argument, 179, for discussion. 
1031 ΗΕ 8.16.3. 
1032 Johnson, Ethnicity and Argument, 179, 193. 
1033 See, for example: VC 1.42.2, 2.20.1-22.1, 2.44.1-45.1, 3.54.2-56.3, 3.58.1-4, 4.28.1. 
1034 Constantine’s personal piety and virtuous behaviour are stressed at, for example: VC 1.9.1, 2.14.1, 
3.2.2, 4.15.1-18.1, 4.22.1-3, 4.29.1, 4.33.1-2, 4.48.1. On Constantine as a teacher, see, for example: VC 
1.4.1, 1.5.2, 3.58.2, 3.59.3, 4.18.1, 4.29.5, 4.55.1. Averil Cameron has pointed to the presentation of 
Constantine as a teacher in the VC as ‘one of the more striking features’ of the work, suggesting that 
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explicitly, suggesting in the LC that Constantine ‘expounds to those ruled by him 
the godly knowledge of the greatest king, as though they were the students of a 
good schoolmaster’.1035 Similarly, in the VC, Eusebius claims that Constantine’s 
soldiers ‘admitted the emperor as their teacher in the ways of piety’.1036 Throughout 
both the VC and the LC, Constantine is praised for his piety, his modesty and his 
recognition of the greater importance of spiritual over earthly matters.1037 As a result 
of his exemplary lifestyle, Eusebius suggests that Constantine has become ‘a lesson 
and example of piety to the mortal race’ (διδασκελίαν θεοσεβοῦς ὑποδείγματος… 
τῷ θνητῷ γένει).1038 A virtuous Christian emperor, it seems, can, simply by his 
existence, act as a teacher and help to spread the divine message by setting an 
example of good behaviour. 
More than this, however, Constantine is also presented as actively seeking to 
instruct his subjects in the Christian faith. We are told in the VC how he would 
deliver sermons on religious and moral issues to his court,1039 while the LC suggests 
that soldiers in the army received similar instruction.1040 The importance which 
Eusebius attached to this aspect of Constantine’s role is further indicated by the fact 
that he chose to attach what he claimed was one of the emperor’s own speeches on 
Christian doctrine to the end of the VC.1041 In fact, Eusebius likewise suggests that 
                                                                                                                                                                    
this is one of many thematic parallels between the VC and the slightly later Vita Antonii by Athanasius: 
‘Form and Meaning’, 78. 
1035 LC 5.8: …τοῖς ὑπ’ αὐτὸν ἀρχομένοις ὡς ὑπὸ διδασκάλῳ παιδευομενοις ἀγαθῷ τὴν τοῦ μεγάλου 
βασιλέως θεογνωσίαν προβαλλόμενος. 
1036 VC 4.18.1: …βασιλέα διδάσκαλον εὐσεβῶν ἐπεγράφοντο τρόπων... 
1037 For example: piety: VC 2.14.1, 3.2.2; LC 2.6; modesty: VC 1.39.1-3, 4.48.1; LC 5.6; spiritual concerns: 
LC 5.5, 5.8. 
1038 VC 1.4.1; cf. VC 1.5.2. 
1039 VC 4.29.1-5. 
1040 LC 9.10. 
1041 VC 4.32.1. It should be noted that the authenticity of this speech has been widely questioned; 
however, for our purposes the important point is that Eusebius felt it necessary to emphasise and, 
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Constantine’s letters to his subjects on religious matters had the specific effect of 
‘keeping those he ruled away from the deceit of demons’.1042 Even Constantine’s 
actions against paganism are said to have had an instructive function – when 
Constantine orders the destruction of pagan shrines and the statues of the gods are 
stripped of their precious metal exteriors, people are said to have realised the error 
of their previous religious practices and to have laughed at the demons they had 
once worshipped, rather than fearing them.1043 Thus it seems that, for Eusebius, 
Constantine’s significance lay principally in his role as a teacher of Christian piety 
and virtue. Just as with the bishops, by actively spreading the Christian message, 
Constantine was working to undermine demonic influence and hence helping to 
forward the divine historical plan. As Christian teachers, both bishops and the 
emperor could be seen as performing a similarly crucial role in leading people to 
salvation. 
This idea that Eusebius, or even Constantine himself, might have seen a 
parallel between the role of bishops and that of the Christian emperor is hardly new 
to Eusebian scholarship. Eusebius’ report at VC 4.24.1 that Constantine described 
himself as ‘a bishop of those outside’ (τῶν ἐκτὸς... ἐπίσκοπος) the church, together 
with a similar comment by Eusebius that Constantine was like ‘a shared bishop’ (τις 
κοινὸς ἐπίσκοπος),1044 has long been the subject of scholarly debate.1045 This debate, 
                                                                                                                                                                    
indeed, prove through the inclusion of this document that Constantine performed a role in instructing 
his subjects. Whether or not the speech was in fact written and delivered by the emperor, its inclusion 
nevertheless reinforces Eusebius’ presentation of Constantine as a teacher. For a summary of the 
debates surrounding the speech’s authenticity, see chapter I above, p. 69-70. 
1042 VC 2.61.1: …δαιμονικῆς μὲν ἀπείργων τοὺς ἀρχομένους πλάνης… 
1043 VC 3.57.1; cf. LC 8.8. 
1044 VC 1.44.1. 
1045 See, for example: C. Rapp, ‘Imperial Ideology in the Making: Eusebius of Caesarea on Constantine 
as “Bishop”’, JTS 49 (1998), 685-95; W. Seston, ‘Constantine as a “bishop”’, JRS 37 (1947), 127-31; D. 
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however, has tended to focus on what these comments might reveal about either 
Eusebius’ or Constantine’s attitude towards the relationship between the church 
and the empire as separate and even opposed organisations,1046 rather than on what 
they can show about Eusebius’ understanding of the duties of bishops and the 
emperor in their own right. For Johnson, Constantine’s remark, at least in Eusebius’ 
interpretation, if not in Constantine’s original intention, is ‘an expression of the 
doctrine of the separation of Church and State’.1047 Yet Eusebius’ designation of the 
emperor by the same term, ἐπίσκοπος, used to denote the bishops of the church 
surely suggests unity rather than separation. Of course, this parallel enhances the 
position of the bishops by suggesting that they are, in their own way, equivalent to 
the emperor, but it also further strengthens the position of both bishops and 
emperor by highlighting their privileged relationship with the divine. In particular, 
it suggests that Eusebius saw these earthly leaders as imitating the instructive, 
supervisory role of the Christ-Logos.  
In a parallel which has not previously been explored by scholars, Eusebius 
often uses various forms of the word ἐπισκοπέω (oversee), from which ἐπίσκοπος 
is derived, to describe divine activity on earth, particularly that of the Christ-
Logos.1048 In the VC, for example, Eusebius suggests that it was only ‘the supervision 
of God (θεοῦ τις ἐπισκοπὴ), and the fear of the emperor’ that prevented rioting in 
                                                                                                                                                                    
DeDecker, and G. Dupuis-Masay, ‘L’“Épiscopat” de l’Empereur Constantin’, Byzantion 50 (1980), 118-
157; J.A. Straub, ‘Constantine as ΚΟΙΝΟΣ ΕΠΙΣΚΟΠΟΣ: Tradition and Innovation in the 
Representation of the First Christian Emperor’s Majesty’, Dumbarton Oaks Papers 21 (1967), 37-55. 
1046 For example: Straub, ‘ΚΟΙΝΟΣ ΕΠΙΣΚΟΠΟΣ’, 52; G. Dagron, Emperor and Priest: The Imperial Office 
in Byzantium, trans. J. Birrell, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003 [originally published in 
French, 1993]),135; Seston, ‘Constantine as “bishop”’; P.G. Caron, ‘Constantin le Grand ἐπίσκοπος τῶν 
ἐκτὸς de l’église romaine’, Revue internationale des droits de l’antiquité 22 (1975), 179-88. 
1047 Johnson, Ethnicity and Argument, 195. 




Antioch.1049 While Rapp has demonstrated how Eusebius’ presentation of 
Constantine as an ἐπίσκοπος was tied in part to his portrayal of the emperor as a 
‘type’ of Moses in the VC, she gave little consideration to this further parallel with 
Christ.1050 Rapp pointed out that, since Moses was considered by many early 
Christian writers to be a ‘prefiguration’ of Christ, the parallel between Constantine 
and Moses could suggest a further parallel between Constantine and Christ;1051 
however, she overlooked the fact that this link was also made more directly through 
the use of term ἐπίσκοπος. Moreover, since ἐπίσκοπος was also used to designate 
bishops of the church, they too could be drawn into this parallel. In Eusebius’ 
works, the supervisory role of an ἐπίσκοπος is thus exercised in common by the 
Christ-Logos, by Constantine, and by the bishops of the church. It therefore seems 
that, for Eusebius, Christian leaders, whether bishops or the emperor, stood almost 
in the place of the Christ-Logos, performing a similar role of instruction and 
guidance to lead people to divine truth. 
This sense that Christian leaders were acting almost as representatives of the 
divine on earth is reflected in the kind of language which Eusebius uses to describe 
them. Eusebius’ presentation of Constantine as a mimetic image of Christ on earth 
in the LC and VC, and his claim that the emperor had taken the divine likeness into 
his soul have often been noted by scholars,1052 who have at times suggested that this 
represents the ‘sanctification’ of the imperial office by Eusebius.1053 Yet Eusebius did 
                                                          
1049 VC 3.59.2. 
1050 Rapp, ‘Imperial Ideology’. 
1051 Rapp, ‘Imperial Ideology’, 693. Cf. Cameron, ‘Form and Meaning’, 85. 
1052 For example: Chesnut, First Christian Histories, 152; Thielman, ‘Another Look’, 227; Barnes, C&E, 
254; Cameron and Hall, Life of Constantine, 35. 
1053 Trompf suggests that, in its descriptions of Constantine, the VC is ‘virtually sanctifying but never 
divinising’: Early Christian Historiography, 138. 
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not reserve such language exclusively for the emperor. There are clear parallels 
between the terms which Eusebius uses of Constantine in the LC, and his earlier 
description of bishop Paulinus of Tyre in the panegyric which he delivered at the 
dedication of the new basilica at Tyre in around 315.1054 In this speech, Paulinus is 
said to ‘carry in his own soul the impression of Christ in whole, the word, the 
wisdom, the light’,1055 and to have created as far as possible earthly images of 
heavenly ‘models’ (ἀρχετύποις) and ‘patterns’ (παραδείγμασιν) through his 
actions.1056 Thus it seems that for Eusebius, Christian ἐπίσκοποι, whether men of the 
church or the emperor, act at their best as representative images of the Christ-Logos 
on earth. 
Yet, while Eusebius was evidently quite comfortable transferring the language 
of divine mimesis that he had once used of bishops like Paulinus to the new figure 
of the Christian emperor, this should not be taken as an indication that the emperor 
had displaced the bishops in Eusebius’ eyes. The fact that in the VC, one of his last 
works, Eusebius drew a deliberate parallel between Constantine and the bishops 
through his description of Constantine as an ἐπίσκοπος demonstrates that the 
importance of the bishops was not diminished for him by the existence of a 
Christian emperor. Rather, in the VC, Constantine is shown as adding himself to the 
number of the existing bishops. Hence, when Constantine is said to have claimed 
that he was also a bishop, we are told that this comment was made while the 
emperor was receiving other bishops at a banquet, reinforcing the sense that he is 
                                                          
1054 On the date of this speech, see: Barnes, C&E, 162. This similarity of language was also noted by 
Drake, In Praise of Constantine, 43-44. 
1055 HE 10.4.26: …ὅδε Χριστὸν ὅλον, τὸν λόγον, τὴν σοφίαν, τὸ φῶς ἐν τῇ αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ 
ἀγαλματοφορῶν ψυχῇ… 
1056 HE 10.4.25. 
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simply one bishop among equals.1057 Similarly, when Eusebius describes 
Constantine as being like a ‘shared bishop’, the emperor is said to have ‘sat in the 
middle as though one of many’.1058 Eusebius allows for no distinction between 
bishops of the church and the emperor – in terms of their importance in God’s 
salvific design, they are equal. 
Thus, in dismissing the idea that Eusebius believed himself to be standing at 
the very end of historical time, we are led to reassess the view that he must have 
invested particular significance in either the church or the empire. Instead, when we 
look anew at Eusebius’ works, freed from misleading assumptions about his 
understanding of history, we can see that, for him, real significance lay in the kind 
of virtuous Christian leadership that might be displayed either by the bishops of the 
church at their best, like Paulinus of Tyre, or by an exemplary Christian emperor, 
like Constantine. This significance stemmed from the role of these leaders in God’s 
plan for salvation. As teachers and models of virtue, they could provide the kind of 
instruction in piety that would enable their followers to resist the malign influence 
of the demons and turn instead towards the true Christian God. As such, what 
Eusebius celebrates in his later works is not the fulfilment of God’s kingdom on 
earth in either the church or the empire, but rather the unification of political and 
religious leadership in Christian virtue and the role which that might play in 
furthering God’s historical plan for salvation. 
 
 
                                                          
1057 VC 4.24.1. 




While Eusebius undoubtedly welcomed many of the events of his later life, 
particularly the new political and religious circumstances after the Council of 
Nicaea, it is important not to confuse this generally positive attitude with a sense of 
naïve triumphalism. For all his celebration of Constantine’s patronage of the 
Christian church, Eusebius was by no means blind to the challenges that continued 
to confront the virtuous. In the VC, much as he sought to downplay internal 
disagreements within the church, like the Donatist schism in Africa, or the dispute 
over the date of Easter, Eusebius could not completely avoid referring to them.1059 
Moreover, his remarks make it clear that he held such disputes to be the work of 
demons.1060 Even in a work that was meant to be celebratory and triumphal, then, 
we find Eusebius still disturbed by the lingering demonic threat. Throughout the 
VC, there is repeated emphasis on the importance of unity within the church.1061 
Having seen that, for Eusebius, it was the unity and consistency of virtuous 
Christian leadership that was so important for encouraging salvation, we can 
recognise that for Eusebius such calls for unity were particularly pressing. Unless 
Christian leaders were able to maintain the high standards of behaviour necessary 
to imitate the divine, and the level of unity that would allow them to present a 
strong front in the fight against the demons, there remained the danger that the 
                                                          
1059 VC 1.45.2, 2.61.1-5, 2.62.1, 2.73.1, 3.4.1, 3.5.1-3, 3.23.1, 3.59.1-2, 4.41.1-4. 
1060 Some of these disputes are attributed directly to demonic activity (VC 1.45.2-3); others more 
obliquely to the work of ‘envy’ (VC 2.61.3, 3.1.1, 3.59.1, 4.41.1), which, as we saw in chapter II, was 
immediately identifiable as a characteristic of demons for Eusebius. Some are attributed to both at 
once: VC 2.73.1. At VC 3.5.3, the dispute is said to be the work of an ‘unseen enemy’ (ἀφανοῦς ἐχθροῦ) 
of the church, in what is surely another reference to demonic activity. 
1061 VC 1.45.1, 3.13.1-2, 3.21.1, 3.21.4, 3.66.3, 4.41.4. 
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demons – always present and always active – might find a way to regain some of 
their influence. 
There can be no doubt that Eusebius was alert to this possibility. Modern 
scholars view Eusebius’ works with the benefit of hindsight, aware that after 
Constantine there would be a largely unbroken succession of Christian emperors. 
But Eusebius had no such knowledge. The example of Licinius, who had switched 
from toleration of Christians to outright persecution, was hardly promising. Indeed, 
the very existence of the VC, often read as a ‘mirror for princes’, designed to instruct 
Constantine’s heirs in the requirements of virtuous Christian monarchy,1062 
demonstrates both the importance in Eusebius’ eyes of ensuring that future 
emperors maintained high standards of virtue, and his awareness of the fact that 
such continuity could not be guaranteed. 
Nor was the unreliability of imperial Christian virtue the only potential 
problem for Eusebius. As we have seen, Eusebius considered ‘heresy’ to be the 
work of demons and the last years of his life saw him actively involved in 
theological disputes. Even as he was preparing the VC, Eusebius was also 
composing polemical works directed against the teaching of Marcellus of Ancyra, 
the Contra Marcellum and De ecclesiastica theologia.1063 Thus, even at the end of his life, 
Eusebius was troubled by and actively participating in the kind of dispute that he 
felt to be the work of demons. In attempting through his writings to ensure the 
widespread acceptance of ‘correct’ doctrine, Eusebius would surely have seen 
himself as actively resisting demonically inspired attacks. For Eusebius, the struggle 
                                                          
1062 Johnson, Ethnicity and Argument, 195; Ruhbach, ‘Politische Theologie’, 250; Cameron, 
‘Construction’, 154; Cameron and Hall, Life of Constantine, 12; Cameron, ‘Form and Meaning’, 73. 
1063 On the dating of these works, see Barnes, C&E, 263, and the discussion above, p. 69. 
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against the demons was real and continuing. There was thus no room for 
complacency in Eusebius’ understanding of history and little space for 




DEMONIC TYRANNY AND VIRTUOUS KINGSHIP 
Eusebius’ ideas about kingship represent one of the most heavily studied aspects of 
his thought. His presentation of Constantine and the understanding of sovereignty 
which underpins this portrait have long drawn the attention of scholars, who have 
identified in some of his later works, particularly the VC and LC, the beginnings of 
Byzantine and western medieval theories of kingship.1064 However, despite 
extensive study, the picture we have of Eusebius’ ideas in this area remains both 
incomplete and in parts confused. For some scholars, Eusebius’ understanding of 
sovereignty reflects little more than a superficial ‘Christianisation’ of earlier 
Hellenistic theories of kingship in which Eusebius simply adopted and expressed in 
Christian terms several ideas which had long been current.1065 Such a picture 
undoubtedly owes much to a focus on the LC in particular1066 – a speech in which 
the absence of overtly Christian language has long been noted by scholars.1067 Yet 
for others, Eusebius’ presentation of Constantine, particularly in the VC, is striking 
for its use of Christian imagery and typology.1068 Eusebius’ portrayal of Constantine 
                                                          
1064 See, for example: Dvornik, Political Philosophy, II.616; Baynes, ‘Eusebius and the Christian Empire’; 
Farina, L’impero, 257; Chesnut, First Christian Histories, 133; Cameron and Hall, Life of Constantine, 34; 
J.R. Lyman, ‘Eusebius of Caesarea’, 327; Eger, ‘Kaiser und Kirche’, 115; Young, Nicaea to Chalcedon, 14. 
1065 For example: G.F. Chesnut, ‘The Ruler and the Logos in Neopythagorean, Middle Platonic and Late 
Stoic Political Philosophy’, in H. Temporini and W. Haase, eds., ANRW 2.16.2 (Berlin: Walter de 
Gruyter, 1978), 1330-32; Dvornik, Political Philosophy, II.619; Baynes, ‘Eusebius and the Christian 
Empire’; A. Louth, ‘Eusebius and the Birth of Church History’, in F. Young, L. Ayres and A. Louth, 
eds., The Cambridge History of Early Christian Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 
273. 
1066 Chesnut, for instance, claims that in the LC ‘one sees the typical emphases of Romano-Hellenistic 
political theory’: ‘The Ruler and the Logos’, 1331. Dvornik similarly suggests that parts of the LC 
‘sound like passages from some treatise on kingship by a Hellenistic writer’: Political Philosophy, II.619.  
1067 For example: Drake, In Praise of Constantine, 29, 46-60; Cameron, ‘Rethinking’, 79. 
1068 For example: Williams, Authorised Lives, 25-57; Johnson, Eusebius, 155-66. 
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as a ‘type’ of Moses, or even of Christ, has been highlighted by several scholars in 
recent years.1069 
As a result, we are presented on the one hand with a speech in which, we are 
told, Constantine is presented as a typical Hellenistic king, and, on the other, with a 
biography in which he appears as an unmistakably Christian sovereign. Moreover, 
Eusebius’ ideas about sovereignty are not confined solely to those works which 
focus on the figure of Constantine. The later books of the HE also discuss the 
political affairs of Eusebius’ own lifetime and mention a variety of different rulers, 
both positive and negative.1070 Even in the DE, we find occasional, brief references to 
the role of the Roman empire and its rulers in relation to the spread of 
Christianity.1071 
However, even where scholars have taken account of a range of Eusebius’ 
works and have attempted to reconcile the various influences on his thought, the 
resulting analysis has been far from satisfactory. Glen Chesnut, for instance, 
identified two streams of influence on Eusebius’ thought – the Hellenistic and what 
he terms the ‘apocalyptic’ or the ‘Hebraic’.1072 Chesnut analyses each of these in 
turn, arguing first that Constantine was, for Eusebius, a virtuous Hellenistic king, 
and second that he was an eschatological leader and saviour-figure in line with 
                                                          
1069 For example: Rapp, ‘Imperial Ideology’, 685-95; M.J. Hollerich, ‘The Comparison of Moses and 
Constantine in Eusebius of Caesarea’s Life of Constantine’, Studia Patristica 19 (1989), 80-85; Hollerich, 
‘Religion and Politics’; Williams, Authorised Lives, 36-46; Cameron and Hall, Life of Constantine, 35-37; 
Cameron, ‘Construction’, 158-61; R. Flower, ‘The Emperor’s New Past: Re-enactment and Inversion in 
Christian Invectives Against Constantius II’, in C. Kelly, R. Flower and M.S. Williams, eds., Unclassical 
Traditions, Vol. I: Alternatives to the Classical Past in Late Antiquity (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010), 29. 
1070 Including, as negative figures: Maximin (e.g. HE 8.13.15, 9.1.1) and Maxentius (e.g. HE 8.14.1-6); and 
as positive figures: Constantius (HE 8.13.12-13), Crispus (HE 10.9.6), and, of course, Constantine 
himself. Licinius appears as both positive and negative at different points in the narrative. On Licinius 
as positive, see e.g. HE 9.9.1, and as negative, see e.g. HE 10.8.1-19. 
1071 For example: DE 3.7.30-39, 6.20.20-21, 7.2.22. 
1072 Chesnut, First Christian Histories, 134. 
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apocalyptic ideas drawn from Jewish traditions.1073 Chesnut suggests that this 
second presentation of Constantine, in which the emperor is said to have been 
raised to his position by God for the benefit of humankind, bears little relation to 
earlier Greek understandings of the role of divine activity in history.1074 However, 
while suggesting that these two approaches to the figure of Constantine ‘were 
linked together firmly’ by Eusebius,1075 Chesnut does not really offer an adequate 
explanation of how Eusebius may have combined these two sets of influences into a 
coherent picture of kingship. 
Moreover, Chesnut’s suggestion that Eusebius viewed Constantine as an 
eschatological figure, ruling over the final ‘Kingdom of Peace’ on earth, fails to 
address the continuing presence of hostile demons in Eusebius’ understanding of 
the universe.1076 It is hard to believe that Eusebius can have felt Constantine to have 
been presiding over a Kingdom of Peace, when he also believed that hostile demons 
were continuing to challenge and mislead humankind. A similar problem is raised 
by Michael Williams’ suggestion that Eusebius presented Constantine as a figure 
‘who had overcome the old order and led his people into a world they seemed set to 
dominate’.1077 As a result, we need to find a new way of understanding 
Constantine’s place in Eusebius’ thought and to reassess Eusebius’ presentation of 
the role of a Christian sovereign in the light of his concerns about the continuing 
demonic threat. 
                                                          
1073 Ibid. 133-66. 
1074 Ibid. 162. 
1075 Ibid. 156. 
1076 Ibid. 160-61. Cf. the similarly problematic formulation of Farina: L’impero, 162. 
1077 Williams, Authorised Lives, 42. 
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To do so, this chapter will approach the question of Eusebius’ ideas of 
kingship from an angle rather different from that usually adopted. Previous 
scholarship has tended to focus above all on Eusebius’ presentation of Constantine 
as the paradigm of virtuous sovereignty.1078 Yet there is just as much to be learnt 
about Eusebius’ understanding of the role of a good sovereign by considering his 
references to the opposite figure – the tyrant. This chapter will therefore devote at 
least as much attention to Eusebius’ presentation of Constantine’s opponents and 
predecessors, usually portrayed by Eusebius as vicious ‘tyrants’, as it will to his 
presentation of Constantine. In those works which deal most thoroughly with 
matters of earthly sovereignty – the VC, LC and HE – we find bad rulers repeatedly 
linked with demons or the devil.1079 Eusebius presents tyrannical and vicious rulers 
as being under the influence of, indeed, enslaved to, demons.1080 He argues as a 
result that they are unfit to rule, and incapable of meeting the criteria required of a 
good monarch by traditional Hellenistic kingship theory. Consequently, he is able 
to present Constantine’s actions against his former co-rulers as entirely justified and 
praiseworthy. 
More than this, Eusebius’ ideas about sovereignty are underpinned by his 
continuing concern over the on-going demonic threat. He suggests that, by a 
process of μίμησις, or imitation, such tyrants pose a threat not only to their subjects’ 
earthly well-being, but also to their spiritual health, and hence to their salvation. 
Tyrants would lead their subjects towards demons and hence, in order to combat 
                                                          
1078 See, however, the brief remarks at Johnson, Eusebius, 167-68 and the largely descriptive discussion 
of Farina, L’impero 224-34. 
1079 See, for example: HE 8.14.5, 8.14.8; VC 1.58.3; LC 5.2-3, 7.6-7. 
1080 For example: LC 5.2-3, VC 1.13.3. 
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the demonic threat, a virtuous Christian sovereign, free from the influence of 
demons, is essential. Thus, for Eusebius, Constantine was important, not as the 
triumphant eschatological figure envisaged by Chesnut, but rather as a key figure in 
the on-going battle to secure people from demonic influence. 
 
‘Thinking With’ Tyranny 
Before progressing further in our examination of Eusebius’ representation of the 
tyrannical in his works, it is important to give some consideration to the concept of 
tyranny in the ancient and late antique world more broadly. For several centuries 
before Eusebius was writing, tyranny had ceased to be a neutral designation for a 
particular kind of political constitution.1081 Rather, from as early as the fifth century 
BCE, it had become a weapon of invective, laden with negative connotations.1082 In 
Aristotle’s definition of various possible political constitutions in his Politics, 
tyranny had represented the negative, inverted form of monarchy.1083 Moreover, the 
figure of the tyrant had been a staple of classical Greek tragedy and in the process 
became associated with a further series of negative behaviours and 
characteristics.1084 By the time it passed from Greek to Roman political discourse, 
characteristics such as arrogance, lust, and cruelty were considered standard in the 
                                                          
1081 Dunkle suggests that, in its original meaning, the term tyrannos simply designated ‘a ruler who had 
gained power by usurpation and did not necessarily signify that the ruler was oppressive’: J.R. 
Dunkle, ‘The Greek Tyrant and Roman Political Invective of the Late Republic’, TAPA 98 (1967), 152. 
1082 K.A. Raaflaub, ‘Stick and Glue: The Function of Tyranny in Fifth-century Athenian Democracy’, in 
K.A. Morgan, Popular Tyranny (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2003), 59; L. Mitchell, ‘Tyrannical 
Oligarchs at Athens’, in S. Lewis, ed., Ancient Tyranny (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), 
179-80. 
1083 Arist. Pol. 1279a32-b10, cited in S. Lewis ‘Introduction’, in Lewis, ed., Ancient Tyranny (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2006), 4. 
1084 I. Gildenhard, ‘Reckoning with Tyranny: Greek Thoughts on Caesar in Cicero’s Letters to Atticus in 




figure of a negative ruler,1085 as the traditional Greek tyrant became assimilated to 
the hated figure of the Roman rex.1086 Thus, to label someone a ‘tyrant’ was to 
condemn not only the quality of their rule, but also their character and lifestyle.1087 
Polybius had even suggested that it was hard to find ‘a greater or more pungent 
charge’ to make against a person, on the grounds that the charge of tyranny 
‘encompasses a meaning of the greatest impiety and brings together every injustice 
and unlawfulness in man’.1088 
Among early Christian writers, the concept of tyranny developed still further, 
with the ‘tyrant’ acquiring yet another negative association – the persecution of 
Christians.1089 Justin Martyr and Tertullian do not go quite so far as to label current 
emperors as ‘tyrants’, but they come close. Both writers suggest that to persecute 
Christians is to act in a violent and tyrannical manner, while Tertullian argues that 
persecution fails to respect the law.1090 These writers thereby urge the emperors and 
their subordinates to refrain from prosecuting Christians. This connection between 
the persecution of Christians and tyranny is one that would later also appear in 
Eusebius.1091 Christian writers therefore not only preserved, but also extended the 
negative connotations that attached to the figure of the ‘tyrant’. 
                                                          
1085 Dunkle, ‘The Greek Tyrant’, 151-52. 
1086 Ibid. 158. 
1087 Ibid. 156. 
1088 Plb. Hist. 2.59.6: ταύτης δὲ μείζω κατηγορίαν ἢ πικροτέραν οὐδ’ ἂν εἰπεῖν ῥᾳδίως δύναιτ’ οὐδείς. 
αὐτὸ γὰρ τοὔνομα περιέχει τὴν ἀσεβεστάτην ἔμφασιν καὶ πάσας περιείληφε τὰς ἐν ἀνθρώποις 
ἀδικίας καὶ παρανομίας. 
1089 T.D. Barnes, ‘Oppressor, persecutor, usurper: the meaning of tyrannus in the fourth century’, in G. 
Bonamente and M. Mayer, eds., Historiae Augustae Colloquia, ns 4 Colloquium Barcinonense MCMXCIII 
(Bari, 1996), 58; and A.E. Wardman, ‘Usurpers and Internal Conflicts in the Fourth-Century AD’, 
Historia 33 (1984), 223. 
1090 Justin Martyr 1 Apol. 3; Tert. Apol. 2.13-15. 
1091 See, for example: HE 8.14.8-9, 9.2.1, 9.4.2; Mart. Pal. [SR] 4.8, 6.6, 8.5, 11.7; VC 1.12.2, 2.2.3. This is 




Recognising the power that the label ‘tyrant’ held in the ancient world, a 
number of scholars have stressed in recent years that the concept of tyranny could 
be ‘good to think with’, providing a means by which people could explore what 
was necessary in a good leader or political constitution through consideration of its 
opposite.1092 In consequence, there was a long literary and philosophical tradition, 
reaching back to the earliest Greek historians, of contrasting the vices of a tyrant 
with the equivalent virtues of a good sovereign.1093 This is a strategy which Eusebius 
also employs to considerable effect in the VC and LC.1094 Yet the vices associated 
with the figure of the tyrant were not fixed, but might be added to by different 
writers as they saw fit.1095 For instance, Christian writers’ belief that persecuting 
Christians was characteristic of tyranny would not necessarily have been shared by 
non-Christian authors. Thus tyranny was, in Sian Lewis’ assessment, ‘a malleable 
construct’, which could change according to circumstances.1096 
Previous work on the idea of tyranny in late antiquity, however, has tended to 
focus less on this idea of the tyrant as a concept to ‘think with’, and more on the 
question of legitimacy. It has been suggested that the meaning of the term 
‘τύραννος/tyrannus’ changed during the fourth century, coming to mean 
specifically ‘usurper’, and to say more about the legitimacy of a person’s position 
                                                          
1092 S. Forsdyke, ‘The Uses and Abuses of Tyranny’, in R.K. Balot, ed., A Companion to Greek and Roman 
Political Thought (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 231; Mitchell, ‘Tyrannical Oligarchs’, 179; 
Raaflaub, ‘Stick and Glue’, 83: ‘To put it simply, tyranny was good to think with’. 
1093 R. MacMullen, ‘The Roman Concept Robber-Pretender’, Revue internationale des droits de l’antiquité, 
3rd ser. 10 (1963), 221-2; J.G. Gammie, ‘Herodotus on Kings and Tyrants: Objective Historiography or 
Conventional Portraiture?’, Journal of Near Eastern Studies 45 (1986), 185. 
1094 For example: VC 3.1.1-8; LC 5.1-4. 
1095 Lewis, ‘Introduction’, 6. 
1096 Ibid. 6. 
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than about the character of their rule.1097 Yet the question of what constituted 
‘legitimate’ rule in this period is far from straightforward. As Alan Wardman has 
pointed out, for the fourth century it ‘is very difficult to issue a satisfying judgement 
on the way or ways in which emperors proper were lawfully made’.1098 This is a 
problem which Gilbert Dagron has argued continued into the later Byzantine 
period, when he suggests that the lack of a clearly established system for arranging 
the transfer of imperial authority led contenders for power to base their claims on 
the competing grounds of inheritance and merit.1099 Both of these claims can 
similarly be found in panegyrics from early in Constantine’s reign,1100 while the 
same collection of panegyrics also contains several attempts to link the emperor in 
question to some form of divine patron or ancestor.1101 This suggests that, both in 
the fourth century and beyond, there were a range of ways in which rulers might 
attempt to justify and strengthen their position. Indeed, the development of the 
Tetrarchy under Diocletian can only have made this question of ‘legitimacy’ more 
complex. The creation of a hierarchy of multiple emperors ruling in east and west 
meant that the defeated imperial rivals branded as ‘tyrants’ could now include, not 
only those who had never held imperial power, but also, as in the case of Licinius, 
someone whose rule had been recognised by his co-emperors for some time. This 
makes any attempt to associate the language of tyranny with a particular 
understanding of ‘legitimacy’ extremely problematic. Rather, since it appears that 
ideas of ‘legitimacy’ were constantly being negotiated, we need to look instead at 
                                                          
1097 For a valuable summary of this debate, see Barnes, ‘Oppressor, persecutor, usurper’. 
1098 Wardman, ‘Usurpers and Internal Conflicts’, 225. 
1099 Dagron, Emperor and Priest, 13-53, esp. 37. Cf. Wardman, ‘Usurpers and Internal Conflicts’, 227. 
1100 Pan. Lat. VII (VI).5.3; VI (VII).3.1. 
1101 For example: Pan. Lat. XI (III).2.4; XI (III).3.8; VI (VII).8.5 and X (II).2.1. 
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how emperors, and those writing in their honour, sought to justify their actions and 
to persuade people that they were the best possible ruler. 
Moreover, as Barnes sensibly recognised, the apparent proliferation in the use 
of the term ‘tyrant’ in the years following Constantine’s defeat of Maxentius in 312 
was surely a result of the fact that the word had not yet lost its negative 
connotations, rather than a sign that it had become a neutral designation for an 
illegitimate ruler.1102 For an imperial victor looking both to justify his past actions 
and to secure his future position, the figure of the tyrant could prove invaluable.1103 
Labelling a defeated rival a ‘tyrant’ served simultaneously to undermine the 
reputation of the loser and to enhance that of the victor, by presenting him as the 
liberator of his subjects. Thus it appears that, at least in the early fourth century 
when Eusebius was writing, the idea of the ‘tyrant’ remained loaded with negative 
connotations. Since tyranny was not a fixed and neutral designation for a particular 
political constitution, but rather a constructed and negotiable idea, it is important to 
pay close attention to Eusebius’ use of the term in order to determine what he 
understood by the concept. 
Throughout those works in which Eusebius is concerned with matters of 
earthly sovereignty – the VC, LC and later books of the HE – he repeatedly describes 
Constantine’s imperial predecessors and rivals using the vocabulary of tyranny.1104 
In the VC, the Tetrarchs, with the exception of Constantine’s father, Constantius, are 
                                                          
1102 Barnes, ‘Oppressor, Persecutor, Usurper’, 55-56. 
1103 Wardman, ‘Usurpers and Internal Conflicts’, 223. 




labelled as ‘tyrants’,1105 and Eusebius is careful to emphasise that, despite being 
raised in the households of these men, Constantine did not share their moral 
character.1106 Thus, even before he is emperor, Constantine is depicted as antithetical 
to the tyrants – for Eusebius, it seems, it was not simply the manner of a person’s 
rule that would determine whether or not they were to be called a tyrant, but their 
entire way of life. Similarly, in the HE, the label of ‘tyrant’ is once again applied to 
Constantine’s predecessors and rivals as emperor,1107 while, in the LC, it is clear that 
Eusebius wishes to associate earlier emperors with a tyrannical style of government. 
In the LC we do not find any specific individuals accused of tyranny; rather, 
Eusebius refers obliquely to those ‘thought at some time to rule with tyrannical 
force’.1108 This, however, is more likely a reflection of the conventions of late antique 
panegyric than of any uncertainty on Eusebius’ part about who was to be labelled a 
tyrant, for it was usual in this period for speakers to avoid naming an emperor’s 
defeated rivals in their orations.1109 It is also perfectly clear from the way in which 
Eusebius repeatedly contrasts Constantine’s rule with that of his predecessors that 
Eusebius intended his listeners to identify earlier emperors as bad rulers or 
tyrants.1110 Moreover, in all three works the negative associations of tyranny are 
clearly in evidence.1111 There is no suggestion at any point of any positive 
connotation for the term. Even in places where the terms ‘tyrant’ or ‘tyranny’ are 
                                                          
1105 VC 1.12.2: ‘The tyrants of our own time’ (τύραννοι... οἱ καθ’ἡμας). On Constantius as different 
from the other Tetrarchs, see VC 1.13.1-4. Cf. HE 8.13.12-13, 8.App.4. 
1106 VC 1.12.2-3. 
1107 Including Maxentius: HE 8.14.1-6, 9.9.3; Maximinus: HE 8.14.7-15, 9.1.1, 9.4.2 and Licinius: HE 
10.9.2. 
1108 LC 5.2: …κἂν νομίζηταί ποτε τυραννικῇ βίᾳ κρατεῖν… 
1109 Wardman, ‘Usurpers and Internal Conflicts’, 222. 
1110 LC 5.1-4, 7.12, 9.13-14. 
1111 For example: LC 5.3; VC 1.33.1, 1.35.1-36.2, 2.2.3, 3.1.1-8; HE 8.14.1-18. 
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used without further elaboration, the degree to which they are elsewhere associated 
with negative characteristics and behaviours makes it impossible to read these 
words simply as neutral descriptions. It therefore seems clear that, in using these 
words, Eusebius was seeking to tarnish the reputation of Constantine’s rivals. 
This, then, is one way in which the concept of tyranny functions within these 
works – it allows Eusebius to undermine the authority of Constantine’s competitors 
for imperial power. Constantine, by contrast, is presented as a liberator and any 
questions about his own – less than straightforward – route to sole rule are tactfully 
obscured by this comprehensive attack on the character of his enemies.1112 Yet this is 
not the only role which the idea of the tyrant played in these works, for, as we have 
seen, tyranny was a concept ‘good to think with’. The vices attributed by Eusebius 
to his tyrants help to highlight key features of his virtuous sovereign as well. In this 
way, Eusebius’ presentation of tyranny contributes to creating his picture of the 
good ruler. It also enables him to exert some influence over the actions of future 
sovereigns by suggesting that anyone who acts in a vicious manner would become a 
tyrant rather than a king. Thus, by studying the negative associations of tyranny in 
these works, we can learn something of what Eusebius wanted from future rulers. 
In many cases, there is considerable overlap between Eusebius’ tyrannical vices and 
those found in the works of earlier non-Christian writers, yet Eusebius also added 
                                                          
1112 On Constantine as a liberator, see, for example: HE 9.9.2; VC 1.26.1, 1.37.1, 1.39.2, 1.41.2. This also 
appears to have been a feature of Constantine’s own self-presentation – Eusebius records an 
inscription of Constantine in which he described his liberation of the city of Rome:  VC 1.40.1-2. 
Constantine’s route to sole rule of the Roman empire involved wars against several of those who had 
previously ruled as his colleagues – on these various conflicts, see: Barnes, C&E, 28-43 and 62-77. 
According to Wardman, Constantine’s route to power was such that ‘however paradoxical it may 
seem, Constantine was certainly a usurper’: ‘Usurpers and Internal Conflicts’, 232. 
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to these another negative association that reflects the influence of his Christian 
beliefs. This was the idea of a link between human tyrants and wicked demons. 
 
Demonic Slavery 
In an earlier chapter, we saw that Eusebius associated demons with an oppressive 
and tyrannical style of rule;1113 it is clear from his descriptions of earthly tyranny 
that he likewise saw human tyrants as firmly linked to the demonic. Both kinds of 
tyrant – demonic and human – are said by Eusebius to govern in a manner that 
‘enslaves’ their subjects.1114 Of course, this association between tyranny and slavery 
was not new to Eusebius; as far back as Aristotle, it had been suggested that a tyrant 
might be equated to a δεσπότης, or ‘slave-master’.1115 Similarly, Herodotus wrote of 
the Milesians that they ‘were in no way eager to accept another tyrant in their 
territory, having experienced freedom’,1116 making it clear that tyranny was held to 
be incompatible with liberty. Within Roman society, P.A. Brunt has suggested that, 
whilst there had been provision in the earliest, archaic Roman law for a citizen to be 
enslaved for debt, such a sale would, by law, have had to take place outside Roman 
territory, implying that it was considered to be incompatible with romanitas.1117 
                                                          
1113 See above, p. 138-40. 
1114 For example, human tyrants: VC 1.13.3, 1.36.2; HE 8.14.6, 9.9.3; demons: VC 1.13.3; LC 5.3; HE 8.12.3 
(τῇ τῶν δαιμόνων δουλείᾳ). As Martin has also previously noted: Inventing Superstition, 220. 
1115 Arist. Nic. Eth. 1160b28-29, cited in Garnsey Ideas of Slavery, 118.  
1116 Hdt. 6.5.1: …οὐδαμῶς πρόθυμοι ἦσαν ἄλλον τύραννον δέκεσθαι ἐς τὴν χώρην, οἷα ἐλευθερίης 
γευσάμενοι. 
1117 P.A. Brunt, ‘Libertas in the Republic’, in The Fall of the Roman Republic and Related Essays (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1988), 283. 
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Indeed, Aristotle had set out in his Politics a theory of slavery in which the 
condition of slaves was presented as almost less than human,1118 claiming that some 
people deserved to be slaves because they lacked the capacity for reasoning 
necessary for freedom.1119 Once again, this was connected to the idea that slavery 
was not to be imposed on Greek citizens, for Aristotle identified the characteristic of 
being ‘irrational in nature’ (ἐκ φύσεως ἀλόγιστος) as one which would be found 
primarily among ‘far-off barbarians’ (οἱ πόρρω βαρβάροι).1120 Both law and 
philosophy therefore presented slavery as a barbarous condition, which would be 
degrading for a Greek or Roman citizen. The idea that tyranny, in effectively 
enslaving a population, was a barbarous form of government is reflected in 
Eusebius’ LC, where Eusebius suggests that rulers he elsewhere characterises as 
tyrants are themselves barbarians. Demons, often presented by Eusebius as 
tyrannical, are described in the LC as ‘rougher than all barbarians’.1121 Slightly later 
in the speech, Eusebius also suggests that Constantine has ‘defeated that dual 
barbarian nation’ of both demons and godless humans, suggesting that Eusebius 
also held human tyrants to be barbarous.1122 
                                                          
1118 Garnsey, Ideas of Slavery, 113, citing Arist. Politics 1256b20-25 and 1280a31-35. For full discussion of 
Aristotle’s views on slavery, see Garnsey, Ideas of Slavery, 107-27. Although Aristotle’s ideas of slavery 
are usually studied using both the Politics and the Nicomachean Ethics, Garnsey suggests that there are 
several differences between these two works, and argues the theory of ‘natural slavery’ is in fact only 
found in the Politics: 107-08. 
1119 Garnsey, Ideas of Slavery, 109, citing Arist. Politics 1254b21-24. 
1120 Arist. Nic. Eth. 1149a10-12: …οἱ μὲν ἐκ φύσεως ἀλόγιστοι καὶ μόνον τῇ αἰσθήσει ζῶντες 
θηριώδεις, ὥσπερ ἔνια γένη τῶν πόρρω βαρβάρων… Garnsey cites this passage, but suggests that 
Aristotle was not in fact thinking of the ‘natural slave’ in this instance: Ideas of Slavery, 114. However, it 
is easy to see how by combining Aristotle’s suggestion that natural slaves are deficient in reason with 
his claim that ‘barbarians’ are also deficient in reason, his audience might have been led to consider 
slavery as a condition fit only for non-Greeks. 
1121 LC 7.2: …οἱ δὴ βαρβάρων ἁπάντων ἀπηνέστεροι… Cf. LC 6.21. 
1122 LC 7.13: …τὸ διττὸν ἐκεῖνο βάρβαρον ἐνίκα γένος… 
266 
 
However, for Eusebius earthly tyrants were not simply slave-masters in the 
manner envisaged by Aristotle, but also slaves themselves. We find this expressed 
most fully in the LC, where Eusebius makes it clear that he believed vicious 
sovereigns to be enslaved to demons. In this case, as we saw, Eusebius is not 
discussing the example of a particular tyrant, but, more generally, those figures who 
might be ‘thought at some time to rule with tyrannical force’,1123 showing that he 
considered this enslavement to demons to be characteristic of all human tyrants. 
Here, Eusebius poses his audience a question: ‘How,’ he asks, ‘can a ruler and lord 
of the whole world be someone who has attached himself to numberless embittered 
masters, and who is a slave of dishonourable hedonism, a slave of intemperate 
madness for women, a slave of unjustly acquired riches, a slave of anger and rage, a 
slave of fear and terrors, a slave of murderous demons, a slave of deadly spirits?’1124 
The repetition of the word δοῦλος (slave), which appears seven times in this one 
sentence, makes it clear that Eusebius wishes to emphasise the enslaved condition 
of the figures he is describing. 
Moreover, in parallel to this emphasis on slavery, Eusebius also finds room 
for many of the traditional tyrannical vices, familiar from earlier Greek literature.1125 
Yet the construction of the sentence ensures that the greatest emphasis is placed, not 
on these vices, but on the tyrannical ruler’s relationship with demons. Concluding 
                                                          
1123 LC 5.2: …κἂν νομίζηταί ποτε τυραννικῇ βίᾳ κρατεῖν… 
1124 LC 5.3: πῶς δ’ ἄρχων καὶ τῶν ὅλων κύριος ὁ μυρίους καθ’ ἑαυτοῦ πικροὺς δεσπότας 
ἐφειλκυσμένος, καὶ δοῦλος μὲν αἰσχρᾶς ἡδονῆς, δοῦλος δ’ ἀκολάστου γυναικομανίας, δοῦλος 
χρημάτων ἐξ ἀδίξου ποριζομένων, δοῦλος θυμοῦ καὶ ὀργῆς, δοῦλος φόβου καὶ δειμάτων, δοῦλος 
μιαιφόνων δαιμόνων, δοῦλος ψυχοφθόρων πνευμάτων; 
1125 Herodotus, for instance, claimed that envy, indiscriminate murder, rape and a lack of respect for 
the law were characteristic of tyrants: Hdt. 3.80.4-5; Euripides associated tyrants with the illegal 
acquisition of wealth, hedonism and lust: Eur. Supp. 444-55; Plato characterised the tyrannical 
character (in this case not restricted to those who occupied positions of leadership) as disposed to 
theft, murder, impiety and corruption: Rep. 9.575b. 
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the sentence with the emphatic pairing of wicked demons and spirits ensures that it 
is these malevolent spiritual forces which linger longest in the audience’s minds. It 
is surely also significant that this list of traditional vices is framed here by opening 
and closing references to ‘embittered masters’, ‘murderous demons’ and ‘deadly 
spirits’.1126 This implies that these traditional characteristics and behaviours of the 
tyrant are in fact a product of their enslavement to demons. 
In developing this idea of spiritual enslavement, Eusebius drew on a long 
tradition of earlier thought. It was widely accepted in both Greek and Christian 
thought that it was possible for a person who was not legally a slave nevertheless to 
be enslaved in a moral sense. Most famous is the Stoic doctrine of moral slavery, 
elaborated at length in Philo of Alexandria’s Every Good Man Is Free.1127 This formed 
only half of a longer two-part work, which originally included the counterpart 
Every Bad Man Is a Slave.1128 In the surviving part of this treatise, Philo explicitly 
distinguished two kinds of slavery, one which related to ‘souls’, and another to 
‘bodies’.1129 For Philo, who suggested that a soul might be enslaved to ‘wickedness 
and passion’,1130 it was slavery of the soul, rather than legal slavery, that was most 
important and hence most worthy of a philosopher’s attention.1131 In the Stoic view, 
                                                          
1126 It is clear that Eusebius is thinking of demons in his initial reference to ‘numberless embittered 
masters’, for in the sentence immediately before this, Eusebius had referred to the same person having 
similarly associated himself with ‘numberless falsely drawn icons of demons’ (LC 5.3: …ὁ μυρίας 
ἑψευδογραφημένας δαιμόνων εἰκόνας…). 
1127 On Stoic ideas of moral slavery, see Garnsey, Ideas of Slavery, 131-33. Sources for early Stoic ideas of 
slavery, as for much of early Stoicism, are limited and it is only from the first and second centuries CE 
onwards that we have full discussions of the subject from Stoic philosophers: ibid. 129-31. On Philo’s 
ideas of moral slavery, see: ibid. 157-63. 
1128 Philo, Probus 1. 
1129 Philo, Probus 17: δουλεία τοίνυν ἡ μὲν ψυχῶν, ἡ δὲ σωμάτων λέγεται. 
1130 Ibid.: δεσπόται δὲ τῶν... ψυχῶν δὲ κακίαι καὶ πάθη. 
1131 Garnsey, Ideas of Slavery, 158. 
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it was only by exercising a high level of self-control in order to defeat these passions 
that a person could be said to be truly free.1132 
Moreover, this idea had already found Christian expression in Paul’s 
language of the slavery of sin. At Romans 6:12, Paul instructs his audience not to ‘let 
sin exercise dominion in your mortal bodies, to make you obey their passions’.1133 
Elsewhere, he describes how ‘with my flesh I am a slave to the law of sin’.1134 As 
Peter Garnsey has observed, this Pauline language of enslavement bears 
considerable similarity to the earlier Stoic notion of moral slavery, with slavery to 
sin replacing slavery to the passions.1135 There can be no doubt that Eusebius would 
have been very familiar with Paul’s letters – indeed, he quotes passages from the 
epistle to the Romans on many occasions.1136 We also know that he was aware of 
Philo’s discussions of slavery. Andrew Carriker has demonstrated that Eusebius 
would have had access to both parts of Philo’s treatise on moral slavery through the 
library at Caesarea,1137 and Eusebius, in common with many other early Christian 
writers,1138 did not hesitate to express his admiration for Philo.1139 The lack of direct 
quotation from either writer in Eusebius’ discussions of the slavery makes it 
                                                          
1132 Ibid. 133. 
1133 NRSV trans.: μὴ οὖν βασιλευέτω ἡ ἁμαρτία ἐν τῷ θνητῷ ὑμῶν σώματι εἰς τὸ ὑπακούειν ταῖς 
ἐπιθυμίαις αὐτοῦ. 
1134 Rom. 7:25, NRSV trans.: ἄρα οὖν αὐτὸς ἐγὼ τῷ μὲν νοῒ δουλεύω νόμῳ θεοῦ, τῇ δὲ σαρκὶ νόμῳ 
ἁμαρτίας. 
1135 Garnsey, Ideas of Slavery, 183. 
1136 For example: PE 3.13.4, 6.6.37, 11.8.1, 12.27.6, 12.52.34, 13.7.5. 
1137 Carriker, Library, 170, 174-75. Eusebius refers to both parts of Philo’s treatise on slavery at HE 
2.18.6. 
1138 Philo’s influence on early Christian writers has been demonstrated by D.T. Runia, Philo in Early 
Christian Literature: A Survey (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1993). Cf. H. Chadwick, ‘Philo and the Beginnings 
of Christian Thought’, in A.H. Armstrong, ed., The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval 
Philosophy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 168-92, who explores Philo’s influence on 
Clement of Alexandria and Origen. 
1139 HE 2.18.1. 
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impossible to prove direct influence,1140 although it is highly probable that he 
developed his own ideas in the context of these earlier writings. 
A further possible influence on Eusebius’ ideas about the enslavement of 
tyrants to demons can be found in the work of earlier Christian apologists, 
particularly Justin Martyr. Several Christian apologists writing in times of 
persecution had suggested that bad rulers were acting under the influence of 
demons.1141 For instance, in his Apology, a work which Eusebius appears to have 
known,1142 Tertullian wrote to the Roman provincial governors that ‘there might be 
a power hidden in concealment which directs you against the form and against the 
nature of judgement, and also against the laws themselves’.1143 For Tertullian, 
attacks on the Christians were so perverse that they could only be attributed to the 
malign inspiration of wicked spiritual powers, although Tertullian did not 
specifically use the language of enslavement here. We do find the vocabulary of 
slavery in Justin’s Apology, however.1144 Justin does not go as far as Eusebius in 
claiming that the emperors actually are already enslaved to demons; rather, he 
frames his suggestion of an association between bad rulers and demons in the form 
of a warning. He urges his addressees – including the emperor Antoninus Pius and 
                                                          
1140 Eusebius does quote from Philo’s Every Good Man is Free at PE 8.12.1-19. However, the passage 
which Eusebius quotes is a description of the community of the Essenes and the context of the 
quotation is not a discussion of slavery, but rather an attempt to prove the superiority of the ‘Hebrew’ 
lifestyle. Thus, while it proves that Eusebius had read at least some of Philo’s treatise, we cannot use 
this quotation to determine how far Eusebius was influenced by Philo’s understanding of moral 
slavery. 
1141 For discussion of this theme in the works of the early Christian apologists, including Justin, 
Tertullian, Clement and Athenagoras, see: Pagels, ‘Christian Apologists’, 301-25. 
1142 Eusebius quotes from the Apology five times in the HE (HE 2.2.5-6, 2.25.4, 3.20.7, 3.33.3, 5.5.7) and 
Carriker suggests that this was probably the only work by Tertullian to which he had access, most 
likely in a Greek translation: Carriker, Library, 261-62. 
1143 Tert. Apol. 2.14: Suspecta sit vobis ista perversitas, ne qua vis lateat in occulto, quae vos adversus formam, 
adversus naturam iudicandi, contra ipsas quoque leges ministret. 
1144 It appears that Eusebius also had access to both parts of Justin’s Apology, for he includes them in a 
list of Justin’s works at HE 4.18.1-2. See Carriker, Library, 220-23. 
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his heir Marcus Aurelius1145 – to be on their guard against the deceitful attacks of the 
demons, who, he claims, seek to make the emperors their ‘slaves and servants’.1146 
Justin raises the idea that rulers might be enslaved to demons as a dangerous 
possibility; Eusebius, in writing about previous emperors rather than the present 
ruler, was free to make the connection more explicitly. 
Thus, in developing his ideas about the relationship between bad human 
rulers and demons, Eusebius had a range of different sources upon which he could 
draw. Eusebius appears to have combined well-established ideas of moral slavery 
with a long Christian tradition of associating bad rulers with demons to produce the 
idea that ‘tyrants’ were enslaved to demons. In searching for the cause of a soul’s 
enslavement, either to sin or to the passions, and in identifying that cause as an 
initial enslavement to demons, Eusebius firmly grounds the notion of moral slavery 
in physical reality. In this, his understanding of moral slavery differs from that of 
both Philo and Paul. For these writers, the idea of slavery to the passions remains 
metaphorical – we are not led to envisage a physical master external to the moral 
slave. In Eusebius’ thought, however, we find the moral slave placed firmly in the 
power of external beings – the demons. These, as we have seen, were as real and as 
physical for Eusebius as any external human master would have been.1147 Eusebius 
draws a distinction between the kind of slavery to vice and immorality discussed by 
Philo and Paul, and a prior slavery to demons. As we have seen, at LC 5.3, Eusebius 
implies that the vicious character of the bad rulers under discussion is at least partly 
                                                          
1145 Justin 1 Apol. 1. 
1146 Justin 1 Apol. 14: ...ἀγωνίζονται γὰρ ἔχειν ὑμᾶς δούλους καὶ ὑπηρέτας...  As Pagels notes, Justin 
concludes his two-part apology with the suggestion that he is actually acting in the emperors’ own 
best interests by trying to divert them from demonic influence: Pagels ‘Christian Apologists’, 307, 
citing Justin 2 Apol. 15. 
1147 See above, p. 90-98. 
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a result of their enslavement to wicked demons.1148 Eusebius is therefore not only 
accusing these figures of being morally corrupt, he is actually denying their 
independence. 
As a result, Eusebius is able to suggest that these figures are incapable of 
ruling. By framing his suggestion that bad rulers are the slaves of demons as a 
rhetorical question, Eusebius is encouraging his audience to note the striking 
paradox in the idea that a ‘lord of the whole world’ might also be a slave.1149 He 
implies that a person’s enslavement to demons makes it impossible for him to rule. 
This is contrasted with Eusebius’ suggestion that Constantine alone may be 
described as ‘truly lord of himself’ – clearly Constantine has the level of 
independence necessary to make an effective leader.1150 Eusebius was certainly 
aware that there were other ways, beyond claims to virtue, by which a ruler might 
seek to justify his position, for he deploys some of them in support of 
Constantine.1151 However, by suggesting that vice is in fact evidence of a ruler’s 
enslavement, Eusebius effectively over-rides these other claims to authority. From 
Eusebius’ perspective, a moral slave simply cannot be an emperor; consequently, it 
                                                          
1148 This suggests a similar relationship between tyrants and demons to that found in Tertullian, who 
suggests that the actions of the persecutors are so wrong-headed that they can only be the result of 
demonic influence: Tert. Apol. 2.14, and see above, p. 269. 
1149 LC 5.3. 
1150 LC 5.4: …αὐτοκράτωρ ἀληθῶς… 
1151 In particular, Eusebius stresses that Constantine inherited his position from his father: HE 8.13.12-
13, 9.9.1; VC 1.9.2, 1.22.1-2. Williams has noted that ideas of inheritance were particularly important to 
Constantine and his sons, arguing that the Constantine’s father Constantius appears in the VC ‘above 
all to show that Constantine was a legitimate ruler’: Authorised Lives, 52. Cf. Farina, L’impero, 169. 
Although Williams’ terminology of ‘legitimacy’ is unhelpful, it is nonetheless evident that Eusebius 
wished to avoid giving the impression that Constantine owed his position exclusively to his virtue. I 
will demonstrate below, however, that the question of virtue remained the most important 
requirement for sovereignty for Eusebius, even in the case of the Constantinian dynasty (see 
discussion below, p. 291-92). 
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little matters whether such a person had gained his position through inheritance, or 
even whether he had been widely acknowledged as the ruler. 
This sense that even someone who, in being acknowledged by others, was in 
all outward appearance the emperor might not in fact be a true sovereign recurs 
throughout the LC. In this work, Eusebius sets up a contrast between the outer form 
and inner reality of a tyrant’s position. Eusebius introduces this distinction to his 
discussion of sovereignty in the prologue to the LC, when he announces that what 
will concern him in this speech is the nature of the difference between ‘the exemplar 
of kingship in our time and the fraudulent impression (τὸ χάραγμα 
κεκιβδηλευμένου)’.1152 The phrase which Eusebius chose to describe the opposite of 
his model king is worthy of note, since it is powerfully resonant of counterfeit 
coinage. The word ‘τὸ χάραγμα’ could refer generally to official, stamped 
documents, but also, importantly, to stamped money or coinage,1153 while 
‘κίβδηλος’, from the verb ‘κιβδηλεύω’ (‘to adulterate’), was used of adulterated 
coinage.1154 With this phrase, Eusebius is thereby equating the opposite of the model 
sovereign to a counterfeit coin, with all its associated connotations of falseness. Such 
a ruler may thus be seen as just as worthless and, potentially, just as socially 
damaging as counterfeit coinage. Crucially, however, Eusebius is drawing attention 
to an important distinction between appearance and reality: a counterfeit coin may 
‘look the part’, just as a tyrant may dress, act and even be treated like a sovereign. In 
reality, however, both are base, and without worth. 
                                                          
1152 LC Prol.5: …τοῦ τε καθ’ ἡμᾶς βασιλικοῦ παραδείγματος καὶ τοῦ τὸ χάραγμα 
κεκιβδηλευμένου… 
1153 LSJ, s.v. χάραγμα. 
1154 LSJ, s.v. κιβδηλεία. 
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Having established this important distinction at the very start of his oration, 
Eusebius is then able to pick up on this idea again later on. At LC 5.2, Eusebius 
makes his point explicit, saying that an emperor of this kind ‘might be thought at 
some time to rule with tyrannical force, but he will at no point be called king in true 
speech’.1155 Finally, at LC 7.6, Eusebius describes the rulers of the past, those who 
were enslaved to demons, as ‘those thought to rule’.1156 Once again, Eusebius makes 
an important point about the reality of these men’s sovereignty – it is deceptive, 
existing only in appearance but not in reality. As a result, Eusebius is able subtly to 
suggest that Constantine, as the true sovereign, did nothing wrong at all in 
attacking men such as Licinius, for, while they may have appeared to be his 
co-emperors, the reality was very different. 
For Eusebius, a tyrant’s vices thus become evidence of a deeper problem, only 
the outer manifestation of his inner condition. Of course these vices are troubling in 
themselves – in many cases they are characteristics that would prove unpleasant or 
even dangerous for a ruler’s subjects. Yet Eusebius is more concerned with the bad 
ruler’s enslavement, which, far more than his propensity for vice, is what really 
disqualifies him from ruling. Eusebius’ interest in the tyrants’ vices as evidence of 
their relationship with demons reflects his understanding of how demons might 
draw people away from salvation. As we have already seen,1157 Eusebius felt that 
the encouragement of vice was a key weapon in the demons’ arsenal. However, this 
was not the only means by which Eusebius believed the demons could lead people 
                                                          
1155 LC 5.2: …κἂν νομίζηταί ποτε τυραννικῇ βίᾳ κρατεῖν, ἀλλ’ οὔποτ’ ἀληθεῖ λόγῳ χρηματίσει 
βασιλεὺς οὑτος. 
1156 οἱ… κρατεῖν νομιζδομένοι… 
1157 Above, p. 192-93. 
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to damnation; he also stresses their role in promoting false belief.1158 Thus, since 
Eusebius suggests that vice, as a manifestation of demonic enslavement, disqualifies 
a person from ruling, we might also expect a similar suggestion that ‘incorrect’ 
belief be seen as a distinguishing feature of the ‘tyrant’. 
Sure enough, in Eusebius’ presentation of Constantine’s predecessors, we find 
repeated emphasis on the error of their religious beliefs.1159 Their faith in the pagan 
demon-gods, and particularly the folly of trusting in these lesser spiritual beings 
instead of the true Christian God is highlighted in Eusebius’ descriptions of the 
various civil wars between the Tetrarchs. When describing both the war between 
Licinius – at this point still presented as a virtuous sovereign – and Maximinus in 
the HE and that between Constantine and his erstwhile ally Licinius in the VC, 
Eusebius reminds his audience that the ‘tyrants’ placed their faith in the wrong 
spiritual forces and were defeated accordingly.1160 Indeed, as several scholars have 
previously recognised, the war between Constantine and Licinius is re-imagined in 
the VC almost as a ‘battle of the gods’, in which the Christian God is shown as 
victorious and therefore stronger.1161 For good measure, Eusebius further associates 
his tyrants not only with traditional civic worship, but also with other practices that 
would have been widely considered abhorrent, including by non-Christians. 
Maxentius, for example, is said to have cut open a pregnant woman as part of a 
magical ritual.1162 This is a practice which we also find condemned later in the 
                                                          
1158 DE 7.1.103. 
1159 As Farina noted: L’impero, 225-26, 231-32. 
1160 HE 9.10.2-4; VC 2.4.1-12.2. 
1161 Williams, Authorised Lives, 39. Cf. Cameron and Hall, Life of Constantine, 202-03 on the war between 
Constantine and Maxentius, and 231-34 on the war between Constantine and Licinius; Farina, L’impero, 
232. 
1162 VC 1.36.1; HE 8.14.5. 
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fourth century by the pagan historian Ammianus Marcellinus.1163 Licinius is 
similarly condemned for having recourse to magical practices.1164 For Eusebius, 
tyrants are thus characterised both by vice and by religious error, both of which, in 
his eyes, are manifestations of their enslavement to demons and hence are evidence 
that they are unsuited to positions of leadership. 
Moreover, the kind of ‘false’ belief encouraged by demons was not, for 
Eusebius, restricted to pagan practices, but also encompassed ‘heterodox’ Christian 
belief. This is less heavily emphasised as a feature of tyranny by Eusebius – 
unsurprisingly, given that Eusebius was mainly describing the ‘historical’ tyranny 
of Constantine’s predecessors, who were, of course, pagans, rather than Christians 
of any persuasion. Yet, in Eusebius’ presentation of Constantine we do find it 
clearly implied that, not just Christian belief, but ‘orthodox’ Christian belief was 
essential in a true sovereign. When discussing Constantine’s attitude towards God, 
Eusebius uses a range of different words which might loosely be covered by the 
English term ‘piety’, or ‘pious’, including ‘φιλόθεος’, ‘θεοσέβεια’ and 
‘εὐσέβεια’.1165 Of these, the ones that appear most frequently in connection with the 
emperor are ‘θεοσέβεια’ and ‘εὐσέβεια’.1166 The meaning of these two words is very 
                                                          
1163 Amm. Marc. 29.2.17. 
1164 VC 2.4.2, 2.11.2. Cf. on Maximinus HE 9.3.1. 
1165 For example, φιλόθεος: VC 1.22.2, 3.29.2, 4.64.2; θεοσέβεια: VC 1.3.4, 1.4.1, 1.8.2, 1.41.2, 4.52.1; 
εὐσέβεια: VC 1.5.2, 1.6.1, 1.8.4, 1.9.1, 1.12.3, 1.22.2, 1.39.3, 3.29.1, 3.54.6, 4.18.1, 4.24.1, 4.52.1. 
1166 Eusebius uses forms of the word θεοσέβεια and εὐσέβεια over ten times each in the VC to describe 
either Constantine or the kind of attitude which the emperor sought to encourage in his subjects and 
his sons. By contrast, forms of φιλόθεος are applied to Constantine or the state of his soul only three 
times in the VC. My calculations discount references in quoted documents and in chapter headings, 
where the wording is not Eusebius’ own. (On the fact that the chapter headings are not to be attributed 
to Eusebius, see Cameron and Hall, Life of Constantine, 24.) 
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similar and they often appear to be used almost interchangeably by Eusebius.1167 
Both words, with their basic meaning of ‘piety’ or ‘belief in God’, contrast 
favourably with the ‘δυσσέβεια’ (impiety) of tyrants like Licinius and Maxentius.1168 
However, they also have a secondary meaning which was surely significant, for 
they could both refer, not just to piety in general, but to ‘correct belief’ more 
specifically.1169 Religious devotion alone was not enough for someone to be 
described as ‘θεοσεβής’ or ‘εὐσεβής’; rather, that piety had to be correctly directed. 
The possibility that Eusebius wished to exclude from ruling those Christians whose 
views he regarded as heterodox cannot be ignored. 
Early in the VC, when describing the kind of example which Constantine 
provides to his subjects, Eusebius repeatedly describes him as a model of 
‘θεοσέβεια’.1170 Here, forms of the word appear three times in only eight lines of 
Winkelmann’s edition of the text, and this rapid repetition helps to emphasise the 
importance of this particular virtue. Moreover, on its second appearance here, it is 
further described as ‘απλάνος θεοσέβεια’, or ‘undeceived piety’.1171 The use of this 
adjective, which, as we have seen, appears frequently in Eusebius’ presentation of 
the demonic,1172 was surely deliberate. Eusebius seems to be emphasising the 
importance of Constantine’s orthodoxy here: Constantine’s view of God has not 
been led astray by the demons who inspire both ‘heresy’ and polytheism. By using 
these words ‘θεοσέβεια’ and ‘εὐσέβεια’ more often than ‘φιλόθεος’ to describe 
                                                          
1167 Farina suggests, however, that θεοσέβεια is a more specific virtue that may be encompassed within 
the broader εὐσέβεια, which he rightly identifies as one of the most important virtues of the ‘true 
emperor’ (‘del vero Imperatore’): L’impero, 211-12, 216. 
1168 VC 1.33.1; 1.49.2. 
1169 PGL, s.v. εὐσέβεια; θεοσέβεια. 
1170 VC 1.4.1. 
1171 Ibid. 
1172 See above, p. 184. 
277 
 
Constantine, it therefore seems that Eusebius meant to deny the possibility of ruling 
to ‘heterodox’ Christians, as well as pagans. 
For Eusebius, a tyrant cannot be a true sovereign because he is a slave of 
demons. A tyrant may be identified for Eusebius either by his vicious lifestyle or by 
his false belief. Thus, both virtue and ‘orthodox’ Christianity become the primary 
qualifications for sovereignty in Eusebius’ view. Of course, as we have seen, 
Eusebius was not the first Christian writer to imply – however obliquely – either 
that earlier, pagan emperors were tyrants, or to suggest that they might be acting 
under the influence of demons. Pagels argues that scholars have frequently 
underestimated the subversive core of earlier Christian apologists’ political message 
by disregarding their discussions of demons.1173 The same might be said of scholars’ 
treatment of Eusebius’ political thought. 
Of course Eusebius celebrates Constantine as the model of a virtuous 
Christian king,1174 but in doing so he also establishes strict criteria for determining 
who should be considered capable and worthy of ruling.1175 At root, it was essential 
that a ruler should be free from the influence of demons. In view of the demons’ 
role in encouraging both vice and ‘false’ belief, Eusebius has therefore found a 
straightforward way of identifying a tyrant, or potential tyrant. Any ruler who 
inclined either towards vicious behaviour, or towards religious beliefs with which 
Eusebius did not agree, would be demonstrating that they were closer to the 
demons than to God, thereby disqualifying themselves from government. This is a 
                                                          
1173 Pagels, ‘Christian Apologists’, 314, 323. 
1174 As scholars have long recognised – for example: Farina, L’impero, 10; J.M. Sansterre, ‘Eusèbe de 
Césarée et la naissance de la théorie “césaropapiste”’, Byzantion 42 (1972), 137, 155. 
1175 As Johnson has also previously noted: Ethnicity and Argument, 194. As Johnson has elsewhere 
pointed out, this was a key element of the ‘mirror for princes’ literature of which the VC at least is 
often said to be a part: Eusebius, 166-69. 
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particularly striking message if we remember that Eusebius wrote at least one of his 
most ‘political’ works, the VC, not, for the most part, under Constantine, but under 
his sons.1176 Since these new emperors had already recalled one of Eusebius’ 
theological enemies, Athanasius of Alexandria, from an exile imposed by, among 
others, Eusebius himself,1177 we may conclude that Eusebius was not entirely 
comfortable with the religious direction being taken by the new regime. It may have 
been couched in the language of praise for a Christian sovereign, but Eusebius’ 
message that an unacceptable ruler was enslaved to demons was potentially no less 
subversive than Justin Martyr’s earlier suggestion that the emperors Marcus 
Aurelius and Antoninus Pius were at risk of losing their independence to the power 
of demons.1178 
 
Divine and Demonic Μίμησις 
For Eusebius, however, this idea that tyrants and demons were linked was not 
simply a useful means of exerting some degree of moral influence over the 
emperors; rather, the idea that a ruler could be serving the forces of evil had 
considerable cosmological significance for Eusebius. In Eusebius’ view, a ruler’s 
relationship with either the divine or the demonic would have a particularly 
profound impact on the progress of the on-going struggle against the demons. 
Where earlier authors like Justin had urged the pagan emperors to turn to the 
                                                          
1176 On the dating and composition of the VC, see: Barnes, C&E, 263, 265, and Cameron and Hall, Life of 
Constantine, 9-12, as well as the discussion above, p. 57-62. 
1177 On the return of Athanasius, see: Barnes, C&E, 263-64; on Athanasius’ prior exile by the Council of 
Tyre, see: ibid. 235-40. 
1178 Justin, 1 Apol. 14. 
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Christian God for their own benefit,1179 Eusebius did not consider a ruler’s religious 
beliefs to be a purely personal matter. Instead, he suggests that a sovereign’s 
decision to follow either the divine or the demonic had the potential to affect not 
only his capacity to rule, but also the salvation and spiritual wellbeing of his 
subjects. This was because Eusebius believed that, by a process of μίμησις, or 
imitation, a ruler’s religious beliefs were likely to be adopted by many of his 
subjects. Thus, a ruler’s choices would affect not only his own salvation, but that of 
many of his subjects as well. As a result, while a Christian sovereign would lead his 
subjects away from demons, a non-Christian tyrant would encourage his subjects to 
turn towards the demonic, strengthening the position of the hostile forces in the 
continuing cosmic battle.  
The concept of μίμησις was a long-standing and prominent element of 
Hellenistic kingship theory and its adoption by Eusebius has long been noted by 
scholars like Chesnut.1180 Yet, in focusing on Eusebius’ presentation of Constantine 
as the mimetic image of the Christ-Logos, scholars have overlooked the fact that, in 
a non-Christian ruler, this spiritual μίμησις might take a – from Eusebius’ 
perspective – far more troubling form. The idea that a good sovereign was an image 
or imitation of the divine was well-established in Hellenistic thought, to the extent 
that Chesnut described it as ‘simply part of the general intellectual atmosphere’ of 
the period.1181 As far back as the second century BCE, writers had argued that a 
                                                          
1179 Pagels, ‘Christian Apologists’, 307, citing Justin 2 Apol. 15. 
1180 Chesnut, ‘The Ruler and the Logos’, 1329-31. Cf., for example, Baynes, ‘Eusebius and the Christian 
Empire’, 168-72, Cameron and Hall, Life of Constantine, 35, 187; Johnson, Ethnicity and Argument, 193-94; 
Farina, L’impero, 107-27. 
1181 Chesnut, ‘The Ruler and the Logos’, 1329. 
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ruler’s virtues came from the gods and were a reflection of divine virtues.1182 By the 
first century CE this idea was widespread: it can be found in the work of both 
Plutarch and Philo, among others.1183 Plutarch’s statement that ‘a ruler is an icon of 
god’ in his treatise To An Uneducated Ruler neatly encapsulates this theory.1184 The 
crucial element of this idea, as Plutarch expressed it, was that it was chiefly through 
mirroring the virtues of the divine that a ruler would be able to become in some 
measure semi-divine himself. Plutarch asserts that ‘through virtue he [the 
sovereign] establishes a resemblance to god’.1185 This appears to have been an 
extension of the earlier belief that self-control was essential for a good sovereign, 
since it would allow him to govern effectively and virtuously.1186 
Eusebius was clearly influenced by this tradition when developing his own 
understanding of virtuous sovereignty, as many scholars have recognised.1187 In the 
VC, for instance, Eusebius suggests that Constantine has been given ‘the icon of his 
[God’s] sole power’.1188 Indeed, throughout both the VC and the LC, the concept of 
μίμησις occupies a prominent place in Eusebius’ articulation of his ideal of 
sovereignty. Eusebius introduces the idea early in the LC: 
                                                          
1182 D.E. Hahm, ‘Kings and Constitutions: Hellenistic Theories’, in C. Rowe and M. Schofield, eds., The 
Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 
462. 
1183 For discussion of these ideas, see: Chesnut, ‘The Ruler and the Logos’, 1310-32 and B. Centrone, 
‘Platonism and Pythagoreanism in the early empire’, in C. Rowe and M. Schofield, eds., The Cambridge 
History of Greek and Roman Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 559-84. 
1184 Plut., To an Uneducated Ruler 780e: …ἄρχων δ’ εἰκών θεοῦ… 
1185 Ibid.: …ἀλλ’ αὐτὸς αὑτὸν εἰς ὁμοιότητα θεῷ δι’ ἀρετῆς καθιστὰς… 
1186 Hahm, ‘Kings and Constitutions’, 463. 
1187 For example: Dvornik, Political Philosophy, II.614-22; F. Young, ‘Christianity’, in C. Rowe and M. 
Schofield, eds., The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), 651; Baynes, ‘Eusebius and the Christian Empire’, 168-72; Farina, L’impero, 107-
27; most recently: P. Van Nuffelen, ‘The Life of Constantine: The Image of an Image’, in Johnson and 
Schott, eds., Eusebius: Tradition and Innovations, 137. 
1188 VC 1.5.1: τῆς δ’ αὐτοῦ μοναρχικῆς ἐξουσίας τὴν εἰκόνα δούς… 
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αὐτὸς δ’ ἂν εἴη ὁ τοῦδε τοῦ σύμπαντος καθηγεμὼν κόσμου, ὁ ἐπὶ 
πάντων καὶ διὰ πάντων καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν ὁρωμένοις τε καὶ ἀφανέσιν 
ἐπιπορευόμενος τοῦ θεοῦ λόγος, παρ’ οὗ καὶ δι’ οὗ τῆς ἀνωτάτω 
βασιλείας τὴν εἰκόνα φέρων ὁ τῷ θεῷ φίλος βασιλεὺς κατὰ μίμησιν 
τοῦ κρείττονος τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς ἁπάντων τοὺς οἴακας διακυβερνῶν 
ἰθύνει.1189 
And this is the one who rules the whole of this universe, who is above 
everything and through everything and in everything, both seen and 
unseen, the penetrating Logos of God, by whom and through whom the 
king who is a friend of God, carrying the icon of the highest kingdom, as 
an imitation of the best one [i.e. God], steering the ship, directs as a 
guide all things on earth. 
Here, Eusebius appears to have picked up on several of the essentials of this idea as 
expressed by earlier Greek writers, including the notion that the good sovereign 
carried the ‘image’ of the divine and that he ruled ‘as an imitation’ of God.1190 The 
idea is also expressed in terms with which even non-Christians in Eusebius’ 
audience would have been familiar. It would, however, be a mistake to suggest that 
Eusebius was therefore simply using the concept in order to appeal to an audience 
whose sympathies lay more with Hellenistic philosophy than with Christianity, for 
similar ideas also run through the more overtly Christian VC. Here, in his 
description of Constantine’s vicennalia celebrations, Eusebius writes that the 
occasion ‘seemed as if it were an imagined icon of Christ’s kingdom’.1191 In this case, 
the idea of μίμησις is expressed in unmistakably Christian terms. As a result, it is 
clear that this idea of the ruler as an image of the divine formed an important part 
of Eusebius’ understanding of virtuous sovereignty. 
                                                          
1189 LC 1.6. 
1190 For similar ideas, see: Plut. To an Uneducated Ruler 780e-f; Ecphant. On Kingship 245.5, 272.13-14, 
274.14-16; Diotog. On Kingship 265.8-12; Sthenid. On Kingship 270.14-17. The treatises of Ecphantus, 
Diotogenes and Sthedias, preserved by Stobaeus, are cited here by their Hense page and line numbers. 
Baynes, in particular, highlighted the similarities between these three treatises and the LC of Eusebius: 
Baynes, ‘Eusebius and the Christian Empire’, 168-72. 
1191 VC 3.15.2: Χριστοῦ βασιλείας ἔδοξεν ἄν τις φαντασιοῦσθαι εἰκόνα… 
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However, despite these similarities, in suggesting that Eusebius ‘simply took 
over’ earlier Hellenistic ideas on the topic of divine μίμησις, scholars like Chesnut 
overlook an important difference between these earlier views and those of 
Eusebius.1192 Crucially, in Eusebius’ version of the theory, it was not only μίμησις of 
the divine, but also μίμησις of the demonic that was possible. In earlier kingship 
theory, a failure on the part of the sovereign to mirror effectively the virtues of the 
divine would undoubtedly mean that he would not be a good ruler, but it did not 
mean that he would imitate instead an alternative, evil spiritual power. For 
Eusebius, by contrast, it appears that a ruler must be imitating some sort of spiritual 
power, and if that was not the true Christian God, then it could only be the wicked 
demons who tried to so often to usurp the true place of God.1193 As a result, for 
Eusebius, the failure of divine μίμησις became not simply a regrettable lapse, but a 
dangerous error of choice, in which the ruler came to side with the forces of evil 
against goodness, virtue and piety. 
That Eusebius held μίμησις of the demonic to be a worrying possibility is 
made clear in the LC, in a passage which contrasts the soul of the virtuous sovereign 
with the souls of his tyrannical enemies. Eusebius begins his discussion with what 
appears to be a fairly standard expression of the theory of divine μίμησις – 
Constantine is praised for ‘having admitted into his soul the outpourings from there 
[i.e. from God]’, and is therefore said to share in God’s wisdom, goodness, justice, 
and courage.1194 Yet Eusebius rapidly switches his attention to the unnamed 
tyrannical ruler, who is said to have ‘taken the disfigured and dishonourable into 
                                                          
1192 Chesnut, ‘The Ruler and the Logos’, 1332. 
1193 On the demons’ desire to usurp God’s position and honours, see: PE 7.16.10. 
1194 LC 5.1: …τὰς ἐκεῖθεν ἀπορρίας τῇ ψυχῇ καταδεδεγμένος… 
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his soul’.1195 This, Eusebius makes clear, is because this tyrant ‘has stamped 
(τετυπωμένος) on his soul numberless falsely drawn icons of demons’.1196 The 
contrast with the good sovereign, who has the image of God in his soul, is obvious. 
It is equally clear from Eusebius’ juxtaposition of these two figures that he 
considered the relationship between the tyrannical ruler and the demons to be an 
inverted form of mimetic relationship between the virtuous king and the truly 
divine Christian God. This is made still clearer by Eusebius’ suggestion that the bad 
ruler ‘has taken the rage of a savage wild-beast in exchange for kingly 
gentleness’.1197 Unrestrained rage may have been a traditional feature of a bad 
ruler,1198 but the reference to a ‘savage wild-beast’ immediately brings to mind the 
demons which Eusebius elsewhere describes in similar terms.1199 It seems that, for 
Eusebius, the bad ruler, in forming the image of demons in his soul, has also 
adopted some of their other characteristics.  
Of course, Eusebius was not the first writer to express an interest in the 
contents of a tyrant’s soul – Plato had suggested that a human tyrant might have an 
inner tyrant residing in his own soul.1200 Yet for Plato it was ὁ ἔρως (passion/desire) 
                                                          
1195 LC 5.2: …ἀμορφίαν δὲ καὶ αἴσχος ἀναλαβὼν τῇ ψυχῇ… 
1196 LC 5.3: …ὁ μυρίας ἐψευδογραφημένας δαιμόνων εἰκόνας τῇ αὐτοῦ ψυχῇ τετυπωμένος; We have 
already seen (above, p. 187-89) that the tyrant may be held to account for his association with demons, 
since he submits to them through his own free choice. 
1197 LC 5.2: …θηρὸς μὲν ἀγρίου θυμὸν βασιλικῆς ἡμερότητος ἀντικαταλλαξάμενος… 
1198 See for example: Hdt. 1.73; Philo Leg. ad Gaium 366. For further examples, and a discussion of this 
theme in Greek and Roman literature, see: W.V. Harris, Restraining Rage: The Ideology of Anger Control 
in Classical Antiquity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 229-63. 
1199 See, for example: PE 4.17.9, VC 1.49.1; HE 10.4.14; DE 10.8.73; Theoph. 3.13, 3.55. Cf. LC 2.3 on ‘the 
rebellious powers’ (τὰς ἀποστατικὰς δυνάμεις). 
1200 Plat. Rep. 9.575c-d. On Plato’s idea of the ‘tyrannical soul’, see the discussion in M. Schofield, Plato: 
Political Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 265-70. D.J. O’Meara suggests that the 
Republic, particularly its portrait of a tyrant, was ‘an obvious and lajor source of inspiration’: 
Platonopolis: Platonic Political Philosophy in Late Antiquity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003), 147-48. 
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that tyrannised the tyrant’s soul.1201 In making the force dominating a tyrant’s soul 
an external, spiritual power, Eusebius opens up the possibility that the tyrant may 
also be engaged in a negative process of μίμησις in a way that Plato had not. Thus, 
while scholars generally focus on the idea of Constantine’s μίμησις of the divine in 
Eusebius’ works, there can be no doubt that he also allowed for the more dangerous 
possibility of μίμησις of the demonic. 
Moreover, Eusebius’ use of the verb τυπόω (to stamp) to describe how the 
tyrant acquires the images of demons in his soul is a reminder once again that a bad 
ruler was not a passive victim of the demons, but rather an active participant in 
their wickedness. This word is found in earlier Stoic psychology,1202 appearing in 
Diogenes Laertius’ account of Zeno to describe the way in which an external 
impression (φαντασία) makes a mark on the human soul: 
Τὴν δὲ φαντασίαν εἶναι τύπωσιν ἐν ψυχῇ, τοῦ ὀνόματος οἰκείως 
μετενηνεγμένου ἀπὸ τῶν τύπων τῶν ἐν τῷ κηρῷ ὑπὸ τοῦ δακτυλίου 
γινομένων. 1203 
A phantasia is a moulding on the soul, fittingly taking its name from the 
impressions which are brought about by a signet ring in sealing-wax. 
Yet, for the Stoics, receiving such an impression in the soul was not an entirely 
passive process; rather, it also involved actively accepting the impression.1204 Thus 
people also had a role to play in forming impressions in their souls. This is best 
illustrated by Philo, who wrote in his Legum allegoriae: 
ἡ μὲν οὖν φαντασία συνίσταται κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ἐκτὸς πρόσοδον 
τυποῦντος νοῦν δι’ αἰσθήσεως, ἡ δὲ ὁρμή, τὸ ἀδελφὸν τῆς 
φαντασίας, κατὰ τὴν τοῦ νοῦ τονικὴν δύναμιν, ἣν τείνας δι’ 
                                                          
1201 Ibid. 574e-575a. 
1202 For a straightforward account of Stoic φαντασίαι, see: M. Frede, ‘Stoic Epistemology’, in K. Algra, 
J. Barnes, J. Mansfeld and M. Schofield, eds., The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 300-13. 
1203 D.L. 7.45. 
1204 Frede, ‘Stoic Epistemology’, 306-07. 
285 
 
αἰσθήσεως ἅπτεται τοῦ ὑποκειμένου καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸ χωρεῖ 
γλιχόμενος ἐφικέσθαι καὶ συλλαβεῖν αὐτό.1205 
And so phantasia is composed from the approach of an external thing 
moulding the mind through sensation, while impulse, the brother of 
phantasia, is composed from the stretching power of the mind, which, 
stretching out through sensation, fastens on to the thing before it and 
travels towards it, longing to attain and come together with it. 
Although Philo’s philosophy was by no means exclusively Stoic,1206 A.A. Long 
suggests that, in this particular case, Philo’s discussion largely reflects Stoic ideas.1207 
This passage shows that, in the Stoic view, forming an impression on the soul or on 
the mind was an active process, in which the human being had to participate. Of 
course, in this case Eusebius is discussing images of demons, rather than φαντασίαι 
in general, but it is hard to believe that he would not have had this Stoic idea of 
active participation in mind when selecting the verb τυπόω. We know that Eusebius 
was familiar with Philo’s Legum Allegoriae, for he mentions it in his catalogue of 
Philo’s works in the HE.1208 Once again, Eusebius subtly conveys the idea that these 
bad rulers have chosen to collaborate with the demons by allowing these false 
images to be stamped on their souls. 
This idea that bad rulers might be engaged in active μίμησις of the demonic 
has further implications for Eusebius’ understanding of the capacity of a non-
Christian to rule. No one enslaved to demonically inspired religious error, be that 
polytheism or ‘heresy’, could hope to be a virtuous sovereign, for as far as Eusebius 
was concerned they have chosen the wrong model to imitate. As long as they do not 
recognise the ‘correct’ divinity, they cannot meet the requirement of Hellenistic 
                                                          
1205 Philo Leg. 1.30. 
1206 On the variety of different influences on Philo’s thought, see, most recently: L. Kerns, ‘Soul and 
Passions in Philo of Alexandria’, Studia Patristica 63 (2013), 141-54. 
1207 A.A. Long, ‘Stoic Psychology’, in K. Algra, J. Barnes, J. Mansfeld and M. Schofield, eds., The 
Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 573. 
1208 HE 2.18.1; Carriker, Library, 165. 
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kingship theory that the good sovereign should imitate the divine, for they have 
chosen the wrong exemplar upon which to model themselves and their behaviour. 
By contrast with the tyrants, whose enslavement to demons is so heavily 
emphasised, Eusebius in the VC describes Constantine as a ‘slave’ (δοῦλος) and a 
‘servant’ (θεράπων) of God.1209 Moreover, Eusebius makes it clear in the same 
passage that Constantine is happy to describe himself in these terms.1210 If tyrants, 
by enslaving themselves to wicked masters, have made a fundamental error of 
judgement by choosing the wrong spiritual model to copy, Constantine, as a slave 
of the true God, has selected the correct model to follow and might therefore be able 
to achieve the level of virtue necessary to govern in the divine image. Eusebius is 
thus able in the VC to set up a contrast between the ‘good’ slavery of Constantine 
and the ‘bad’ slavery of the tyrants, thereby helping to emphasise the wide gulf that 
separates them. 
At first sight, it might appear somewhat contradictory that Eusebius is able in 
one work, the VC, to describe Constantine as a ‘slave’,1211 and in another, the LC, to 
refer to him as ‘truly self-ruling’.1212 Yet this does not in fact represent any 
inconsistency in Eusebius’ thought; rather, it demonstrates the variety of different 
traditions which influenced his manner of expression. In the Greek and Roman 
tradition, particularly from the third century onwards, a ruler would often be 
presented as a friend or companion of the divine.1213 It is this metaphor of friendship 
that Eusebius employs extensively in the LC, although he also describes Constantine 
                                                          
1209 VC 1.6.1, 1.46.1. 
1210 VC 1.6.1. 
1211 Ibid. 
1212 LC 5.4: …αὐτοκράτωρ ἀληθῶς… 




in these terms in the VC and other works.1214 At the same time, however, there was 
also a tradition in Jewish literature of describing the pious, particularly prophets 
and kings, as ‘slaves of God’.1215 Philo, combining Greek and Jewish influences in 
his thought, had shown himself, like Eusebius, to be familiar with both possible 
metaphors for describing this relationship with God.1216 Although Philo appears to 
have preferred the metaphor of friendship to that of slavery, arguing that someone 
who was wise should be described as a friend of God rather than a slave,1217 he was 
nevertheless prepared to use the verb δουλεύω (to be a slave) to describe a pious 
person’s relationship to God.1218 For Eusebius’ understanding of ‘good’ slavery, 
however, it was more likely the epistles of Paul that proved most influential. This 
notion of slavery to God as a positive condition, even a source of pride, is extremely 
prominent in Paul’s letters.1219 Paul regularly describes himself either as δοῦλος 
θεοῦ or δοῦλος Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ.1220 Moreover, it is a term that he also applies to the 
recipients of his letters.1221 Thus, within Christian thought, it was perfectly possible 
to be enslaved in a positive sense, provided that enslavement was to God, and God 
alone. 
For Eusebius, then, these separate ideas of tyrannical enslavement to demons 
and of μίμησις combined to suggest that anyone who was not an ‘orthodox’ 
Christian was incapable of ruling as a virtuous sovereign, according to the 
                                                          
1214 For example: LC 1.6, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 5.1, 5.4; VC 1.3.4, 1.52.1; HE 10.8.6, 10.9.2. Cameron regards this 
as ‘a translation of [the motif] of the emperor as divine comes’: ‘Construction’, 157-58. 
1215 C. Hezser, Jewish Slavery in Antiquity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 327, citing Mal. 3:22; 
2 Sam 3:18; Ps. 18:1; 1 Kgs 11:13; Ezek 34:23-4. 
1216 Hezser, Jewish Slavery, 330. 
1217 Philo, De sobrietate 55, cited in Heszer, Jewish Slavery, 330. 
1218 Philo, De cherubim 107, cited in Heszer, Jewish Slavery, 330. 
1219 Paul develops a distinction between ‘slavery to sin’ and ‘slavery to God’ in his letters, the former 
being a bad condition, while the latter is good: Garnsey, Ideas of Slavery, 183-86. 
1220 See, for example: Romans 1:1; Philippians 1:1; Titus 1:1. 
1221 For example: Colossians 3:24: τῷ κυρίῳ Χριστῷ δουλεύετε. 
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requirements set out by long-standing theories of kingship. Yet Eusebius also 
envisaged a second level of μίμησις, which led him to see the tyrant’s enslavement 
to demons as a problem of cosmological significance. This was because, in Eusebius’ 
view, demonic error might spread through the figure of the ruler to infect the entire 
state. Eusebius’ statement in the VC that Constantine’s ‘tyrannical’ predecessors had 
‘first enslaved themselves and afterwards all of their subjects to the errors of wicked 
demons’ makes this process clear.1222 As a result of the ruler’s mistaken faith in 
demons, his subjects have also been drawn into the power of the demonic. In this, 
Eusebius was once again drawing on earlier ideas. According to earlier Greek 
philosophy, the good ruler, by imitating the divine, could lead his subjects towards 
the divine, encouraging them to imitate a lifestyle of godly virtue and rationality.1223 
Philo had written that ‘the obscure are the emulators of those who are esteemed 
and, that which they [the esteemed] seem especially to reach out for, towards such 
things do they [the obscure] extend their own impulses’.1224 In the context of a 
tyrannical ruler, this meant that ‘whenever a leader starts to revel in luxury and to 
decline towards a luxurious life, practically all his subjects also fan up the desires of 
the stomach and others besides those of the stomach, over and above what is 
necessary’.1225 In other words, Philo argued that the majority of a ruler’s subjects 
would seek to imitate their leader’s behaviour, for better or worse. For Eusebius, 
                                                          
1222 VC 1.13.3: …σφᾶς αὐτοὺς πρότερον κἄπειτα τοὺς ὑπηκόους ἅπαντας πονηρῶν δαιμόνων 
πλάναις κατεδουλοῦντο… 
1223 Chesnut, ‘The Ruler and the Logos’, 1312. 
1224 Philo, De Vita Mosis, 1.160: …ὅτι ζηλωταὶ τῶν ἐνδόξων οἱ ἀρανεῖς εἰσι καί, ὧν ἂν ἐκεῖνοι μάλιστ’ 
ὀρέγεσθαι δοκῶσι, πρὸς ταῦτα τὰς αὑτῶν ἀποτείνουσιν ὁρμάς. 
1225 Ibid.: ἐπειδὰν γοῦν ἡγεμὼν ἄρξηται καθηδυπαθεῖν καὶ πρὸς τὸν ἁβροδίαιτον ἀποκλίνειν βίον, 




however, it was not simply the tyrants’ behaviour that people would imitate, but – 
far more worryingly – their devotion to the demons. 
This would have deep implications not only for the salvation of those 
concerned, but for the progress of salvation history more broadly. Non-Christian 
rulers could slow, if not reverse, the decline of demonic power by ensuring that the 
majority of people continued to turn to the demons in imitation of their emperors. 
Indeed, in the DE Eusebius is explicit about the fact that, for much of its history, the 
Roman empire had done little to assist the spread of Christianity.1226 Eusebius 
suggests that the anti-Christian measures put forward by earlier emperors were 
permitted by God in order to demonstrate the power of the Christian message. It 
was important, he argues, that Christian worship should ‘not be thought to have 
endured because of the acquiescence of the rulers’.1227 
The significance of this idea that subjects would imitate a ruler’s religious 
beliefs and practices to Eusebius’ thinking on kingship is further reflected in his 
presentation of Constantine. In contrast to the tyrants, Constantine in the VC is ‘a 
clear model of a pious life to all men’,1228 while, in the LC, he ‘calls up the entire 
human nation to the knowledge of the best one [i.e. God]’.1229 The crucial point is 
that, in the figure of Constantine, God has provided people with the correct model 
of virtue to imitate. Eusebius’ use of the verb ἀνακαλέω (to call upwards), with the 
prefix ἀνα- indicating a positive movement upwards contrasts strikingly with the 
kind of language that he uses of tyrants and demons. For these rulers, Eusebius 
                                                          
1226 DE 3.7.36-38. As Johnson similarly noted: Ethnicity and Argument, 179. 
1227 DE 3.7.36: Πάλιν τε αὔ ὡς μὴ νομισθείη κατὰ συγχώρησιν τῶν κρατούντων διαρκέσειν· 
1228 VC 1.3.4: …ἐναργὲς ἅπασιν ἀνθπώποις παράδειγμα θεοσεβοῦς… βίου. 
1229 LC 2.4: …πᾶν γένος ἀνθρώπινον ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ κρείττονος ἀνακαλεῖται γνῶσιν… 
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prefers to apply the prefix κατα- to verbs describing their style of government, 
suggesting a negative, downwards movement.1230 Where Constantine leads people 
into a better condition, a non-Christian ruler would encourage people to fall to a 
lesser state. A ruler like Constantine, with ‘correct’ religious beliefs, is able to guide 
his subjects towards God, while a ruler enslaved to demons would lead them down 




Eusebius is often presented as a pillar of the political establishment, an imperial 
sycophant who ‘placed himself and his pen unconditionally at the service of the 
Emperor’.1231 According to Chesnut, Eusebius’ political and historical thought was 
established ‘as the official ideology of the Christian empire’.1232 Yet our examination 
of the role which Eusebius believed demons could play in the political system 
suggests that Eusebius would not be unreservedly supportive of the political 
establishment. On the contrary, Eusebius had strict requirements of those wishing 
to considered ‘true sovereigns’, in which both virtue and faith featured heavily. Of 
course, Eusebius was not quite as subversive as those earlier thinkers studied by 
Pagels. Pagels suggests that writers like Athenagoras had adopted a radically 
egalitarian approach, in which all people, or at least all Christians, were to be 
considered equal.1233 Eusebius does not go nearly so far. Indeed, we know from the 
                                                          
1230 See, for example: HE 10.2.1, 10.9.3; VC 1.12.2, and discussion above, p. 139. 
1231 Quasten, Patrology, iii.319. Cf. Brown, World of Late Antiquity, 86. 
1232 Chesnut, ‘The Ruler and the Logos’, 1329. Cf. Dvornik, Political Philosophy, II.617; Baynes, ‘Eusebius 
and the Christian Empire’, 168. 
1233 Pagels, ‘Christian Apologists’, 319-20, citing Athenag. Leg. 25. 
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DE that he believed that different Christians would exercise different levels of 
virtue, to the extent that he envisaged two different paths towards God for these 
different groups.1234 
Eusebius is certainly a long way from suggesting that just any Christian 
would be capable of ruling. His works consequently offer some other possible 
justifications for imperial rule, alongside those of virtue and religious belief.1235 Of 
these, the most prominent is the idea of inheritance. In both the LC and the VC, 
Eusebius stresses the continuity between Constantine and his sons as rulers of the 
empire. In the LC, this consists of a brief reference to Constantine sharing the rule of 
the empire with his sons as Caesars.1236 However, it is stressed much more strongly 
in the VC, where the idea of the imperial throne descending from father to son 
appears both towards the beginning and the end of the work.1237 This serves to 
frame Constantine’s reign with the idea of a smooth transition of imperial power. At 
VC 1.9.2, Eusebius describes how ‘the throne of the empire’ (ὁ θρόνος τῆς 
βασιλείας) passed from Constantius to Constantine and then on to his own sons, 
stressing the idea of continuity. Here, Eusebius likens the empire to ‘an inheritance’ 
(τις πατρῷος). This word is used again towards the end of the work, when 
Eusebius discusses how Constantine divided the empire among his three sons ‘as if 
allocating something in the nature of an inheritance to those most dear to him’.1238 
                                                          
1234 DE 1.8.1-4. 
1235 Farina suggests that Eusebius combines ‘the principle of the divine origin of power’ (‘dell’origine 
divina del potere’), with that of the ‘elective’ (‘elettivo’) and ‘hereditary’ (‘ereditario’) origins: L’impero, 
169. 
1236 LC 3.1. 
1237 Cameron and Hall, Life of Constantine, 334. 
1238 VC 4.51.1: …οἷά τινα πατρῴαν οὐσίαν τοῖς αὐτοῦ κληροδοτῶν φιλτάτοις. 
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This is a striking word to use, as if to suggest that the empire belongs by right to 
Constantine’s family. 
Yet there remains a sense that this inheritance is a gift of God: in the LC it is 
God who appoints Constantine’s sons as Caesars. Moreover, this is said to be just 
one of an increasing number of rewards which God gives to Constantine, ‘in 
exchange for his holy acts towards him [God]’.1239 Indeed, while the word πατρῷος 
traditionally referred to something which was inherited from one’s father,1240 among 
Christian writers the word could also refer to something which belonged to God, as 
the Father.1241 As such, Eusebius’ language here also hints that the empire in fact 
continues to belong to God, and remains God’s to give away or to entrust to a 
chosen ruler. Therefore, while the importance of inheritance is undoubtedly 
stressed, this remains at root a reward for Constantine’s piety towards God – 
further evidence of the fact the his religious beliefs are the ‘correct’ ones. In 
consequence, it is also an inheritance that might be removed in the case of a failure 
of piety on the part of one of Constantine’s successors. 
Eusebius’ first loyalty therefore lies with God in the battle against the demons, 
rather than with the emperor and the imperial family. Any failure, either of virtue 
or of faith, would, according to Eusebius’ understanding of sovereignty, see a figure 
disqualified from government. If Constantine’s actions against Licinius, who had at 
one point been presented by Eusebius as a sovereign appointed by God and 
rewarded for his faith, were valid and justifiable on the grounds of Licinius’ later 
                                                          
1239 LC 3.1: …ἀμοιβαίως ταῖς εἰς αὐτὸν ὁσίαις… 
1240 LSJ, s.v. πατρῷος. 
1241 PGL, s.v. πατρῷος. 
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turn towards the demons, then future action against other emperors who similarly 
failed to remain true to the Christian God might be similarly justifiable. 
As a result of the foregoing analysis of Eusebius’ understanding of the 
broader cosmological significance of the ruler, we are also able to locate the figure 
of Constantine more precisely within Eusebius’ historical and cosmological vision. 
Chesnut suggests that Eusebius identified the pax Romana with the final, 
eschatological ‘Kingdom of Peace’ and envisaged a brief future of not more than a 
few centuries, during which the Constantinian dynasty would rule as eschatological 
saviour-figures.1242 This seems implausible in view of the fact that Eusebius ended 
his life theologically on the defensive, eying a future in which it was by no means 
certain that Constantine’s descendants would share Eusebius’ precise 
understanding of Christian truth, and hence remain free from demonic influence. 
Eusebius certainly considered Constantine to have a role to play in bringing people 
to salvation and driving forward the defeat of the demons as a result of a process of 
μίμησις. This role was significant, however, not because Constantine represented 
the concluding figure of human history, but rather because he was operating as part 
of a finely poised and closely fought battle against the demons. Constantine’s 
importance for Eusebius is best understood in the context of the continuing struggle 
against demonic influence. 
                                                          




The aim of this study has been to explore the ways in which Eusebius’ ideas about 
the demonic influenced and interacted with his thinking on a range of other subjects 
that comprised his political ideas. It began with a survey of Eusebius’ oeuvre that 
sought to situate his surviving writings in the context of the political and religious 
upheavals of the era. This was followed by an essential examination of Eusebius’ 
understanding of the demonic, filling a gap in previous scholarship on Eusebius. 
This showed that Eusebius believed firmly in the reality of demonic power, 
regarding these beings as a hostile, active presence in the universe. A further 
chapter demonstrated how Eusebius’ belief in malevolent demonic forces helped to 
structure his thought, resulting in a cosmology of starkly divided, warring 
opposites. 
With the role of demons in Eusebius’ cosmology clearly established, the 
fourth chapter began to examine how these ideas helped to shape other areas of 
Eusebius’ thought. This chapter looked at the interplay between demonic influence 
and human free choice in Eusebius’ descriptions of wicked activity. It revealed the 
importance of the concept of προαίρεσις in Eusebius’ understanding of moral 
responsibility and showed that Eusebius regarded the maintenance of high 
standards of virtue as essential to securing salvation. The fifth chapter examined the 
role of demons in Eusebius’ understanding of history, challenging the widespread 
scholarly view that Eusebius believed all demonic power to have ceased with the 
incarnation. This showed that Eusebius considered virtuous, exemplary Christian 
leadership – of both church and empire – to be essential in an on-going struggle to 
resist demonic influence. Finally, the sixth chapter turned to examine Eusebius’ 
295 
 
presentation of imperial sovereignty and the figure of Constantine. It revealed that 
Eusebius was by no means unconditional in his support for the Roman emperor; 
rather, he demanded a particularly high standard of ‘orthodox’ piety from those 
wishing to be seen as the true ruler. Only in this way would the emperor be able to 
perform the essential role of leading his subjects on the journey towards salvation. 
Taken together, the conclusions of this study are striking, compelling us to 
reassess the common conclusion of scholars that Eusebius was complacently 
triumphalist in his vision of history and his understanding of the position of the 
Christian church. At each stage Eusebius has been revealed as far more cautious 
than his usual characterisation suggests, deeply concerned about a continuing 
threat to human salvation from malevolent demonic forces. This concern led him to 
lay great weight on the importance of a virtuous Christian lifestyle in order to avoid 
the deceits of the demons and remain on the path to salvation. For Eusebius, 
complete Christian triumph still lay in the future and was dependent upon the 
maintenance of virtue by all Christian souls. 
Of course, this study is not the first to reassess the traditional caricature of 
Eusebius as a servile imperial sycophant, who ’placed… his pen unconditionally at 
the service of the Emperor’.1243 Aaron Johnson has already presented us with a far 
more independent Eusebius, whose ambivalence about the role of the Roman 
empire persisted even after Constantine’s unification of east and west.1244 Michael 
Hollerich has likewise suggested that the importance of high political concerns in 
shaping Eusebius’ thought has been over-emphasised in the scholarship and has 
                                                          
1243 Quasten, Patrology iii, 319. Cf. Brown, World of Late Antiquity, 86. 
1244 Johnson, Ethnicity and Argument, 153-97. 
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highlighted the importance of his thinking on the role of the church.1245 Other 
long-standing assumptions about Eusebius’ outlook have similarly been challenged: 
F.S. Thielman questioned the notion of Eusebius’ ‘realised eschatology’ and in the 
process perhaps came closer than anyone to querying the triumphalist 
interpretation of Eusebius, although he stopped short of directly challenging this 
view.1246 
In questioning this further, longstanding assumption about Eusebius – that he 
should be characterised as a triumphal optimist – this study therefore has strong 
foundations in recent scholarship. Nevertheless, it leaves us with a picture of 
Eusebius that is strikingly different even from that found in the most up-to-date 
work on Eusebius.1247 It is a more nuanced picture, in which Eusebius’ outlook 
might be better described as cautiously positive than complacently triumphalist. By 
focusing on Eusebius’ ideas about demons, this study has revealed a new side to 
Eusebius. It has also highlighted several possible avenues for future research. 
It has not been possible in the space available to examine fully the sources of 
and possible influences on Eusebius’ ideas about demons. We have observed a 
range of possible influences, from the works of Plato and Porphyry, to Jewish 
apocalyptic writings such as 1 Enoch, but further work on this might reveal more 
both about Eusebius’ own intellectual background, and about trends in Christian 
demonology in the late third and early fourth centuries. Eusebius’ profound 
                                                          
1245 Hollerich, ‘Religion and Politics’; Hollerich, Eusebius’ Commentary on Isaiah. 
1246 Thielman, ‘Another Look’. 
1247 Johnson, for instance, continues to stress the ‘triumphalism’ of Eusebius’ views: ‘The Ends of 
Transfiguration’, 196. Cf. Simmons, ‘Universalism in Eusebius’, 132-33. 
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intellectual debt to Origen has often been highlighted by scholars;1248 recently, 
however, some have started to question the extent of Eusebius’ dependence on 
Origen and to focus instead on areas of difference between the two writers.1249 
Origen’s works contain a rich and intriguing demonology1250 and a comparison 
between the views of Origen and Eusebius on demons might therefore offer a 
valuable new perspective on this debate. 
Work on the reception of the Enochic story of the Watcher angels suggests 
that, by the late third and early fourth centuries, this interpretation of Genesis 6:1-4 
was falling out of favour among Christian writers,1251 to be replaced by an 
interpretation in which the references to ‘angels’ were reinterpreted to describe 
pious humans, who had strayed from their virtuous lifestyle.1252 Lactantius is cited 
in this scholarship as the last significant writer to adopt the angelic interpretation of 
Genesis 6,1253 yet, as we have seen,1254 hints of this story can also be found in some of 
Eusebius’ works. Examining the traces of this account in Eusebius’ writings could 
therefore prove instructive for those wishing to trace the decline of this 
interpretation among Christian authors. 
From a broader perspective, this study has also demonstrated the importance 
of analysing ideas about demons in the works of urban, intellectual Christians of 
                                                          
1248 See, most recently: Penland, ‘The History of the Caesarean Present’, esp. 93; Ramelli, ‘The Doctrine 
of Apocatastasis’. 
1249 For example: Corke-Webster, ‘Mothers and Martyrdom’, 55; Hollerich, ‘Eusebius’ Commentary on 
the Psalms’, 164; Zamagni, ‘New Perspectives’, 243; Johnson, ‘The Ends of Transfiguration’, 201-02. 
1250 For example: Cels. 1.6, 1.67, 2.51, 3.2, 3.29, 3.37, 4.32, 4.92-93, 7.6, 7.35, 7.67-70, 8.30; De Princ. 3.2.1-7. 
On Origen’s demonology, see: Marx-Wolf, ‘Third Century Daimonologies’; T. Mikoda, ‘A Comparison 
of the Demonologies of Origen and Plutarch’, in R.J. Daly, ed., Origeniana Quinta (Leuven: Peeters, 
1992), 326-32; on his angelology, see also: Blanc, ‘L’angélologie’; Muehlberger, Angels, 33-34 and 98-99.  
1251 VanderKam, ‘Enochic Motifs’, 84; Reed, Fallen Angels, 206, 218-21. 
1252 VanderKam, ‘Enochic Motifs’, 80. 
1253 Ibid. 84, citing Lact. Inst. Div. 2.14-17. 
1254 p.111-12 above. 
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this period – a need previously highlighted by the work of Dayna Kalleres.1255 As 
bishop of a leading city and centre of learning,1256 few writers could be seen as closer 
to the heart of urban Christian culture at this time than Eusebius, and demons, as 
we have observed, occupied a prominent place in his writings. Overlooking these 
references to demons has led scholars in the past to form a distorted picture of 
Eusebius’ ideas, over-emphasising the optimistic elements of his thought to the 
neglect of his concerns about the maintenance of high moral standards. Recognising 
the significance of Eusebius’ views on the demonic has led us to revise our picture 
of Eusebius’ overall outlook, illustrating the value of studying references to demons 
where they have previously been ignored. This thesis thereby complements the 
recent work of Kalleres and Morwenna Ludlow,1257 while also highlighting the gap 
that still remains in our understanding of fourth-century Christian demonology. 
Further research on ideas about demons in the works of other urban Christian 
intellectuals of the period is urgently needed. Despite the efforts of Kalleres and 
Ludlow, there remains scope for much further work on Cappadocian demonology. 
The homilies of John Chrysostom and other preachers of the era also call for a 
similar approach. 
Finally, the exploration of Eusebius’ ideas about agency and moral 
responsibility in chapter IV has not only helped to clarify Eusebius’ thought on this 
subject, but has also revealed a wider problem in scholarship on early Christian 
ideas about agency. It is not only scholarship on Eusebius that persists in using the 
                                                          
1255 Kalleres, ‘Demons and Divine Illumination’. 
1256 On Caesarea Maritima in this period, see: J. Patrich, ‘Caesarea in the time of Eusebius’, in Inowlocki 
and Zamagni, eds., Reconsidering Eusebius, 1-24; on the city and its library, see: Carriker, Library, 1-36. 
1257 Kalleres, ‘Demons and Divine Illumination’; Ludlow, ‘Demons, Evil and Liminality’. 
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terms ‘will’ and ‘free will’ without adequate definition. Rather, it is possible to find 
scholars from various backgrounds – historical as well as theological – casually 
referring to an early Christian author’s ideas about ‘free will’, without in any way 
acknowledging that ancient views on agency were expressed in an entirely different 
vocabulary.1258 This problem is particularly noticeable in some theological 
scholarship. Richard Swinburne, for instance, wrote that ‘all Christian theologians 
of the first four centuries believed in human free will in the libertarian sense’, 
disregarding the fact that debates concerning libertarian or compatibilist free will 
are a more modern development.1259 C.J. Eppling’s attempt to determine what early 
Christian writers ‘meant when they spoke of free will’ fails to note that these writers 
would not have spoken – or written – about ‘free will’ at all, but rather about τὸ 
αὐτεξούσιον, ἡ προαίρεσις, and τὰ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν, or their Latin equivalents.1260 
Although the problem is less acute in the work of historians, references to an 
ill-defined notion of ‘free will’, such as those of Denise Kimber Buell or Antigone 
Samellas,1261 nevertheless prevent us appreciating the complexity of early Christian 
ideas about agency. In order to improve our understanding of early Christian 
debates about agency, freedom and responsibility, examinations of the vocabulary 
and grammar of agency similar to that in Chapter IV will be needed for other 
authors of this era. The significance of this thesis therefore lies in its contribution 
                                                          
1258 A selection of examples includes: Buell, Why?, 123; Eppling, Patristic Doctrine; A. Samellas, 
‘Experience, Freedom, and Canon in the Work of Gregory of Nyssa’, JECS 21 (2013), 569-95.  
1259 R. Swinburne, Providence and the Problem of Evil (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 35. 
1260 Eppling, Patristic Doctrine, vi. 
1261 Buell, Why?, 123; Samellas, ‘Experience, Freedom and Canon’. I do not mean to suggest that either 
of these authors is particularly affected by this problem. Instead they are simply representative 
samples of a more widespread problem, chosen precisely because they are representative of the 
unthinking way in which the term ‘free will’ is often deployed. 
300 
 
not only to our understanding of Eusebius’ thought, but also to scholarship on early 
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